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ABSTRACT 
Agricultural co-operative businesses are the focus of considerable academic 
research overseas, particularly from the perspective of agricultural economics.  
Research on Australian agricultural co-operatives, however, is very limited.  This 
exploratory study investigates agricultural co-operatives at two inter-related levels.  
Firstly, the thesis examines the broader political economy shaping the agricultural 
co-operative sector, specifically policy and institutional arrangements affecting 
agricultural co-operatives. Secondly, the thesis considers how this external world 
influences the internal behaviour of the agricultural co-operative business. The study 
adopts a qualitative research methodology, principally using the case study method.  
Over 50 in-depth interviews were conducted with actors associated with the 
agricultural co-operative sector, including the United Farmers Co-operative 
Company (UFCC).   
The thesis argues that neoliberal influenced restructuring of the agricultural 
industry has, in the last decade and a half, stimulated a renewed interest in the 
agricultural co-operative model in Western Australia.  The research also identifies 
that, paradoxically, neoliberalism sets limits on the evolution of commercially 
successful agricultural co-operatives.  Neoclassical economic theory, based on 
notions of individualism and profit maximisation, undermines the collective and 
democratic nature of co-operative principles, fundamental to the viability of the co-
operative business structure.  Furthermore, the co-operative business model is 
frequently misconstrued or misunderstood by powerful gate keepers who, influenced 
by neoclassical economic theory, privilege the corporate business structure over the 
co-operative model.  These factors potentially threaten the standing of the co-
operative model in the market place and therefore diminish the benefits of the co-
operative model for the agricultural industry.   
The inter-relatedness of Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC 
illustrates this double effect of neoliberalism on the agricultural co-operative model.  
For over six decades, the Westralian Farmers Co-operative was the archetypal 
expression of the co-operative movement in Western Australia.  Yet, over time, 
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Westralian Farmers Co-operative evolved into a corporation, Wesfarmers.  This 
conversion process set up the conditions for market failure that triggered the 
formation of the UFCC.  However, the commercial success of Wesfarmers as a 
corporation has reinforced a widely held perception that a co-operative is an 
immature business structure that, if successful, inexorably progresses to the mature 
status of a corporate structure.  In recent years, this belief has influenced some actors 
within the UFCC Board and management to consider strategies designed to emulate 
the success story of Wesfarmers, thereby potentially undermining the co-operative 
basis of the UFCC.  
The UFCC case study illustrates the theoretical and applied strengths of the 
agricultural co-operative business structure in a period of agricultural restructuring. 
One of the conclusions of the thesis is that the agricultural co-operative model is 
particularly suited to a market economy to moderate the excesses of the free market 
as well as take advantage of new opportunities arising from restructuring. The thesis 
also concludes that notions based on neoliberalism challenge the philosophical 
orientation of maturing agricultural co-operatives.  The thesis concludes that the 
agricultural co-operative model has much to offer the agricultural industry and that 
the need for agricultural co-operatives is as evident in contemporary times as any 
other period in the agricultural industry.   
This thesis points to several areas for additional research.  The first is for the 
field of agricultural industry public policy development.  Identifying the key factors 
associated with successful agricultural co-operatives in Australia will provide 
directions for government agencies to develop public policy to grasp new 
opportunities within the agricultural supply chain and concurrently address the 
downside of industry deregulation.  A second area of research is the comparison of 
the attitudes and motivations of agricultural co-operative members with farmers who 
choose not to join these organisations.  This research will assist policy makers and 
the peak body to develop strategies to build the Western Australian agricultural co-
operative sector. The third area is in the field of rural community economic 
development.  Research findings from this thesis suggest that agricultural co-
operatives can have a positive impact on the social and economic well-being of rural 
communities adjusting to the effects of significant rural and agricultural industry 
restructuring.   
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CHAPTER ONE  
The Agricultural Co-operative Business Structure in Western Australia 
A Mini-Revival in Agricultural Co-operatives? 
Western Australia experienced a notable upsurge in co-operative business 
registrations in the last few years of the 20th century and into the new millennium. Of 
the estimated 55 ‘active’1 co-operatives in Western Australia in that period, over 30 
were formed after 1996 (Booth, 2004). The majority of these newly established co-
operatives were regionally based with a direct relationship with the agricultural 
industry.  
Several factors contributed to this new wave of agricultural and regionally 
based co-operative business ventures. A significant element in the co-operative 
revival in recent years is the United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC), 
formed in the early 1990s. It has evolved as the most significant agricultural co-
operative success story in Western Australia since the conversion of the Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative into a publicly listed corporation, Wesfarmers, in the mid 
1980s. UFCC’s success and rapid membership growth to over 3000 members, 
approximately half of Western Australia’s grain growers (Madden, 2003b), is also a 
significant factor contributing to the subsequent mini-boom of co-operative 
registrations identified in the late 1990s.  
Industry deregulation is clearly another key theme in recent co-operative 
formation. Following the dismantling of legislation underpinning the Western 
Australian Meat Marketing Corporation (WAMMCO), which was a Statutory  
                                                 
1 ‘Active’ co-operatives are defined as co-operatives that are registered with the regulatory body, the 
Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection and are actively trading. 
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2Marketing Authority (SMA),  a co-operative business structure was created to 
assume the activities of the former SMA (Clarke, 1999). The co-operative model was 
recommended for other SMAs facing review, such as those involved in the marketing 
of potatoes and eggs (Interviewee 686, 2003; Potato Marketing Corporation of 
Western Australia, 2003; Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 2002a). 
Farmers adopted the co-operative model as a consequence of government initiated 
deregulation of several regionally based water irrigation statutory bodies (Booth, 
2004; Roberts & Henneveld, n.d.). 
The Australian Wheat Board (AWB), a former national statutory marketing 
body, underwent a highly publicised restructuring in which the co-operative model 
was discussed as an alternative to a publicly listed company at a number of well 
attended farmer meetings throughout Western Australia (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 
660, 2002). While the AWB did not pursue the co-operative business model, the 
farmer meetings provided Western Australian growers with an opportunity to 
understand the co-operative business structure.3  
Dairy industry deregulation in 2001 stimulated the birth of the Challenge 
Dairy Co-operative. Challenge Dairy Co-operative was the first newly established 
dairy co-operative in Western Australia for several decades (Booth, 2004; 
Interviewee 652, 2003; Interviewee 679, 2002). These examples demonstrate that the 
deregulation of SMAs has positively influenced the uptake of the co-operative model 
in these agricultural sectors. However, as the National Competition Policy process to 
review SMAs in Western Australia is almost complete, this avenue of potential co-
operative development is now nearly exhausted.  
Debate about the appropriateness of the co-operative structure as a long-term 
strategy is another theme in the mini-revival. Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH), 
                                                 
2 The Productivity Commission (2000) describes SMAs as bodies established by legislation that have 
monopoly selling powers which may include both domestic and export sales of an agricultural 
commodity, although some SMAs are restricted to export sales. The SMA also referred to as single-
desk marketer.  The potential impact of deregulating SMAs on the agricultural co-operative sector is 
discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
3 In 1998, the business activities of the Australian Wheat Board were corporatised and transferred to a 
new corporation, AWB Limited, and a number of subsidiaries; AWB International, AWB Australia, 
and AWB Finance. In 1999, AWB Limited, privatised and wheat growers became the new 
shareholders. In August 2001, AWB Limited listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Growers retain 
about 80 per cent of AWB Limited’s share base.  Under the Commonwealth Wheat Marketing Act 
1989, the AWBI has the authority to export bulk shipments of wheat from Australia, commonly 
referred to as the ‘single desk’ (Australian Wheat Board, n.d.). 
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with around 7000 grain industry members, raised the profile of the co-operative 
model when it unsuccessfully conducted a campaign in the year 2000 to convert from 
an agricultural co-operative business structure to a publicly listed company (Wasley, 
2003), with the estimated financial windfall to members of $100,000 each (Bolt, 
2004). Rumblings among some grains industry farmers, confirmed by comments 
from a retiring chairman that CBH was still considering this option (Slater, 2004), 
has kept debate alive among its membership and in the rural media about the merits 
or otherwise of the co-operative structure (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 655, 2003). The 
CBH Board finally acknowledged member disquiet about a possible restructure and 
confirmed that it would remain a co-operative (Bolt, 2005b). Member concerns with 
corporatisation related to the loss of farmer control, the likelihood that the new 
corporation would focus on profits rather than providing a benefit to members via 
high quality storage and handling network for grain and foregoing tax exemptions for 
agricultural co-operatives under the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 
1936 (Bolt, 2006b).  The outcome of the CBH exploration of alternative business 
structures has been a reaffirmation of the merits the agricultural co-operative model 
in the contemporary agricultural industry. 
Institutional responses are also evident in stimulating the new groundswell of 
agricultural co-operatives. The activities of the Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture are part of this institutional involvement. The Department initiated and 
financially contributed to several international study tours of agricultural co-
operatives in the late 1990s. Scores of Western Australian farmers, agribusiness and 
co-operative sector actors4 5 participated in New Generation Co-operative (NGC)  
study tours in the United States and other international agricultural co-operative 
study tours, developing their knowledge of co-operative business structures. The 
Western Australian Department of Agriculture also invited a United States academic, 
Professor Michael Cook, who had a special interest in the NGC model, together with 
                                                 
4 The generic term ‘co-operative actor/s’ is adopted throughout the thesis to refer collectively to 
people (either individually or as a group) who have direct knowledge of the co-operative structure or 
exert influence over its viability in Western Australia. Many of these actors were interviewed for this 
thesis. 
5 The NGC model is a hybrid between the traditional agricultural co-operative model and the Investor 
Owned Firm (IOF) corporate model. It focuses on value-added processing and only accepts a 
predetermined amount of product from its members (Stefanson, Fulton, & Harris, 1995). See 
Appendix 5 for further information.  The United States Department of Agriculture report (2002, p 
25ff) also summarises the similarities and differences between the traditional agricultural co-operative 
model and the NGC model. 
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the CEO of an American NGC, to Western Australia to deliver several seminars 
about NGCs.  One outcome of the study tours and seminars was the initiative of the 
Western Australian Department of Agriculture, in conjunction with Edith Cowan 
University, to obtain funding for this PhD research project on agricultural co-
operatives. The Department also assisted one of its officers to study a PhD on 
agricultural co-operative economics in the United States, under the supervision of 
Professor Cook.6   
Further, some officers within the Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture have been actively encouraging the adoption by farmers of the co-
operative structure as a viable strategy in response to agricultural restructuring. 
These individuals have been pressing for several years to enable Western Australian 
agricultural co-operatives to access a special Commonwealth government provision for 
agricultural co-operative loans under Section 120(1)(c) in the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936. In 2004, as a result of a Western Australian government review into the impact 
of dairy industry deregulation on dairy farmers, a mechanism was proposed and accepted 
by the government (Government of Western Australia, 2004). Officers from the 
Department have subsequently promoted this facility to agricultural co-operatives, 
developing the knowledge base of farmers about the benefits of the agricultural co-
operative model in a contemporary agricultural industry setting. Furthermore, the review 
into the viability of the Western Australian dairy industry recommended that the 
Western Australian government conduct an analysis of the role of co-operatives in 
addressing market failure issues in the dairy industry. These activities suggest the 
beginnings of an institutional response to promote the benefits of and stimulate the 
uptake of the agricultural co-operative model by farmers. 
The decision of the peak body, the Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia, the CFWA, to employ a full-time Executive Officer in 1996 is another 
institutional element contributing to the increased uptake of the co-operative 
structure.7 This event coincided with the spurt of new co-operative formation. A 
knowledgeable and accessible peak body employee in this period was a significant 
resource for these embryonic co-operatives during their vulnerable start-up phases.  
                                                 
6 See Plunkett (2005). 
7 Chapter Five examines the role of the CFWA in the agricultural co-operative sector. Prior to the 
appointment of the Executive Officer in a full-time capacity, for several decades the CFWA executive 
support was outsourced on a part-time basis to an accounting firm. 
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Furthermore, individuals seeking co-operative information and advice, along 
with relevant government agencies responding to co-operative initiatives, were able 
to contact the CFWA Executive Officer who had the expertise and time to address 
these queries.8
An additional institutional aspect of the recent revival of interest in co-
operatives has been the status of the long anticipated new Western Australian co-
operative legislation. The drive for new legislation is part of an agreement by all 
Australian State governments to introduce co-operative legislation that is essentially 
the same in each jurisdiction (National Co-op Update, 2000; New South Wales 
Government Information Service, 1997). The issue has been bubbling along for 
several years in Western Australia without resolution, although some progress was 
anticipated in 2006. The lack of updated Western Australian co-operative legislation 
is reaching a critical phase and the need to finalise this issue is again contributing to 
the awareness of the co-operative structure by actors in the agricultural industry.  
Lastly, these multiple triggers occurred within a relatively concentrated time 
span and predominantly in a specific geographic area and sector, that is, in rural 
Western Australia and the agricultural industry. There is a convergence of chance in 
these events. If they had occurred over a longer period, or in an unrelated manner or 
across different industries, then their impact would not have been as evident. These 
separate events have symbiotically and mutually reinforced each other and, in the 
process, sustained existing or developed new industry knowledge about agricultural 
co-operatives as a legitimate business structure for their particular circumstances.  
This wave of agricultural co-operative development does not appear to be 
unique to Western Australia. Australia generally has experienced a quiet but 
persistent growth in co-operative activity over the last decade (Australian Centre for 
Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-b). Nationally there are approximately 
2,500 registered co-operatives and Western Australia has around 3 per cent of these 
(Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-b). Research 
suggests that during these past ten years or so, co-operatives have had an 81 per cent 
                                                 
8 Other factors outside of Western Australia may also have contributed to the CFWA role in the mini-
revival. These include promoting the International Co-operative Alliance initiative of the www.coop 
domain, the formation of the research centre, Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and 
Development (ACCORD) and the annual Monash University Agribusiness Co-operative Leadership 
and Governance Forums which commenced in 1998. 
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increase in turnover and almost 70 per cent increase in asset growth (Australian 
Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-b). The CFWA estimates 
that the co-operative sector in Western Australia has an aggregate annual turnover of 
approximately $2 billion. With a combined membership of around 50,000 members,9 
many of whom operate their own businesses; co-operatives create direct employment 
for some 3,000 staff, lifting the total employment pool and annual turnover of entities 
linked to co-operatives many times over (Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia, 2005a). Agricultural and regionally based co-operatives account for much 
of this activity. 
Clearly, something worthy of note is occurring in the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector.  The agricultural co-operative sector, however, 
functions in a broader political and economic environment. Over the last three 
decades, Commonwealth and Western Australian governments have overtly 
implemented orthodox economic policies in a range of industry sectors. Agricultural 
public policy during this period has exhorted farmers to implement strategies and 
mechanisms based on neoclassical economic theory and concepts found within 
neoliberalism (Botteril, 2003; Lawrence, 1992; Lawrence & Hungerford, 1994). 
Notions of small government, privatisation, individualism, and the pursuit of profit 
via the company business structure, characterise these strategies. As a result, the 
agricultural industry has experienced significant restructuring with uneven outcomes 
for farmers and rural communities. Ironically, agricultural industry restructuring, 
with its focus on the individual, has partly contributed to a farmer response based on 
a collective business structure.  
However, agricultural restructuring has a dual impact for the co-operative 
structure. While on one hand new agricultural and rural co-operatives are forming 
and registering as legal entities, on the other hand, there is evidence of internal 
grumblings in some agricultural co-operatives as they mature as organisations. 
Additionally, the impact of market forces has contributed to weakening the historical 
institutional arrangements surrounding the agricultural co-operative sector. Perhaps 
orthodox economic policies also have the potential to set limits on the recent 
achievements emanating from the mini-revival in the agricultural co-operative sector.  
                                                 
9 As members may belong to multiple co-operatives, this aggregate membership may overstate the 
total number of members. 
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The Research Problem 
The mini-revival in Western Australia’s co-operatives may not be a full-scale 
renaissance, but it does merit a reconsideration of the business structure by actors 
connected with the agricultural industry.  A tension develops between strategies in 
agricultural industry public policy emanating from a neoclassical economic tradition 
that favours individualist approaches and the profit maximising corporate business 
model and the reality of a preference by many producers to adopt a collaborative 
business model. This tension is in essence the research problem. The key question 
that follows from this tension is: 
How do contemporary agricultural co-operatives contend with a neoliberal 
influenced political and economic environment? 
Several supplementary questions evolve from this question:  
1. Why did the agricultural industry initially embrace the co-operative 
business structure over alternative business structures?  
2. Why has the agricultural co-operative been such a persistent business 
structure in the agricultural industry?  
3. Does the agricultural industry have unique characteristics that are 
particularly suited to the co-operative structure?  
4. If so, have these unique qualities been overlooked in the development 
of agricultural policy based on orthodox economic theory to the 
detriment of the agricultural co-operative structure?  
5. Are agricultural co-operatives an instrument that can assist in the 
preservation of family farming in a capitalist market economy?  
6. Have contemporary institutional arrangements enhanced or impeded 
the development of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative 
sector? 
These questions reinforce the paradox - the co-operative model continues to 
be employed by some actors in agriculture as a collective response to the broader 
economic policy framework that favours individualism and the corporate business 
structure. Ironically, the agricultural co-operative model is one of the strategies some 
farmers adopt in order to adapt to a restructured agriculture. 
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Methodology 
Chapter Two reveals that the literature tends to favour an economic analysis 
of agricultural co-operatives and hence often employs quantitative research 
methodology.  The methodology adopted in this thesis to explore the tension 
identified above adopts a qualitative research approach, essentially built around case 
studies. Qualitative research operates from a different platform and mindset to 
quantitative research approaches.  It is embedded in understanding individuals’ 
experiences of their worlds and how they make sense of these.  Thus, an appreciation 
of an individual’s perspective of the agricultural co-operative business structure and 
behaviour is an end in itself (Patton, 1990), whether or not one can generalize from 
these personal experiences to all agricultural co-operatives.  Nevertheless, these 
individual reflections can provide insights that are pertinent to others involved in 
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia.   
A report by Patrie (1998) guided the orientation and methodology for this 
research. Patrie, in analysing why a particular form of agricultural co-operative, the 
NGC, evolved in North Dakota, identified that in addition to the internal behaviour 
and business strategies of an agricultural co-operative, a range of external factors can 
affect the viability of the co-operative business model.10  He acknowledged the role 
of a number of institutions in stimulating the uptake of the NGC model. These 
organisations included, for example, government funded business development 
agencies, banks and other financial institutions, management and agribusiness 
consultants, legal firms and accounting firms. Patrie also referred to the North 
Dakota State government in the development of a whole-of-State strategic plan, 
Vision 2000.  He noted, too, the importance of other factors stimulating the 
formation of co-operatives, such as favourable legislation for co-operatives and low 
interest financial loans specifically for co-operative business start-ups, as well as a 
young generation of well-educated farmers who could evaluate the co-operative 
business structure on its economic and organisational merits (Patrie, 1998).  
Similarly, this thesis does not merely focus on the internal dynamics of an 
individual agricultural co-operative case study. The methodology enables the various 
institutional sectors surrounding agricultural co-operatives to also be viewed as 
                                                 
10 Chapter Two explores other literature that comments on the interplay of external influences on the 
internal behaviour of the co-operative business. 
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specific ‘cases’. The following organisations or sectors formed the basis of the case 
studies: 
• United Farmers Co-operative Company. 
• The Western Australian government sector. 
• The Western Australian co-operative movement. 
• The professional management, financial, legal and tertiary education 
industries servicing the Western Australian agricultural co-operative 
sector and industry. 
Over 55 interviews were conducted between 2002 and 2004 with 
representatives from these organisations or sectors. Interviews were generally for a 
minimum of one hour, but frequently longer.  Individuals were very generous with 
their time and provided insights on various issues associated with the agricultural co-
operative business structure.  Some of these interviews comprised two or more 
sessions.  Hand written notes of the interviews (rather than transcribed tape 
recordings) were drafted into documents over the next few days to ensure that as 
much information as possible was retained.  The latter were then returned to those 
interviewees whose individual input was especially important to the thesis to enable 
them to comment, amend or supplement the notes if required. 
These extensive interviews provide a narrative about the evolution and status 
of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector at the beginning of the 21st 
century.  Collectively, they reveal the relationship between Western Australian 
farmers and the enduring nature of the agricultural co-operative business model, 
particularly within the broader context of Australian agricultural public policy and 
agricultural restructuring.  
Three individuals are very significant in this research. These are Mr Rod 
Madden, inaugural chair of the United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC), Mr 
John Booth, Executive Officer of the Co-operative Federation of Western Australia 
(CFWA) from 1996 to 2004 and Mr Don Munro, who was closely associated with 
the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector from the 1960s to the early 
1990s. As these individuals are, or have been, major figures within the Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative sector and hence easily identifiable, their names 
are used in this thesis with their permission. Other interviews were conducted on the 
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11basis of confidentiality and every effort has been made to honour this commitment.  
Where interviewees, including Madden, Booth and Munro, have been quoted or 
referred to, it is on the understanding that they do not officially represent or speak on 
behalf of their associated organisations. Rather, their views are acknowledged as 
personal views or perceptions of a particular issue.  
The interviews and case studies are supported by a selective literature review 
of agricultural co-operative theory and agricultural restructuring theory.  This review, 
contained in Chapter Two, provides a framework for the understanding of the issues 
surrounding the tensions faced by agricultural co-operatives functioning within a 
neoliberal public policy environment. To enhance the thoroughness of the research, 
other sources of information in the public domain are also used, such as annual 
reports, webpage information, newsletters from co-operatives and peak co-operative 
bodies and newspaper articles.12  These supplementary sources of information aid in 
the process of triangulation of information arising in the interviews, providing 
additional rigour to the research.   
Nevertheless, despite this effort, much of what is captured in the thesis is 
based solely on the information provided by the interviewees, and sometimes by just 
one interviewee.  The thesis retains the uncorroborated information arising from 
these interviews, as this work is exploratory and seeks to develop a better 
understanding of the perspectives and experiences of various individuals and 
organisations, directly or indirectly, involved in or related, to the Western Australian 
agricultural sector.   
Significant changes occurred in several of the case study organisations during 
the four years of this research. Firstly, the focus of the thesis shifted from a study of a 
particular type of agricultural co-operative structure, the NGC model, to a broader 
examination of the agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia, as the 
proposed NGCs did not eventuate.13  Mr Rod Madden, the inaugural chair of the 
United Farmers Co-operative Company, resigned from the position of Chair in late 
                                                 
11 For reasons of confidentiality, the version of this thesis held by Edith Cowan University has 
removed identifying information about the interviewees. However, when the thesis was examined, 
general information regarding interviewees was provided to the examiners. 
12 Rural media reports were particularly useful in following developments in the UFCC. 
13 Appendix One explains the circumstances leading to the refocus of the research from a specific 
study of New Generation Co-operatives to a broader analysis of the Western Australian agricultural 
co-operative sector.  
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2003, and in early 2004, also resigned from the Board of Directors. The Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia (CFWA), the peak body, restructured in 2004 and 
Mr John Booth’s position of Executive Officer was made redundant. As part of the 
restructure, the CFWA re-badged itself as Co-operatives WA.14 There were also 
several staff changes within key government departments. While occurring prior to 
research on this thesis, Westralian Farmers Co-operative, an agricultural co-operative 
which figures very strongly in this thesis, converted in the mid 1980s to a corporation 
and renamed itself as Wesfarmers.  
Due to the ongoing evolution in the case studies of issues identified in this 
thesis, a cut off date of early 2004 was established, although where appropriate, 
significant developments after this date have been taken into account. To some 
extent, these ongoing changes have complicated the overall narrative of the thesis. 
They also demonstrate that organisations and the agricultural co-operative sector 
itself are organic and evolving, and over relatively a short period can present an 
entirely different snapshot of the sector. Therefore, the thesis actually represents a 
time bound document that can potentially transform into a historical document in a 
very short period. 
Significance of the Study 
This thesis, to the best knowledge of the researcher, is the most extensive 
piece of contemporary research on the agricultural co-operative sector in Australia. 
The study of co-operative theory and practice in Australia is important in a period of 
wide ranging economic reform leading to declining market power of producers in the 
supply chain. As such, the thesis is of significance to academic research related to 
business structures, agricultural restructuring and agricultural economics.  The study 
contributes to these areas of study by commenting on orthodox economic theory and 
examining the co-operative business model as a possible alternative to the more 
familiar investor owned corporate structure.  
In terms of application, this study will enhance understanding of agricultural 
co-operative behaviour within the Australian context.  This will contribute to the 
knowledge base for policy makers within government, and to those working in the 
                                                 
14 In order to minimise these name changes, the thesis retains the name CFWA for Co-operatives 
WA.  Further, the CFWA is the incorporated name of this organisation. 
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agricultural industry, the agri-political sector and the wider Australian co-operative 
movement.  The study also highlights issues related to the internal organisational 
behaviour of co-operative businesses as these organisations adjust to unfolding 
changes in the agricultural supply chain, particularly the relationship between the 
Boards of Directors and senior management, and the setting of business strategies for 
co-operatives. 
Employing qualitative research methodology, specifically in-depth interviews 
for the case studies, as an alternative to the more commonly applied quantitative 
method, is also another contribution to the field of agricultural co-operative study.  
This approach enables the ‘voice’ of actors from within agricultural co-operatives 
and other institutions influencing the agricultural co-operative sector to be 
distinctively heard throughout the thesis. 
Although the thesis gives some background information on the history of the 
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia, the case studies focus primarily on 
agricultural co-operative and institutional behaviour at the beginning of the 21st 
century.  The case studies therefore provide a valuable base line for future research. 
The thesis also demonstrates that agricultural co-operatives in Australia are 
organisations that merit further academic research and industry support.  
Insofar as the thesis is concerned only with the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector and the way it interfaces with political and economic 
factors based on neoliberalism, it has some limitations.  The thesis does not address 
the behaviour of the agricultural co-operative sector in other parts of Australia or 
internationally.  It is not concerned with non-agricultural co-operatives incorporated 
under the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943.  It does not 
consider similar structures such as housing co-operatives, non-profit co-operatives, 
credit unions, building societies, friendly societies or franchises.  Interviewees 
consulted for this thesis, with one exception, have been men; therefore, the thesis 
also has not addressed the views and experiences of women in relation to the 
agricultural co-operative structure.  Lastly, the thesis makes only passing reference to 
the potential role of the agricultural co-operative structure to rural community 
economic development.  This is a subject worthy of further investigation. 
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Organisation of the Thesis  
The thesis consists of nine chapters. This introductory chapter introduced the 
notion of a tension between agricultural industry restructuring based on neoliberal 
theory and a possible uptake of agricultural co-operatives as a response to economic 
reform. This tension guided the study to the research problem and questions. The 
chapter also briefly outlined the research methodology and significance of the 
research.  
Chapter Two selectively reviews the international literature on co-operative 
theory and agricultural co-operatives to introduce theoretical concepts and empirical 
research. The reviewed literature on agricultural co-operatives focuses mainly on 
North America, where it is a strong area of academic research and many of the issues 
are similar to those confronting the Australian agricultural industry. The literature 
review demonstrates a deficit in Australian research on agricultural co-operatives, 
with minimal work conducted on Western Australian agricultural co-operatives. 
Chapter Three examines contemporary Australian agricultural public policy 
and strategies, with particular attention to the compatibility between agricultural 
policy and the agricultural co-operative structure. The chapter highlights a possible 
double effect of neoliberalism on the agricultural co-operative model. Chapter Four 
discusses the history of Western Australian agricultural co-operatives, particularly 
the conditions leading to the formation of the prominent Westralian Farmers Co-
operative. In the mid 1980s, this co-operative converted to a corporation, 
Wesfarmers. The chapter argues that the subsequent success of Wesfarmers, to the 
benefit of its farmer shareholders, has created a rural mythology that the most 
appropriate trajectory for a commercially viable agricultural co-operative is to 
eventually become a corporation.  
Chapter Five analyses the CFWA, the peak body for the co-operative 
movement in Western Australia. The chapter focuses on the tensions within the peak 
body in providing member benefits and services while concurrently building 
relationships with government and other influential agencies to positively affect 
public policy for co-operatives. The chapter analyses the peak body’s commitment to 
a ‘co-operative logic’ or alternatively, if it is motivated by a more pragmatic 
approach to the co-operative as a business model.  
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Chapter Six reviews the public policy environment for agricultural co-
operatives in Western Australia and the role of government in shaping public policy. 
This chapter also reviews public policy issues associated with the dismantling of 
Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs) and the implications of this for the 
agricultural co-operative sector. The chapter argues that there are strong ‘public 
good’ and ‘public benefit’ arguments to support a public policy position favourable 
toward agricultural co-operatives. 
Chapter Seven introduces the United Farmers Co-operative Company 
(UFCC) case study. It reviews the economic and social factors leading to the 
formation of the UFCC and its subsequent evolution as an influential agricultural co-
operative. This success hints at some pressures that point to a repetition of the early 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative development. Chapter Eight reviews the UFCC as 
a mature co-operative, with a particular focus on its internal dynamics. The chapter 
argues that there is evidence that the importation of corporate management has 
started to undermine its co-operative logic, with the potential outcome of a 
conversion to a corporate entity.  
Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter. The preceding chapters collectively 
suggest that the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector is confronting an 
uncertain future. Nevertheless, the thesis argues that the agricultural co-operative 
model has much to offer the agricultural industry and rural communities in Western 
Australia as they adapt to the outcomes of contemporary agricultural policy. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Review of the Literature: Major Approaches to Co-operative Theory and 
Agricultural Co-operative Theory 
Introduction 
A substantial body of international academic literature and empirical research 
about the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives is available.  This chapter, through 
a selective reference to some of this literature, examines co-operative and 
specifically agricultural co-operative theory to help answer the research question and 
understand what is occurring in the Western Australian agricultural co-operative 
sector.15 The chapter firstly defines several terms specific to this thesis.  It then 
reviews the literature to determine a definition of an agricultural co-operative; sets 
out some differences between the co-operative structure and the Investor Owned 
Firm (IOF)16 and concludes by summarising key conceptual developments in 
agricultural co-operative theory.   
In the context of agricultural co-operative literature, this review focuses 
predominantly on North American work, as it is a strong area of academic research 
on agricultural co-operative theory development.17  North American agricultural co-
operative research is highly relevant, as much of Australia’s engagement with 
neoliberal theory emanates from the United States.18  Therefore, many of the issues 
facing North American agricultural co-operatives provide insights that are pertinent 
to the evolution of Australian agricultural co-operatives.  
                                                 
15 This chapter introduces key research and theoretical concepts relevant to this thesis.  However, 
other chapters, where relevant, introduce additional theoretical concepts and literature to assist in 
understanding specific issues under discussion.   
16 Cobia (1989) employs the term ‘Investor Owned Firm’ (IOF) to differentiate co-operatives from 
other types of ‘for-profit’ business structures. 
17 The thesis is concerned with the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives in Western industrialised 
countries adapting to a neoliberal environment.  It does not explore the activities of agricultural co-
operatives in developing countries or transitional economies. 
18 Chapter Three contains an analysis of neoliberal theory as it is applied to Australian agricultural 
industry policy development and the implications of this for the agricultural co-operative structure. 
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Defining Terms Associated with the Agricultural Co-operative Sector 
‘Co-operative Movement’ and ‘Agricultural Co-operative Sector’ 
19This thesis frequently refers to the ‘co-operative movement’  and the 
‘agricultural co-operative sector’. At one level, the terms are almost interchangeable. 
Chapter Four, in exploring the evolution of the agricultural co-operative model in 
Western Australia, demonstrates that the early history of Western Australia’s 
experience with the co-operative structure, dating back over 100 years, is essentially 
one tied directly to the beginnings of the Western Australia agricultural industry 
(Sandford, 1955). Agricultural co-operatives in present day Western Australia still 
comprise the largest industry sector adopting the co-operative structure (Western 
Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a), contribute 
the greatest percentage to the annual co-operative movement turnover (Booth, 2004), 
and arguably exert the most influence over the Western Australian co-operative 
movement.  
Nevertheless, the phrase ‘Western Australian co-operative movement’ is an 
overarching concept with a wider meaning than that encapsulated by the term 
‘agricultural co-operative sector’. The Western Australian co-operative movement 
encompasses the collective efforts of former and present day individuals and groups 
who championed the development of a co-operative ethos and appropriate 
infrastructure to enable a business structure different from the corporate model to 
function throughout Western Australia. Historically this was essentially in regional 
Western Australia but the phrase encompasses a wider range of co-operative business 
structures than just agricultural co-operatives. Evolving over the last few decades in 
Western Australia, non-agricultural metropolitan based co-operatives and consumer 
or retail oriented co-operatives have registered under the Western Australian 
Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943. The Capricorn Society (which sources 
products and services for co-operative members in the vehicle smash repair and 
service station industries) and Travellers Choice (a travel industry co-operative that 
obtains wholesale travel packages on behalf of its retail travel agent members) are 
                                                 
19 Although Lewis (1992) correctly argues that Australia has not had a ‘co-operative movement’ per 
se, the early history of the agricultural co-operative structure in rural and regional Western Australia is 
consistent with the concept of a social movement which can be construed as a ‘co-operative 
movement’.  
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examples of non-agricultural metropolitan co-operative sector activity in 
contemporary Western Australia.  
The expression ‘agricultural co-operative sector’ specifically refers to co-
operatives that supply agricultural inputs and services, or handle, market or add value 
to agricultural commodities. The member base of these co-operatives is 
predominantly engaged in the agricultural industry as farmers. Included loosely in 
this definition are some remnant country town retail co-operatives, which were 
originally formed to service farm enterprises and supply domestic goods to farm 
families.20
The Family Farm 
Family farms are significant in this thesis as they have historically employed 
agricultural co-operative structures as an institutional link to the agricultural supply 
chain21 and the wider market place. The agricultural co-operative represents a well-
established strategy for family farms to engage assertively with the supply chain.  
The vast majority of Western Australian farms are family based enterprises. 
By definition, the family farm is a business that is owned and operated by a family. 
The family provides most of the land, labour, and capital required to resource the 
farm, and farm management decisions are made within the family unit (Tonts & 
Black, 2001). The importance of the family in committing a substantial proportion of 
the total on-farm labour requirement is evident in this definition. Madden (2003b), 
the inaugural UFCC Chair and a grain farmer, argues that, in Western Australia, 
family farming will remain the dominant structure of on-farm production. He 
maintains that corporate farming in Western Australia will be held in check by the 
thin profit margins that render on-farm production an unattractive prospect for the 
corporate farming model.  
Tonts and Black (2001) note a small trend towards corporate farming in some 
sectors of agriculture, such as the pastoral and dairy industries and intensive farming 
sectors such as poultry and pig industries. The literature identifies two main forms of 
                                                 
20 The term ‘agricultural co-operative sector’ could perhaps also include co-operatively owned farm 
enterprises engaged in the production of commodities. However, apart from a few cases of co-
operatively owned farm businesses promoted or formed in the 1970s and subsequently disbanded, this 
form of agricultural co-operative is rare in Western Australia and is not usually seen by most co-
operative sector actors as included under the heading of an agricultural co-operative. 
21 The concept of a ‘supply chain’ is discussed in the following section. 
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non-family farming which can be defined as ‘corporate farming’ (McDougall, 1986; 
Tonts & Black, 2001). The first definition describes a farm owned by a group of 
diverse non-farming shareholders who can sell their shares at any time. The second 
form of corporate farming involves a form of legal contract between a family farm 
and other enterprises operating in other links of the supply chain. This form of 
corporate farming is also referred to as ‘contract farming’ (Hendrickson, Heffernan, 
Howard, & Heffernan, 2001; Stefanson & Fulton, 1997).  
A third form of ‘corporate farming’ outside the definitions above was 
identified in the interviews for the present study. This encompasses large family 
farms which have achieved economies of scale by purchasing nearby farms and 
adopting corporate management practices, such as employing farm managers 
(Interviewee 680, 2003). This is part of a now well established trend of fewer and 
larger farm enterprises resulting from agricultural industry restructuring (Hooper, 
Martin, Love, & Fisher, 2002). It is debatable if these types of farms are actually a 
form of corporate farming. However, the perception by some actors within the 
agricultural co-operative sector that this category of farm structure is a corporate 
farm demonstrates the need to be cautious about the definitions of terms. In this 
thesis, these larger farms still owned by a (possibly intergenerational) family are 
deemed ‘family farms’.  
Supply Chain 
The concept of a ‘supply chain’ is relatively new and entered Australian 
agricultural industry discourse following several Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry - 
Australia (AFFA) reports (Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry - Australia, 2000a, 
2000b, 2001) and Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC) 
research reports (Thompson, 2001). A supply chain can be defined as:  
…all stages of production, processing and distribution [which] are 
bound tightly together to ensure reliable, efficient delivery of high-
quality products. The glue that binds together neighbouring links of 
the chain ranges from production contracts to outright ownership, or 
vertical integration. (Drabenstott, 1999, p 35) 
In the context of the agricultural industry, the supply chain links every 
activity and enterprise that contributes to the final presentation of an agricultural 
commodity to the consumer. The supply chain is conceptualised as a sequential 
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series of interlocking parts, commencing with pre-farm services, such as fertiliser, 
seed and new technologies, followed by the on-farm production link, then post-farm 
activities such as handling, processing and retailing, on to the final link of the end 
consumer. An agricultural supply chain may range from relatively few to many 
linkages (Drabenstott, 1999). Drabenstott (1999) also notes that the most powerful 
actor in the chain usually initiates the formation of and controls the supply chain. As 
the next chapter demonstrates, the on-farm production link, that is the family farm, is 
typically the least powerful link in the supply chain.  However, the co-operative 
structure can help counter this power differential (Cobia, 1989). Agricultural co-
operatives usually operate in the links of the supply chain adjoining both sides of the 
on-farm production link; that is the input supply link and the post-farm link of 
handling, marketing or some form of value adding such as processing.  
22Definition of a Co-operative: International Co-operative Alliance
The literature reveals some diversity in defining an agricultural co-operative.  
It is valuable, therefore, to differentiate between definitions of a ‘co-operative’ and 
the specific form of ‘agricultural co-operative’. Evolving from the co-operative 
principles penned by the founders of the original Rochdale co-operative23 (Birchall, 
1994), the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) has redefined the values, 
principles and philosophy underpinning a co-operative. The 1995 Centennial 
Congress of the ICA adopted a Statement on the Co-operative Identity that provides 
a widely accepted definition of a co-operative as: 
an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their 
common economic, social and cultural need and aspiration through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise. (International 
Co-operative Alliance, 1995) 
The ICA values state that: 
Co-operatives are based on the values of self-help, self-responsibility, 
democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. In the tradition of their 
founders, co-operative members believe in the ethical values of 
honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others. 
(International Co-operative Alliance, 1995) 
                                                 
22 The ICA is the peak organisation of the international co-operative movement. 
23 The Rochdale principles were open membership, democratic control (one member, one vote), 
distribution of the surplus to the members in proportion to their transactions, limited interest on 
capital, political and religious neutrality, cash trading, and promotion of education (Birchall, 1994). 
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The new principles are guidelines by which co-operatives put their values 
into practice and are as follows: 
1. Voluntary and open membership - Co-operatives are voluntary 
organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and 
willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without 
gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination. 
2. Democratic member control - Co-operatives are democratic 
organisations controlled by their members, who actively 
participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men 
and women serving as elected representatives are accountable 
to the membership. In primary co-operatives members have 
equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives 
at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner. 
3. Member economic participation - Members contribute 
equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their 
co-operative. At least part of that capital is usually the 
common property of the co-operative. Members usually 
receive limited compensation, if any, on capital subscribed as 
a condition of membership. Members allocate surpluses for 
any or all of the following purposes: developing their co-
operative, possibly by setting up reserves, part of which at 
least would be indivisible; benefiting members in proportion to 
their transactions with the co-operative; and supporting other 
activities approved by the membership. 
4. Autonomy and independence - Co-operatives are autonomous, 
self-help organisations controlled by their members. If they 
enter into agreements with other organisations, including 
governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so 
on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and 
maintain their co-operative autonomy. 
5. Education, training and information - Co-operatives provide 
education and training for their members, elected 
representatives, managers, and employees so they can 
contribute effectively to the development of their co-
operatives. They inform the general public — particularly 
young people and opinion leaders — about the nature and 
benefits of co-operation. 
6. Co-operation among co-operatives - Co-operatives serve their 
members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative 
movement by working together through local, national, 
regional and international structures. 
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7. Concern for community - Co-operatives work for the 
sustainable development of their communities through policies 
approved by their members. (International Co-operative 
Alliance, 1995) 
The co-operative values and principles are a distinctive feature of the co-
operative model and an essential element in understanding the unique nature of the 
co-operative structure. The extent to which agricultural co-operative definitions 
incorporate the ICA co-operative principles demonstrates some diversity in views 
about the centrality of some or all of these co-operative values in an agricultural co-
operative. The uniqueness of these co-operative values becomes more significant in a 
later section of the chapter that contrasts the co-operative business structure with an 
IOF structure, a term used by Cobia (1989) to refer to business firms other than co-
operatives.  
Other Definitions of a Co-operative 
The University of Wisconsin Co-operative Centre adopts the ICA definition 
of a co-operative and adds a complementary one of a co-operative as a ‘business 
voluntarily owned and controlled by its member patrons and operated for them and 
by them on a non-profit or cost basis. It is owned by the people who use it’ 
(University of Wisconsin Centre for Co-operatives, n.d.). Craig (1993, p 11) from a 
social sciences perspective, firstly defines co-operation as a verb, as ‘any joint or 
collaborative behaviour that is directed towards some goal and in which there is a 
common interest or hope of reward’. He expands on this definition to incorporate an 
organisational structure in a later part of his work, as follows: 
Co-operation is the free and voluntary association of people to create 
an organisation which they democratically control, providing 
themselves with goods, services and/or a livelihood rather than 
profiting from others, with an equitable contribution of capital and 
acceptance of a fair share of risks and benefits generation by the joint 
activity. To sustain their endeavour they must develop individuals and 
build a solidarity relationship with other co-operators and like minded 
people. (Craig, 1993, p 43) 
Similarity and overlap in terms enable common themes to emerge in these co-
operative definitions. Firstly, it is apparent that a co-operative has an associative 
organisational structure, often with an economic element, usually as a business. 
Further, members form and jointly own and control their co-operative. Profits are 
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distributed among the members. Craig’s definition contains an implied values base 
and a social element.  
The economic elements of a co-operative captured by the above definitions 
are also incorporated in definitions of the agricultural co-operative. In the context of 
agricultural co-operatives, the literature reveals some diversity in definitions (see, for 
example, Barton, 1989; Hind, 1997; Nilsson, Kyriakopoulos, & Van Dijk, 1997; 
Staatz, 1987). Staatz (1987) acknowledged the difficulty in defining an agricultural 
co-operative, arguing that it was problematical to develop a definition which can be 
applied to all agricultural co-operatives. Such a definition, he conceded, was unlikely 
to be comprehensive.  However, he did develop a definition of a co-operative based 
on three elements that he considered would be found in most agricultural co-
operatives.  According to Staatz, an agricultural co-operative is:  
…. a business with the following characteristics: 
1) The stockholders, who are farmers, are the major users of the 
firm’s services. 
2) The benefits a stockholder receives from committing capital to a 
co-operative are tied largely to patronage. There are three 
reasons for this: 
a) The business pays a strictly limited dividend on equity 
capital invested in the organisation. 
b) Net margins are distributed among stockholders in 
proportion to their patronage with the business rather than in 
proportion to their equity ownership in the firm. 
c) Stock of co-operative firms does not appreciate because 
there is a very limited or non-existent secondary market for 
it. Therefore capital gains are not a major benefit of stock 
ownership in co-operatives, in contrast to IOFs. 
3) The formal governance of the business by the stockholders is 
structured “democratically” in the sense that: 
a) Voting power is not proportional to equity investment. The 
limitation of “voting one’s equity” may be in the form of 
one-member/one-vote rule, or voting may be proportional to 
patronage or stock ownership but subject to some limit such 
as restricting any one member from having more than 5 per 
cent of the total votes. 
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4. There are strict limitations on the number of non-stockholders 
who may serve on the board of directors. (Staatz, 1987, p 34-
35) 
Staatz composed this definition in the late 1980s as part of a commissioned 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) report to advance agricultural co-
operative theory (Royer, 1987). The ‘definition’ is akin to a description, as it is 
highly detailed, providing considerable information about an agricultural co-
operative as a business entity. The definition demonstrates the incursion of ‘business’ 
language into defining an agricultural co-operative, and contains no explicit 
reference to the ICA co-operative values. While the definition reflects the sentiment 
of the first four ICA co-operative values, it does not capture the latter ones 
concerning education and training, co-operation among co-operatives and concern 
for community. This neglect of the latter ICA principles occurs also in most other 
definitions of agricultural co-operatives.   
Barton (1989) also argued that there was significant disagreement over what 
constituted the ‘correct’ set of principles for agricultural co-operatives. He suggested 
that further evolution was anticipated in co-operative values if agricultural co-
operatives were to continue as effective economic institutions. Barton’s definition 
differentiated four sets of co-operative principles adopted by agricultural co-
operatives, which he labelled as: 
i. Rochdale 
ii. Traditional 
iii. Proportional 
iv. Contemporary co-operative values. 
The fourth set of principles identified by Barton, namely contemporary co-
operative values, consisted of three factors, which were:  
• voting by member-users is on a democratic or proportional basis;  
• equity is provided by patrons;  
• net income is distributed to patrons as patronage refunds on a cost 
basis.  
Unlike the ICA definition, with its focus on the social and cultural as well as 
the economic needs of members, supplemented by a statement of principles, Staatz 
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and Barton’s definitions of an agricultural co-operative reflect a pragmatic and 
economic approach.  This trend continued with the USDA (1987) agricultural co-
operative definition, and subsequently adopted by Cobia. Cobia defined a co-
operative as:  
a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes benefits on 
the basis of use. More specifically, it is distinguished from other 
businesses by three concepts or principles:  
First the user-owned principle. Persons who own and finance 
the co-operatives are those that use it.  
Second, the user-control principle. Control of the co-operative 
is by those who use the co-operative.  
Third, the user-benefits principle. Benefits of the co-operative 
are distributed to its users on the basis of their use. The user 
benefits principle is often stated as business-at-cost. (Cobia, 
1989, p 1) 
According to Reynolds (2000), the 1987 USDA restatement of the co-
operative principles confirmed the central user basis of agricultural co-operatives and 
removed those which were deemed operational rather than actual principles. He 
asserted that the USDA interpretation of the co-operative principles encouraged 
members to maintain a longer-term connection with their agricultural co-operative 
(Reynolds, 2000). A subsequent USDA publication (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2002, p 1) underlined this definition by reconfirming the 1987 report 
that an agricultural co-operative is characterised by the three core principles of user-
owner, user-control, and user-benefits. It further stated that: 
a co-operative is a business that is owned and controlled by the people 
who use its services and whose benefits (services received and 
earnings allocations) are shared by the users on the basis of use. Only 
an enterprise conforming to the spirit and intent of this definition 
should be labelled a co-operative. (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2002, p 1) 
The USDA definition appears to be the most cited definition in United States 
papers on agricultural co-operatives in both the academic and non-academic 
literature. The difficulty in developing an agreed definition of an agricultural co-
operative to encompass all variations in activity perhaps explains the ubiquity in the 
United States of the USDA definition. van Bekkum and Nilsson (2000) chose to use 
the USDA 1987 definition of an agricultural co-operative in a European context.   
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Clearly, the USDA definition is sufficiently broad and acceptable to 
academics to define agricultural co-operatives across western industrialised 
countries.24 Australian literature on agricultural co-operatives provides limited 
definitions. Lyons (2001a) adopted a legislative definition of a co-operative as an 
organisation incorporated under State or Territory co-operative legislation. The 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 described an agricultural co-
operative for taxation purposes in Sections 117 through to 120 of the Act 
(Hildebrand, 2002). The Australian Agricultural Council (1988, p 4), cited in 
Krivokapic-Skoko (2002a, p 3), defined agricultural co-operatives as ‘associations of 
primary producers who have come together to achieve some common commercial 
objectives more successfully than they could as individuals’. Australian academics 
have also implicitly defined agricultural co-operatives by describing their functions, 
such as a supply co-operative or a marketing co-operative (see, for example, 
Langdon, 1991) or by analysing their current or potential role in the agricultural 
industry or rural Australia (e.g. Lawrence, 1987; Pritchard, 1996).  
O'Connor and Thompson (2001) and Clarke (1999) have used the term 
‘traditional’ to describe Australian agricultural co-operatives. In this context 
‘traditional’ differentiates existing agricultural co-operatives from a relatively recent 
development in agricultural co-operative models that incorporate features more 
commonly found in IOFs, such as the NGC model. Some Australian agricultural co-
operatives have also experimented with elements of IOFs, such as innovative share 
and capitalising arrangements adopted by Tatura Milk Industries Ltd (Plunkett & 
Kingwell, 2001), Dairy Farmers Group (Greenwood, 2001) and Challenge Dairy Co-
operative (Interviewee 652, 2003), and the Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company in 
New Zealand (Frampton, 2001).25  
The discussion concerning a definition for an agricultural co-operative 
indicates that there is considerable diversity in definitions. The scope in definitions is 
linked to how strongly the ICA co-operative principles have been embedded into the 
                                                 
24 The expansiveness of the agriculture co-operative definition can also embrace hybrid co-operative 
structures. The New Generation Co-operative (NGC) model fits this definition and is therefore 
deemed an agricultural co-operative (Bielik, 1999) despite perhaps not being consistent with a number 
of the original Rochdale principles or the ICA statement of co-operative values.  
25 Despite these examples in Australia of some agricultural co-operatives exploring hybrid co-
operative structures, it appears that the more common Australian experience with alternative options 
to the traditional agricultural co-operative model is direct conversion to a corporate structure (Cronan, 
1995).  
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definition. Agricultural co-operative definitions have veered towards a pragmatic 
interpretation of the co-operative values. The majority of agricultural co-operative 
definitions are also framed in business or economic language, reflecting the 
academic disciplines of various writers and the economic focus of agricultural co-
operatives.  The UFCC case study presented later in this thesis provides insight to the 
relevance of the co-operative values in its evolution and perception of itself as a 
business entity.  
Defining a ‘Co-operative’ in this Thesis 
This thesis principally adopts the USDA definition of an agricultural co-
operative.  However, a legal definition of a co-operative is also central to an 
Australian understanding of a co-operative.  In this thesis, a co-operative is a 
business registered under the present Western Australian Corporations (Co-
operative) Act 1943 or is successor legislation.26 It is acknowledged that there are 
entities in Western Australia that have characteristics of co-operatives but these 
organisations cannot register as co-operatives due to the nature of the current 
legislation. The several housing ‘co-operatives’ functioning in Western Australia, for 
example, are not recognised as co-operatives under the Western Australian 
legislation despite identifying with the concept of the co-operative model and its 
principles (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 659, 2003). Additionally, credit unions and 
building societies, while embracing the co-operative principles of mutuality, operate 
under separate legislation and are not deemed ‘co-operatives’ under the Western 
Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943. There are also many informal 
farmer groups in Western Australia which display some features of co-operative 
values and business philosophy in their behaviour (Murray-Prior, Ducie, Burnside, & 
Flanagan, 1997). Although these informal groups do not fall under the legal 
definition of a co-operative, they are often the breeding ground of new agricultural 
co-operatives that subsequently register under the Western Australian legislation.  
The types of agricultural co-operatives examined in this thesis are involved in 
some form of farm supply input or post-farm activity. The United Farmers Co-
operative Company is an example of a supply co-operative that sources and imports 
agricultural chemicals and fertilisers on behalf of its farmer members. Post-farm 
                                                 
26 The issue of the legislation for co-operatives in Western Australia is discussed in Chapters Five 
and Six and Appendix Two. Some Western Australian co-operatives are also registered under the Co-
operative and Provident Societies Act 1903. 
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agricultural co-operatives can be involved in the handling, transport and marketing of 
members’ agricultural commodities, such as Co-operative Bulk Handling in the 
grains industry. Challenge Dairy Co-operative is an example of a post-farm 
agricultural co-operative concerned with the collection of members’ raw milk, and 
the processing, value adding and wholesaling of these milk products into the 
international market.  
The research has revealed that Western Australian farmers have not generally 
embraced the concept of ‘on-farm production co-operatives’, in which farmers 
amalgamate their on-farm production activities and resources to produce a 
commodity.27 On-farm co-operative activities were promoted in South Australia in 
the 1970s (Chatterton, 1976) and Lawrence (1987) discussed on-farm syndication as 
a strategy to address rural issues.  A group of Western Australian grain farmers 
contemplated the model in the 1980s but did not pursue the initiative (Interviewee 
655, 2003).  More recently, four farmers in New South Wales informally 
amalgamated their landholdings and resources to farm collectively (Hughes, 2003). 
Hildebrand (2002) recommended that the Queensland sugar industry explore the 
possibility of on-farm sugar production co-operatives. Despite these few examples, 
this model has not become a mainstream pursuit within the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector.28  
Investment Owned Firms (IOFs) and Agricultural Co-operatives 
A co-operative business is one of several forms of legal business structure.  In 
Australia, other legal structures are unincorporated sole trader, partnership, 
unincorporated and incorporated non-profit associations and a range of company 
structures, classified according to the degree of liability of company members (Ford, 
Austin, & Ramsay, 1997). The co-operative legal structure is also a form of company 
incorporated under a State based co-operatives act, such as the Western Australian 
                                                 
27 Group Settlements were established in the wheatbelt and southwest of Western Australia in the 
1920s.  This large-scale assisted program of immigration from Britain was designed to open up 
farming lands and strengthen British culture and identity in Western Australia. Groups were formed 
with twelve to fourteen families.  While successful in opening up farming land, the scheme itself was 
flawed by poor planning and the inexperience of the settlers (Brayshay and Selwood 2002).  The 
Groups Settlements were not a form of on-farm production co-operatives. 
28 Two interviewees (Interviewee 687, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002) believed that the members of a 
Christian sect operated a group of farms in the Western Australian wheatbelt in a co-operative 
manner. 
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Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. A co-operative business is an unlisted public 
company and is unable to list its shares on the Australian Stock Exchange. In most 
Australian States, co-operatives can be either commercial or non-profit organisations 
(Australian Capital Territory, 1999); however, in Western Australia the existing 
legislation prohibits the incorporation of non-commercial co-operatives.29  Co-
operative legislation disallows the use of the noun ‘co-operative’ in the registered 
name of any organisation not incorporated under co-operative legislation.   
Commercially oriented co-operatives, in several aspects, are similar to 
companies.30  They undertake comparable functions and follow many of the same 
business practices to ensure longevity. As with companies, profitability of the co-
operative is essential.  Both business structures are incorporated and have a legal 
status separate from that of their membership or shareholders with limited liability. 
While there are many similarities between them, several distinctive features of a co-
operative differentiate it from an IOF structure. The philosophical values contained 
within the co-operative principles cause the co-operative model to treat the purpose, 
ownership, control and distribution of benefits differently from an IOF.  
The underlying philosophies of IOFs and co-operatives partly explain these 
differences. The theory of the firm, based on neoclassical economic theory, posits 
that the main objective of an IOF is profit maximisation on behalf of its shareholders 
(Cobia, 1989). In contrast, co-operative theory determines that a co-operative may 
have other objectives, such as maximising a benefit or service to the members who 
own and control it and rewarding them with a patronage rebate, rather than simply 
pursuing profit maximisation (Cobia, 1989). This close connection between the roles 
of member, owner and user is a distinctive feature of a co-operative.  In addition to 
economic benefits, the co-operative principles also promote social objectives such as 
democracy, member participation and education. 31  These multiple objectives may 
be internally contradictory for the co-operative, unlike the singular profit 
maximisation objective of the IOF (Mooney & Gray, 2002).   
                                                 
29 The proposed legislation for co-operatives will enable both trading (commercial) and non-trading 
(non-profit) co-operatives.  Appendix Two discusses legislation for co-operatives. 
30 Corporations or companies in this thesis are also referred to as Investor Owned Firms or IOFs. 
31 The co-operative pursuit of a benefit or service/good rather than ‘profit’ does not suggest that the 
co-operative should operate at a loss. A co-operative must be economically and financially sound to 
achieve its benefits; however, profit is not its primary objective. 
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The variation in objectives between the two models can lead to different 
business strategies.  As an agricultural co-operative seeks to maximise member farm 
business profitability, rather than its own profitability, it may pay as high a price as 
possible when purchasing member commodities (Cobia, 1989). Alternatively, a 
supply co-operative will seek to sell farm inputs, such as chemicals and fertiliser, to 
its members at cost (Cobia, 1989). An IOF, by contrast, will set a high price when 
selling a product, or seek to minimise the costs of purchasing a product, in order to 
maximise the level of profit on behalf of its shareholders.  
The ownership of the two business structures sits with the shareholders 
(Hansmann, 1996).  However, ownership in an IOF is based on individual private 
property rights (Chaddad & Cook, 2002), which contrasts with the collective 
ownership of the co-operative structure. Further, in a co-operative, the shareholder is 
also a member while in an IOF the shareholder is simply an investor. The co-
operative shareholder is referred to rightly as a ‘member’ in co-operative discourse 
(Craig, 1993), although in Australian agricultural co-operatives, the term 
‘shareholder’ is widely used (Madden, 2003b). IOF shareholders have an ‘arm’s 
length’ association with the IOF (Hansmann, 1996). Members of a co-operative, as 
its owners, have a much more intimate and direct relationship with the co-operative, 
as they are also the users of the co-operative, by, for example, supplying raw 
materials or purchasing services or products.  
Membership of an agricultural co-operative is usually restricted to farmers 
actively involved in the commercial production of a commodity.  This is different 
from an IOF, as usually there are no restrictions on who can buy a share or how 
many shares they may purchase (Cobia, 1989).  Further, as the company is listed on 
the external stock exchange, shares can be easily bought and sold in the open market.  
Shares in an IOF can increase or decrease in value according to the market (Cobia, 
1989), while shares in an agricultural co-operative are generally of a fixed and 
nominal value and can only be sold back to the co-operative at par value (the value at 
which they were originally purchased).32  
                                                 
32 Hybrid agricultural co-operative structures, such as the New Generation Co-operative model, may 
have different mechanisms for share ownership and funding within a co-operative (Stefanson et al., 
1995).  
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Voting privileges in an IOF are proportional to the number of shares owned 
by an investor. Only investors with large share portfolios will have significant voting 
power. In a co-operative, the democratic co-operative principle of one member, one 
vote guarantees that all members have an equal share and vote in the election of the 
Board of Directors (Craig, 1993). The democratic nature of the agricultural co-
operative structure arising from the principle of one member, one vote ensures that 
control of the co-operative remains with its farmer members.  Unlike the IOF 
structure, in a co-operative, control of the business by one shareholder or group of 
shareholders on the basis of their investment cannot occur, which is an appealing 
feature of the co-operative structure for farmers with smaller enterprises.  
Membership of the co-operative also conveys a responsibility for managing 
and controlling the co-operative (Craig, 1993). Co-operatives and IOFs both have 
elected Boards of Directors and employ staff.  However, the differences between 
IOFs and co-operatives are reflected in management styles of the Board of Directors 
and executive staff. The implicit and explicit values of a co-operative require a 
particular mindset in management, which Craig (1993) refers to as a ‘co-operative 
logic’. However, access to a pool of management with this logic is limited in an IOF 
dominated economy, which focuses on profit maximisation as the primary objective 
of a business entity.  
A further significant distinction between the IOF and the co-operative 
concerns the distribution of profit (which is also referred to as ‘surplus’ in co-
operative discourse). In an IOF, profits are usually allocated between reserves for the 
growth of the IOF and a dividend, where investor shareholders receive a return on 
their shareholdings (Hansmann, 1996). A co-operative’s profit (surplus) is also 
allocated between retained equity to fund future co-operative activities and a 
patronage rebate (Cobia, 1989; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Fulton, 1995). However, 
unlike an IOF, a co-operative does not allocate surplus on the basis of shareholdings, 
but on the basis of member patronage. A rebate is a share of the co-operative surplus 
and is calculated on a proportional basis determined by the amount of business 
(patronage) a member conducts with the co-operative. Therefore, the greater the 
business carried out with the co-operative, the greater the patronage rebate for the 
member.   
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IOFs and co-operatives can also differ in capital raising strategies.  An IOF 
raises its capital via listing on a stock exchange and selling shares to investors. It 
may also borrow funds from the banking industry (Hansmann, 1996). In contrast, a 
co-operative predominantly sources it funds from its membership, and may 
supplement this member funded capital base with loans from the banking sector 
(Hansmann, 1996). As a co-operative cannot list on the stock exchange, it cannot 
access investor shareholder funds (Hansmann, 1996).  While a co-operative relies 
mostly on its members for capital, and cannot raise additional funds from investor 
shareholders, an agricultural co-operative may be restricted in its capital raising 
strategies (Cobia, 1989).  This factor is a recurring theme in the literature.  
In the United States, Schrader (1989) argued that agricultural co-operative 
practices and State and Federal legislation affecting agricultural co-operatives result 
in a persistent lack of capital. The USDA (2002) noted that as a business structure 
funded predominantly by its membership, it can be difficult for members to provide 
sufficient capital for the co-operative venture, particularly for a highly capital 
intensive co-operative involved in the processing or marketing of commodities. 
Further, an agricultural co-operative, in contrast to an IOF, may have difficulties in 
accessing capital from alternative sources such as commercial banks or joint venture 
investors (Cobia, 1989).  Unlike the IOF structure, a co-operative is not designed as 
an investment vehicle for external investors. Therefore, the structural inability found 
within the co-operative form to raise sufficient funds may result in inadequate 
investment in technology or equipment, leading to economic inefficiencies in the co-
operative (United States Department of Agriculture, 2002).  
In Australia, agricultural co-operatives that meet Sections 117 to 120 of the 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 may qualify for taxation benefits 
(Hildebrand, 2002).  This is a significant advantage over the corporate structure for 
producers engaging in agribusiness related activities.33  
A comparison of the IOF and co-operative structure, in the absence of strong 
co-operative theory knowledge, diminishes the intrinsic strength of the co-operative 
business model and the factors influencing its behaviour. Given that the IOF is the 
business structure compatible with orthodox economic theory, and that agribusiness 
                                                 
33 The Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 taxation advantages for agricultural co-operatives are 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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actors generally have a stronger understanding of the IOF model than the agricultural 
co-operative model, the comparison tends to construct the agricultural co-operative 
structure as a business entity with inherent flaws. Often, the proposed solution to 
these perceived flaws is to encourage the agricultural co-operative to emulate 
features of the IOF.  However, this strategy unintentionally tends to weaken the 
intrinsic strength of the co-operative model and may become the first step in a 
process whereby the co-operative is converted into a corporation.  
It is acknowledged that the agricultural co-operative structure may have some 
elements that may contribute to organisational decline when left unaddressed (Cobia, 
1989; Craig, 1993).  These factors, however, need to be placed into perspective. The 
IOF business structure also experiences a range of benefits and disadvantages, and 
many businesses based on this model also fail as business entities. According to 
Bickerdyke, Lattimore and Madge (2000), a third of Australian businesses are not 
operating after five years.34 This high failure rate is not countenanced as a flaw in the 
basic premise of the IOF structure. In contrast, influential actors, particularly those 
trained in economic theory, frequently contest the economic viability of the co-
operative structure.  
35Review of Selected Agricultural Co-operative Literature
A review of agricultural co-operative literature reflects a strong and sustained 
orientation towards economic theory. Economic analysis of the agricultural co-
operative structure tends to fall into two streams.36  Firstly, macro-economic theory 
seeks to explain the existence of the agricultural co-operative as an organisational 
form in the market.  The focus of this approach is on the ability of the co-operative 
model to contribute to the efficiency of the market and hence to rationalise some 
form of public policy intervention in support of the co-operative model (Torgerson et 
al., 1997).  Micro-economic approaches to internal agriculture co-operative 
organisational behaviour has driven theoretical evolution for the past 40 years.  
                                                 
34 Many of these businesses may have closed due to non-economic reasons which are unrelated to the 
financial position of the business, suggesting that the profit maximisation tenet of the theory of the 
firm is not always a reason to enter business or indeed exit a business.  
35 Some of the literature reviewed in this chapter and throughout the thesis may be viewed as ‘dated’.  
However, the historical and evolutionary insight offered from this literature about agricultural co-
operatives justifies their inclusion. 
36 Cook (1995), Torgerson et al., (1997) and Krivokapic -Skoko (2002a; 2002b) summarise literature 
on agricultural co-operative theory. 
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Micro-level analysis tends to be dominated by neo-classical theory and new 
institutional economic theory, including transaction costs theory.  Property rights 
theory and principal-agent theory are recent approaches to analyse problems 
attributed to the agricultural co-operative structure.   
The early macro-economic work is of interest to this thesis as it explores how 
the agricultural co-operative can influence its external environment.  Sapiro’s 
theoretical contribution in the 1920s positioned co-operatives as instruments of 
orderly marketing (Sapiro, 1920, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997).  He supported the 
formation of regionally based monopoly marketing co-operatives as a market 
mechanism to create economies of scale and secure the best market price for member 
commodities, thus enhancing member returns.  This form of post-farm co-operative 
competed with, or bypassed, IOFs operating in the handling and marketing of 
commodities (Cook, 1995).  Sapiro’s interpretation of the role of the agricultural co-
operative is an early indication that co-operatives enabled farmers to vertically 
integrate into the post-farm gate segment of the supply chain. Sapiro’s work is 
significant to this thesis, as this form of orderly marketing is reminiscent of 
Australia’s adoption of Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs) around the same 
period to undertake comparable functions on behalf of farmer members.37
In a similar time frame, and as a counter to Sapiro’s interpretation of the role 
of the agricultural co-operative, Nourse introduced the concept of the ‘competitive 
yardstick’ (Nourse, 1922, cited in Cook, 1995, Torgerson et al., 1997).  Nourse 
rejected Sapiro’s monopoly role of the agricultural co-operative, arguing that an 
agricultural co-operative’s function was to ensure a competitive market place. 
Nourse contended that an agricultural co-operative formed to correct some form of 
market failure.  This may be removing the monopoly power of an IOF or providing a 
missing, costly or inadequate good or service in the market (Mooney & Gray, 2002).  
When a competitive market was created or restored by the presence of the co-
operative, Nourse argued that it should not attempt to dominate the market, but 
assume a maintenance role of keeping IOFs and the market competitive, that is, be a 
‘competitive yardstick’.  Nourse further argued that, in some situations, once IOFs 
are competing efficiently amongst themselves in the market place, it may be more 
appropriate for the co-operative to wind up (Mooney & Gray, 2002).  The concept of 
                                                 
37 SMAs are discussed in Chapter Six. 
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‘competitive yardstick’ is informative to this thesis in understanding the behaviour of 
the United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC) case study. 
A significant conceptual shift from analysing the macro-economic role of 
agricultural co-operatives to examining their internal behaviour was Emelianoff’s 
work in the 1940s (Emelianoff, 1948, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997).  Emelianoff’s 
contribution was the analysis of the agricultural co-operative as a mechanism for 
vertical integration.  He further argued that the role of a co-operative was to operate 
at cost.  Therefore, an agricultural co-operative did not seek to earn profits for itself, 
but for the members' farm business, precipitately introducing the concept of principal 
and agent within an agricultural co-operative. These are important concepts to guide 
agricultural co-operative business strategy, and again they are useful in analysing the 
strategic direction of UFCC. 
A theory of the firm adapted for the agricultural co-operative business model 
evolved during the 1960s, commencing with the work of Helmberger and Hoos, 
(1962, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997).  While the theory of the firm assumed that the 
firm’s objective was to maximise profits, the co-operative was understood to have 
multiple objectives related to maximising organisational outcomes.  However, unlike 
the IOF, these objectives were not to maximise profit, but to maximise benefits to 
members, via for example, patronage refunds or minimising on-farm costs. 
Helmberger contributed further to agricultural co-operative theory evolution 
during the 1960s.  Writing in a period when the United States agricultural industry 
started to industrialise, Helmberger (1966) argued that the changing structure of 
agriculture and technology would threaten the relevance of agricultural co-
operatives.  A contrary argument was presented by Abrahamsen who interpreted 
agricultural industrialisation as an opportunity for agricultural co-operatives to 
integrate farmers into the changing agricultural industry (Abrahamsen, 1966, cited in 
Cook, 1995). Given that agricultural co-operatives continue to absorb the interest of 
academics 40 years later, Helmberger’s views may have been premature.  However, 
Fulton (1995), employing a property rights approach, revisited the factors identified 
by Helmberger as a starting point to analyse whether contemporary agricultural co-
operatives, as collective structures, can survive in a wider society that favours 
business structures which separate ownership and use, that is IOFs.  Fulton 
concluded that changing societal values, such as rising individualism, combined with 
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the increasing industrialisation of the agricultural industry, make co-operation more 
difficult and by extension threaten the formation and resilience of agricultural co-
operatives. 
Fulton’s adoption of a property rights approach in the analysis of agriculture 
co-operatives is part of a wider shift in the contemporary theoretical framework for 
agricultural co-operatives. It is important to acknowledge that the increasingly 
sophisticated theoretical treatment of agricultural co-operatives has coincided with 
significant changes in the agricultural industry and the growing complexity of the 
agricultural co-operative business model itself.  Of significance to this thesis is the 
application of concepts sitting within the broader field of new institutional 
economics, such as transaction cost economics, the economics of property rights and 
principal-agent theory, to explain the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives.38   
An important conceptual contribution for this thesis is the work of Shaffer 
(1987).  Shaffer applied transaction costs analysis to explore the capacity of 
agricultural co-operatives to coordinate macro-economic activity.  His work 
indicated that vertical linkages established by agricultural co-operatives in an 
economic system did not just depend on a co-operative’s ability to create economies 
of scale and address monopoly power problems, but also on the costs associated with 
transactions to perform this coordinating function. Additionally, Shaffer theorised 
that the efficacy of performing these coordination functions also partly depended on 
the internal organisational relationships between the co-operative’s principals and 
agents.  Shaffer’s work indicates a desire to take account of macro-economic factors 
and the interplay of these with organisational factors to explain the complexity of 
external and internal elements of agricultural co-operative behaviour.   
The work of Cook (1995) and Cook and Iliopoulos (2000) also provides a 
significant theoretical framework for this thesis.  This work has drawn together a 
body of literature detailing several difficulties attributed to the agricultural co-
operative structure.  From a new institutional economics perspective, these problems 
                                                 
38 The literature reveals the continuing economic focus of contemporary agricultural co-operative 
analysis. Condon (1987) was an early advocate of the property rights approach to extend co-operative 
theory for agricultural co-operatives. The property rights approach has been built upon by Fulton 
(1995), Cook (1995), Cook and Iliopoulos (2000), van Bekkum (2000) and Chaddad and Cook (2002) 
in their theoretical analysis of agricultural co-operatives. Principal-agent theory has been favoured by 
European agricultural co-operative theorists, such as van Bekkum and Nilsson (2000), Rokholt and 
Borgen (2000), and Borgen (2000).  Australian academics and commentators, such as Mathews 
(1999), Plunkett (1999) and Clarke (1999) have also adopted principal-agent theory in their work.  
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are ascribed to vaguely defined property rights specific to the unique user-driven 
nature of the co-operative model.  The first three affect investment issues for a co-
operative while the remainder impact on the management of co-operatives. 
The first is the ‘free rider’ phenomenon, which may arise from factors within 
or external to the co-operative (Cook, 1995).  The internal problem is connected with 
the common property of a co-operative and arises when new members of an 
agricultural co-operative immediately gain the same benefits as existing members.  
As new members join, co-operative rebates are diluted amongst the total membership 
(Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). New members, in effect, are free riding on the past 
efforts and contributions of long-standing members.  This potentially creates inter-
generational conflict and is a disincentive for long standing members to invest in the 
co-operative (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000).  
The external free rider problem arises when non-members benefit from the 
collective action of co-operative members, without bearing any of the joint 
organisational costs of the co-operative (Cook, 1995; Fulton, 2001). Non-members, 
therefore, are enjoying private benefits from the co-operative without participating in 
the process of creating them, consequently free riding on the collective effort of 
others.  
The second problem, the ‘horizon problem’, arises from a disparity in some 
members’ anticipated membership period and the time frame required to benefit from 
future investments undertaken by the co-operative.  Members close to retirement 
from farming may not have an incentive to support and direct co-operative funds into 
projects that will not realise a financial benefit for them personally, even though the 
proposed investment is in the long-term interest of the co-operative (Cook and 
Iliopoulos, 2000).  In this environment, some members may prefer that co-operative 
surpluses be directed back to members as rebates, rather than set aside to invest in 
the co-operative’s future, potentially depriving the co-operative of capital for future 
proposals (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). This problem may render the co-operative 
structure less efficient than an IOF, as it facilitates a situation where sub-optimal 
investment decisions may occur (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). 
The ‘portfolio problem’ arises when some members’ personal risk profiles 
may not be compatible with the strategies recommended by the Board of Directors. 
Conflict may arise between members who have differing risk profiles, which may 
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cause the co-operative to make non-optimal decisions in order to pacify risk adverse 
members (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000).  
The last two problems relate to management issues that may affect 
agricultural co-operatives (Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). The fourth matter concerns 
issues associated with the costs of control. This issue is linked to the principal-agent 
theory, which examines the problem of motivating one party (the agent) to act on 
behalf of another (the principal) to maximise the principal’s goals for the 
organisation. While both IOFs and co-operatives separate ownership and 
management, mechanisms to control management differ between the two structures.  
The control problem is attributed to the inherent features of the co-operative structure 
that cause inefficiencies in performance when compared to IOFs (Porter & Scully, 
1987). As a democratic organisation, a co-operative requires the active participation 
of its membership, each of whom have an equal voice in determining management 
issues.  As the benefits of the co-operative are shared equally, there are fewer 
incentives to become involved in the governance of a co-operative and monitor the 
activities of management. In contrast, investors own an IOF and exert control over 
management according to the number of shares they hold. As investors with large 
share portfolios will potentially generate higher profits, it is in their own interests to 
monitor the performance of management, thus allegedly rendering the IOF a more 
efficient structure compared with the co-operative model. Linked to this cost of 
control is a concern with a lack of measures to evaluate the success of the co-
operative, compared with, for example, the indicator commonly used in an IOF of 
the share price in the open market. The lack of measurable indicators within a co-
operative is considered to inhibit management from developing higher-level 
management skills.  Therefore, Cook (1995) concludes, the intrinsic factors 
associated with the co-operative structure may lead to greater costs in controlling the 
activities of the manager as agent.   
Lastly, ‘influence costs problems’ may arise in a co-operative as it can have 
multiple and possibly conflicting objectives.  In contrast, an IOF has the singular 
objective of profit maximisation.  The broader the diversity of co-operative activities, 
the greater the potential opportunity for influence costs to develop.  Cook (1995) 
argues that these problems may arise when members’ interests become 
heterogeneous and factions develop to promote particular agendas. The separate 
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groups may seek to exert influence over management and co-operative strategy for 
their own interests, which can be distracting and damaging to the financial well-
being of the co-operative (Cook, 1995).  
Cook’s analysis of these property rights issues is significant to this thesis. 
Professor Cook, at the invitation of the Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture, presented some seminars in Western Australia in the late 1990s on these 
factors in the context of NGCs.39  Several interviewees for this thesis attended these 
seminars, revealing that there is a residual knowledge within the agricultural industry 
of these property rights ‘problems’ with the agricultural co-operative structure.   
Non-Economic Theoretical Approaches to Agricultural Co-operatives 
Craig (1993), from a sociological perspective, offers alternative theoretical 
approaches to explain why people behave co-operatively and hence form co-
operatives. He argues that these theories link co-operative activity to biological, 
psychological and cultural origins. He briefly explores the theory of mutual aid, 
socio-biological theory, behavioural theory and exchange theory as explanations for 
co-operativeness. However, he argues that none of these theories adequately explains 
co-operative behaviour and organisations. He goes on to develop his own theoretical 
approach to account for co-operative organisational development, success and 
failure, built around the concept of ‘co-operative logic’.   
According to Craig (1993), co-operative logic is based on co-operative 
values. Co-operative logic assumes that each member of a co-operative understands 
these values.  Complexity and diversity is intrinsic to this logic and is embraced as it 
brings innovation.  Co-operative logic acknowledges the inherent tensions in 
balancing economic and social objectives within co-operative organisations. Co-
operative logic recognises that the needs of each group are unique and that members 
will develop a co-operative organisational model responsive to their specific needs.  
The logic accepts that decisions made by members via a democratic process and 
based on co-operative logic may not be understood by outsiders, yet will be very 
meaningful to members of the co-operative (Craig, 1993).  Craig (1993) also 
acknowledges that co-operative logic can be difficult to communicate to those who 
                                                 
39 See Appendix Three for further information on these seminars and Appendix Five for a discussion 
of New Generation Co-operatives. 
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are not socialised in this logic.  He argues that individuals who frame their 
understanding of business structures via the IOF prism can find it very difficult to 
understand co-operative logic and the way that it applies to co-operative business 
structures. 
According to Craig (1993), as an organised group of farmers, agricultural co-
operatives can be a vehicle for empowering farmers in political and economic 
debates, enhancing the democratic nature of the organisation and the society in which 
the co-operative functions. As democratic organisations, agricultural co-operatives 
can therefore contribute to the formation of social capital. Putnam (1993, p 2) defines 
social capital as ‘features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, 
that facilitate coordination and co-operation for mutual benefit’. Putnam considers 
social capital as an essential ingredient in a civil society, and one of the prerequisites 
for a democracy is a well-developed civil society. Therefore, in the process of 
forming a co-operative, farmers join together to develop networks and trust among 
members, building social capital within the rural community in which the co-
operative is embedded. Agricultural co-operatives, as a result, are structures that 
promote democracy, social capital and a blend of social and economic goals in 
regional communities.40   
The social capital of an agricultural co-operative can be expressed in various 
ways. The rooted nature of an agricultural co-operative in a geographic area ensures 
that the income generated by the co-operative also remains within the community, 
while an IOF may choose to leave (United States Department of Agriculture, 1990). 
An agricultural co-operative, as a result, offers a mechanism for local control. Craig 
(1993) suggests that external decision-makers are more likely to take notice of the 
collective voice of the agricultural co-operative than the views of an independent 
farmer, further enhancing local control. The participative structures of co-operatives 
can promote and facilitate an entrepreneurial spirit among groups who may not have 
an opportunity to develop organisational or management skills (Craig, 1993). Craig 
(1993) argues that the internal funding via members makes co-operatives 
independent of external investment.41 This aspect means that co-operatives can be a 
                                                 
40 For further discussion on social capital see, for example, Cavaye (2000), Coleman (1988), Cox 
(1995), Putnam (1993; 1995), Winter (2000), and Woolcock (1998).  
41 Capital raising issues associated with agricultural co-operatives are discussed elsewhere in the 
chapter. 
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source of employment in mature or declining industries and sparsely populated 
regions or with socially marginalised groups. Co-operatives, accordingly, enable the 
local community to engage within a globalised capitalist economy.  
Given that agricultural co-operatives may build social capital within a rural 
community, Bourdieu provides a conceptual map to understand that in addition to 
social capital, other forms of capital may also derive from agricultural co-operatives.  
Bourdieu (1986) extended the concept of ‘capital’ beyond its economic basis to 
include ‘immaterial’ and ‘non-economic’ forms of capital. He defined and explained 
how the different types of capital can be attained, substituted, and converted into 
other forms. In Bourdieu’s discussion on conversions between different types of 
capital, he established that all types of capital could be derived from economic 
capital through varying modes of conversion (Bourdieu, 1986). Social capital may 
therefore be exchanged and transformed with another form of capital, such as 
economic capital or possibly, even ‘co-operative capital’, thus contributing to the 
economic well-being of a regional area.   
Mooney and Gray (2002) present one of the few sociological examinations of 
agricultural co-operatives.  They identify the influences of historical and sociological 
factors in contemporary agricultural co-operative behaviour. Their analysis of 
agricultural co-operatives also acknowledges the inherent contradictions within the 
co-operative values identified by Craig (1993).  However, unlike much of the 
analysis of agricultural co-operatives by academics trained in economics, Mooney 
and Gray argue that this tension is positive, as it leads to better quality decision 
making by agricultural co-operative Boards. 
Cobia (1989) also notes these social factors associated with being a member 
of an agricultural co-operative. He recognises that these intrinsic and satisfying 
benefits for members can accrue from being part of an association of peers, from 
involvement in a member-based organisation with a common purpose and from 
experiencing the democratic nature of electing co-operative Board members. 
However, Cobia correctly cautions that, while the social benefits of an agricultural 
co-operative are important, the co-operative must position its economic objectives as 
its first priority to ensure that its remains in business.  
Australian literature with a non-economic theoretical perspective on co-
operatives and agricultural co-operatives is limited. Lewis (1992) explored the 
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development of the Rochdale model in this country.  Lyons (1996; 2001a; 2001b) 
has written about Australian experiences of co-operatives, including agricultural co-
operatives, mostly within the context of the broader environment of voluntary 
associations. There are references to agricultural co-operatives by some Australian 
academics working in the area of rural restructuring, such as Lawrence (1987) and 
Pritchard (1996). Krivokapic-Skoko (2002a; 2002b) summarised international 
literature and various classifications systems of agricultural co-operatives. The Co-
operative Federation of Victoria, in conjunction with www.australia.coop (Griffiths, 
2004) and the Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development 
(ACCORD) have developed websites, undertaken some research and prepared 
submissions to government agencies about co-operatives (Australian Centre for Co-
operative Research and Development, n.d.-a).42 Greenwood, for many years, edited a 
co-operative newsletter, the National Co-op Update, and has written about dairy co-
operatives (Greenwood, 1996a) Overall, as Cronan (2003) confirms, there is a deficit 
in Australia of academic work on the co-operative structure. 
Summary  
This chapter has reviewed selected literature about agricultural co-operatives 
and introduced some key concepts.  These concepts are applied in parts of this thesis 
to help explain elements of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector 
story. The discussion of agricultural co-operative literature reveals that economically 
focused theory has dominated theory development in this area.  The review identifies 
that the main trigger for establishing an agricultural co-operative is to address some 
form of market failure. Agricultural co-operatives have the capacity to counteract 
monopsony or monopoly situations; provide a missing or costly service and to reduce 
risk for producers.  Much of the later theoretical work has been especially 
preoccupied with correcting professed structural deficits or inefficiencies of the 
agricultural co-operatives model, often using the IOF as a benchmark by which to 
                                                 
42 Founded in 1999, the Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development (ACCORD) 
was a joint venture between the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS) and Charles Sturt 
University (CSU) and the New South Wales State Government.  Each partner contributed financially 
to its establishment (Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, n.d.-a).  
ACCORD was formed to undertake research on and build awareness of the co-operative movement in 
Australia, including mutuals and the broader social economy (Australian Centre for Co-operative 
Research and Development, n.d.-a). In June 2005, ACCORD was unable to sustain itself financially, 
and the research centre closed.   
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evaluate the agricultural co-operative structure.  Changes in the agricultural industry 
resulting from increasing industrialisation, combined with identified problems with 
the agricultural co-operative model, have led to recent literature that explores 
modified agricultural co-operative structures that import features of the IOF model, 
such as the NGC model.  
The focus of earlier theoretical analysis by Sapiro and Nourse (cited in Cook, 
1995; Torgerson et al., 1997), concerning the wider ability of agricultural co-
operatives to generate public good by correcting market failure, and the capacity of 
the co-operative structure to vertically connect farmers in the supply chain, have 
become neglected areas of research for the co-operative structure. There is a scarcity 
of recent research on the external macro-economic, political and institutional 
environments that affect the agricultural co-operative structure.  
This literature review suggests an over-reliance on agricultural economic 
theory for analysis of agricultural co-operatives. A concentration on economic 
analysis of agricultural co-operatives can lead to inappropriate and unhelpful 
assumptions about the nature of the agricultural co-operative and co-operative 
behaviour. Orthodox economic theory is unable to satisfactorily explain several 
features of contemporary agricultural co-operatives, such as possible non-economic 
motivations for being involved with an agricultural co-operative, the role of co-
operative values within the organisation, or a long history of agricultural co-
operatives as a type of farmer initiated social movement.43 Further, the limitation of 
an economic approach prevents the development of a highly descriptive analysis of 
the relationship between agricultural co-operatives and their affiliated institutions, 
such as government agencies and a peak body representing the co-operative sector. 
Economic theory discounts these non-economic factors and as a result cannot 
develop a subtler understanding of the agricultural co-operative model and its 
behaviour in the social and economic arenas. 
                                                 
43 The concept of the agricultural co-operative sector as an expression of a social movement is 
examined in the UFCC case study in Chapter Seven.  The social movement concept can also partially 
explain the minor revival in agricultural co-operatives in the latter part of the 1990s. As the influence 
of the market informs the development of agricultural and regional policy in Australia, some sectors 
of agriculture are bearing a greater economic and social burden resulting from agricultural 
restructuring than are other Australians. This uneven disadvantage in turn is stimulating a renewed 
interest among farmer groups in some sectors of the agricultural industry to evaluate the agricultural 
co-operative model as a strategy to alleviate hardship.  Their activities can be viewed as an expression 
of a farmer initiated social movement.  
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Scattered amongst the recent literature have been calls for an interdisciplinary 
approach to enlarge theoretical and empirical understanding of agricultural co-
operative behaviour. Torgerson et al. (1997) comment on the trend towards economic 
approaches to evaluate agricultural co-operatives, observing the narrowness of 
agricultural co-operative theory development resulting from this economic focus. 
Baarda (2001) lamented the limited approach to research on agricultural co-
operatives, supporting an interdisciplinary slant to develop a broader knowledge of 
co-operatives and their role in a rapidly changing agricultural system. These requests 
have not been restricted to academics.  Hassebrook, a co-author of a USDA report on 
the future of small farms (United States Department of Agriculture, 1998) and a co-
operative member, disapproved of the business and economic focus of agricultural 
co-operatives, challenging Boards to also remember their social obligations as co-
operatives (Hassebrook, n.d.).  
In conclusion, there is a deficit in Australian research on agricultural co-
operatives, particularly from perspectives outside the dominant agricultural economic 
orientation. Lastly, there is a need to undertake Australian research on agricultural 
co-operatives that does not concentrate solely on issues within the organisation. This 
thesis seeks to contribute to Australian research on agricultural co-operatives and the 
wider agricultural co-operative sector to address this shortfall. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Neoclassical Economic Doctrine, Australia’s Form of Capitalism and 
Agricultural Co-operatives 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the implications of a quarter century of economic 
reform in the Australian agricultural industry and the outcomes of this reform for 
farmers and rural communities. The chapter commences by firstly exploring the key 
concepts underpinning neoclassical economics and neoliberalism. The chapter then 
sets out aspects of neoclassical economics and neoliberal concepts, policy and 
strategies that have explicit or unintended consequences on the viability of 
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. The chapter examines points of 
compatibility between neoliberal theory and co-operative theory to demonstrate that 
agricultural co-operatives can be a means to support rural communities through 
economic reform.  The chapter concludes that persistent economic reform based on 
neoclassical economic theories has mixed outcomes for the contemporary 
agricultural co-operative model in Western Australia.  
Neoclassical Economic Reform 
Beeson (1999, p 1) maintains that the key elements of a developed or 
advanced capitalist system consist of ‘market oriented commodity production, 
private ownership of the means of production, the selling of labour power, and 
individualistic, acquisitive behaviour’. According to Pusey (2003), several forms of 
developed capitalism are in place throughout the contemporary world. Various styles 
of capitalism, Pusey suggests, include the Dutch and German partnership form of 
capitalism, the Japanese model, the Mediterranean model and the form of capitalism 
implemented in various Asian countries. Variations in the implementation of these 
key features of capitalism suggest that countries adapt elements of capitalism to 
accommodate their domestic political, social and economic contexts and institutional 
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environment. Australia, along with other mostly English speaking nations, has 
chosen a ‘libertarian model of free market capitalism’ based on neoclassical 
economic theory over the last few decades (Pusey, 2003, p 9). 
In conjunction with domestic reform within nation States based on the 
doctrines of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism, these theories have also 
shaped the outlook of globally focused institutions.  These include the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(Lawrence, 1998; Pritchard, 2000). Domestic and international arenas therefore 
mutually reinforce and strengthen neoclassical economic doctrines.  
The Australian experience with economic reform was labelled as ‘economic 
rationalism’ (Pusey, 1991). Pusey (2003, p 9) defines economic rationalism as the 
‘…assumption that economies, markets, money and prices can always, at least in 
principle, deliver better outcomes than states, governments, and the law’, and, as a 
consequence, achieve human freedoms and social justice. Pusey (2003, p 9) further 
adds that the concept of economic rationalism assumes that the ‘market provides the 
only practical means for setting values on anything’. In recent years, the 
internationally recognised terms ‘neoliberalism’, ‘the market economy’ or the ‘free 
market’ (Pusey, 2003; Stilwell, 2000) have superseded the distinctly Australian 
phrase of ‘economic rationalism’. Whatever language is utilised to describe the 
ideology that initiated economic reform, the underpinning concepts persist in 
reaffirming the supremacy of the market in organising the economy. The neoclassical 
economic doctrine has garnered extensive backing in Australia by both economists 
and the public service bureaucracy responsible for industry policy and it permeates 
the nation’s economic policy (Pusey, 1991). Further, these concepts are the platform 
for the dominant ideology in agricultural industry economic reform (Gray & 
Lawrence, 2001b; Lawrence, 1996; Pritchard, 2000). 
Shift in Paradigm 
Prior to adopting the present day form of capitalism based on neoclassical 
economic theory, Australia functioned under a Keynesian style of capitalism (Beeson 
& Cloney, 1997; Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 2000). Keynesian capitalism rose to 
prominence in an era incorporating the Depression and the effects of two world wars, 
followed by a long post war boom (Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). Keynesians 
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favoured government initiated protectionist strategies, such as tariffs, subsidies and 
direct intervention in the market place by government. Quiggan (2001) argues that 
Keynesianism itself was a product of the failure of the initial form of the free market 
economy of the 19th century, due to internal and inherent instabilities of free market 
economics. As outlined in Chapter Four, the market failures of the 19th century 
market economy identified by Quiggan also gave birth to the co-operative model, 
including the agricultural co-operative, as a sophisticated adaptation to the free 
market (Craig, 1993).  
By the 1970s, the prevailing Keynesian economic theory became discredited.  
Economic conditions in Australia and internationally were characterised by the rise 
of very high inflation and unemployment, combined with rapid oil price rises, poor 
exports and overvalued exchange rates, and gave rise to economic instability 
(Beeson, 1999; Mauldon & Schapper, 1974; Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 2000). These 
economic factors also occurred at a time when increasing globalisation in trade and 
capital demanded a less restrictive regulatory environment.  Collectively these 
multiple factors presented a trigger for the counter theory of neoclassical economics 
to emerge. A cyclical pattern can be detected in these economic shifts, from a 19th 
century market economy to Keynesianism, to a period in which several western 
countries, including Australia, again adopted a capitalist system informed by 
classical economic theory. 
According to Beeson (1999) and Pusey (2003), Australia has implemented 
neoclassical economic reform with great zeal.44 Commencing with the Whitlam 
Labor Government in the early 1970s establishing the Industries Assistance 
Commission in 1973, followed by the Industry Commission (1991), successive 
Australian governments have continued with this process of domestic economic 
reform across a range of industries, including agriculture. The introduction of the 
National Competition Policy in the mid 1990s following the Hilmer Report (1993), 
together with the Productivity Commission report (2000), confirmed this ongoing 
ideological commitment to neoclassical economic doctrines. In the prevailing 
political environment, there is every suggestion that future Australian governments 
of both persuasions will undoubtedly continue to pursue economic policies in 
harmony with this philosophy.  
                                                 
44 Pusey (2003) notes that New Zealand expressed even greater enthusiasm for the theories. 
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Economic Reform in the Agricultural Industry 
During the period in which Keynesianism guided Australian economic 
policy, the agricultural industry gained an importance beyond its mere commercial 
function (Botteril, 2003). This is partly attributed to the significant fall in agricultural 
commodity prices after the Depression, followed by low commodity production 
during and immediately after World War II (Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). Other 
factors include the potential of the industry as a source of food for its own population 
and internationally and the vulnerability of the industry to the vagaries of the climate.  
The ability of the agricultural industry, as an export industry, to contribute strongly 
to Australia’s gross domestic product, and the close cultural connection with farming 
between rural and urban Australians, also stimulated a firm association between 
those involved with the agricultural industry and governments (Lawrence, 1987; 
Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). Consequently, this mutually agreed outlook generated 
an agricultural industry policy position with a range of interventionist and 
protectionist strategies to safeguard the industry’s ability to ensure farmers were able 
to continue this economically, culturally and socially important function (Lawrence, 
1987).  
Due to the factors identified earlier, by the 1970s, Keynesianism agricultural 
policy gave way to one based on neoclassical economic theory. The theory argues 
that competitive market forces will shape the future of the agricultural industry into 
an enhanced competitor in the international market, and this will result in increased 
farmers’ incomes.  The role of government, according to the theory, is cast as 
strategic and intervention is limited to what is permissible within market principles 
(World Trade Organisation, 2002). At the farm level the theory assumes that a 
typical farm household will follow a single path of development to intensive, 
commercial farming based on the adoption of modern technology (Lawrence, 1987). 
Further, the theory maintains that the consumer will also benefit from higher quality 
and lower priced food and fibre products.  
To apply the theory, contemporary Australian agricultural public policy 
concentrates on a number of multi-tiered strategies designed to increase farm 
productivity to enable Australian farmers to compete in a globalised market.  
Approaches at the macro-economic level focus on working with other like-minded 
countries to develop a market-oriented global agricultural trading system (World 
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45Trade Organisation, 2002).  At the industry-wide level, many of the SMAs in most 
agricultural sectors have been dismantled under a policy of government withdrawal 
from agricultural marketing and handling activities to facilitate a competitive market 
in these areas (Productivity Commission, 2000). At this level, other strategies 
encourage industry innovation; the development of industry leadership skills to assist 
the industry determine its own future, and the promotion of the supply chain concept 
between farmers, processors, and other actors (Botterill, 2003). At the farm level, 
agricultural policy approaches focus on ‘capacity building’ among farmers (Botterill, 
2003).  Strategies include developing business and risk management skills to reduce 
on-farm costs and capture economies of scale in production via adopting new 
technologies.  Concurrently, other strategies focus on farm exit programs for farming 
families deemed less efficient in order to facilitate the redistribution of farm 
enterprises to more competent farm operators (Botteril, 2003).  
Agricultural industry policy also seeks to work in partnership with regional 
and local communities to address natural resource management and wider rural 
issues, overlapping to some extent, agricultural policy with regional policy. Other 
macro-level policies impacting on rural and regional centres and the agricultural 
industry include the withdrawal of government services from country towns (Gray & 
Lawrence, 2001b), the privatisation of public assets and tariff reduction (Stilwell, 
2000) and the retreat from proactive regional development strategies in non-
metropolitan Australia and the agricultural industry (Tonts, 1998). 
                                                 
45 The theoretical basis of Australia’s approach to agricultural policy contrasts with other 
industrialised countries. While adopting the rhetoric of neoliberalism, the United States has retained 
domestic agricultural subsidies and protectionism, as evidenced by the 2002 US Farm Act (Nuthall, 
Osborn, Dobie, & Fine, 2002). Europe has the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) underpinned by 
the concept of multifunctionality. CAP argues that agriculture has a cultural and social meaning which 
outweighs its economic function. Agricultural policies based on this premise, from the viewpoint of 
Australia’s agricultural policy makers, have highly distorting impacts on the global agricultural 
market, with particularly unfavourable effects for exporting countries such as Australia. The 
Department of Agriculture Strategic Plan 2003-2013 (Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 
n.d.) states that the ‘concept of multifunctionality in agriculture will see countries supporting their 
agricultural businesses for non-economic objectives. This will continue to distort markets, making it 
increasingly difficult to gain entry to some major markets.’ The European and United States 
approaches are examples of industrialised economies, on the one hand, supporting the general 
direction of WTO agricultural policy, while concurrently developing domestic agricultural policies 
that are inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory. In contrast, Australia has progressed with 
implementing neoliberal policies in agriculture with considerable commitment. For an overview of the 
different orientations of these arguments and their implications for agricultural industries in different 
countries and globally, see, for example, Botteril (2003) , Coutsouradis (2000), Wynen (2002), 
European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (1999). 
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Outcomes of Contemporary Agricultural Policy 
Keogh’s (2004) overview of the present state of the Australian agricultural 
industry confirms that the doctrine of neoclassical economics in agricultural policy 
has resulted in a substantial change in the structure of the agricultural industry. These 
changes include the introduction of new technology in machinery and agricultural 
science and the requirement for higher levels of capital on-farm.  Farm business 
structures have altered and contract farming has entered some sectors of the industry.  
Agricultural restructuring has resulted in a trend towards a two-tiered family farm 
based production structure (Black, Duff, Saggers, & Baines, 2000; Keogh, 2004).46 
One trend is towards larger scale farm operators seeking production economies of 
scale via farm consolidation, absorbing farmland as some farm families exit the 
industry. A secondary trend is the subdivision of agricultural land into small scale 
and possibly non-commercial farms in coastal and outer areas of metropolitan and 
regional centres. Other adjustments are evident, such as increasing vertical 
integration of the agri-food chain, and growing concentration in the processing and 
retailing industries. More recently, environmental degradation has resulted in 
modified farm production and management practices (Black et al., 2000). Lawrence 
(1987) highlighted many of the anticipated implications of these changes in the mid 
1980s and his subsequent writings confirm the depth and impact of agricultural 
industry restructuring on farming families and communities.47  
There are approximately 110,000 commercial farms in Australia, with just 
under 14,000 family farms in Western Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2001).48 The number of farm enterprises declined by an average of 1.3 per cent per 
annum in the ten years to 1994-95 (Black et al., 2000), citing Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (1998), although other industry commentators suggest that the number of 
farms in Australia has been falling by around 2 per cent per annum (Interviewee 688, 
2001; Interviewee 689, 2002). Keogh (2004), also quoting ABS data over several 
                                                 
46 Chapter Two discussed the family farm based nature of Australian farming, comprising about 95 
per cent of all farm enterprises. 
47 Lawrence and Hungerford (1996; 2000) and Buttel (2000) summarise various theories of rural 
restructuring, such as fordism and post-fordism, the third food regime, flexible specialisation, 
subsumption, survival and synthetic schools and regulation theory, each of which seeks to account for 
these changes in rural communities and agricultural industries.  
48 Black et al. (2000) and Tonts (1998) outline changes that have occurred in gathering ABS data, 
which contributes to the difficulty in quantifying an aggregate number of Australian farm enterprises. 
ABARE data incorporates broad acre farms and excludes intensive farm enterprises such as dairy and 
horticulture, which further complicates quantifying farm enterprises.  
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years, estimates that the number of ‘commercial’ Australian farms has fallen by 
approximately 15 per cent over the last decade or so.  
While there is a decline in the number of farmers remaining in the industry, 
ABARE (n.d.) confirms that farm production has been improving in volume and 
value over the last decade.49 Increasing production in crop yield was the major 
contributor to the rise in value (Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, n.d.). This indicates that Australian farmers have been achieving greater 
on-farm efficiencies, as there is an increase in commodity output even though there 
are fewer farmers in the industry.  Further, with approximately 80 per cent of 
Australian commodities exported and contributing to more than one quarter of 
Australia’s total exports (World Trade Organisation, 2002), Australian farmers are 
successfully competing in the international market place.  
The owners and managers of farm enterprises remaining in the agricultural 
industry have negotiated their way through two decades of agricultural industry 
restructuring.  As a result, they have achieved on-farm efficiencies to lower the costs 
of production, improve productivity, and be internationally competitive. These are 
predicted outcomes of an agricultural policy underpinned by neoclassical economic 
theory, and lend support the wisdom of the adoption of this policy approach. 
Downside of Industry Restructuring 
Yet, many farmers themselves are not benefiting from the predicted and 
expected prosperity in spite of implementing the range of strategies outlined above. 
Paradoxically, notwithstanding these improvements in international competitiveness, 
and on-farm efficiencies and rising productivity, Australian farmers continue to 
encounter low levels of farm profitability. Keogh states that:  
As a generalisation, the 1990s are considered to have been a period of 
low profitability for farmers in Australia, especially the early part of 
the decade, and especially relative to previous decades. As a simple 
indicator of this, over the 1980s and 1990s, average farm operating 
costs increased sevenfold while average farm cash operating surpluses 
increased only threefold. (Keogh, 2004, p 4) 
                                                 
49 The extended drought period in recent years weakened this trend in the short term. 
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Despite the sustained growth in farm productivity, commodity prices received 
by Australian farmers have not kept pace with the rising prices of farm inputs, 
leading to low farm enterprise profitability. This ratio in the price of outputs to the 
costs of inputs is referred to as ‘cost price squeeze’. Indeed, the Western Australian 
Department of Agriculture does not anticipate any improvement in this area, as it 
states in its Strategic Plan 2003-2013 that: 
The cost-price squeeze will continue to affect farm profitability. Real 
prices for farm commodities will continue to decline. Price inflation 
will continue to affect the prices paid by farmers for their inputs.’ 
(Western Australian Department of Agriculture, n.d., p 4) 
Keogh (2004) further acknowledges the increasing trend for Australian farms 
to rely on off-farm income to remain financially viable. This points to a further irony 
- Australian farmers who have remained in the industry have, willingly or 
reluctantly, adopted the practices of industry policy, which have led to increased 
productivity, efficiency, economies of scale and international competitiveness, yet 
have not been able to increase their farm enterprise levels of profitability. Indeed, 
profitability has fallen to the extent that many farm families are required to augment 
their incomes off-farm to manage financially. Clearly, despite these policies and 
strategies, farmers themselves have not been financially rewarded by industry policy 
based on neoclassical economic doctrines. Those farmers remaining in the industry 
have implemented the range of agricultural industry policies urged upon them by 
successive governments but have not necessarily reaped the alleged financial benefits 
of these new practices.  
Undoubtedly, economic reform has had significant and mixed impact at the 
individual farm enterprise level. Concurrently, other links in the supply chain 
comprising the supply of various farm inputs and post-farm activities have also 
experienced significant restructuring. In pursuing economies of scale, the 
agribusiness, food processing and retail grocery industries have experienced 
substantial industry consolidation to the extent that a declining number of major 
companies now dominate these industry sectors. In the retail industry, a heavily 
concentrated environment has arisen with two or three major supermarket chains 
dominating the grocery industry (Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector, 
1999).  
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Several of the new companies formed following the dismantling of SMAs are 
also undergoing a noticeable consolidation. The New South Wales based grain 
handler and marketer, GrainCorp, merged with Queensland’s Grainco in late 2003 
(Marshall, 2003), resulting in a consolidated company involved in grain storage and 
export from Queensland to Victoria (Graincorp, 2003). Western Australia’s CBH’s 
merger with the Grain Pool to achieve economies of scale in the storage, handling 
and exporting of grain (Bolt, 2002) is another contemporary illustration of this 
50phenomenon.   
In food processing, the dairy processing industry is especially prone to 
consolidation, with the New Zealand dairy processing co-operative Fonterra 
intricately involved with Australian dairy processors (Farmers Weekly, 2002). There 
is growing interest by non-dairy food manufacturing companies to buy into the dairy 
processing industry, further reducing the number of companies operating in this 
sector of the supply chain (Sydney Morning Herald, 2004).  
In the farm inputs sector, a similar pattern is emerging. This is illustrated by 
the merger of the publicly listed company, Incitec, and the former agricultural 
fertiliser supply co-operative, Pivot (Incitec Pivot Ltd, 2002).  The resulting listed 
company controls approximately 65 per cent of the eastern States of Australia’s 
fertiliser business (Daily News, 2003).  
The emerging pattern in the agricultural supply chain is that the agricultural 
production sector, comprising in Western Australia of approximately 14,000 family 
farms and approximately 110,000 nationally, sits in the middle of a supply chain in 
which all other non-farm links shift towards consolidation controlled by a few large 
national or multinational companies. As Drabenstott (1999) notes, the supply chain is 
typically dominated and controlled by a dominant player in the chain. Clearly, the 
on-farm production sector, depicted by the highly atomised and low profit family 
structure, is the weakened link in the supply chain, despite its demonstrated 
efficiencies, economies of scale and international competitiveness.  
While increasing consolidation of the non-farm sectors of the agricultural 
supply chain is leading to fewer corporations and therefore less competition, it is also 
                                                 
50 As discussed in Chapter Six, many of the dismantled SMAs have moved to a non-listed corporate 
business structure comprised mostly of farmer shareholders. Some of these new companies are now 
facing pressure to list on the Australian Stock Exchange, removing farmer control as non-farm 
shareholders purchase shares. 
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possible that they are less efficient than the on-farm production sector. As Keogh 
(2004) states, the cost of farm inputs are estimated to have increased seven-fold over 
the 1980s and 1990s while farm cash operating surpluses have increased only three-
fold. This suggests that the consolidated farm supply industries, comprising fewer 
companies, are not under the same pressure as farmers to ensure that their prices are 
actually competitive.  
Additionally, the inability of farm cash operating surpluses to keep pace with 
increasing farm input costs indicates that the consolidated food processing and retail 
grocery sector are able to employ market power to continue to pay low prices to 
farmers for their commodities. This again suggests that the consolidation of the post-
farm gate links in the agricultural chain have resulted in these companies becoming 
less competitive. At some point, unchecked economies of scale result in industry 
consolidation to the point where there are too few large companies to enable a 
competitive environment. Therefore, while on-farm efficiency has increased via 
skills development, economies of scale and use of technologies, leading to improved 
productivity and international competitiveness, it is not clear if the same can be 
claimed for the other sectors of the agricultural supply chain. As James (2004, p 66) 
states, ‘The top corporations are getting bigger, but they are not getting more 
financially efficient’. In some cases, non-farm links of the agricultural supply chain 
in Australia have become inefficient and, in the process, trapped Australian farmers 
in a cost price squeeze (James, 2004).  
Clearly, restructuring in agriculture has not produced the theoretical outcome 
of a competitive market in all links in the agricultural supply chain. Further, one 
sector of the supply chain, the on-farm agricultural production sector, has been 
manoeuvred into a position in which it has to endure most of the burden of this 
failure. It is evident that Australian farmers and rural communities are under stress 
after a quarter century of economic reform.  
Neoliberal public policy admits to some shortfalls, acknowledging that 
certain individuals or sections of society may acquire the benefits of neoclassical 
economic restructuring later than others (Productivity Commission, 1999).  
However, the theory and its advocates maintain that the ‘trickle down’ effect will 
ensure that in time the market will distribute social benefits all sections of society 
(Productivity Commission, 1999). While the Productivity Commission report into the 
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effects of the National Competition Policy on rural and regional Australia concedes 
some downsides after decades of economic reform in rural and regional Australia 
(Productivity Commission, 1999), it urges rural people to be patient about the 
inevitable social and economic benefits that will arise in the future from the difficult 
adjustment period. This sentiment is consistent with orthodox economic theory, in 
that the disadvantage endured by many farmers is presented as a transitory problem, 
as theoretically the free market process, in the long-term, benefits the economy and 
society, including those in rural communities.  
The impact of agricultural restructuring on rural communities, such as farm 
consolidation into larger farm operations, coupled with a decline in the number of 
remaining farm operators and the exodus of displaced farmers, has been commented 
on by several academics, such as Tonts and Black (2001), Tonts (2000), Pritchard 
(1996) and Lawrence (1992). It is well documented that these policies have resulted 
in unprecedented economic and social changes in rural communities in the last few 
decades with uneven outcomes (see, for example, Cheers, 1995; Gray, 1994; Gray & 
Lawrence, 2001b; Lawrence, 1990; Lawrence, Gray, & Stehlik, 1998; Pritchard, 
2000). Theorists researching the agricultural industry internationally and within the 
Australasian region broadly agree on the considerable transformation in the 
economic and social dimensions of agriculturally dependent rural communities, 
family farms and agriculture (Lawrence, 1987; Lawrence & Hungerford, 1994). 
These writers generally concur that neoclassical economic philosophy is a significant 
factor contributing to the changes facing agriculture. 
Market Failure and the Agricultural Co-operative Model 
The effect of market driven agricultural policy at the on-farm business level 
adds weight to Quiggan’s argument that neoliberalism is inherently an unstable 
system (Quiggan, 2001). Farmers are in the midst of a pervasive form of market 
failure arising from the market power of the non-farm production sectors in the 
national and international agribusiness supply chain. Yet the underlying message 
from the then deputy Prime Minister, John Anderson, (1999) to the 1999 Regional 
Australia Summit, was for a recommitment to neoliberal influenced agricultural 
industry policy.  Further, Anderson called for rural communities to fix these 
problems by stating that ‘the individual solutions for individual communities can 
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only come from within those communities’ (Anderson, 1999, p 6). Rural 
communities are urged to mobilise their own resources and inventiveness as a self-
help strategy to address the difficulties they are experiencing. Other strategies 
include facilitating local investment and business activities and promoting links 
between industry, government and communities to stimulate self-reliant communities 
and unleash their potential for economic development (Regional Australia Summit, 
2000). The subtext appears to be that the problem experienced by agriculturally 
dependent rural communities is not the theoretical basis informing agricultural 
policy; but that rural people have the wrong mindset and this poor attitude is the 
impediment that blocks them from being receptive to new opportunities emanating 
from economic reform (Gray & Lawrence, 2001b). 
The current phase of economic public policy duplicates the philosophy of 
classical 19th century economic theory.  This ‘first’ phase also triggered similar 
hardship for some sectors of society. The agricultural co-operative structure evolved 
in the 19th century in response to the downside of a free market economy and small 
government evolving from the industrial revolution. Agricultural co-operatives have 
a particularly long history as a strategy to address the accumulation of market power 
by other powerful entities in the agricultural supply chain by providing farmers with 
a mechanism to achieve economies of scale in farm supplies or commodity 
marketing (Cobia, 1989; Craig, 1993; Hansmann, 1996). The subsequent dominance 
of the agricultural co-operative structure in Europe and North America indicates that 
it fits the agricultural industry particularly well. Given that the agricultural co-
operative evolved as a response to the initial period of classical economic theory, 
similar conditions evolving from economic philosophies in the late 20th century 
suggest a possible ‘rebirth’ of agricultural co-operatives.  
The repetition of economic adversity in the present day agricultural industry 
partly explains the recent mini-revival in co-operatives in Western Australia. The 
successful examples of agricultural co-operatives, such as the UFCC described 
briefly in Chapter One, illustrate this.51 The UFCC, a relatively young organisation 
formed in the contemporary economic environment, demonstrates the ability of the 
agricultural co-operative model to continue with the traditional agricultural co-
operative role of ameliorating some form of market failure. By amalgamating the 
                                                 
51 The UFCC is analysed in detail in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
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collective resources of atomistic farmer members, the UFCC was able to harness 
economies of scale to source chemicals and counter the escalating costs commanded 
by agribusiness corporations for agricultural fertiliser and chemicals. The UFCC 
experience suggests that the agricultural co-operative model, therefore, remains a 
valid and legitimate mechanism at the beginning of the 21st century to address the 
types of market failure problems arising from economic reform.  
Despite the merits and potential of the agricultural co-operative model, the 
Australian government’s approach to agricultural industry restructuring does not 
readily present the co-operative business model as an option for farmers to address 
economic adversity arising from market failure.  In practice, however, contemporary 
policy makers, while perhaps understanding the downside, do not take neoliberal 
policy to its logical extreme at a program level. After two decades or so of 
restructuring, there is evidence that Australian public policy makers are now seeking 
an approach that can lessen the negative consequences of economic reform on 
marginalised sections of society, including those living in rural and regional areas of 
Australia. The disparity in economic and social well-being between rural and urban 
communities after decades of restructuring has led to an increased awareness of rural 
community well-being (Anderson & Chaffey, 2000; Black et al., 2000; Cheers, 1995; 
Gray, 1994; Gray & Lawrence, 2001a; Kingma, Crellin, & Hoitink, 1999; Lawrence, 
1995; Haslam McKenzie, 1999). The Productivity Commission (2003) report into 
social capital, which suggests that there is capacity for Government to be more aware 
of the role of social capital in effective policy development, demonstrates this 
recently evolving ‘softer’ side of economic policy.52 Further, the Productivity 
Commission’s 2002-2003 Annual Report (2004), while continuing to recommend 
on-going domestic economic reform, suggests subsequent reforms recognise the 
human and environmental consequences of these policies. This is a significant 
conceptual move from early policy approaches that focused on hard-edged economic 
issues, which in the rural context, often resulted in harmful economic and social 
consequences for farming families and rural and regional communities. This 
                                                 
52 The Productivity Commission report (2003) on social capital also recognises that some 
Government activities actually undermine social capital within a community, diminishing a 
community’s ability to implement the self-help qualities of its members, a key concept in neoliberal 
theory. However, the Productivity Commission report, representing an essentially neoliberal analysis 
of the concept of social capital, requires a cautious approach. To illustrate, the Productivity 
Commission report explores the concept of social capital as it might be a useful mechanism for 
reducing public expenditure.  
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recognition of the disadvantages of economic reform on farming communities has 
several implications for the agricultural co-operative business structure.  
The Interface of Neoclassical Economic Theory and Co-operative Theory 
Three key elements underline the divide between neoclassical economic 
theory and co-operative theory. The first element of neoliberalism that has 
implications for the agricultural co-operative structure is the concept of 
individualism. Implicit in neoclassical economic theory is a particular understanding 
of human behaviour as rational, self interested, and individualistic (Quiggan, 2001). 
Neoliberalism assumes individuals are in competition with each other (Mooney & 
Gray, 2002). Immediately it is apparent that there is a conflict between the 
neoclassical economic concept of individualism and co-operative theory which is 
built on a view of human behaviour that embraces a collaborative approach to solve 
common problems (Craig, 1993). The notion of ‘co-operativeness’ is therefore 
problematical in neoliberalism, as acting co-operatively is contrary to individualism. 
When the wider public policy environment privileges individualism above co-
operative values, a fundamental element of the agricultural co-operative business 
structure is jeopardised.  
Aligned to the value of individualism is the neoliberal concept of self-help, 
the second element of interest to the agricultural co-operative model. In the context 
of agricultural industry policy and regional policy, the concept of self-help places the 
responsibility on rural people to personally overcome their own economic and social 
obstacles. This policy implies a belief that it is ultimately the responsibility of rural 
communities to advance their own economic futures. Government involvement in 
these matters is construed as an inhibitor to individual expression of self-help. 
Government therefore should withdraw from the provision of these services to 
liberate individuals’ self-help ethos to overcome the barriers that formerly restricted 
their options (Gray and Lawrence, 2001b).53 Gray and Lawrence (2001b) cite 
Landcare is an example of a government initiated approach to stimulate a collective 
                                                 
53 This neoliberal understanding of self-help removes the possibility of structural explanations 
contributing to the difficulties facing the agricultural industry and rural people, placing responsibility 
on human agency (Gray & Lawrence, 2001b). 
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54self-help response among rural people to address environmental problems.  Marsh 
and Pannell (1998) note that State Departments of Agriculture now facilitate the 
formation of farmer groups, rather than one-to-one interaction, as a strategy for 
agricultural extension, particularly for human ‘capacity building’. The public policy 
strategies of local communities working together in a self-help ethos to facilitate 
revitalisation of small towns, rather than demand State support to resolve their 
problems, also illustrate this approach. 
Interestingly, the self-help concept of neoliberalism dovetails with the mutual 
self-help concept embedded in co-operative values. The co-operative business 
structure, built on the concept of mutual self-help, can also contribute to endogenous 
rural community based development. The overlap of the neoliberal concept of self-
help and mutual self-help in co-operative values is a potential argument for public 
policy support to create the environment to stimulate the uptake of the agricultural 
co-operative structure.  These two concepts enable individual farmers to work 
collectively to help themselves cope with the market failure consequences of 
agricultural restructuring.55  
The third feature of neoclassical economic theory of interest to the 
agricultural co-operative business structure is the profit maximising IOF business 
structure. As argued in the previous chapter, fundamental differences between the 
IOF and the agricultural co-operative structure diminish the intrinsic value of the co-
operative model. However, this chapter has argued that the co-operative model has a 
number of features that make it particularly suited to a market economy environment. 
The model is able to address market failure arising from the downside agricultural 
industry policy and therefore make a positive social and economic contribution to 
rural communities.   
Agricultural Co-operatives as an Agricultural Industry Policy Tool 
The implementation of free market public policies in agriculture and regional 
Australia has created a paradoxical situation in which the co-operative business 
model is a valuable mechanism to grasp opportunities created by economic reform 
                                                 
54 Landcare also reflects a relatively recent addition of environmental sustainability to the economic 
competitiveness of agricultural policy (Western Australian Department of Agriculture, n.d.). 
55 The public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives is discussed in Chapter Six. 
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while also minimising the downside of restructuring. Gray and Lawrence (2001b) 
argue that Australian public policy makers are seeking strategies to assist rural and 
agricultural sectors to achieve the benefits of agricultural and rural restructuring by 
adopting collective approaches to implement a neoclassical economic reform agenda 
built around individualism. The agricultural co-operative is an ideal vehicle to 
achieve this policy direction.  
By reframing the agricultural co-operative structure in neoliberal discourse, 
the formation of an agricultural co-operative can be interpreted as the rational action 
of commercially minded independent farmers collaborating with similarly self-
interested farmers with the objective of maximising their individual benefit. In 
circumstances where agricultural restructuring has resulted in some negative social 
or economic outcome, the formation of a co-operative can be viewed as a self-help 
strategy by individual farmers to address the downsides of economic reform. 
Additionally, while the co-operative enhances the economic outcomes of the 
individual farm entity as a business, it concurrently meets a neoliberal ideal of 
assisting in social justice by facilitating the social and economic well-being of the 
farming family. The co-operative structure can therefore rationalise minimal 
government intervention in resolving economic or social inequities arising from 
economic policies because rural people are able to use the co-operative structure as a 
self-help mechanism to overcome these deficits.  
Continuing this perspective, agricultural co-operatives can be presented as a 
tool to participate in government’s ‘mutual obligation’ contract with rural 
communities. Consistent with Gray and Lawrence’s (2001b) work, Yeatman (1999, p 
258) examines the concept of ‘mutual obligation’, in which individuals ‘should make 
a contribution to society in exchange for the support society gives them’. Mutual 
obligation is a reciprocated arrangement, where government provides support while 
the individual makes an effort to become self-reliant. Communities can use the co-
operative model as a demonstration of their self-help orientation, in exchange for the 
government providing the necessary seed funding to enable them to establish the 
feasibility of the co-operative structure for their particular problem. An illustration of 
this form of community self-help supported by small seed funding from government 
is the collective effort of various individuals connected to the proposed Harvest 
Highway co-operative. This initiative is a local response by a range of actors to the 
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economic adversity experienced by small tourist and agricultural produce businesses 
in a regional area in Western Australia’s southwest. Under the Commonwealth 
Department of Transport and Regional Services program of ‘Stronger Regions, A 
Stronger Australia’ (Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional 
Services, n.d.), this initiative has gained funds to explore the feasibility of a co-
operative structure for their venture. 
Lastly, the concept of ‘freedom to choose’ suggests that the broader liberal 
philosophy of an individual’s right to choose a business structure can support the 
adoption of the agricultural co-operative structure. Consequently, it is acceptable if 
individual farmers voluntarily choose a co-operative structure as the means by which 
they wish to engage commercially with other sectors of the economy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the impact of two decades of agricultural industry 
restructuring on the industry and identified mixed outcomes for farmers and rural 
communities. The chapter argued that the agricultural co-operative model can 
provide a vehicle to capture opportunities as well as address some of the downside of 
restructuring. Several key concepts underpinning neoclassical economics and 
neoliberalism were examined to identify those that complement co-operative theory.  
Identifying this theoretical interface enabled agricultural co-operatives to be 
reframed as a strategy that is compatible with neoliberal assumptions of the market 
and the economic behaviour of individuals, with the added benefit of ensuring the 
social well-being of the farm family with minimal intervention of government. This 
approach enabled new insights that validate the structure in a public policy context, 
although there is some risk in perceiving the co-operative as potentially complicit in 
the reform agenda of government withdrawal of services in rural and regional areas.  
In conclusion, neoliberal theory and the accompanying reform based on these 
notions provide some potential opportunities to facilitate the adoption of the 
agricultural co-operative structure. However, the ideological challenge of neoliberal 
theory to the fundamental values base of the co-operative structure, while subtle, is 
potentially very damaging for the future of the co-operative structure in agriculture. 
Fostering co-operativeness among producers in order to participate in the 
marketplace can only be achieved if neoliberal policies acknowledge the importance 
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of co-operative behaviour and the social foundations that facilitate this behaviour. 
The contradiction between neoliberal notions of self-interest and market driven 
behaviour on the one hand and developing a business structure based on collective 
action is clearly apparent. While a public policy argument can be made to support 
agricultural co-operative development as a tool to stimulate self-help, it does not 
compensate for a strategy for sustainable co-operative development. Clearly, the 
agricultural co-operative structure has proven its legitimacy as a structure that 
historically and currently serves agriculture well. The task, expanded upon in 
Chapter Six, is to identify how this intrinsic value can be recognised in a broader 
theoretical context that can then facilitate a public policy position for the agricultural 
co-operative structure.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Western Australia’s Agricultural Co-operative History 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the history of the agricultural co-operative movement in 
Western Australia. While the focus of this thesis is on the contemporary era, 
particularly in the last decade or so, there is a strong, but arguably not well-
understood, historical dimension to the Western Australian co-operative movement. 
This chapter reveals that the severe economic and social conditions in rural and 
regional Western Australia during the early decades of the 20th century gave rise to 
the first agricultural co-operatives. These difficult circumstances nurtured the co-
operative business model and subsequently agricultural co-operatives evolved into an 
economically strong and politically influential Western Australian agricultural co-
operative sector up until at least the late 1970s.  
Historical Accounts of the Western Australian Co-operative Movement 
There is relatively little secondary information available on the development 
of the Western Australian co-operative movement and the agricultural co-operative 
story. Sandford’s (1955) account of the co-operative movement in Western Australia 
is the most detailed. He describes the early foundations of the co-operative 
movement as it grew alongside an infant agricultural industry establishing itself 
under primitive conditions. Of significance is his account of the genesis of the most 
well known agricultural co-operative in Western Australia - Westralian Farmers Co-
operative - that later converted to the corporation, Wesfarmers. 
Smith (1984) also briefly recounted some of the early agricultural co-
operative activity in the State.56 The focus of his work was much more on the growth 
                                                 
56 According to Munro (2003), this book was completed in the late 1970s although it was not 
published until the mid 1980s. 
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and logistical development of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, which had 
commissioned his book. Co-operative Bulk Handling has produced a history of its 
background which sheds minimal light on the development of the Western Australian 
co-operative sector apart from confirming that CBH was based on the principles of 
the Rochdale model of ‘one man one vote, irrespective of the volume of business 
conducted with no racial, political or religious bias’ (Ayris, 1999, p 12). The 
Geraldton Fishermens’ Co-operative also published a history to celebrate its 50th 
anniversary (H. Gray, 2000), again focusing predominantly on the logistical aspects 
of establishing and sustaining the co-operative in regional Western Australia. 
This chapter derives much of its information on two extensive personal 
interviews with Mr Don Munro. Munro’s involvement with the Western Australian 
co-operative sector commenced in the 1960s, when he began providing accountancy 
services to Westralian Farmers Co-operative members (Munro, 2003). His first 
exposure to agricultural co-operatives was in finalising the operations of many rural 
co-operatives that were no longer operational. His association with the Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative sector continued when he left Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative with, according to Munro, their blessing and acknowledged 
support, and established an accountancy firm specialising in the agricultural industry 
and, in particular, agricultural co-operatives. The Co-operative Federation of 
Western Australia (CFWA), the peak body for the Western Australian co-operative 
movement, subsequently contracted his accountancy firm to provide secretariat 
services until 1996, when the CFWA appointed a full-time Executive Officer. 
Munro’s early connection with the co-operative movement overlapped the 
last years of several Western Australia ‘co-operators’57 who were involved with the 
first co-operative wave commencing around the time of World War 1. He spoke in 
detail of his exposure to the idealism and enthusiasm that motivated these original 
‘co-operative champions’58 to form the first co-operatives in Western Australia. He 
commented that he felt privileged to share in ‘the wonder and values base of the co-
operative movement’ as embodied by the founding agricultural co-operators in 
                                                 
57 Munro used the term ‘co-operators’, which is not commonly used in contemporary Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative discourse. Craig (1993) also uses this term. 
58 The term ‘co-operative champion’ is adopted from Craig (1993) and is well understood as a 
concept by interviewees. 
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59Western Australia, such as Harper, Thomson, Ashton and others from that era.  
Arguably, Munro is a bridge between the original Western Australian agricultural co-
operative movement and the present day era of agricultural co-operatives. 
The Early Development of the Western Australian Agricultural Co-operative 
Sector 
The early history of the Western Australian co-operative movement is a story 
of the newly evolving agricultural industry and of the adaptation of a business 
structure which itself was in its infancy. The emerging co-operative movement in 
Western Australia is a distinctive example of co-operative development (Munro, 
2003).  The closeness between the agricultural industry and the co-operative model 
resulted in the Western Australian co-operative movement being essentially one 
based on the agricultural industry. While the first chapter differentiated and defined 
the terms of the ‘co-operative movement’ and the ‘agricultural co-operative sector’, 
the beginning of the Western Australian co-operative movement is also the history of 
the agricultural co-operative sector. The formative and ongoing influence and 
dominance of the agricultural co-operative sector on the overall Western Australian 
co-operative movement is undeniable. The divergence of the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector and the wider co-operative movement only occurred 
in the latter half of the 20th century when a number of metropolitan based co-
operatives commenced in Western Australia. However, agricultural and regional co-
operatives continue to dominate the contemporary Western Australian co-operative 
movement as evidenced by the number of agricultural or regionally based co-
operatives that are members of the CFWA. 
The literature contains several references to early agricultural co-operative 
activity in Western Australia. Kenyon (1983, p 49) states that rural co-operatives 
were in operation in Western Australia by 1859. The Swan district was exploring the 
formation of co-operatives as early as 1897 to ‘prevent a glut of grapes and to ensure  
                                                 
59 See Sandford (1955) for further information on the role of these key individuals in the early 
Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector. 
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the making of wine of a high and uniform grade on a large scale…’ (Lindley-Cowen, 
1897, p 158).60 Smith (1984, p 115) refers to the existence of fruit co-operatives in 
the early 1900s with a reasonable network of co-operative grower packing sheds and 
export activities in place in the 1920s (K. Smith, 1984, p 116). Some dairy co-
operatives were also operational, with the Bunbury Butter Co-operative registered in 
1908 (Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, 
2005b).  
These early Western Australian agricultural co-operatives focused on two 
activities.  Co-operatives either provided farm services or inputs at near cost; or 
undertook the marketing, handling or value adding of commodities to achieve the 
best possible price for members. These early co-operatives provided a service or 
infrastructure which was lacking in the newly evolving agricultural industry, or were 
established in situations where farmers were economically disadvantaged. This is 
consistent with agricultural economic co-operative theory, in which agricultural co-
operatives are created to either capture economies of scale or address some form of 
market failure (Cobia, 1989).  
Sandford (1955) argues that the first co-operative champions such as Harper 
and Thomson recognised that in order to support farmers in their efforts to establish 
and expand the agricultural industry, the industry had to embrace the co-operative 
model. Undoubtedly, the influence of the first co-operative champions was an 
essential component in the development of the agricultural co-operative sector in 
Western Australia. Co-operative champions, both theorists and activists, were central 
catalysts in spreading the co-operative ideal and motivating farmers to form co-
operatives (Munro, 2003; Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984). Sandford writes  
…three men, Walter Harper, Tom Bath and WD Johnson, have been 
the outstanding figures in the Western Australian co-operative 
movement. Harper primarily a businessman with a sense of 
trusteeship and the prestige of a name long famous in Western 
                                                 
60 At the time Lindley-Cowen was writing, in the last years of the 19th century, the co-operative 
wineries had not been established. He cited Harper (the father of Walter Harper who in turn is the 
father of the Western Australian co-operative movement), who warned that the industry was short-
sighted in not forming co-operatives. Harper recounted the experiences of Californian, Victorian and 
South Australian grape growers where ‘[the] growers, in fact, had to come to the position of working 
for the benefit of those who were enabled to become monopolists, because those who had grapes to 
sell were without the means of turning them into wine’ (Lindley-Cowen, 1897, p 158). The similarity 
of this story at the end of the 19th century and that of grape growers in Australia at the beginning of 
the 21st century is striking. 
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Australia behind him, Bath an idealist in the practical sense of the 
word and Johnson, the enthusiast, able speaker and politician…. 
(Sandford, 1955, p 84) 
61Munro (2003) adds that Harper  in particular had established links with 
agriculture via his own family farm and therefore carried substantial credibility when 
rallying farmers to the co-operative ideal. Sandford further writes ‘co-operation was 
undoubtedly something of a crusade at the time and the example of the Rochdale 
pioneers in England was bandied about by …. [co-operative] organisers in a way that 
has not taken place since’ (Sandford, 1955, p 45). Munro (2003), based on personal 
contact with some of these first co-operative champions, states ‘they had a dream and 
wanted to share that dream with other farmers’ . The commitment and idealism of 
these co-operative champions as an element in the development of a co-operative 
movement is highly consistent with sociologically informed co-operative theory 
(Craig, 1993).  
The Rochdale consumer co-operative model, imported from the United 
Kingdom, provided the guiding structure and philosophy for the champions striving 
to develop the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector. The traditional 
Rochdale model is based on many retail co-operatives owning a single wholesale co-
operative supplier, with the distribution of ‘profits’ back to member customers 
(Lewis, 1992). Akin to the Rochdale model, the early co-operative champions 
envisioned a long-term strategy in which a network of agriculturally focused country 
town retail co-operative stores would buy shares in a parent co-operative that would 
assume a wholesale function.  
This dream, however, did not eventuate. Circumstances unique to Western 
Australia forced the adaptation of the Rochdale model and principles to suit the 
environment in which it was seeking to establish itself. Several factors can account 
for this. The infant Western government sought to create an agricultural industry in a 
primitive pioneering environment and in virgin rural areas with an unknown ability 
to support agriculture (Munro, 2003). Subsequently, the embryonic Western 
Australian agricultural industry had to readjust to the difficult economic and social 
                                                 
61 The family name ‘Harper’ did not continue as a civic ‘father’ in Perth or Western Australia, unlike 
several of the family’s business partner contemporaries. 
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effects of the First World War and the Depression, quickly followed by another 
world war (Sandford, 1955).  
Sandford (1955, p 73) also argues that it proved impractical to have 
independent retail co-operatives in country towns serviced by a separate wholesale 
co-operative. The limited economic development of Western Australia at the time 
demanded a strong overarching agricultural co-operative to undertake both retail and 
wholesale functions to ensure that all country towns in agricultural Western Australia 
had access to goods and services. Westralian Farmers Co-operative emerged from 
the assortment of small agricultural co-operatives active at the time as the dominant 
agricultural co-operative. Only a State-wide co-operative, such as Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative, Sandford (1955) further argued, could provide the logistical 
coordination between different agricultural regions given the transport and 
communications channels of the period. Therefore, in response to the challenges 
presented by the immaturity of the economic and infrastructure development of the 
agricultural industry, the co-operative movement evolved as a top down initiative 
under the influence of one dominant agricultural co-operative, Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative. The unique development of the Western Australian co-operative 
movement reflects Craig’s (1993) concept of co-operative logic.  This logic accepts 
that each group’s needs are unique and that the group’s members will develop a co-
operative organisational model responsive to their specific needs.   
While the Rochdale model had to be adapted for Western Australian 
circumstances, as represented by Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the co-operative 
based commercial activity embedded in the Rochdale model and promoted by the co-
operative champions found fertile ground in rural communities. Steeped in a 
collective self-help ethos, the beliefs of rural people and those underpinning co-
operative philosophy were highly compatible (Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984). 
Munro (2003) maintained that farmers believed that they were part of a community 
and the only way for them to survive during the difficult economic times preceding 
the First World War, the years of the war itself, the following Depression era and the 
Second World War, was to unite for their own common good. At a pragmatic level 
Munro (2003) also considered that the first wave of the co-operative movement was 
compatible with the ‘horse and cart’ level of technology in the early 1900s. These 
factors suggest a strong focus on geographically bound social and economic 
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networks among rural communities as a precursor to agricultural co-operative 
development in this era. The ability of the co-operative message to overlay the values 
of rural people and thus to enable the co-operative concept to take root and develop 
is also a recurrent theme in Craig (1993).  
Munro, (2003) in addition, argued that the concepts underpinning the benefits 
of a co-operative, and how to form a co-operative, were simple for farmers to 
understand and the co-operative champions were able to convey the key messages to 
them without difficulty. These early farmers appeared to have an intuitive 
understanding of co-operative logic. According to Munro, the message of the early 
agricultural co-operators conveyed to farmers was to ‘look past your farm gate to see 
how you can help yourself to get a better deal by owning and controlling your inputs 
and outputs’.  He asserts that this was an appealing and understandable message for 
farmers. Munro (2003) believed that this was the first time farmers had been 
encouraged to think more broadly about their industry by looking at issues outside 
actual farm production. This reflects early understanding by farmers of the 
agricultural co-operative structure as both a part of a supply chain and a means for 
vertical integration.  
Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
The evolution of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector is 
intimately entwined with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Westralian Farmers Co-
operative, established in 1914, was one of the many localised agricultural co-
operatives formed around the turn of the 20th century to provide services or 
infrastructure to the infant agricultural industry, or to assist economically 
disadvantaged farmers. Unlike many of these early co-operatives, Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative prospered and evolved over five or six decades into a powerful 
economic and political force in Western Australia. Arguably, its economic influence 
continues today as the publicly listed company, Wesfarmers. 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative grew out of a politically oriented farmers’ 
interest group. In the immediate pre-World War I years, the Farmers’ and Settlers’ 
Association62 was formed at a conference in Perth on March 28, 1912 (The 
                                                 
62 This farmer association is a predecessor to the current agri-political peak body, the Western 
Australia Farmers’ Federation (WAFF) (K. Smith, 1984). 
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Nationals, n.d.).  Discussions focused on the political and economic well-being of 
farmers and delegates elected to separate commercial activities from political 
lobbying (K. Smith, 1984).  The Country Party was formed in March, 1913, to 
address the political concerns of farmers,63 while the co-operative business model 
was adopted as the strategy to achieve the economic goals of farmers (K.Smith, 
1984).  
The newly established Westralian Farmers Co-operative absorbed two 
existing grains related agricultural co-operatives, the Producers Union Co-operative 
and the Farmers Mercantile and Union Chaff Mills (K. Smith, 1984). The objective 
of the new co-operative was to buy and sell grain and also to provide farm supplies 
and merchandise, receiving commissions on the sale of goods and handling of grain 
(Sandford, 1955). Over the next three decades until World War II, Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative grew rapidly, and actively pursued agricultural supply, 
marketing or processing opportunities in most agricultural sectors, such as grains, 
dairy, horticulture, wool, cattle and sheep meat and honey.  
Under the guidance of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the agricultural co-
operative sector in Western Australia evolved into two, highly inter-related, threads. 
The first thread is that of Westralian Farmers Co-operative which directly owned co-
operative branch retail stores in many country towns.64 This thread also drove the 
expansion of the agricultural co-operative movement in Western Australia for over a 
half century, and provided the necessary level of coordination to ensure that growth. 
Furthermore, this thread, again through necessity, adopted a ‘top down’ approach to 
the development of the agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia, 
contrary to co-operative theory which suggests endogenous evolution (Craig, 1993; 
Mathews, 1999).  
The second thread was the formation in country towns of independent 
merchandising co-operative stores owned by farmer members from the surrounding 
area. These co-operatives were established in those small communities that had 
sufficient zeal to form their own and therefore did not need to participate in the top 
                                                 
63 Following the success of the Western Australian Country Party, farm organisations supported the 
establishment of Country Parties in Queensland in 1915, Victoria in 1917, South Australia 1918, New 
South Wales 1919 and Tasmania in 1922. The Federal Country Party was formed in 1920 (The 
Nationals, n.d.). 
64 Westralian Farmers Co-operative head office was located in Perth, the capital of Western Australia. 
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down Westralian Farmers Co-operative network of branch stores. These co-operative 
stores were self-governing, and due to their atomistic evolution, tended to operate in 
isolation from each other and to some extent without overall direction or 
coordination from the wider agricultural co-operative sector (Sandford, 1955). Over 
time, many of these stores were absorbed into the Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
network as agents. Sandford (1955, p 45) indicates that by 1919, only four years after 
it formed, Westralian Farmers Co-operative had a country town network of 65 local 
co-operatives, either as directly owned branches or agents, demonstrating a high 
level of goodwill between the endogenous and exogenous co-operative threads.  In 
this period, Westralian Farmers Co-operative also agitated to form a peak body, the 
Co-operative Federation of Western Australia. As a result of this, the separate 
threads of the agricultural co-operative sector were further integrated into a cohesive 
movement under its own peak body. 
This intense first wave of co-operative development over a relatively short 
period, demonstrated a passionate and active social movement in rural Western 
Australia in these early years. Munro (2003) reports, from first hand discussions 
many years later with the co-operative champions involved, that they were extremely 
active and busy over this period, travelling throughout Western Australia, often in 
difficult conditions, promoting the co-operative option to agriculturally dependent 
rural townships. The strategy of developing a network of local level multi-purpose 
retail co-operatives was successful and facilitated imitation in other rural 
communities, reinforcing the mutual self-help attitude already instilled in rural 
regions. Munro (2003) argues that the ease of duplicating the Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative successful formula for country town co-operatives contributed to the 
spread of the co-operative business model in rural Western Australia. By the 
outbreak of WWII, a coordinated system of co-operative farm and domestic supply, 
and commodity transport and handling services operated in most country towns from 
Esperance to Geraldton under the aegis of the Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
network of directly owned or affiliated country town based co-operatives (K. Smith, 
1984). 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative also gained an early impetus in the 
agricultural industry when it was appointed by the Western Australian government as 
an agent to collect the grain harvest during the difficult years of World War I up to 
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1922 when the compulsory scheme ended (K. Smith, 1984). The success of 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and its country town co-operative store network in 
achieving the grain collection task developed strong farmer loyalty towards the co-
operative concept and further entrenched the structure in the minds of country people 
(K. Smith, 1984, p 67). It also demonstrated to the Western Australian government 
the ability of farmer controlled co-operatives to benefit the economic well-being of 
farmers in regional Western Australia, and therefore the State’s economy. The 
contribution of agricultural co-operatives to the agricultural industry and the 
economy subsequently stimulated a positive Western Australian government public 
policy framework for agricultural co-operatives that endured for several decades (K. 
Smith, 1984). 
Nevertheless, Westralian Farmers Co-operative did face some difficulties.  
The co-operative’s grain pool activities experienced growing competition from 
private grain merchants during the 1920s. These grain merchants offered farmers 
immediate cash payments compared to the part cash, part deferred payment system 
of Westralian Farmers Co-operative (K. Smith, 1984). Concurrently, during this 
period a new group of soldier settler farmers opened up virgin regions in the 
wheatbelt. These soldier settlers were unfamiliar with Westralian Farmers Co-
operative’s earlier contribution to the economic and social infrastructure of wheatbelt 
farmers and were therefore unaware of and uncommitted to the co-operative ethos. 
Their lack of knowledge about the co-operative philosophy further enabled the 
private grain merchants to gain a foothold in grain handling and selling.  
This new scenario for the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector 
during the 1920s, following very quickly on its earlier success, demonstrates the 
fragility of the co-operative movement. It confirms the need to consistently promote 
the concept within the agricultural industry and to ensure that agricultural co-
operatives continue to provide an economic and social benefit to member farm 
businesses to retain relevance and hence loyalty. 
Notwithstanding this challenge from private grain merchants, Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative’s experience in the grains industry as the government agent 
encouraged it to explore strategies to introduce a voluntary farmer pool for the bulk 
handling of grain. It had attempted to introduce bulk handling directly after WWI but 
circumstances frustrated this development (see K. Smith, 1984, chapter 6). 
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Westralian Farmers Co-operative, in conjunction with the predecessor of the current 
Western Australian Farmers’ Federation (WAFF), was instrumental in forming CBH 
in 1933. Close connections between Westralian Farmers Co-operative and an 
agricultural co-operative based in London, Overseas Farmers, jointly formed by 
several Australian farmer co-operatives as a marketing agent, ensured that all profits 
from the sale of grain went to farmers rather than ‘middle men’ (K. Smith, 1984). 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative was also involved with the formation of some 
Statutory Marketing Authorities, such as the Honey Pool, the Grain Pool and the 
Australian Wheat Board (Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984).  
These activities demonstrated that the Westralian Farmers Co-operative was 
purposefully undertaking a public good function, via its economic development role 
on behalf of the wider agricultural industry, rather than simply focusing on providing 
goods, services or infrastructure to its members within the grains industry. Although 
most Westralian Farmers Co-operative activities contributed to the financial growth 
of the co-operative, its commitment to the wider agricultural industry influenced it to 
supply a farmer needed function in any agricultural commodity, even if it financially 
stretched the co-operative or did not earn a surplus over the cost of undertaking the 
activity (Munro, 2003). The involvement of Westralian Farmers Co-operative in the 
economic viability of the dairy industry in the mid 1920s illustrates this approach 
(see K. Smith, 1984, chapter 9).  
As Westralian Farmers Co-operative expanded into other agricultural 
industry sectors, it elected to incorporate the different industry sector co-operative 
activities as divisions under the one organisational and administrative banner of 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative, rather than develop separate co-operative entities 
(Sandford, 1955). This was viewed as desirable as the small population base of 
Western Australia could not absorb the additional administrative costs associated 
with forming separate co-operatives (Sandford, 1955). The wisdom of this strategy at 
that time was confirmed by the difficulties of some independent co-operatives that 
struggled to survive while Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to grow from 
the benefits of organisational economies of scale. However, as a long-term strategy, 
it has had negative impacts on the viability of the agricultural co-operative sector in 
Western Australia as discussed below. 
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The success of Westralian Farmers Co-operative in the agricultural industry 
is also partly attributed to its understanding of the biophysical and cyclical nature of 
the agricultural industry, often characterised by ‘booms and busts’ (K. Smith, 1984). 
Other for-profit providers of comparable services were not prepared over the long 
term to accept the risks associated with the unpredictable elements inherent in the 
agricultural industry. Unlike an IOF, Westralian Farmers Co-operative provided 
services to farmers in the knowledge that in any one year, a farmer can experience 
difficulty but rebound profitably in the following season (K. Smith, 1984). 
Supporting farmers in down times in turn created a great deal of member loyalty 
towards the co-operative, as members recognised that their financial well-being was 
intimately enmeshed with that of the co-operative’s activities. During this period, the 
symbiotic relationship between the co-operative and its members across different 
commodities created a virtuous and mutually beneficial circle of collective self-help 
in the agricultural industry.  
As Westralian Farmers Co-operative matured as an organisation, a subtle 
change in direction occurred.  The co-operative started to provide a diverse range of 
farm services that were not directly related to the actual production of a commodity, 
such as the provision of finance, insurance, leasing and taxation advice. The co-
operative continued to demonstrate its on-going commitment to the wider 
agricultural co-operative sector by exploring international opportunities in 
agricultural co-operative activity that could be applied in Western Australia (K. 
Smith, 1984). Additionally, a number of technical commodity production or handling 
innovations were introduced to Western Australia as a result of Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative enthusiasm to look internationally for solutions to local issues (K. 
Smith, 1984).  
The Waning of the Western Australian Agricultural Co-operative Sector 
By the 1960s, Westralian Farmers Co-operative had tentacles in virtually 
every activity connected with assisting farmers in the production and marketing of 
their commodities and conducting a farm business.  A vast network of retail co-
operatives in most country towns also underpinned it. Due to the vastness and 
influence of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, those associated with agricultural co-
operatives thought that there would always be a significant place for this business 
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structure in the Western Australian agricultural industry (Munro, 2003). The Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative sector, under the auspices of Westralian Farmers 
Co-operatives, was well established institutionally, well supported by its membership 
and highly influential in a public policy sense. In spite of this confidence about the 
longevity and embeddedness of the co-operative business model in the economic and 
social viability of the agricultural industry, by the 1960s, the golden era of 
agricultural co-operatives was gradually waning. The large number of country town 
agricultural co-operatives still operating under the highly successful Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative network masked this shift, although with hindsight, one 
indicator of the change in the Western Australian co-operative movement was the 
increasing pace in winding up defunct retail agricultural co-operatives in country 
towns.65 However, as Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to grow in 
organisational size and economic power, the awareness of the trend and its 
implications for the agricultural industry and the Western Australian co-operative 
movement did not become apparent to the agricultural co-operative sector until much 
later (Munro, 2003). The agricultural co-operative sector had inadvertently instituted 
its own subsequent decline.  
The success of Westralian Farmers Co-operative created a self-contained and 
self-sustaining agricultural co-operative sector functioning in a relatively closed 
system without external input for several decades. Although Westralian Farmers Co-
operative was internationally connected to the wider co-operative movement, there 
was no need for any new impetus to the co-operative movement in Western Australia 
for over forty years. Any additional service required by farmers was provided 
directly by Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Alternatively, the co-operative 
influenced the environment to ensure that another co-operative or company was 
established under its auspices to deliver the service. As Westralian Farmers Co-
operative was able to successfully meet the needs of farmers via its own unique 
approach, the agricultural co-operative sector did not need to change its strategy to 
maintain the viability and vivacity of the co-operative movement.  
                                                 
65 Sandford (1955) notes that prior to the Depression a number of agricultural co-operatives also 
folded. He cites several reasons for this, such as inadequate capital, insufficient local support (which 
Sandford argues leads to inadequate capital), poor or dishonest management, the early pioneering 
efforts to establish an agricultural industry in certain regions proved to be misjudged and therefore the 
co-operative also failed, or in some regions a natural conservatism did not facilitate a collective 
approach. 
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Paradoxically, the success of Westralian Farmers Co-operative unwittingly 
created a dependency and vulnerability in the wider agricultural co-operative sector 
on the goodwill of Westralian Farmers Co-operative. As the co-operative movement 
grew throughout Western Australia, it became much more difficult for farmer 
members to understand its complexity (Sandford, 1955). With the increasing 
intricacy, fewer people were inclined to expend the effort to become involved, which 
led to the burden falling on declining numbers of highly committed individuals. An 
outcome of this was that management started to assume roles ordinarily undertaken 
by the Board of Directors or members, creating the environment for co-operative 
managers to exert greater influence over the strategic direction of the agricultural co-
operative.66 Sandford (1955) suggests, even as early as the 1950s, that the increasing 
reliance of co-operative businesses on their management and executive for 
administration and planning contributed to the diminishing role of agricultural co-
operatives. This unwittingly further perpetuated the problem of an increasing 
knowledge and power gulf between members and the individuals employed to 
manage co-operative activities on their behalf. 
Sandford (1955) lamented that farmer members had not become more 
involved with and fully informed about the Western Australian co-operative 
movement. Sandford was prepared to accept, due to the hardship of establishing their 
farms, why the first generation of member shareholders did not become active 
participants in the movement and understand how it contributed to the economic 
viability of their farm enterprises. However, he commented that the second 
generation of farmers in the post-war years were no more aware of the co-operative 
movement then their fathers.  
In their enthusiasm to establish the agricultural co-operative sector in 
Western Australia, the founding co-operative champions appeared to have neglected 
the co-operative principle of education. They did not, for example, set up adult 
education centres as practised by the co-operatives established in British Columbia 
(Mathews, 1999; Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996). The focus on education in British 
Columbia, both generic and co-operative specific, developed an understanding by 
                                                 
66 The tension between agricultural co-operative Boards, chairs and senior executives is explored via 
principal-agent theory in Chapter Five and Chapter Eight. 
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these individuals of how the wider economic and social systems could disadvantage 
them (Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996).  
Smith (1984) notes the willingness of Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
executives and Board members to travel to the UK to secure markets for agricultural 
commodities, and to the US and Canada to observe new developments in agricultural 
co-operative plant and equipment and understand the workings of Statutory 
Marketing Authorities. These international trips reflect a technical orientation rather 
than undertaking education according to the co-operative principle. There is little 
evidence of key actors associated with the Western Australian co-operative 
movement or agricultural co-operatives seeking to understand the nature of the 
unique co-operative business structure or embed the spirit of co-operativeness within 
the rural communities. This can partly explain Sandford’s lament that the agricultural 
co-operative sector in Western Australia did not truly embrace the idealism of the co-
operative movement, rather adopting the model in a pragmatic way as long as it 
provided economic and social benefits.  
Other developments emerging from the 1960s can also explain the gradual 
decline in the agricultural co-operative sector. ‘Entrepreneurs’67 started to promote 
co-operatives for reasons unrelated to the co-operative principles. These reasons 
included the taxation benefits specifically for agricultural co-operatives under the 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, or to remove a proposed 
agricultural business from the requirements of the extant Western Australian 
Corporations Act, or to exploit some weakness in the Western Australian Companies 
(Co-operative) Act 1943 (Munro, 2003). The philosophy motivating the early co-
operative champions was not evident in these latter promoters of the co-operative 
business structure.  
Munro also identified the contribution, during the 1960s, of professional 
advisors, such as accountants, financiers and solicitors, to the decline of the co-
operative sector, as they recommended the corporate structure to farmers over the co-
operative structure. This development illustrated the declining knowledge base of the 
co-operative structure outside of the few key co-operative actors still active at the 
                                                 
67 This is the term used by Munro (2003), which was in vogue in Western Australia during the 1980s 
to describe individuals such as Alan Bond. A more contemporary term to describe this type of activity 
in agriculture may be ‘management consultant’ or ‘agribusiness management consultant’. 
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time. Public servants also did not have an intrinsic interest in the co-operative 
structure, also partly explaining the decline of the model (Munro, 2003). It is 
insightful that these factors were starting to frustrate the viability of the agricultural 
co-operative sector in the 1960s, as it indicates a waning in the agricultural co-
operative sector that has been evident for several decades.68  
Another possible explanation for the declining agricultural co-operative 
sector from the 1960s can be based around the concept of co-operative development 
as an expression of a farmer initiated social movement as discussed in Mooney & 
Gray (2002). The first phase of Western Australia’s co-operative movement grew out 
of the economic and social difficulties facing farmers at the time. These primitive 
conditions and the economic adversity endured by farmers created the circumstances 
where people seek to improve their situation via innovative strategies based on 
mutual self-help. In this situation, it is possible to garner support from the 
disadvantaged for new approaches to overcome their hardship. However, as the 
Western Australian agricultural industry developed and prospered, the social and 
economic conditions for farmers and rural communities also improved. As Sandford 
(1955, p 299) stated ‘the pioneering atmosphere that surrounded the birth of co-
operation has gone.’ Consequently, the difficult conditions that created the drive to 
form agricultural co-operatives had been resolved and some co-operatives became 
less important and closed down, leading to their diminishing numbers.  
Munro supported this view, suggesting that the Westralian Farmers Co-
operative was very successful in enhancing farmers’ economic well being. Therefore, 
the original economic hardships that stimulated the formation of local co-operative 
stores had been alleviated and they were no longer needed (Munro, 2003). He argued 
that these co-operatives had achieved their function of correcting market failure and 
that by the 1960s, the private sector was able to profitably provide the services and 
products that previously could only be provided by co-operatives (Munro, 2003). To 
illustrate, by this time, supermarkets and private sector farm machinery agents were 
able to compete successfully with the co-operative merchandising stores (Munro, 
2003).  
                                                 
68 The interviews conducted for this thesis demonstrate that in the first years of the 21st century, the 
factors identified by Munro continue to thwart the standing of the agricultural co-operative model. 
The significant difference today is that neo-classical economic theory confers a legitimacy on actors 
when they dismiss the validity of the agricultural co-operative model. 
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Munro considered that improving technology also changed the external 
environment for co-operatives. Better roads and cars enabled rural people to travel 
more cheaply and efficiently to larger regional centres for goods and services, thus 
bypassing their local retail co-operative. Clearly co-operative member loyalty to the 
local co-operative was diminishing and this provided the space for for-profit actors to 
enter. Munro’s rationale for the declining number and influence of agricultural co-
operatives is consistent with Nourse’s competitive yardstick theory for agricultural 
co-operatives (Nourse, 1922, cited in Cook, 1995, Torgerson et al., 1997). Nourse 
considered that agricultural co-operatives should operate in a market as a competitive 
yardstick to ensure that IOFs behave appropriately and that the market would operate 
efficiently (Cobia, 1989). Once a market became competitive as a result of the co-
operative participating in the market, then the role of the co-operative was fulfilled 
and they could exit the market (Nourse, 1922, cited in Torgerson et al., 1997). 
Munro, while unfamiliar with Nourse’s theory, found it related well to his own 
observations of the evolution of Western Australia’s agricultural co-operative sector. 
As small agricultural co-operatives were undergoing change, Munro (2003) 
also identified that significant transformation was occurring within the dominant 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative itself. He argued that by the 1950s, Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative had operationally and psychologically evolved from a co-
operative to a corporation. In 1984, when Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
converted to the company Wesfarmers, Munro (2003) believed that its farmer 
members recognised it was a reasonable step for the co-operative to take.  
The Conversion of Westralian Farmers Co-operative to Wesfarmers 
In 1984, the Westralian Farmers Co-operative Board proposed that the Board 
restructure itself as a corporation, and this was subsequently endorsed by its 
membership.69  The Board was concerned about the possibility of a hostile takeover 
of the co-operative. According to Madden (2003b), and confirmed by Munro (2003) 
and Booth (2004), the co-operative’s $2.00 share (par value) was backed by net 
assets which reflected approximately $12.00 value per share.  The Board believed 
that a significant number of members could be enticed to sell their $2.00 shares for a 
                                                 
69 See Plunkett (1999) for more information about the restructure of Westralian Farmers Co-
operative. 
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higher price to a ‘corporate raider’, who would then control the co-operative (Munro, 
2003).70
In recognition of the effectiveness of the agricultural co-operative model to 
ensure farmer control and ward off takeover bids, Wesfarmers preserved two features 
of the co-operative business structure in its new corporate structure. The first was the 
retention of the overarching co-operative structure via Westralian Farmers Co-
operative, which held 60 per cent of Wesfarmers shares.  The second strategy was 
the holding of a single founders share (often referred to as the ‘golden share’)71 in 
Wesfarmers by the overarching co-operative.  These mechanisms were subject to 
five-year reviews by the Wesfarmers Board. 
By 2001, the Wesfarmers Board elected to wind up the Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative.72 Booth (2004) argued that Wesfarmers made this decision as it no 
longed needed the safeguard mechanism provided by the overarching co-operative 
structure to protect Wesfarmers from a hostile takeover.  Wesfarmers had, by this 
time, also evolved into a highly successful Australia-wide company.  The threat of a 
hostile takeover bid had become highly unlikely, as it would require substantial funds 
to achieve this outcome.73 Thus, the Westralian Farmers Co-operative story ended 
and its successor, Wesfarmers, was now totally in the corporate world. 
Munro (2003) accounted for the transition of Westralian Farmers Co-
operative to a corporation by the following sequence of events. When Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative was the wholesaler to a large network of retail co-operatives in 
country towns, the major source of cash flow was the commission it earned on 
selling goods and services to members. Westralian Farmers Co-operative was 
structured to devolve democratic power to its members, which is a key element of a 
co-operative structure. The 30 or 40 managers of the country town retail co-
                                                 
70 An agricultural co-operative, Pivot, was the target of an unsuccessful takeover bid by a private 
‘corporate raider’, Mr Don Shears, in 1987 (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). 
71 The Westralian Farmers Co-operative ‘golden share’ was a nominal share held by the co-operative 
that gave it the right of a decisive vote in the new company of Wesfarmers.  Thus the co-operative 
retained the right to veto all other Wesfarmers shareholders, ensuring the control of the co-operative 
over the corporation. 
72 As part of its finalising its activities as a co-operative, Wesfarmers donated $5,000 to the CFWA 
(Booth, 2004). 
73 Wesfarmers also reorganised its structure at this time, which included dismantling of the Franked 
Income Fund. This was another vehicle within the Wesfarmers group to protect it from hostile 
takeover.  The CFWA had some shares in this fund and recouped several hundred thousand dollars by 
selling them back to Wesfarmers (Booth, 2004). 
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operatives established by Westralian Farmers Co-operative were closely aligned to 
their local farmer members. The managers gained their power and authority from this 
familiar connection with the local co-operative members and used this strength to 
control and direct the Perth-based head office management team.  
Over time, however, the city based businesses or services Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative accumulated after WWII, such as finance and insurance services, 
started to earn more ‘profit’ for Westralian Farmers Co-operative than the simple 
commission based income from the co-operatives in the regions. As a result, the 
managers of these city based business units gained a stronger voice due to their 
contribution to Westralian Farmers Co-operative’s profitability. Correspondingly, the 
regional branch management power base gradually eroded. This trend was intensified 
as falling farm enterprise numbers also contributed to a declining member base.  
Munro argued that this shift in power from the country town retail co-
operatives to the city based managers effectively meant that Westralian Farmers Co-
operative had transformed during the 1950s from a co-operative to a corporation in 
behaviour and thinking, although it remained incorporated under co-operative 
legislation. He also argued that this occurred incrementally and without the farmer 
members being aware of it or understanding the implications for the Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative structure of the shift in the power base from the country town 
co-operatives to the managers of the commercially oriented Perth based business 
units (Munro, 2003).  
Eventually Westralian Farmers Co-operative’s change in direction resulting 
from its growth and transition to profit driven business units stimulated its 
subsequent restructure to a publicly listed corporation in the mid 1980s. Munro 
(2003) unsentimentally contended that co-operatives can get too big for the co-
operative structure and, under these circumstances, that it was appropriate that they 
become corporations. This, he argued, was to be viewed as a successful outcome for 
the individual co-operative, and not as a failure of the co-operative structure itself. 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative Contribution to the Agricultural Co-
operative Sector 
Although Westralian Farmers Co-operative eventually became a corporation, 
it is clear that it had a highly demonstrated commitment to the co-operative ethos. 
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Munro (2003) argued that Westralian Farmers Co-operative was jealously supportive 
of the co-operative sector. In the pre-WWI era, the co-operative champions 
persuaded farmers to adopt the co-operative structure due to its capacity to garner 
economic benefits for member farmers and exert some control over the supply chain. 
Further, Westralian Farmers Co-operative initiated and supported the formation and 
growth of other agricultural sector co-operatives within its own organisation. He 
stated that Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to provide services and 
infrastructure to the agricultural co-operative sector and contribute funds to the State 
and National Co-operative Federations up until the 1980s, even though it itself had 
outgrown the structure by the 1950s (Munro, 2003).74  
The Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector, largely as a result of 
being under the aegis of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, was clearly dominating 
the wider Western Australian co-operative movement. To illustrate the strength and 
influence of agricultural co-operative sector, a survey conducted in 1945 estimated 
that there were 32,000 members of agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia 
(Sandford, 1955). Sandford (1955, p 297) adds that in 1954, there were 52 country 
co-operatives under the banner of Westralian Farmers Co-operative and only eight 
non-agricultural consumer co-operatives. Five of these non-agricultural co-operatives 
were located in metropolitan Perth, two in the Goldfields and one in the South West 
(Sandford, 1955), demonstrating the historical imbalance between metropolitan non-
agricultural co-operatives and rurally based agricultural co-operatives. The city and 
metropolitan retail merchandising co-operatives failed to gain much traction or 
influence in Western Australia or to provide new directions or stimulus to the overall 
co-operative movement.  
Furthermore, the agricultural co-operative sector gained an inferred power 
based on its ability, via the agricultural industry, to contribute to the Western 
Australian economy. According to Munro (2003), the influence and strength of the 
agricultural industry encouraged a positive response from external actors, such as 
politicians, public servants and farm advisors, to the co-operative model as the 
preferred business structures adopted by the industry. Additionally, many of Western 
Australia’s politicians were also from regional areas. Tonts (1998) notes that a 
                                                 
74 Indeed, Wesfarmers donated some funds to the CFWA in 2003 (Western Australian Department of 
Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a). 
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political feature of rural Western Australia was a longstanding electoral 
malapportionment that facilitated a disproportionate representation of rural voters 
over metropolitan voters.  This resulted in country electorates achieving greater 
political representation than their populations warranted.  The notion of rural 
electoral malapportionment evolved from the 1870s in acknowledgement of the 
hardships of rural life and that much of Western Australia’s wealth came from 
agriculture (Tonts, 1998).75   
With the prevalence of co-operatives in rural areas it was not uncommon for a 
number of co-operative Directors to be in a politician’s electorate. The Directors 
therefore had considerable access to lobby politicians about co-operative issues 
(Munro, 2003). The CFWA, as the peak body, was well supported by the agricultural 
co-operative sector and, combined with the effect of electoral malapportionment, was 
therefore able to favourably influence political stakeholders, reinforcing strong 
member support (Munro, 2003). It is clear that during the period of Munro’s links 
with the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector, it functioned within an 
advantageous State and Commonwealth level public policy framework for 
agricultural co-operatives. 
The Westralian Farmers Co-operative story demonstrates that the Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative sector was very viable and deeply embedded into 
the social and economic activity of farming from the 1920s to the 1950s. While 
deviating from the Rochdale model, the top down strategy fostered by Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative undoubtedly succeeded in establishing a successful 
agricultural co-operative sector in regional Western Australia. Over time, Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative’s objectives expanded to develop the necessary infrastructure 
to service the needs of its farmer members and address market failure by developing 
more competitive markets (Sandford, 1955, p v). Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
matured over fifty or so years into a multipurpose agricultural co-operative providing 
a diverse range of services and goods to farmers across different sectors. It was a 
highly vertically integrated co-operative and operated in an international market. The 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative demonstrates that over successive generations, 
Western Australian farmers have been successfully functioning within the concepts 
                                                 
75 Electoral malapportionment remained in place until May 2005, when the Gallop Government 
(Australian Labor Party) secured the passage of legislation to remove malapportionment 
(Findlaw.com.au). 
 82
of ‘vertical integration’, ‘supply chain’ and ‘globalisation’ for decades. 
Paradoxically, much of the contemporary farm business literature urges farmers to 
develop these concepts (Botteril, 2003). In reality, farmers have been, in a very 
sophisticated manner, using their co-operative structures to achieve these outcomes 
for many decades.  
The Agricultural Co-operative Sector in the 1980s 
With the conversion of Westralian Farmers Co-operative to Wesfarmers, 
however, the agricultural co-operative sector lost its primary benefactor and 
leadership. Additionally, the switch to the company of Wesfarmers occurred at a 
time where the founding co-operative champions had retired and a second generation 
of co-operative champions with similar passion for the co-operative model in the 
wider agricultural industry failed to eventuate. Lastly, the conversion of Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative also resulted in a gradual loss of political influence for the 
agricultural co-operative sector and the CFWA.  
Despite the slipping power of the agricultural co-operative sector, new 
agricultural co-operatives still formed during the 1980s (Munro, 2003). Co-operative 
Purchasing Services, a wholesale grocery co-operative; Capricorn Society, which 
sources products and services on behalf of member co-operative service stations and 
smash repairs; and Rural Traders Co-operative, a wholesale and retail agricultural 
co-operative, formed in the late 1970s and 1980s. Munro (2003) remarked that Rural 
Traders Co-operative was a grass roots agricultural co-operative initiated under the 
banner of the Farmers Union (now WAFF), and was formed in response to the 
increasing neglect by Wesfarmers of its farmer base. This conforms with Madden’s 
(2003b) view that there will always be co-operatives in agriculture because as one 
co-operative grows and successfully moves onto another plane, the vacuum left 
behind will be filled by another agricultural co-operative.  
Another agricultural co-operative trend arose in the 1980s. Rather than 
coming from the traditional agricultural industries as in the first period of agricultural 
co-operative development, many of these new co-operatives were niche based in 
sunrise industries such as deer, rabbits, emu and olives. According to Munro (2003), 
they mostly failed as agricultural co-operative ventures. As Munro (2003) explains, 
the potential members in these niche sectors understood the co-operative concept at 
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an intuitive level and this enabled initial discussions with potential members to 
commence. However, at another level, probably financial, they were not prepared to 
commit to the initiative when the critical time came, leading to the collapse of the co-
operative business enterprise (Munro, 2003). Further, ventures into niche industries 
were often sidelines to the main commodity of farm businesses.  Unlike the first era 
of co-operative development, often this meant that there was not a great financial 
dependence by the proponents on the outcome of the experiment (Munro, 2003), 
which potentially weakened their commitment to the co-operative venture.  
Another factor was that many of the individuals involved in niche industries 
were more geographically dispersed than those with one commodity in a defined 
region (Munro, 2003). The lack of deep social and economic connections between 
the producers, apart from the shared interest in the niche activity itself, also 
contributed to the failure of these co-operatives. The success of Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative demonstrates the requirement for some pre-existing connection 
between members of a proposed co-operative to build the necessary trust to move to 
the subsequent stages of forming the co-operative business and building its economic 
viability. These close associations, often arising from hardship and cemented in other 
agricultural or community based activities, were in place prior to the first wave of 
Western Australia’s agricultural co-operatives. However, with the niche agricultural 
industries this pre-existing trust and these networks were not so well established.  
Munro thought that another major factor was that the farmers involved in 
niche production generally lacked the ability to see past the actual production of the 
niche product into developing it as a commercially viable consumer product for the 
retail market place. The newness of knowledge involved in a niche industry also 
undermined confidence to develop the co-operative venture over a longer period. He 
also commented that, ironically, if the product did have some potential in the market 
place, invariably a ‘cashed up capitalist’ would come in and take it to the market 
place after the producer members of the niche sector co-operative had undertaken all 
the early feasibility research and development (Munro, 2003). 
While many of the niche co-operative initiatives did not succeed for long, the 
continued interest in forming co-operatives demonstrated an ongoing knowledge in 
the 1980s of the commercial benefits of the structure despite the decline in overall 
agricultural co-operative activity. Interestingly, notwithstanding the lack of success 
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of these niche based agricultural co-operatives during the 1980s, many of the 
contemporary agricultural co-operatives in the agricultural co-operative mini-revival 
have also formed in these sunrise industries. Booth (2004) argues that the future of 
agricultural co-operatives in present day Western Australia is linked to these sunrise 
industries with the formation of small agricultural co-operatives comprising five to 
twenty members. Munro (2003), with his historical knowledge and perspective of the 
Western Australian agricultural sector, argues that there will always be a need for 
small interest groups with a commercial focus, and that these could be formed into 
agricultural co-operatives. However, as has been demonstrated with recent activities 
in these niche industries, the role of the external consultant (the ‘entrepreneur’) 
threatens the potential for grower control and ownership of returns via the 
agricultural co-operative model (Booth, 2004). Farmer groups presently involved in 
developing several niche sectors, such as olives, have potential for commercial 
success, and have been encouraged by professional advisors and consultants to use 
the corporate rather than co-operative model to develop their industries. The longer-
term wisdom of adopting a corporate business structure is debatable. However, the 
authority of agribusiness consultants, supported by an institutional framework based 
on neoliberalism, overshadows the limited advisory resources affiliated with the 
contemporary Western Australian co-operative movement.  
Another development during the 1980s in Western Australia’s co-operative 
movement was a drive, initiated by the Western Australian government, to integrate 
commercial co-operatives and non-profit community based organisations based on 
co-operative sentiments (Munro, 2003). The Co-operative Federation of Victoria 
(CFV) also notes the role of the Victorian government to try and amalgamate 
commercial and community based co-operatives around this time (Co-operative 
Federation of Victoria, n.d.). According to the CFV (n.d.), the Victorian government 
funded two projects, one about employment co-operatives and the other housing co-
operatives. Both initiatives failed, attributed to the Victorian government driving the 
agenda in their development, rather than the grass roots endogenous approach found 
in co-operative theory (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, n.d.).76 Concurrently, 
Kenyon (1983) was exploring the potential of community and worker co-operatives 
                                                 
76 Booth (2004) argues that co-operatives in Victoria are more community based co-operatives unlike 
the commercially oriented co-operatives which are dominant in Western Australia. The development 
of the Victorian co-operative legislation partly explains this orientation.  
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in Western Australia. Munro (2003) participated in several State Government 
initiated meetings to explore the amalgamation of commercial co-operatives and 
community based activities under the co-operative movement banner.77  He 
commented that representatives from Western Australia’s commercially focused co-
operatives, which were essentially businesses, found it very difficult to comprehend 
the nature of a community oriented non-profit co-operative. Munro (2003) argues 
that the philosophical divide between the non-profits and the commercial co-
operatives was too great to enable a joint focus and the Western Australian impetus 
in the early 1980s to integrate the two approaches died away. Another effort to 
stimulate the community based co-operative sector was mounted in the late 1990s 
with the formation of a peak body for community based ‘co-operatives’, funded by 
the Lotteries Commission (Booth, 2004). It appears to have produced a website then 
rapidly disappeared. The proposed Western Australian legislation for co-operatives78 
will embrace ‘non-trading’ co-operatives, which are essentially community based 
non-profit entities, thus potentially revisiting the philosophical divide between 
commercial and community co-operatives identified by Munro. 
Decline in the Use of the Co-operative Structure 
Munro (2003) attributes the underlying cause of the decline in the co-
operative option to the lack of need for the agricultural co-operative in the 
contemporary agricultural industry. He contrasts the early period of rapid 
development in co-operatives that, he argues, formed in response to a need usually 
associated with market failure, with the contemporary situation where there are few 
agricultural co-operatives. By inverting the maxim of ‘need leads to co-operatives’ to 
‘no co-operatives, therefore no need’, he is able to dispassionately explain the 
decline in active agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. Based on this 
interpretation, he therefore argues that it is not appropriate to artificially stimulate 
interest in the agricultural co-operative model if the need for it is not there. He 
maintains that the highly institutionalised support for co-operatives in other parts of 
the world, such as in the United States and Europe, mistakenly props up agricultural 
                                                 
77 The Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 does not cover non-commercial 
entities, such as community-based organisations, even if these organisations philosophically embrace 
the co-operative principles.  Further, the Act prohibits entities not incorporated under this Act from 
using the term ‘co-operative’ in their registered name.   
78 Appendix Two discusses the Western Australian development of new legislation for co-operatives. 
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co-operatives and enables them to continue for the time being. This, he argues, 
simply masks the fact that the real need for agricultural co-operatives has passed 
(Munro, 2003). Later chapters in this thesis provide alternative explanations for the 
present day circumstances confronting agricultural co-operatives and their role 
within the changing environment of the Western Australian agricultural industry. 
Conclusion 
This chapter established that the severe economic and social conditions 
experienced in the emerging agricultural industry of the early 20th century triggered 
the early co-operative movement in Western Australia.  Further, this period produced 
arguably the most famous agricultural co-operative in Western Australia - Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative.  Westralian Farmers Co-operative underscored the role of an 
agricultural co-operative in contributing to the economic viability and social well-
being of the agricultural industry. The Western Australian agricultural co-operative 
sector, symbolised by Westralian Farmers Co-operative, subsequently enjoyed 
several decades of political and economic influence.  
In the mid 1980s, Westralian Farmers Co-operative converted to the 
corporation, Wesfarmers.  Implicit in this conversion is a proposition that the most 
appropriate pathway for a successful co-operative is towards a corporate structure. Its 
conversion also impacted in other areas of the agricultural co-operative sector, 
particularly the ability of the peak body to ensure that the co-operative movement 
functioned in a favourable public policy environment. The role of the peak body is 
explored in depth in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The CFWA: The Peak Body for the Western Australian Co-operative 
Movement 
Introduction  
Inherent in co-operative philosophy is the belief that co-operatives foster a 
broader movement by co-operating with other co-operatives. The sixth value of the 
Statement on the Co-operative Identity is:  
Co-operation among co-operatives - Co-operatives serve their 
members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement 
by working together through local, national, regional and international 
structures. (International Co-operative Alliance, n.d.). 
One way to develop a wider co-operative movement is to establish and 
support a peak body. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of the peak 
body for the Western Australian co-operative movement, the Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia (CFWA). The CFWA is a significant organisation in 
this thesis, as it has a direct relationship with, and bearing on, the well-being of the 
co-operative movement, the agricultural co-operative sector and hence agricultural 
co-operatives in Western Australia.  
This chapter reviews the current role of the CFWA, its organisational 
structure and its evolution as the peak body. The chapter analyses an array of 
challenges confronting the CFWA as it undertakes its complex peak body role of 
representing its members and the co-operative movement to government and the 
wider community while concurrently providing services and benefits to its 
membership. The analysis is particularly interested in the way the CFWA adjusts to 
the changing political and economic landscape of Australia emanating from 
economic reform.  
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As identified in Chapter One, several significant events occurred with this 
organisation during the research for this thesis. In 2004, the Co-operative Federation 
of Western Australia (Inc) changed its registered trading name to Co-operatives 
WA.79 The re-badging was part of a wider organisational restructure that included 
the abolition of the full-time staff position of Executive Officer and the incumbent, 
Mr John Booth, was made redundant. The Board of Directors subsequently 
contracted the secretariat function of the peak body to an executive management 
services consultant, Mr Peter Wells, of Peter Wells and Associates Pty. Ltd. 
Additionally, at the time of the restructure; several new Directors to the Board were 
elected.80  
These developments, to some extent, have complicated the narrative of this 
chapter. A large amount of the research for this chapter occurred during the former 
Executive Officer’s incumbency and shaped much of the analysis of peak body 
behaviour.81 With the change of name, structure and personnel, some of the 
commentary is now historical. However, the insights of peak body behaviour 
captured in the earlier research are pertinent to the overall argument of this thesis.  
The CFWA as the Peak Body 
The CFWA is the peak body for co-operatives incorporated in Western 
Australia under the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 and the Co-operative and 
Provident Societies Act 1903. The CFWA was formed in 1919 under its original 
name, the Co-operative Federation of Western Australia. It is the oldest co-operative 
movement peak body in Australia and has been continuously operational since its 
incorporation. The CFWA, as an organisation, is itself incorporated as an association 
under the Western Australian Associations Incorporation Act 1987. As required by 
this Act, the CFWA is democratically structured. Its membership elects member co-
                                                 
79 As the incorporated name of the peak body remains the Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia (Inc), and to simplify the narrative, the acronym CFWA is used throughout this thesis.   
80 The CFWA refers to its Board of Directors as a Council. 
81 While much of the research was conducted during the period in which the former Executive 
Officer, Mr John Booth, was employed by the CFWA, the final draft of this chapter of the thesis 
occurred after the restructure. For clarification, references to the individual employed as the Executive 
Officer will continue to refer to him as such. The individual contracted to undertake the secretariat 
function in early 2004 is referred to as the Secretary. 
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82operatives to form the CFWA Council.  In turn, the co-operatives elected to the 
Council nominate representatives from their co-operative to sit on Council. 
Currently, the Council comprises eight member co-operatives. A contracted 
secretariat consultancy firm services the Council representatives and attends to the 
day-to-day affairs of the CFWA. 
Only business entities incorporated under the Western Australian 
Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 or the Co-operative and Provident Societies 
Act 1903 can become members of the CFWA 83.  The CFWA does not represent other 
member based mutual organisations, such as housing co-operatives, building 
societies, credit unions and friendly societies, which have their own peak bodies 
(Griffiths, 2004).84 A diverse range of industries and activities forms the basis of the 
CFWA membership, such as: 
• Newspapers 
• Taxi cabs 
• Travel Agents (Wholesale) 
• Agriculture  - supply, marketing, value adding in a range of traditional 
and new niche industries such as inland aquaculture, carob and olives 
• Fishing 
• Irrigation 
• Storage containers, freight 
• Rural community development  
• Merchandising  - retail and wholesale in grocery, farm machinery, 
hardware 
• Services to Agriculture  - grain handling, storage and marketing, 
abattoirs 
In May 2005, 71 co-operatives were incorporated under the Corporations 
(Co-operative) Act 1943 or the 1903 Act, and listed on the Western Australian 
Department of Consumer and Employment Protection database of co-operatives 
(2005a).85 All but one of these registered co-operatives was ‘active’; that is, 
                                                 
82 The Council is analogous to a Board and in subsequent parts of this chapter, reference is made to 
the activities of a Board.  
83 There are only a few CFWA member co-operatives registered under the Co-operative and 
Provident Societies Act 1903. 
84 The peak bodies for these mutual organisations are not part of this research. The fragmentation of 
the mutual and co-operative sectors and the consequent lack of an overarching national peak body for 
all mutual and co-operative organisations is one of the contributing factors to the marginalised 
position of the co-operative movement in Australia. 
85 The Department of Consumer and Employment Protection is responsible for administering this 
legislation.  During the course of this research, the Department of Consumer and Employment 
Protection reviewed the status of co-operatives registered under its legislation. In late 2003, it was 
estimated that there were approximately 80 Co-operatives were registered with the Department 
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operational and trading on a commercial basis. Of these 70 active co-operatives, 48 
were members of the CFWA (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004b). 
These figures demonstrate that the CFWA represented almost 70 per cent of 
registered co-operatives, which is a respectable membership density.86 Despite this 
high density, the CFWA membership has declined from 52 in 1994 to the present 48 
members (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004b). 
Membership fees are the main source of recurrent income for the CFWA. A 
few larger co-operative members contribute funds in addition to their membership 
fee as benefactors of the peak body. The CFWA also sources funds from fee based 
consultancy services to both existing and newly forming co-operatives and generates 
some profit from its annual conferences. A special levy was applied to members in 
2002, which raised $24,000 to assist members with professional development related 
to the proposed co-operatives legislation to replace the Companies (Co-operative) 
Act 1943.87 The Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment 
Protection (DOCEP) also contributed $15,000 in 2003 for the CFWA to provide 
advice to its membership about the proposed legislation (Interviewee 659, 2003). The 
CFWA also has some cash investments. Despite the recurrent sources of income and 
ad hoc special grants from government departments, the CFWA struggled to balance 
its annual income and annual expenses, resulting in the need from time to time to 
draw down on its investments (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 797, 2004).88   
A significant issue facing the CFWA is the drafting of new Western 
Australian legislation for the co-operative movement to replace the Companies (Co-
operative) Act 1943 and ensure greater consistency in legislation for co-operatives 
across all Australian States. The issue of new co-operatives legislation has been 
bubbling along for over a decade. Some recent impetus is evident, with an Industry 
Reference Group established by the Minister for Consumer and Employment 
                                                                                                                                          
(Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a). Of these 80 
registered co-operatives, about 55 were operational (Booth, 2004; Western Australian Department of 
Consumer and Employment Protection, 2005a). In the same time frame, the CFWA had a membership 
of 48 co-operatives (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2005b; Interviewee 649, 2003). 
86 Membership density is the percentage measurement of membership of all eligible co-operatives 
belonging to the CFWA. It is determined by dividing the number of CFWA members (48) by the total 
number of eligible co-operatives which are still operating (approximately 70).  
87 Appendix Two examines the progress of updated legislation for co-operatives in Western 
Australia. 
88 The CFWA 2005 conference suggested that this situation was stabilising (Co-operative Federation 
of Western Australia, 2005b). 
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Protection in 2004 to advise on the new co-operatives legislation in Western 
Australia (Newcombe, 2005). Another issue absorbing the Council’s energy is 
implementing the new strategic plan following its restructure in 2004. Particular foci 
of the strategic plan are governance and membership education issues, and ensuring 
the peak body’s ongoing financial security (Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia, 2003b). 
The Role of a Peak Body in the Co-operative Movement 
Sandford (1955) and Kenyon (1983) provide insights into the historical role 
of the CFWA. Writing in the mid 1950s, Sandford (1955, p 304) stated that the 
CFWA was a ‘strictly non-political and non-sectarian body, with its main object the 
promotion of co-operative activities’. The political neutrality of the CFWA is also 
repeated by Kenyon (1983, p 156), who stated that the CFWA was structured as a 
‘non-profit, non-political, non-sectarian, non-trading body’.89  
90Kenyon (1983)  provided additional information on the functions and 
services offered by the CFWA in the 1980s. He stated that the primary objective of 
the CFWA was to ‘co-operate and promote Co-operatives actively within Western 
Australia’ (Kenyon, 1983, p 157). Some excerpts from the extensive list of activities 
of the CFWA quoted by Kenyon were to: 
• Collaborate with interstate and overseas organisations 
• Encourage trade between Co-operatives 
• Extend its activities into the social and cultural field 
• Promote and protect the recognised co-operative principles 
• Advise and encourage Co-operatives in successful business 
methods 
• Provide a channel through which Co-operatives can make 
representations to governments 
• Overview legislative changes 
                                                 
89 The strong focus on political neutrality in the CFWA may be explained by the 1914 farmer 
meeting discussed in Chapter Four, which resulted in the creation of the Country Party to address 
political issues on behalf of farmers.  Farmers at this meeting also voted to form the Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative to pursue economic factors on behalf of its farmer members.  The two new 
entities strictly demarcated the political and economic pursuits.  Perhaps this exacting separation also 
carried across into the co-operative movement peak body, accounting for the non-political and non-
sectarian nature of the CFWA. 
90 Kenyon’s (1983) report to the Western Australian State Labor Government concerned the potential 
of the co-operative model for both community based and self-employment business ventures as a 
possible employment strategy.  
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• Provide a central organisation for the promotion, development, 
protection and assistance for co-operative activity. 
Kenyon recorded a number of specific member services provided by the 
CFWA during the 1980s, such as advice on accounting and banking, preparation of 
annual financial reports and organising training and development activities. He also 
referred to a range of administrative services to the Board of Directors, such as the 
organisation of district, regional and State-wide meetings. Lastly, Kenyon noted the 
capacity of the CFWA, in assuming the function of Secretary of the Co-operative 
Federation Trust Limited, to sign legal documents. The Co-operative Federation 
Trust Ltd was a registered company which had legislative and fund administration 
functions (Sandford, 1955; K. Smith, 1984) as specified in the Corporations (Co-
operative) Act 1943.91 This therefore directly involved the CFWA in the legislative 
functions related to the formation, liquidating and changing of co-operative rules. 
According to Munro (2003), this CFWA function was entrenched in the co-operative 
legislation to ensure that business ventures that were not genuine co-operatives did 
not attempt to form under the co-operative legislation to escape other legislative 
requirements demanded by, for example, the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 
or its predecessors.  
In August 2003, the CFWA Board of Directors ratified a new Strategic Plan 
which states that the purpose of the peak body is to be ‘The representative body for 
the promotion and development of the co-operative movement in WA’ (Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia, 2003b, p 1). Its vision is ‘To be recognised as a 
leading authority on the Co-operative movement in Australia making a significant 
contribution to Western Australian business and society achieved through the active 
participation and commitment of its members’ (Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia, 2003b, p 1). The political neutrality emphasised in both Sandford and 
Kenyon’s work is absent in this latest interpretation of the role of the CFWA. 
The range of services provided by the CFWA in 2004 includes: 
                                                 
91 In mid 2004, as part of the restructure of the CFWA, the Co-operative Federation Trust was 
incorporated into the CFWA for organisational efficiency, then subsequently wound up (Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia, 2005b). 
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• Development programs, seminars and workshops for co-
operative Directors and managers on co-operative principles, 
governance and good commercial practices. 
• Consultation with and presentations to State government on 
the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 and matters affecting 
the development of Co-operatives in general or an individual 
co-operative 
• Assistance with formation of co-operative companies. 
• Advice and assistance to co-operatives on administrative 
matters including statutory obligations. 
• Advice and assistance to co-operatives trading across State 
borders on implication of other State co-operative legislation 
and corporations law. 
• Promotion and facilitation of co-operative between co-
operatives  - intrastate, interstate and internationally. 
• Organisation of professional annual conference for members 
and persons interested in co-operative activity. 
• As a member of the Co-operative Council of Australia Inc, the 
CFWA provides an influential avenue through which 
submissions can be made on matters of national importance. 
• Maintenance of a register of members and details of other 
Western Australian registered co-operatives. (Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia, 2004a) 
The evolution and range of the CFWA activities outlined above reflect its 
particular approach as a peak body. A peak body can be defined as: 
A representative organisation that provides information dissemination 
services, membership support, coordination, advocacy and 
representation, and research and policy development services for its 
members and other interested parties, (though) it does not involve 
direct service delivery. (Industry Commission, 1995, p 181; cited in 
Melville, 2003, p 3) 
Another definition of a peak body is: 
An organisation, with other organisations as members, formed to 
represent the collective views of its members to government, to the 
community and to other bodies. (Hamilton & Barwick, 1993, p 17; 
cited in Melville, 2003, p 3) 
Melville (2003) argues that there is a gap in the literature and theory about 
the role, function and behaviour of this type of organisation. Melville’s (2003) 
research provides insight into the operation of community services sector peak 
bodies and their relationship with government in influencing public policy while 
these organisations concurrently adjust to different economic circumstances arising 
 94
from a market economy. Notwithstanding the earlier definitions, Melville has settled 
on the following statement of a peak body as:  
A non-government organisation whose membership consists of 
smaller organisations of allied interests. The peak body thus offers a 
strong voice for the specific community sector in the areas of 
lobbying government, community education and information sharing 
between member groups and interested parties. (Melville, 2003, p 5) 
Melville argues that this definition captures ‘the intermediary position of 
peaks in relation to the development of government policy, their duty of 
representing, informing the particular sectors that form their constituency, and the 
communication of information to the wider community’ (Melville, 2003, p 5). 
Melville’s definition suggests that a peak body consists of three sets of important 
relationships. The first is between the peak body and the State or government. The 
second concerns the link between the represented, the membership, and the 
representative, that is the peak body. The final relationship involves the peak body 
and the wider community.  
The CFWA is much more industry based than the community services peak 
bodies in Melville’s research.  Further the CFWA represents a membership focused 
on commercial rather than community issues. However, similarities occur in the role 
of both sectors’ peak bodies and the external environment in which they operate. In 
the same way as the community sector, the Western Australian co-operative 
movement and its peak body is also adjusting to the impact of the market economy 
on co-operatives and seeking to ensure that government policy does not discriminate 
against the co-operative movement. Therefore, Melville’s research is a valuable 
starting point to analyse the efficacy of co-operative movement peak bodies in 
undertaking this role.  
A comparison of the CFWA and the Canadian Co-operative Association, the 
Federal level peak body for the Canadian co-operative movement, and the United 
States National Co-operative Business Association, is instructive to identify 
similarities and differences between these peak bodies in representing their 
respective co-operative movements. Australia does not have directly comparable 
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92national level peak bodies to these two organisations.  However, the United States 
and Canada are, to some extent, also confronting the impact of agricultural 
restructuring and it is reasonable to suggest that the peak bodies representing the co-
operative sectors in these countries would face similar issues to peak bodies in 
Australia. Further, the literature review identifies that much of the literature and 
research in relation to agricultural co-operatives emanates from these two countries. 
Therefore, a review of their peak bodies is informative for Australian co-operative 
movement peak bodies. 
The Canadian Co-operative Association states that its purpose is to: 
Support its members and the co-op sector through the provision of 
services in three core areas - development, government affairs & 
public policy, and common table. (Canadian Co-operative 
Association, n.d.) 
As a point of contrast, the national co-operative movement peak body in the 
United States, the National Co-operative Business Association, states that it is the: 
….. lead national membership association representing Co-operatives 
of all types and in all industries. We are democratically organized and 
operate according to internationally recognized co-operative 
principles. Through our comprehensive education, co-op 
development, communications, public policy, member services, and 
international development programs, NCBA helps co-ops strengthen 
their businesses so they can better serve their members. It also 
provides a strong, unified voice on Capitol Hill. (National Co-
operative Business Association, n.d.) 
Using Melville’s (2003, p 5) peak body definition as a ‘bench mark’, the key 
elements of a peak body, while expressed differently, can be discerned in the 
statements of both the Canadian Co-operatives Association and the National Co-
operative Business Association. Both peak bodies position themselves as the 
intermediary link between government and their memberships, by representing their 
membership to government and facilitating the development of constructive 
government policy.  They both seek to inform and educate their membership on 
issues related to co-operatives, and communicate with the wider community about 
the role of the co-operative business structure in economic and social development.  
                                                 
92 The background of Australia’s efforts to establish similar national level peak bodies representing 
the Australian co-operative movement is discussed in the next section.  
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Sandford (1955) and Kenyon’s (1983) explanation of the role of the CFWA, 
as well as the recent CFWA statements (2003b; 2004a), indicate that the CFWA also 
undertakes elements of the functions and activities of a peak body as outlined in 
Melville’s definition.  However, there are some exceptions. The non-political and 
non-sectarian element is absent from Melville’s definition and the Canadian and 
United States co-operative movement peak body statements. The legislative function 
of the CFWA contained within the current Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 is 
another departure. Lastly, contrary to the Industry Commission (1995, p 181; cited in 
Melville, 2003, p 3) statement of a peak body, the CFWA undertakes activities which 
could be deemed ‘service delivery’, such as fee based consultancy services to 
proponents of embryonic co-operatives to establish their business ventures (Booth, 
2004).  
Additionally, neither Kenyon (1983), the 2003 strategic plan (Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia, 2003b) nor the statement of services (Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia, 2004a) purposefully separate the role and functions 
of the CFWA into the discrete internal and external foci suggested in the peak body 
definition. The United States and Canadian co-operative movement peak bodies also 
do not arrange their purpose and function according to this division.  
However, the sentiments of the CFWA statements, combined with many 
interview discussions about the role of the CFWA, make it clear that it seeks to 
represent its members and the Western Australian co-operative movement. It 
aggregates member co-operatives into a single voice to ensure that their individual 
needs are met via the collective structure of the peak body more efficiently than if 
these co-operatives independently sought these outcomes. The CFWA undertakes a 
number of external functions, such as advocacy and policy advice to government and 
other external institutions on co-operative matters. This has become a greater focus 
following the introduction of the 2003 Strategic Plan which contains a specific 
objective related to government affairs (Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia, 2003b). It also performs a range of internally focused membership 
activities, such as holding conferences and seminars to provide information and 
advice about topical co-operative issues. Therefore, while the 2003 strategic plan 
interweaves these activities, they are clearly identifiable as important foci for the 
peak body. While the CFWA has statements concerning these activities and does 
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attempt to implement these, the issue for the CFWA is the ability to achieve the tasks 
it sets itself. 
Historical Overview 
The historical landscape of the CFWA provides insights into its longevity as 
a feature of the Western Australian co-operative movement. As argued in Chapter 
Four, the early Western Australian co-operative movement was essentially an 
agriculturally based movement. The formation of a peak body for the Western 
Australian co-operative movement grew out of the need to coordinate the activities 
of Westralian Farmers Co-operative and a myriad of small rural and regionally based 
co-operatives servicing the agricultural industry (Sandford, 1955). Chapter Four 
revealed that the early Western Australian co-operative movement evolved into two 
strands. One strand comprised the Westralian Farmers Co-operative with its network 
of its own co-operative retail stores in many rural towns. The second strand 
comprised independent co-operatives in the towns where Westralian Farmers Co-
operative itself did not have a co-operative store. These independent co-operatives 
also became retail agents for Westralian Farmers Co-operative wholesale activities.  
According to Sandford, tension developed between these two strands when 
some independent local co-operatives sourced products outside the Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative wholesale range of supplies. Over time, as these small co-
operatives purchased greater quantities of supplies from private traders, they were 
unwittingly redirecting profits to the private traders and away from the wholesale 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and therefore farmer members. Co-operative 
movement proponents recognised this unintended consequence as potentially 
threatening to the future evolution of the embryonic Western Australian co-operative 
movement. 
The solution, promoted at a co-operative conference in 1919, was to form a 
peak body to provide this overarching coordination and strengthen the co-operative 
movement throughout Western Australia. The Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia (Inc) was formed within months of the conference (Kenyon, 1983; 
Sandford, 1955), making it the first co-operative movement peak body in Australia. 
Initially the CFWA struggled to provide the coordinating role it was established to 
perform. Sandford (1955) attributes the problems of the CFWA to coordinate the 
 98
fledgling co-operative movement to the primitive infrastructure of the period. He 
argues that it was not possible, given the transport and communication systems of the 
period, to organise the geographically diverse independent co-operatives into a 
cohesive movement which worked with other co-operatives or with Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative (Sandford, 1955). As an outcome, he contends, only those 
individuals and co-operatives associated with Westralian Farmers Co-operative, 
which had well-established transport and communication links, were able to develop 
an overall understanding of the co-operative movement.  
Sandford argues that up until the 1930s the CFWA was a ‘voluntary goodwill 
organisation’ (Sandford, 1955, p 178), and consequently unable to undertake the role 
and functions of a peak body as defined by Melville (2003). As the CFWA matured 
as a peak body, it was able to exert more influence over the co-operative movement. 
The first evidence of this increasing capacity arose after the Depression when the 
peak body championed the introduction of contracts between the Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative and the independent country town co-operatives (Sandford, 1955). 
These contracts ensured greater coordination between the separate parts of the co-
operative movement and removed damaging practices, such as sourcing products 
outside the Westralian Farmers Co-operative’s wholesale network, which 
inadvertently undermined the co-operative approach to business activity. These 
contracts also established the CFWA as the overall co-operative movement arbitrator 
on any contractual disputes that arose (Sandford, 1955). Sandford (1955) argues that 
managing the new contract agreements enabled the CFWA to fill its peak body role 
and subsequently develop an overall coherence within the Western Australian co-
operative movement.  
Sandford (1955, p 303) maps the structure of the CFWA in the mid 1950s, 
via a diagram reproduced on the following page.  The diagram reveals that 
representatives from the larger agricultural co-operatives dominated the CFWA 
Board, complemented by delegates from seven district co-operative councils located 
throughout rural Western Australia. Only one of the delegates to the CFWA Board 
was to be a manager of a member co-operative, indicating the authority of farmer 
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93members and Directors on the CFWA Board of Directors (Sandford, 1955).  The 
diagram literally and figuratively demonstrates the centrality of the CFWA in the 
Western Australian co-operative movement in this period, reinforcing the point made 
in Chapter Four that the Western Australian co-operative movement was essentially 
an agriculturally based movement.  
                                                 
93 This can be contrasted with the makeup of the current the CFWA Board of Directors, in which 
only one peak body Director is also a Director of a member co-operative, while the remaining peak 
body Directors are employed as managers of co-operatives. 
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The Contemporary Picture: 1955 
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Given the influence of Westralian Farmers Co-operative over the co-
operative movement, there was a deeply entwined relationship between the CFWA 
and the dominant co-operative.  This ‘less than arm’s length’ relationship continued 
until the Westralian Farmers Co-operative converted to a corporation in the mid 
1980s (Booth, 2004; Munro, 2003). Several examples illustrate this close connection 
between the two organisations.  Mr Walter Harper, the key driver in the formation of 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the Western Australian co-operative 
movement, was also the CFWA chairman from its inception in 1919 until 1953 
(Munro, 2003; Sandford, 1955). He was succeeded by Mr Ernest Thorley Loton, who 
also assumed the dual roles of chair of the CFWA and Westralian Farmers Co-
operative (Munro, 2003; Sandford, 1955). Up until 1948, the Westralian Farmers Co-
operative secretary also performed the CFWA secretariat function (Sandford, 1955), 
and the CFWA office was co-located at the Westralian Farmers Co-operative head 
office for many decades (Munro, 2003).  
The close and sustained link between the CFWA and Westralian Farmers Co-
operative perhaps set some limits on the independence of the CFWA to function as a 
peak body in the manner described by Melville. However, the motives of Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative in overseeing the CFWA at this period of the Western 
Australian co-operative movement’s evolution justified the close relationship. 
Without this connection, the CFWA would not have survived and the Western 
Australian co-operative movement may not have evolved to achieve considerable 
influence in the Western Australian economy in the post World War II period. 
Sandford’s (1955) account of the association between the two organisations 
demonstrates considerable benevolence and honourable intentions on behalf of the 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative towards the CFWA. Munro (2003) concurs with 
Sandford’s interpretation and maintains that Westralian Farmers Co-operative felt a 
great responsibility for the Western Australian co-operative movement and was 
jealously supportive of the peak body. While Munro believes that Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative itself had outgrown the co-operative structure by the 1950s, he 
maintains that Westralian Farmers Co-operative continued to provide funds to the 
CFWA, as well as services and infrastructure to support the co-operative 
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94movement.   Booth (2004) also comments on the residual nature of this goodwill as 
Wesfarmers donated a modest sum of money to the CFWA in 2003, although it was 
under no obligation to do so and had converted to a corporation 15 years earlier.95 A 
Wesfarmers subsidiary, Wesfarmers Federation Insurance, continued to sponsor the 
CFWA annual conferences for several years, demonstrating the longevity of this 
relationship.  
In addition to the CFWA gaining authority as a peak body from its close 
association with the powerful Westralian Farmers Co-operative, Munro (2003) also 
attributes the strength of the CFWA to its ability to influence government via 
regionally based politicians, a peak body function highlighted in Melville’s 
definition. As outlined in Chapter Four, Munro argues that the CFWA ability to 
shape public policy was linked to the rural base of the Western Australian economy 
and the influence exerted by agricultural co-operatives in the regions. Additionally, 
many of Western Australia’s politicians were also from regional areas and Directors 
had considerable formal and informal access to their politicians to discuss the 
position of agricultural co-operatives within the broader agricultural industry. 
Consequently, at that time, the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector 
operated in a very favourable public policy environment.  
Munro further reports that due to the privileged position of the agricultural 
co-operative sector in Western Australia in that period, the CFWA did not have to 
actively lobby politicians, but simply engage with them to ensure that the status quo 
was retained. According to Munro, the CFWA continued to exert significant 
influence in establishing and maintaining a positive co-operative public policy 
environment by the Western Australian government up until the mid 1980s.  
Munro himself was a significant CFWA actor from the early 1970s to the mid 
1990s. After approximately a decade of employment at Westralian Farmers Co-
                                                 
94 Despite Munro’s view that Westralian Farmers Co-operative was essentially behaving as a 
corporate entity from the 1950s, it continued with the co-operative structure for another three decades 
before it converted to a corporate structure in 1984. 
95 As discussed in Chapter Four, this 2003 donation to the CFWA was linked to Wesfarmers 
dismantling an overarching holding company which was still structured as a co-operative. The co-
operative structure was retained when Westralian Farmers Co-operative converted to a corporation in 
the mid 1980s to ensure farmer control of Wesfarmers and to protect the company from potential 
hostile take-over bids (Booth, 2004). As Wesfarmers attained subsequent commercial success, its 
large size served as a shield against threats of hostile take-overs and hence the safeguards embedded 
in the co-operative structure became redundant. Wesfarmers donated some funds to the CFWA from 
the winding up of the co-operative remnant. 
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operative, providing accounting services to member co-operatives, Munro 
established his own accounting firm. Westralian Farmers Co-operative supported 
Munro’s transition to self-employment and assisted him by providing office space at 
the co-operative’s head office. Known at the time as Munro and Wiley,96 the firm 
had a particular focus on the agricultural co-operative sector due, in part, to Munro’s 
former connection with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Munro, as a partner in the 
firm, personally continued to provide accounting services to the agricultural co-
operative sector, which included the winding up of non-active rural based co-
operatives. Early in the 1970s, a CFWA registered co-operative auditor97 from 
another accounting firm retired with about 30 rural co-operative clients. As that firm 
was not interested in retaining this function, Munro agreed that his firm would 
assume auditing responsibility for these 30 co-operatives. As a result of this 
connection with the Western Australian co-operative movement, Munro’s firm went 
on to do other accounting or related activities on behalf of the CFWA.98 This 
relationship between Munro’s firm and the CFWA became more formalised in the 
early 1980s when Munro’s firm was appointed by the CFWA as Secretary, 
undertaking secretariat and member service function on behalf of the CFWA. Munro 
personally provided many of these services until his retirement in the mid 1990s.99  
In 1996, the CFWA Board of Directors withdrew from the arrangement with 
Munro and Wiley and directly employed Mr John Booth as Executive Officer on a 
full-time basis. Booth occupied this position until January 2004, when the position of 
Executive Officer was made redundant following the decision of the CFWA Board 
of Directors to restructure the CFWA. The CFWA Board of Directors elected to 
                                                 
96 The firm is now known as Munro’s, Certified Practising Accountants. 
97 The Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 requires that the auditors of co-operatives be registered 
with the CFWA. This requirement is still current, although apparently not now widely known in the 
co-operative movement, the auditing industry or DOCEP which receives copies of co-operative audits 
(Booth, 2004). Consequently, auditors who are not registered with the CFWA inadvertently audit 
some co-operatives. 
98 According to Booth (2004), at that time the CFWA was the body responsible for auditing Western 
Australian co-operatives, which at a surface level conferred authority to the CFWA. However many of 
these co-operatives were agents of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, which implied less than an 
‘arm’s length’ audit.  
99 In addition to traditional Secretary functions of preparing materials for the Board of Directors and 
acting as the point of contact for external stakeholders, as the CFWA Secretary, Munro was also very 
involved in the auditing and accounting functions of individual member co-operative businesses as, at 
the time, this was deemed one of the key functions of the CFWA. The Secretary was highly embedded 
in the activities of member co-operatives. By contrast, the incumbent Secretary and the CFWA does 
not view its role as being this involved at this level in its members’ businesses (Interviewee 797, 
2004).  
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contract the role of Secretary to an executive management services consultant, Mr 
Peter Wells, of Peter Wells and Associates Pty. Ltd (Allomes, 2004). 
CFWA Links with other Australian Co-operative Movement Peak Bodies 
Co-operative Federations operate in New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia, and as peak bodies, perform similar 
functions. However, different organisational models are applied. Some Co-operative 
Federations employ full-time or part-time staff to undertake the function of 
Executive Officer, while others have opted for the contracted secretariat model 
currently adopted by the CFWA. Each peak body has developed in its own way in 
response to its contextual social, economic and political realities. It is clear that in the 
early co-operative movement of Western Australia, the co-operative model was 
conceived as an economic structure rather than as a vehicle for not-for-profit 
enterprises. This commercial co-operative focus was also inculcated into the values 
base of the CFWA and this commercial focus has continued as a primary orientation 
of the CFWA in the present day. The commercial trading nature of the CFWA is also 
embedded in the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. As a result, the non profit co-
operative sector has not gained traction in Western Australia.  
The Co-operative Federation of Victoria (CFV), in contrast, has commercial 
co-operative members, but also embraces non-profit co-operatives (Co-operative 
Federation of Victoria, n.d.). This difference in orientation between the CFWA and 
the CFV can be partly attributed to two factors. Firstly, the influence of the Catholic 
Church in Victoria in developing a co-operative movement based on social justice 
concepts charted the co-operative movement towards the community based not-for-
profit sector. Secondly, the lack of co-operative legislation for many years in 
Victoria suitable for commercially focused agricultural co-operatives drove 
commercial co-operatives to register under the then State-based Companies Act, and 
subsequently the Commonwealth Corporations Act, although co-operative legislation 
was introduced in Victoria in the 1950s. The New South Wales Co-operative 
Federation also has a strong non-trading co-operative membership reflecting that 
State’s own co-operative movement evolution. 
Although there were Co-operative Federations in most Australian States, 
Kenyon (1983, p 49) comments that Western Australia had the ‘strongest co-
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100operative ethos’ with over 600 co-operatives.  Kenyon (1983) and Lyons (2001a) 
also assert that the CFWA was an influential co-operative peak body not just in 
Western Australia but also nationally up to the 1980s. Smith verifies the role of 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and its contribution to the CFWA and the national 
peak body in his history of Wesfarmers (K. Smith, 1984). The Co-operative 
Federation of Victoria (n.d.) confirms that the CFWA also assumed a key role in the 
national co-operative movement.  
The CFWA, along with its sister peak bodies in New South Wales and 
Queensland, formed a national peak body, the Co-operative Federation of Australia, 
in the mid 1940s (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, n.d.; K. Smith, 1984).101 The 
Co-operative Federation of Australia was based in Canberra and largely funded by 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative via the CFWA (Lyons, 2001a). The power of the 
Western Australian co-operative movement at that time to influence the national 
peak body is demonstrated by the appointment of the CFWA Executive Officer to the 
Executive Officer position for the Co-operative Federation of Australia in 1965. A 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative employee was appointed as an Australian 
representative to the International Co-operative Alliance, further integrating 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative into the wider Australian and international co-
operative movement (K. Smith, 1984). The influence of Westralian Farmers Co-
operative over the Western Australian co-operative movement now extended 
nationally via the CFWA to the Co-operative Federation of Australia with links into 
the International Co-operative Alliance.  
However, according to Lyons (2001a), the Co-operative Federation of 
Australia collapsed in the 1980s. He attributes this to the significant change in the 
agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia brought about by the conversion 
                                                 
100 The reference to over 600 co-operatives in Western Australia in the 1980s is not supported by 
available co-operative registration data at DOCEP or confirmed in anecdotal recollections from actors 
involved during this period of co-operative activity. Booth suggests that the large number of co-
operatives quoted by Kenyon could possibly be explained by each rural merchandising co-operative 
under the overall banner of Wesfarmers deemed as a separate entity. However, Booth does not believe 
that it is credible that Western Australia ever had that many co-operatives. Kenyon may have included 
community-based organisations fashioned on the co-operative values but not incorporated under the 
Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 to arrive at this estimate. 
101 The Victorian Federation joined in 1970 and the South Australian Federation joined at a later 
date. Tasmania, Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory do not have Co-operative 
Federations and therefore were not been directly involved with the national body although their co-
operative sector interests were part of the overall national body coverage (Co-operative Federation of 
Victoria, n.d.).  
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of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the major funding source to the Co-operative 
Federation of Australia, to the corporation, Wesfarmers, in 1984. The Co-operative 
Federation of Victoria (n.d.) argues that, concurrently, the Co-operative Federation 
of New South Wales (CFNSW) became disenchanted with the national peak body 
and sought to introduce an alternative structure. The CFNSW withdrew from the 
national peak body and independently formed the Australian Association of Co-
operatives Ltd (AAC) in 1986. Other State Federations did not support this move and 
they elected to retain the Co-operative Federation of Australia as the national peak 
body for the co-operative sector (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, n.d.). 
However, it appears that the removal of the NSW Co-operative Federation and the 
loss of Wesfarmers funding and support was terminal for the Co-operative 
Federation of Australia, as Lyons argues that the Australian Association of Co-
operatives became the coordinating peak body from 1986 to 1993 (Lyons, 2001a). 
Despite this national peak body status conferred by Lyons, it appears to have had a 
New South Wales focus, rather than a national flavour. While Lyons credits the 
Australian Association of Co-operatives with strong leadership and provision of 
services to the co-operative sector, it too subsequently collapsed following some 
financial difficulties resulting from bad debts (Lyons, 2001a). The State Co-operative 
Federations then established, in 1993, the National Co-operative Council. This 
organisation was renamed the Co-operative Council of Australia Inc (CCA) with the 
Co-operative Federations of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, 
Victoria and Western Australia as members (Griffiths, 2004). It continues as the 
national peak body for the Australian co-operative movement.  
According to the CFWA, the CCA provides it with an influential avenue 
through which submissions can be made on matters of national importance (Co-
operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004a). However, the CCA lacks a 
dedicated secretariat and serviced office, and is only convened on an ad hoc basis. Its 
achievements as a national peak body suggest that it does not have a unified and 
cohesive State Co-operative Federation membership and further, that it has marginal 
influence on issues of national importance to the Australian co-operative movement. 
Griffiths (2004) reports that in the last five years, the CCA has only become involved 
in two issues, firstly, the drive for updated co-operative legislation and secondly, 
taxation matters. While acknowledging the amiable liaison between the State Co-
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operative Federations, Griffiths laments the reluctance of the State Co-operative 
Federations to regularly and consistently engage in ongoing co-ordinated public 
policy initiatives, citing two significant public policy matters which, in his view, 
have been neglected at the national level. The first is the International Accounting 
Standard 32,102 an issue strongly debated by the New Zealand Co-operative 
Association and the ICA, but with limited discussion within the Australian co-
operative movement. The second concerns the 2002 review of the Commonwealth 
Trade Practices Act 1974,103 an important piece of legislation underpinning the 
National Competition Policy. This legislation has implications for the co-operative 
business model due to the perceived anti-competitive nature of the collective 
approach to co-operative business that can be interpreted as engaging in collusive 
behaviour. Co-operatives can therefore be deemed as operating contrary to the Trade 
Practices Act 1974. This interpretation of the co-operative business structure presents 
a potentially significant legal and structural impediment to the development of the 
co-operative business model in Australia. Despite the significant implications of this 
review, Griffiths notes that the national peak body did not take it up as an issue.104
This lack of networking and a collective approach by various Australian 
States’ peak bodies reinforces the fragmented nature of the contemporary Australian 
co-operative movement. Furthermore, none of the State-based peak bodies nor the 
national peak body, the CCA, are members of the ICA, counter to the Statement on 
the Co-operative Identity of co-operatives helping other co-operatives and co-
operatives contributing to the community (International Co-operative Alliance, n.d.). 
While co-operatives are State-based entities operating under State legislation, the 
lack of a serviced national peak body has left a vacuum for the development of 
                                                 
102 According to Griffiths (2004) the International Accounting Standard 32 would result in the ‘share 
capital of most co-operatives being classified as liabilities rather than equities with three major 
impacts - the preparation of misleading financial statements, negative impacts on the ability of co-
operatives to raise finance and conduct business and the potential for consequential legal issues arising 
in relation to solvency test requirements.’  
103 Co-operative Federation of New South Wales (2002, p 4) argued in its submission to the Review 
of the Trade Practices Act 1974, that the Act ‘does not currently recognise the fundamental 
differences between co-operatives and other corporate entities. The Trade Practices Act 1974 is 
targeted at preventing the anti-competitive practices of corporations and has an inherent bias against 
businesses joining together. The Co-operative Federation submits that the Trade Practices Act 1974 
does not recognise the pro-competitive nature of the co-operative structure, being small businesses co-
operating through co-operatives to compete against other larger businesses.’ 
104 Two State peak bodies, the VCF and the NSWCF, prepared submissions independently for the 
review. 
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complementary and coordinated State or Commonwealth level public policy for the 
co-operative movement.  
CFWA Diminution in Peak Body Status 
The contrast between the period in which the CFWA was an influential peak 
body within Western Australia and nationally, and that of the early 21st century, is 
striking. It is evident that the influence of the CFWA as peak body has diminished. 
For much of its history, the standing of the CFWA was directly linked to the growth 
and support of Westralian Farmers Co-operative. The conversion of Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative to a corporation meant that the CFWA lost its major 
benefactor. The trend identified by Munro (2003) towards the winding up of rural 
town co-operatives also reduced the membership base of the CFWA and therefore its 
financial base. Other concurrent events also contributed to the waning of the CFWA 
influence from the mid 1980s. Munro (2003) argues that the relocation of the CFWA 
from its co-located offices at Westralian Farmers Co-operative head office to that of 
the Grain Pool contributed to the weakening of the CFWA as a peak body. 
According to Munro, the CFWA did not receive the administrative and financial 
support or the same level of goodwill in the new location that had characterised the 
CFWA relationship with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Further, in the 1980s, the 
CFWA experienced a hiatus arising from inappropriate Board of Director decisions 
that significantly undermined its authority as a peak body to external actors such as 
Western Australian politicians and government bureaucrats. This incident also 
severely eroded its financial base (Munro, 2003). While the CFWA membership 
wrested back control of the CFWA from the Board of Directors and re-established it 
as the peak body, the event occurred against a background in which the wider 
implications of the Wesfarmers conversion had diminished the influence and 
relevance of the CFWA and the importance of the co-operative movement in 
Western Australia.  
The CFWA has not been able to regain its former authority as the peak body 
driving the direction and evolution of the Western Australian co-operative 
movement. The conversion of the highly influential Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
to a corporation symbolises the broader issues confronting the Western Australian 
co-operative movement and its peak body in adjusting to a market economy. The 
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recent restructure of the CFWA can be interpreted as an indication of a desire by 
some member co-operatives to rejuvenate their peak body. It remains to be seen what 
direction the peak body will go following the implementation of these substantial 
changes.  
Analysis of Contemporary Issues Confronting the CFWA 
The next section of the chapter explores how the CFWA is managing its 
external public role along with the internal issues associated with servicing its 
membership. External issues concern the impact of neoliberalism on government 
public policy, on the agricultural industry and on agricultural co-operatives and 
therefore indirectly on the activities of the CFWA. Specifically, the relationship 
between the CFWA and Western Australian State government departments, and the 
ability of the CFWA to influence public policy, is explored. Secondly, the analysis 
delves into internal issues at the CFWA, such as its relationship with its membership, 
the role of the Board of Directors (the Council), the Board’s relationship with its 
appointed agents (employees or consultants) and the value of membership.  
Knowledge of the CFWA as a Peak Body for the Co-operative 
Movement  
The CFWA Council and Secretary view the CFWA as the peak body 
representing the Western Australian co-operative movement (Interviewee 649, 2003; 
Interviewee 797, 2004). This self identification of the CFWA as the peak body was 
also evident in discussions with the former Executive Officer (Booth, 2004). Further, 
interviews with individuals associated with co-operatives which are members of the 
CFWA confirm that they also view it as their peak body on co-operative matters 
(Interviewee 650, 2003; Interviewee 660, 2002; Madden, 2003b). Other interviews 
revealed that a positive relationship is apparent, in that the greater the interaction 
between an organisation or an individual with agricultural co-operative businesses, 
the capacity for the CFWA to be perceived as the peak body representing the co-
operative movement is higher. The converse is also apparent, in that the further an 
actor is from the co-operative movement, awareness of the CFWA declines.  This 
diminishing awareness only becomes an issue for the CFWA when the actor has 
some ability to influence matters of interest to the CFWA or the Western Australian 
co-operative movement.   
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Competition with Non-Co-operative Movement Peak Bodies for 
Membership 
A good understanding of the role and function of the CFWA as the peak body 
is to be expected by members of registered co-operatives, particularly those co-
operatives that are members of the CFWA. However, up to 30 per cent of registered 
co-operatives have elected not to join the CFWA as their representative peak body. 
The research has identified one agricultural co-operative that choose an alternative 
peak body to represent its interests (Interviewee 654, 2003). The CEO claimed that 
the agricultural co-operative did not see any value in belonging to the CFWA. He 
believed that the CFWA focus on representing co-operative business was not a 
sufficiently motivating factor to stimulate a decision to become a member.  He 
further argued that other peak bodies and organisations were able to meet the 
representative and professional development needs of his co-operative. He 
maintained that both he and the Board of Directors gained their professional 
development and support from membership of organisations such as the Australian 
Institute of Management (AIM) and the Australian Institute of Company Directors 
(AICD). He further argued that, as co-operatives were a subset of small to medium 
enterprises, there was no real need for a peak body specifically for businesses that 
structured themselves as co-operatives. Consequently, this agricultural co-operative 
was a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia 
(CCI(WA)).  
The CCI(WA) presents itself as the peak body in Western Australia for the 
private enterprise sector and undertakes the activities of member services and 
influencing a favourable public policy environment (Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Western Australia, n.d.). The CCI(WA) webpage states that it provides 
quality, cost effective support and services to enable members to build their 
businesses. Secondly, it lobbies government to create an economic and legislative 
environment which stimulates the role of private enterprise. It claims to represent 
over 5,000 businesses,105 ranging from self employed and small business through to 
Western Australia’s largest enterprises in all industries throughout the entire State. 
The CCI(WA) states that it is committed to the principles of free enterprise and 
argues that Western Australia will benefit from the implementation of National 
                                                 
105 The webpage does not state the actual number of financial members of CCI(WA).  
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Competition Policy (Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia, 
n.d.).106  
The views of the agricultural co-operative CEO raise significant issues for the 
co-operative movement and its peak body. Firstly, a peak body is not overtly subject 
to competitive processes, as being the ‘peak’ suggests that it is the only 
representative body for an industry sector. However, in a neoliberal environment, the 
CFWA is unable to assume that its natural constituency; that is co-operatives 
registered under the Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943, will routinely seek 
membership of the CFWA simply because they are registered co-operative 
businesses. By recasting co-operatives simply as small to medium businesses, the 
CCI(WA) is able to embrace co-operative businesses without the need to address the 
specific values underpinning the co-operative business model. Categorising co-
operatives as small to medium businesses essentially renders the co-operative 
structure as meaningless. However, for the CFWA, the business structure is the sole 
basis of membership. Of concern for the CFWA, the CCI(WA) represents many of 
the neoliberal values which, as Chapter Three revealed, undermine co-operative 
values. Hence, a preference of an agricultural co-operative for membership of the 
CCI(WA) over the CFWA is a potentially threatening development to the co-
operative movement and its peak body which needs to be closely monitored by the 
CFWA.  
Secondly, the views of the CEO reflect a lack of understanding of the 
essential differences between the co-operative business model and the IOF model. As 
a recently formed agricultural co-operative, and therefore closely observed by 
industry and rural media commentators, this lack of commitment by the CEO to the 
co-operative philosophy and the wider co-operative movement must be of further 
concern to the CFWA. Thirdly, as the co-operative’s Board of Directors had, at that 
point in time, not over-ridden the CEO’s views, it can be imputed that they also did 
not perceive value in belonging to the co-operative movement peak body, suggesting 
that it is not just one individual but a leading group of farmers who also share this 
view. Lastly, the CEO’s position demonstrates that he cannot discern any value in 
promoting the agricultural co-operative on the basis of the co-operative difference, 
                                                 
106 See Chapter Three for a discussion of National Competition Policy in the context of agricultural 
co-operatives. 
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and potential competitive advantage, to influential external stakeholders. This 
attitude further undermines the purpose of the CFWA as a peak body. This example 
demonstrates that the CFWA cannot afford to let registered co-operatives be unclear 
about which peak body best represents their particular interests.  
The Public Sector 
Actors within government departments which interface with the agricultural 
co-operative sector are generally aware of the CFWA as the organisation 
representing the State’s co-operative movement (Interviewee 659, 2003; Interviewee 
680, 2003; Interviewee 684, 2003; Interviewee 685, 2002). The existing knowledge 
within relevant government departments about the CFWA and its role as a peak body 
suggests that the CFWA is achieving one of its peak body functions, namely 
presenting its collective views to government.  
The Western Australian Department of Agriculture, the Department of 
Consumer and Employment Protection, 107 the Department of Local Government and 
Regional Development and the various Development Commissions and Business 
Enterprise Centres, as well as local governments, are potential contact points for 
actors seeking initial information and advice about co-operatives. With the exception 
of the Department of Agriculture that has some internal capacity to deal with initial 
queries about agricultural co-operatives, the research indicates that staff associated 
with government agencies do not attempt to personally deal with queries from 
proponents of embryonic agricultural co-operatives.  Staff prefer to redirect 
individuals to the CFWA.  
Some government departments have implemented ad hoc mechanisms to 
support the agricultural co-operative model.  The Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture has provided advisory and financial incentives to the proponents of 
embryonic co-operatives. To illustrate, the Challenge Dairy Co-operative obtained 
considerable funds as part of the dairy industry restructuring package to purchase a 
dairy processing plant (Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 2001a), and 
                                                 
107 The counterparts of this department in Victoria, South Australia and New South Wales have 
detailed websites providing dedicated co-operative information on registration processes and co-
operative legislation. The New South Wales department responsible for co-operative registrations and 
legislation had a large staff and was involved with co-operative research. The research activity was 
subsequently relocated to ACCORD. 
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an informal farmers group received Department funds for a feasibility study for their 
proposed co-operative venture (Interviewee 680, 2003).108  
The Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment 
Protection provided the CFWA with a $15,000 grant in 2003/4 to deliver 
professional development on behalf of the Department to co-operative businesses 
about the proposed co-operative legislation. The grant was a recognition by a 
government department that it did not have the institutional arrangements or 
resources to undertake this function and that this ability already existed within the 
CFWA. The development work associated with drafting new co-operative legislation 
has also provided the CFWA with a vehicle to build awareness of the Western 
Australian co-operative movement among the senior staff of various government 
departments and their Ministers. Nevertheless, these examples of constructive 
interaction between the CFWA and government agencies, when contrasted with its 
former ability to influence public policy in the broader economic and political 
environment, reveal that the influence of the CFWA and the co-operative movement 
has lessened.  
CFWA Connections with Other External Agencies 
The research suggests that the further away an interviewee is from the 
activities of agricultural co-operatives, knowledge of the CFWA as the peak body 
declines (Interviewee 655, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002). This group of interviewees 
represent organisations such as farmer industry associations, the rural media, 
professional institutions in occupations such as accounting, finance and the law, the 
tertiary education sector and agribusiness management consultants. The relatively 
low awareness in this group of the CFWA is particularly significant for the peak 
body as individuals from this group are very influential in the agricultural industry as 
professional advisors. Actors in this group assist and advise farmers about their farm 
business and in the process can exert influence over farmers about economic and 
political issues in agriculture. If the knowledge of professional advisors about the 
agricultural co-operative sector and the peak body representing this sector is low, 
they are unable to provide appropriate advice or balanced opinions to farmers about 
the economic benefits of forming co-operatives. 
                                                 
108 The farmers group comprised five local community members who were exploring agricultural 
value adding opportunities in their region, possibly via a co-operative structure. 
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109Agribusiness Consultants
To illustrate this point, an agribusiness consultant (Interviewee 689, 2002) 
has not had the need to liaise in a professional sense with the peak body, despite 
having clients who are members of agricultural co-operatives. However, he became 
aware of the CFWA in the late 1990s through the NGC study tours and subsequent 
presentations coordinated by the Western Australian Department of Agriculture 
about co-operatives.110 Booth (2004) asserts that in his time at the CFWA, the peak 
body rarely had agricultural co-operative inquiries emanating from agribusiness or 
management consultants. He claims to have interacted with most of the consultants 
working in the agribusiness area, particularly within the niche industries, and advised 
them of the benefits to farmers of adopting the co-operative business structure. Booth 
also argues that the greatest detriment to the formation of new agricultural co-
operatives in the niche areas is the role of the private sector agribusiness and 
management consultant. In his view, private consultants are ‘cherry picking’, by 
targeting the most economically viable niche sectors and convincing farmer groups 
to develop companies, tempting farmers with the prospect of higher profits from 
listing these companies on the Australian Stock Exchange if successful.111 Yet, 
Booth argues, the niche sectors would benefit most from adopting the co-operative 
structure. Booth contends that consultants are also motivated by self-interest to 
promote the corporate structure over the co-operative structure, as there is greater 
scope for consultant and management fees associated with establishing a company 
than forming a co-operative business.  
As Western Australian farmers readily seek the advice of agribusiness 
consultants, agribusiness and management consultants are significant gate keepers to 
farmers (Marsh & Pannell, 1999). If the CFWA wishes to influence an important 
group that in turn influences farmers’ decisions about business strategy, developing 
the knowledge of the agribusiness consultants and advisors linked to agricultural 
niche industries about the co-operative option is a worthwhile strategy.  
                                                 
109 Agribusiness consultants and advisors undertake a function that was often formerly delivered by 
Department of Agriculture extension officers. 
110 Appendix Three examines the NGC study tours and seminars. 
111 Munro, as discussed in Chapter Four, noticed a similar pattern in the 1980s with ‘entrepreneurs’ 
working in these niche industries. 
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Agricultural Industry Peak Bodies 
Western Australia has two main industry associations representing the 
agricultural industry - the Western Australian Farmers’ Federation (WAFF) and the 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association (PGA). Both have a number of affiliated 
smaller industry associations under their umbrella. The two agricultural industry 
associations embrace different political perspectives on agricultural industry policy; 
however, neither has a policy position on the agricultural co-operative sector.  
The PGA interviewee, actively favouring agricultural industry restructuring, 
expressed a personal view that the co-operative structure was only useful for those 
farmers who could not survive in the free market based agricultural industry on the 
basis of their own business acumen (Interviewee 656, 2003). The WAFF interviewee 
acknowledged the benefits of co-operative businesses in the agricultural industry, 
particularly the potential of co-operatives to rein in the excesses of a market 
economy (Interviewee 655, 2003). When the debate about the future of CBH as a co-
operative was topical, representatives from both WAFF and PGA sought advice from 
the CFWA on the merits or otherwise of retaining the CBH as a co-operative (Booth, 
2004; Interviewee 655, 2003). WAFF was also instrumental in driving the agenda for 
collective bargaining in the dairy industry and actively supported the formation of 
the Challenge Dairy Co-operative (Economics and Industry Standing Committee, 
2003).  
Managing the Tension Arising From Internal and External Foci of a 
Peak Body 
Peak bodies such as the CFWA are complex organisational structures. 
Melville’s (2003) definition of a peak body suggests that this type of organisation 
performs dual and possibly competing roles. Firstly, a peak body advocates on behalf 
of and represents its members in the external environment and, secondly, it services 
its membership. Prioritising and balancing these roles can lead to tensions within the 
peak body. 
The CFWA, until its 2004 restructure, tended to focus more on the 
membership side of its peak body functions (Booth, 2004) than on adopting an 
external orientation on public policy issues and promoting the co-operative 
alternative to the wider community. Several factors can explain the internal focus of 
the CFWA on its membership activities. As suggested by Munro (2003), in the past 
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the CFWA did not have to adopt a strong external public policy role to ensure that 
the co-operative movement functioned in a favourable public policy environment, 
due to its close linkage with Westralian Farmers Co-operative. Therefore, the 
organisation did not need to develop the culture of engaging in debates about public 
policy, although this advocacy role is a key feature of a peak body. Over time, the 
changing external environment lessened the influence of the co-operative movement 
in the overall economic performance of Western Australia. In this contracting 
environment, with diminishing access to government and politicians, the natural 
response of a peak body is to retreat and focus on its own membership. This 
comprises activities for members, such as timely dissemination to members of 
information on topical co-operative movement issues, arranging conferences and 
guest speakers, providing specific advice to individual member co-operatives and 
supporting potential members in new co-operative start-ups. 
In the view of the former Executive Officer, the most appropriate focus of the 
CFWA is on member services. Booth (2004) argues that the strength of the co-
operative sector is from within its membership base. He maintains that the CFWA 
members consider that the peak body is essentially a service delivery organisation, in 
which members pay a membership fee in exchange for a service. He argues that the 
primary objective of the CFWA is to service co-operative members to ensure that 
they are viable businesses that comply with legislative demands. Booth (2004) 
considers that in Western Australia, the commercial standards and auditing processes 
of co-operatives are weak and the CFWA should be supporting members to 
overcome this inadequacy. He also thinks that many Western Australian co-
operatives are not really acting as co-operatives. Therefore, the role of the peak body 
is to provide both education about the uniqueness and the intangible benefits of being 
a co-operative in a competitive environment along with how to build a competitive 
advantage for the co-operative business. Booth argues that the area of greatest need 
in the Western Australian co-operative movement is in assisting commercially viable 
co-operatives to establish themselves and survive the first years of business. He 
believes that building the commercial strength of the members will create positive 
role models for potential co-operative proponents to imitate. Given his focus on the 
internal co-operative sector and member services, he does not really see the CFWA 
as a lobby group. However, he acknowledges that it is important to keep in touch 
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with politicians about co-operative issues that he claims to pursue in a subtle and 
low-key manner. 
The restructure of the CFWA in 2004 ushered in a new strategic direction for 
the peak body. Collectively, the strategic plan’s purpose and vision statements and 
key objectives reflect a greater external orientation. The differences in perspective 
about the appropriate orientation of a peak body such as the CFWA are clearly 
demonstrated in these two views. The Executive Officer presents a case for an 
internally focused peak body with a strong emphasis on member services. Following 
the restructure, the new Board of Directors (Council) sought to adopt a greater 
external focus of influencing key stakeholders, while also attending to a range of 
governance and member education issues within the peak body.  
The CFWA case study demonstrates that managing this internal and external 
focus leads to tension: for example, focusing on external lobbying deflects the 
organisation away from the equally important task of servicing member needs. 
Conversely, an emphasis on member issues can cause a peak body to neglect the 
external advocacy role. Further, peak bodies can separate these activities to the 
extent that they are almost parallel functions rather than integrating and informing 
each other. It is difficult to determine if the individuals representing the different 
orientations in this case study are actually aware of the two concurrent strands to the 
functions of a peak body. Arising from this then is a potential inability to manage the 
tensions that arise within the peak body in trying to simultaneously achieve these two 
objectives or knowingly prioritising one over the other.  
Value of the CFWA to its Membership  - Self Interest versus Collective Interest 
A membership density of about 70 per cent suggests that a significant number 
of registered co-operatives join the CFWA as they perceive some form of tangible 
and intangible benefit and value results from their membership. Member co-
operatives can achieve value from CFWA membership through the peak body’s 
ability to aggregate its membership into a single voice to external stakeholders that 
individual co-operatives would not be able to attain independently. Secondly, 
members realise benefits from the CFWA as it provides them with services such as 
collating, analysing and distributing information, and providing education about the 
co-operative movement and specific advice about the co-operative as a business 
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structure. These benefits are greater than the costs of the membership fees and 
sufficiently motivating for a co-operative to justify renewing the annual membership 
subscription. 
The forthcoming co-operatives legislation and the implications of this 
legislation for existing co-operatives illustrate this collective benefit of belonging to 
a peak body for individual co-operative members. The legislation possibly has been 
the most significant issue confronting the Western Australian co-operative movement 
over the last decade. This matter has provided members with a strong motivator to 
renew their annual membership and support the CFWA as it negotiates the legislative 
changes on their collective behalf. The cumulative outcome of these CFWA 
activities conveys a value to individual co-operatives that is greater than the cost of 
its actual annual membership fees.  
The term ‘value’ often arose in interview discussions about being a member 
of an agricultural co-operative or of the peak body (Interviewee 655, 2003; 
Interviewee 656, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002); and came about in the context of 
how an agricultural co-operative could or could not create ‘value’ for a farm 
business, or how belonging to the peak body did or did not add value to the co-
operative. The language in these interviews suggests that the empirical meaning of 
‘value’ falls into two realms. The first is a neoliberal influenced rational choice 
understanding of value based around some material or economic benefit that satisfies 
a perceived self-interest. An alternative interpretation of value is to conceptualise it 
in the context of ideals, principles or philosophy. Accordingly, members of the 
CFWA determine if there is ‘value’ for their co-operative in joining the peak body on 
the basis of self-interested value or a more idealised concept of value linked to the 
co-operative principles.  
Rational Choice and CFWA Membership 
The empirical research suggests that the dominant interpretation of value for 
a co-operative to join the peak body is tied to a rational choice concept of value. 
Rational choice theory (see, for example, Hall & Taylor, 1996) implies that member 
co-operatives join the CFWA to achieve some form of instrumental benefit from the 
membership which is greater than the cost of annual membership. In evaluating this 
decision about the value of the CFWA membership, there is a tension for a co-
operative to determine if it should act independently or join with other co-operatives 
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under the banner of the CFWA to achieve its goals (Booth, 2004). Members such as 
Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH), United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC) 
and Western Australian Meat Marketing Co-operative (WAMMCO) are 
economically large and prominent co-operative business entities. Due to their size, 
they have sufficient influence as single organisations to behave independently on a 
number of fronts and do not need the collective power of a peak body to achieve 
their political or economic lobbying.  
This research has identified an example of this behaviour. According to an 
interviewee who was at the time a government officer, the individual was approached 
by a representative of a large and influential agricultural co-operative and asked to 
effectively delay the implementation of the new co-operative legislation (Interviewee 
658, 2003). The interviewee interpreted the approach as an attempt by this large co-
operative to preserve some of the favourable conditions under the current legislation 
while it sought to change its co-operative structure to a company structure. Another 
interviewee disclosed that concurrently, as a member of the CFWA Board, that this 
same co-operative also influenced the CFWA to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach to 
the impending legislation. Yet the CFWA is at the same time pressured by some of 
its member co-operatives and other interstate co-operative peak bodies to 
demonstrate that it is moving ahead on this issue. In contrast, smaller co-operatives 
lack this authority to influence external stakeholders in their own right and have little 
option but to rely on the peak body to collectively and without bias represent their 
interests in issues such as the new legislation.  
Olson's theory of collective behaviour explores this type of relationship 
between the represented and representative (Olson, 1965). Olson’s theory maintains 
that ‘unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, 
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests’ 
(Olson, 1965, p 2; cited in Ostrom, 2000). Olson’s theory suggests that self-interest 
motivates an individual’s involvement in collective behaviour. A conflict of interest 
therefore exists between individual and collective behaviour. The reward in behaving  
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112collectively is consequently the ability to achieve an individual’s own self-interest.  
Self-interested behaviour by a large member co-operative could be demonstrated by, 
for example, its ability to exert influence over the policies and strategies of the peak 
body in the direction of its own self-interested position (Interviewee 678, 2003). A 
large industry player can also use the peak body as a cover to conceal its own agenda 
(Interviewee 678, 2003). Membership of the peak body masks the power broker role 
of a large player as the peak body appears at arm’s length from the large independent 
player in providing advice to government. The ‘wait and see’ response of the CFWA 
discussed earlier to introducing the new co-operatives legislation is a possible 
example of this phenomenon (Interviewee 678, 2003).  
Olson argues that it is not rational for an individual to participate in collective 
action if that good is available to everyone. Hence, that individual would seek to free 
ride on the collective action of others (Olson 1965). Free-riding occurs when a 
member is able to gain the benefit of collective action without contributing to its 
availability (Cook, 1995; Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003). Co-
operative peak bodies in other Australian States have observed ‘free rider’ behaviour. 
Some co-operatives have elected not to join their peak body yet paradoxically sought 
to access peak body information from other co-operatives that are members (Booth, 
2004).113 Although a ‘free rider’ attitude indicates that the peak body offers some 
value or benefit to non-member co-operatives, as demonstrated by non-members 
seeking to access peak body information via a member co-operative, this value is 
insufficient to entice the non-member co-operative to pay a membership fee. This 
behaviour is consistent with Olson’s argument that individuals will not behave 
collectively by joining a group, such as a peak body, out of a sense of a collective 
ideal like a co-operative philosophy, but to achieve an identified and rationally 
determined self interest. This suggests that a co-operative movement peak body 
                                                 
112 The application of Olson’s theory to a peak body is paradoxical as the member of the peak body 
is also a collective organisation as a co-operative. Therefore, a peak body such as the CFWA is a 
collection of collectively based organisations, while Olson is referring to an individual joining a 
collective action. However, when a co-operative joins the peak body, Olson’s theory gives some 
insight as it seems that the co-operative can adopt the attitudes that Olson attributes to the individual 
when evaluating whether to join the peak body. 
113 Additionally, the trend of ‘free rider’ identified in some other Australian State co-operative peak 
bodies undermines the financial viability of the co-operative peak body due to diminished 
membership fees. However, the more subtle issue is that as the membership density is diminished, it 
potentially destabilises the peak body’s authority to assume this role in the eyes of Government, the 
main actor which the peak body seeks to influence. 
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therefore needs to identify other incentives or motivations beyond the ‘logic of co-
operativeness’ to entice co-operatives to join the peak body. These incentives need to 
be based around the ability of the peak body to satisfy the attainment of the potential 
member co-operative’s self-interest.  
While Olson’s theory of collective behaviour can provide some insight for 
co-operative sector peak bodies, Ostrom (2000, p 2) states that, in relation to Olson’s 
theory, a ‘substantial gap exists between the theoretical prediction that self-interested 
individuals will have extreme difficulty in coordinating collective action and the 
reality that such co-operative behaviour is widespread, although far from inevitable’. 
Ostrom (2002) suggests that the world comprises many types of individuals, some of 
whom are more disposed than others to initiate mutual activities to gain the benefits 
of collective action. Therefore, despite Olson’s theory, a large co-operative can 
belong to the peak body for reasons other than self-interest.  
Co-operative Values and CFWA Membership 
The work of Sandford (1955) and Smith (1984) suggest that, rather than self 
interest, the relationship between Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the CFWA 
was based on shared co-operative values and an altruistic commitment to the 
Western Australian co-operative movement. Booth (2004) also comments on the 
recent goodwill of Wesfarmers in donating a modest sum of money to the CFWA, 
even though it was under no obligation to do so and had converted to a corporation 
some 15 years earlier. Given that Westralian Farmers Co-operative was one of the 
largest co-operatives in Western Australia, and there are several accounts of its 
commitment to co-operative values, the size of the member co-operative is not an 
indicator of its propensity to behave in a self-interested manner. Simply because a 
co-operative is large does not mean that it will inevitably adopt values of self-interest 
in determining peak body membership.  
Co-operatives may elect to join their peak body because of their commitment 
to the co-operative principles and the co-operative movement, regardless of 
membership numbers, economic turnover, and ability to influence external actors in 
their own right. Institutional sociological theory, drawing on the work of Selznick, 
enables an organic analysis of an organisation (Perrow, 1986). An insight from this 
approach is that an organisation can, over time, become steeped with values that go 
beyond the specific operational tasks of the organisation. A sociological perspective 
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enables the CFWA to be reconceptualised as an institution charged by the founding 
co-operative fathers with the responsibility of ensuring the transmission over time of 
practices and attitudes found in the ‘co-operative logic’ and co-operative values. The 
ability of the CFWA to transmit the co-operative principles from one generation to 
the next within the co-operative movement, individual co-operative members and the 
wider society becomes a useful ‘benchmark’ of its viability as a peak body. Viewing 
the CFWA in this context provides an alternative approach to analysing its activities 
from that of rationale choice and self-interest or in the dual internal and external 
focus contained in the definitions of a peak body. 
Sociological theory also enables co-operatives to be understood as a 
culturally constructed form of organisation shaped by 19th century economic and 
social conditions following the Industrial Revolution. The successful transplanting of 
the co-operative business structure to Australia and the agricultural industry at the 
beginning of the 20th century demonstrates the compatibility of the co-operative 
model with the economic and social conditions of that time. In the subsequent 
Keynesian period, the co-operative business model was also found to be well suited 
to the social and economic views of that period. The connection between the values 
of the co-operative business model with the external political and economic systems 
is demonstrated by the sustained economic viability of the co-operative business 
structure and its peak body in Western Australia over the next five to seven decades. 
The peak body, established to represent the co-operative sector, absorbed and 
reflected back to the co-operative movement this time bound understanding of co-
operative logic and assumed responsibility of ensuring the diffusion of this logic to 
the next generation, political decision makers and the wider community. The peak 
body, in perpetuating these values, can therefore be viewed by external and internal 
stakeholders as a legitimate organisation representing the co-operative movement. 
While this compatibility between the external political and socio-economic 
environment and the values embedded in the co-operative philosophy continued, all 
facets were harmonised and the CFWA as the peak body was able to replicate these 
values through time. 
When there is a positive relationship between the values of the co-operative 
movement peak body and the wider society, members see the value in joining the 
peak body and retaining membership. Consequently, the co-operative movement 
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peak body is able to perpetuate itself over time. According to this theoretical line of 
reasoning, the ability to sustain this values based approach to membership of the 
CFWA is dependent on how much these values are also reflected in the broader 
society (Perrow, 1986).114 The mismatch identified in Chapter Three between the 
values characterised by neoliberalism, and those of the co-operative principles and 
represented by institutions such as the CFWA and the co-operative structure, partly 
explains both the small number of co-operatives in Western Australia and the 
challenges facing the present day CFWA as the peak body. While the concept of 
value embodied in co-operative principles or other non-material benefit captures the 
imagination of some present day co-operative member actors, on balance it does not 
seem to be a strong motivator for a co-operative to join the peak body. The lack of 
understanding of the co-operative values by external stakeholders of influence, as 
well as some of its member co-operatives, was a significant source of frustration for 
the former the CFWA Executive Officer (Booth, 2004). This suggests that the 
CFWA has been curtailed in its role as the institution transmitting over time the co-
operative values to the co-operative movement and the wider society. 
The introduction of new co-operative legislation will test the capacity of the 
peak body to transmit co-operative values to the wider community. The new 
legislation enables the incorporation of a new category of co-operative entities, that 
is, non-trading co-operatives. Historically, CFWA members were only commercially 
focused co-operative businesses and this new category of co-operative membership 
will bring a change to the deeply rooted focus on for-profit co-operatives. The 
CFWA will need to develop a values base that incorporates the aspirations of non-
profit co-operatives. Additionally, it will need to build a skills base to advise on non-
profit co-operatives, establish the networks to interact with this sector and institute 
democratic election processes to ensure appropriate non-profit co-operative 
representation on the Board of Directors. 
The impact of new legislation on other Australian co-operative movement 
peak bodies is instructive for the CFWA. The introduction of the new legislation 
suggests that, in addition to value based on self-interest or co-operatives principles, 
                                                 
114 Sociological theory also suggests that ongoing membership renewal of the CFWA may be 
interpreted as a form of organisational inertia (Perrow, 1986), whereby members continue their 
membership due to established organisational patterns rather than a strictly rational evaluation of 
accrued benefits of the membership. 
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membership value is also linked to major topical co-operative movement issues. The 
CFWA has demonstrable value for its co-operative membership in a period of 
significant change that has a direct impact on member co-operatives, such as the 
introduction of new co-operative legislation. The CFWA, to some extent, recognises 
this phenomenon, as it believes it has the attention of the membership at the moment 
as a result of negotiations with the Western Australian government about the 
proposed new co-operative legislation (Interviewee 797, 2004). However, the 
experience of co-operative movement peak bodies in other Australian States suggests 
that once the new legislation has been embedded and member co-operatives are 
familiar with its implications, the member need for the peak body can diminish until 
a new topical or contentious issue arises.  
The preceding analysis suggests that, in the current climate, membership of 
the CFWA can best be explained by rational choice theory. That is, the peak body is 
able to efficiently deliver material value to its membership, thus satisfying some 
form of self-interest within individual co-operative member organisations. However, 
the research has demonstrated that a commitment to co-operative values among 
individuals associated with member co-operatives remains a motivator for 
membership of the CFWA. Lastly, recognition of the CFWA’s ability to address 
topical issues on behalf of member co-operatives can also motivate membership, but 
this is dependent on the nature of the issue.   
Member Education 
Several commentators have noted that the lack of member education, one of 
the co-operative principles, is a reason for low member commitment to the co-
operative values. Both the International Co-operative Alliance (1999) and the 
International Labour Office (2001) emphasise the importance of member education. 
Many actors deeply connected to the Australian co-operative movement view 
member education as critical to ensure member loyalty, develop an understanding of 
matters confronting the co-operative movement, mobilise members around public 
policy issues, and importantly appreciate how co-operative values can contribute to 
competitive advantage in a commercial sense.  
The Victorian Co-operative Federation is particularly concerned about this 
issue (Griffiths, 2004; Interviewee 996, 2004) and has sought to develop Australian 
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specific education and professional development courses for co-operative Boards, 
staff and members. The CFWA Board of Directors has recognised the importance of 
member education and has focused on co-operative education in its strategic plan 
(Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2003b) and the statement of services 
provided by the peak body (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 2004a). 
As part of its restructuring in 2004, the CFWA established a Membership Committee 
with a particular focus on member education (Co-operative Federation of Western 
Australia, 2003b). The annual conference continues to be a main source of 
membership education about topical co-operative movement issues.  
Despite concerted efforts to stimulate greater interest in education issues by 
forming dedicated subcommittees for co-operative member Chairs and CEOs, it 
appears that these strategies have been difficult to implement. The CFWA is 
changing its focus on co-operative education by seeking to introduce courses or 
curriculum on co-operatives at tertiary and secondary education institutions 
(Interviewee 797, 2004). The change in strategy away from education directed at 
member co-operatives to a long-term strategy of seeking to introduce new curriculum 
in schools and universities reflects the difficulties facing the CFWA as a peak body 
in the area of co-operative education.  
Explaining Lack of Co-operative Member Engagement with Peak Body Matters 
A source of frustration for the former CFWA Executive Officer was a 
difficulty in encouraging members to actively participate in the affairs of the peak 
body. A Board Director  (Interviewee 935, 2004) of a rural based retail co-operative 
that is a member of the CFWA, provided a possible explanation for this seeming lack 
of commitment. He commented that member co-operatives are often inwardly 
focused on their own specific co-operative issues. He added that it is difficult to find 
volunteer co-operative Board members within the local community and encourage 
them to focus properly on their legislative responsibilities as Directors of their own 
co-operative. As a result, member co-operatives may not have the energy or desire to 
look at the broader Western Australian co-operative movement issues addressed by 
the peak body (Interviewee 935, 2004). Therefore, understanding the wider 
‘political’ issues associated with the peak body and the co-operative movement and 
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encouraging volunteer Board members to take on Director duties at the peak body 
can be very onerous for small member co-operatives.  
This interviewee’s comments suggest that, as some of its members have to be 
inwardly focused on their own business survival, the CFWA pursues issues that are 
not overly relevant for some members, particularly smaller regionally located co-
operatives. As a consequence, the CFWA can inadvertently become detached from 
segments of its membership base. He also stated that the big agricultural co-operative 
members of the CFWA, which he believed were now essentially corporate entities 
except in legislation or name, did not care about smaller co-operatives or the viability 
of the wider co-operative movement (Interviewee 935, 2004).  
His views highlight a paradox. Smaller co-operatives are tightly stretched in 
their own human and financial resources, while the larger co-operatives have the 
organisational capacity to provide the human resources to undertake Board of 
Director functions at the CFWA. Consequently, smaller regionally based co-
operatives become further disenfranchised from the peak body, as the Board of 
Directors, predominantly from larger co-operatives, do not have the ability to 
empathise with issues confronting smaller member co-operatives. The difficulty with 
this situation is that, without the support of all its members, the peak body risks 
becoming ineffectual in its ability to represent the diversity of the entire co-operative 
movement and promote an environment that encourages a positive public policy 
environment for the co-operative movement, including small co-operatives. Further, 
as highlighted earlier, large co-operatives have the capacity to influence external 
actors independently of the peak body and do not need to rely on the collective voice 
of the peak body. However, smaller co-operatives are very reliant on the aggregated 
collective voice of the peak body to represent their interests to external stakeholders. 
The prevalence of representatives from larger co-operatives on the CFWA Council 
also raises other issues. 
Board of Directors and the Agent 
The principal-agent relationship can provide some insight to the relationship 
between the Board of Directors and the individual appointed to carry out the Board’s 
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115directions.  Mathews (1999) explains that the principal-agent relationship is 
established when one actor - the agent - agrees to comply with the wishes of and 
represent the principal, who in turn agrees to provide the agent with a specified 
reward, usually a salary. According to this theory, the CFWA Board of Directors 
assume the role of principal and appoint the Executive Officer116 as an agent to act 
on their behalf, with both parties entering into a form of ‘contract’. Consistent with 
economic theory, the principal-agent relationship assumes that individuals by nature 
pursue their own self-interest and are opportunistic. As the agent pursues his or her 
self-interest, the interests of the principal and the agent can diverge and cause friction 
as each has imperfect knowledge and information about the motives and interests of 
the other. According to the theory, agents can express their self interest and 
opportunistic behaviour by shirking, under-performance, theft and collusion 
(Mathews, 1999; Perrow, 1986). Principals can theoretically fail to perform their part 
of the agreement of ensuring that the agent is fairly compensated (Perrow, 1986). 
The theory argues that the way to resolve this conflict is for the principal to enhance 
the quality of the contract and monitor the behaviour of the agent against the 
contract. 
A current Board Director expressed concern that, prior to his appointment to 
the Board, the previous Board of Directors had loosely guided the CFWA. As a 
consequence, much of the decision making and priority setting had been initiated by 
the Executive Officer (Interviewee 649, 2003). The Director acknowledged that the 
Executive Officer had assumed this role as a result of a governance vacuum created 
by an inactive Board. However, he thought the situation between the existing Board 
and Executive Officer had become ‘too cosy’ and that the CFWA needed some 
reinvigorating. The views of the CFWA Director intuitively correspond with the 
principal-agent theory. Implicit in his interpretation of the motives of the Executive 
Officer is a belief that the Executive Officer had created a self-serving niche for 
himself and that he had taken advantage of a compliant and passive Board of 
Directors. The Director, as principal, sought to resolve this by implementing a range 
of contracts such as an employment contract and a duty statement to monitor the 
                                                 
115 The principal-agent theory is also applied in Chapter Eight to understand the relationship between 
the United Farmers Co-operative Company Board of Directors and the executive management.  
116 This discussion refers to the position of the former Executive Officer as agent. The agent at the 
time of writing is the Secretary of Peter Wells and Associates, Pty Ltd. 
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activities and behaviour of the Executive Officer (Interviewee 649, 2003). While the 
views of the CFWA Director reflect principal-agent theory, they are not consistent 
with co-operative logic (Craig, 1993) or as a guardian of the peak body and 
transmitter of co-operative values to subsequent generations of the co-operative 
movement. 
Sociological institutional theory provides an alternative lens through which to 
view human behaviour. It contends that an individual’s world view will be shaped by 
his or her interactions with institutions, particularly the values base of these 
institutions, and that this will influence subsequent behaviour. This perspective 
enables the Executive Officer’s behaviour in filling a vacuum created by a 
disengaged Board of Directors to be interpreted as an effort to ensure that the co-
operative movement continued to have a functioning peak body to convey the co-
operative logic to members and potential members. Therefore, contrary to principal-
agent theory, this theoretical approach would suggest that the Executive Officer was 
not behaving opportunistically. Rather, his interaction with co-operative businesses 
and the wider co-operative movement had shaped his world view and values. 
Therefore, the Executive Officer, as agent, was not acting from self-interest and guile 
as predicted by principal-agent theory, but from a genuine concern to ensure that the 
CFWA continued to function and deliver a service to its membership in the face of 
Board apathy and possible lack of commitment to the co-operative principles. 
Board of Directors  - Balancing the Mix of Skills 
The relationship between the CFWA Board of Directors and the agents it 
contracts to act on its behalf raises another issue of interest. Of the eight co-
operatives elected to the Council, six of the representatives from these elected co-
operatives are senior management employees of their respective co-operatives. This 
is in marked contrast to the make-up of the CFWA Board of Directors in the 1950s. 
Chapter Four reveals that only one employee of a co-operative was permitted to sit 
on the CFWA Board of Directors, with the other Director positions occupied by 
individuals who were members of co-operatives (Sandford, 1955).  
Booth (2004) argues that a mix of members and employees of co-operatives 
on the CFWA Board of Directors is desirable as it provides a balance of skills in 
guiding the peak body across the breadth of co-operative sector issues. 
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Representatives of other co-operative movement peak bodies also view this 
combination of member and employee Directors on a peak body Board as 
appropriate (Interviewee 945, 2003; Interviewee 996, 2004). Managers of co-
operatives, as peak body Directors, can bring strength to the peak body in their sound 
administrative and management skills (Interviewee 945, 2003).  Additionally, they 
often have greater time to read documents and analyse policy issues (Interviewee 
996, 2004). To complement these skills, Directors involved as members in their own 
co-operative bring a broad perspective on the value of the co-operative structure in 
their industry and a strong user and owner perspective (Interviewee 945, 2003). Peak 
body Directors who are members of their own co-operatives can also act as a 
practical and commonsense brake on peak body Directors with management 
backgrounds and ensure that the peak body remains oriented towards co-operative 
principles (Interviewee 996, 2004).  
The issue is to ensure the appropriate mix of Board member skills and 
attitudes on the CFWA Board of Directors. The principal-agent relationship can 
provide insight into the different roles within the peak body. CEOs, in their 
employing co-operative, assume the role of agents. However, as Board members of 
the peak body, they are required to undertake the role of principal rather than retain 
the attitudes and perspectives attributed by the theory to them as agents in their 
employed position. Consequently, the question to be considered is whether the CEOs 
can adopt the appropriate mindsets to switch between the different roles of principal 
and agent.  
Munro (2003), in accord with contemporary organisational and management 
theory, argues that the CFWA Board are the policy setters for the co-operative 
movement, while CEOs are the implementers of these policies. This implies, as per 
principal-agent theory, that managers are essentially technical day-to-day actors 
undertaking functional and managerial activities, while the Board performs the 
broader visionary policy activities. Several of the members of the CFWA Board of 
Directors are employed as managers of their respective co-operatives.  Managers of 
co-operatives, as employees on a salary, do not necessarily bring to the role of 
CFWA Director the same perspectives as those individuals who are members of co-
operatives (Interviewee 996, 2004). Directors who have been involved in the 
formation or growth of their own co-operatives, and have an interest in its survival 
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and the wider political economy in which it functions, can bring to the role of 
Director a broader perspective than a co-operative employee (Interviewee 996, 
2004). Directors who are members of a co-operative have a strong and vested interest 
in ensuring that the peak body has a role representing co-operatives as a business 
model and influencing a positive public policy environment for co-operatives 
(Interviewee 996, 2004).  
In contrast, there is potential for a Board, dominated by managers of co-
operatives, to adopt a managerialist perspective and focus on issues that ordinarily 
fall into the domain of the manager - the agent - of the peak body. If professional 
managers of co-operatives fail to understand co-operative logic and assume that the 
co-operative behaves according to the logic of a ‘for-profit’ business, conflict with 
the inherent nature of the co-operative values will inevitably arise (Craig, 1993). This 
will influence the direction of the CFWA due to the different perspectives that 
Directors who are also managers of co-operatives bring to the understanding of a co-
operative and a co-operative peak body. Therefore, a Board of Directors dominated 
by the CEOs of member co-operatives may, over time, change the values orientation 
of the peak body (Interviewee 996, 2004).  
Lastly, the articulate professionalism of Directors who are career managers 
can be overwhelming for co-operative member Directors (Interviewee 996, 2004), 
who in their own careers may be self-employed farmers or taxicab owners. In other 
words, career managers can overshadow a Board containing only a few Directors 
who are also co-operative members. It is difficult for co-operative member Directors 
to counter this power imbalance in the mix of Directors and ensure the peak body 
remains true to its charter (Interviewee 996, 2004).  
Conclusion 
The CFWA journey from its registration as an association in 1919 
representing the interests of the Western Australian co-operative movement to the 
present has been a long and winding one. This organisation has functioned 
continuously for nearly eight decades, a significant achievement in itself. Throughout 
the majority of this time, the CFWA and the Western Australian co-operative 
movement, particularly in the agricultural co-operative sector, operated in a 
sympathetic and supportive political, social and economic environment. The 
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longevity of the CFWA suggests that it evolved into an institution with its own 
distinctive character and was valued for itself as much as for the technical functions 
it performed on behalf of its membership. However, in recent years, the present day 
CFWA has had limited success embodying co-operative values and transmitting 
these values to subsequent generations, achieving these aims within the Western 
Australian co-operative movement and the broader community. The chapter 
concluded that the CFWA is highly vulnerable to internal and external issues 
influencing the Western Australian co-operative movement overall.  
The late 20th century has produced different cultural interpretations of the 
role of the State and the market based around the concepts of neoclassical economic 
theory. This analysis of the CFWA demonstrated the effect of the contemporary 
Australian economic and political context on the peak body. The dominance of 
neoliberal discourse has essentially displaced the agricultural co-operative structure 
and its institutional support structures such as the CFWA from public debate. In this 
political and economic context, it is difficult for the CFWA to engage in public 
discussions about the co-operative movement or represent the interests of its 
membership to external stakeholders. Despite a desire to promote the co-operative 
structure positively to a range of stakeholders, the co-operative movement peak body 
is manoeuvred into adopting a defensive approach to dispel misconceptions about the 
co-operative structure held by many in government agencies, the business 
community, the media, and influential positions of leadership. Time will tell if the 
peak body can continue to perpetuate knowledge of the co-operative values to its 
membership, the wider community and political decision makers during a period 
when the external environment is not particularly receptive to these values.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Public Policy, Statutory Marketing Authorities and Agricultural Co-
operatives 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the interface between State and Commonwealth 
governments and the agricultural co-operative sector by analysing two related 
matters.  The chapter firstly examines the contemporary public policy framework for 
agricultural co-operatives in a period of agricultural industry deregulation.  The 
second part of the chapter explores a specific public policy issue, the dismantling of 
Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs), and the connection between SMAs and 
agricultural co-operatives.  The chapter revisits some of the neoliberal concepts 
raised in Chapter Three, extending the analysis to the repercussions of these notions 
on Departments of Agriculture, SMAs and the possible development of a revamped 
public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives.  
Public Policy 
Public policy has many definitions, though Gerston (2002, p 3) states that, at 
a minimum, it is the ‘combination of basic decisions, commitments, and actions 
made by those who hold or affect government decisions’. The United States Capper-
Volstead Act 1922 (Volkin, 1995) is an archetype of agricultural co-operative public 
policy enacted in the United States in the third decade of the 20th century. Via this 
legislation, agricultural co-operatives were, and continue to be, exempt from anti-
trust laws in recognition of the co-operative structure’s particular ability to address 
economic disadvantage for farmers.117 While Australia did not emulate this anti-trust 
strategy, two examples of legislation with specific links to the agricultural co-
operative suggest that historically, Australia provided a positive public policy 
                                                 
117 Anti-trust laws are similar to Australian laws dealing with anti-competitive behaviour. 
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environment to support agricultural co-operatives. Firstly, sections 117, 118, 119 and 
120 of the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment 1936 were specifically 
incorporated to provide taxation concessions for agricultural co-operatives, 
illustrating an early example of public policy for the agricultural co-operative 
structure.118
The second example of evidence from the first half of the 20th century of a 
constructive public policy environment for the co-operative structure is that most 
Australian States promulgated co-operative legislation that recognised the co-
operative business structure as a separate legal entity.119 These examples of a 
favourable public policy environment in the first half of the 20th century signal 
recognition by Australian State and Commonwealth governments of the difficult 
economic situation confronting farmers and threatening the viability of the fledgling 
agricultural industry. The capacity of the agricultural co-operative structure to 
resolve market failure, particularly its countervailing ability and the provision of 
goods and services the market was unwilling or unable to provide, justified a public 
policy framework for the agricultural co-operative structure. Policy makers 
developed legislative mechanisms to facilitate the development and financial 
viability of agricultural co-operatives. This form of public policy specifically for 
agricultural co-operatives on behalf of State and Commonwealth governments 
therefore contributed to the development of the emergent agricultural industry to the 
benefit of Australia overall.  
Public policy for agricultural co-operatives was reinvigorated in the early 
1990s to update, via State Departments of Consumer Affairs and State Co-operative 
Federations, co-operative legislation.120 A significant feature of the new co-
operatives legislation is the incorporation of the co-operative principles based on the 
1995 ICA Statement on the Co-operative Identity. Reinforcing the centrality of the 
co-operative principles in the updated legislation can be interpreted as a significant 
                                                 
118 An attempt in the Commonwealth Coalition Government’s 1996 Budget Proposal to remove 
Section 120(1)(c) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 survived an Opposition-controlled Senate 
with the support of Labor, the Democrats, the Greens and two Independents (Greenwood, 1996b). The 
ability of other political parties to prevent the Government’s efforts in this area indicate a residual 
positive public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives, as it demonstrates that agricultural 
co-operative advocates can rally political support for their cause when the structure is under some 
form of threat.  The issue has not been revisited by the Howard Coalition government and the 
concessions still remain in the Act. 
119 Victoria introduced specific legislation for co-operatives in the 1950s, the Co-operation Act 1953. 
120 Appendix Two reviews the development of State based co-operative legislation. 
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public policy statement about co-operatives. Parliamentary debates during the late 
1990s from various Australian States on the updated co-operative legislation were 
invariably supportive of the co-operative sector and the value of dedicated co-
operative legislation, regardless of which party was in government (see, for example, 
New South Wales, 1992; Victoria, 1996). The ability of the co-operative sectors 
within each Australian State to stimulate government support for updated co-
operative legislation in the closing years of the 20th century is a noteworthy and 
contemporary public policy statement about co-operatives. However, despite a 
decade of negotiations on new co-operatives legislation, Western Australia continues 
to operate under the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. No new legislation has 
appeared to date, and the extended delay in introducing this legislation in Western 
Australia can be interpreted as reflecting the low priority within the Western 
Australian government of the co-operative movement in a public policy sense.  
Notwithstanding the taxation concessions in the Commonwealth Income Tax 
Assessment 1936 and the updating of legislation for co-operatives, a deeper analysis 
of the co-operative movement public policy environment in present day Australia 
reveals a comparatively unresponsive state of affairs for agricultural co-operatives. 
Lyons (2001a) correctly argues that government interaction with the co-operative 
movement is characterised by a high degree of ambivalence. Although remnants of 
agricultural co-operative public policy linger into the 21st century in the form of co-
operative legislation, they mask an ambiguity about the agricultural co-operative 
structure among policy makers generally in Western Australia or Australia (Booth, 
2004; Cronan, 2001; Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 682, 2003; Munro, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the continued existence of State and Commonwealth legislation 
provides a solid platform from which to strengthen the argument for an overt and 
active form of public policy for agricultural co-operatives. Further, the historical 
rationale for a public policy position for agricultural co-operatives remains cogent 
and legitimises the role of present day government agencies to develop and 
implement public policy to stimulate and support co-operative development.  
Weak Public Policy Position for the Agricultural Co-operative Structure 
An inadequate contemporary public policy framework for Western Australian 
agricultural co-operatives has several implications for the agricultural industry. 
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Public policy silence on the agricultural co-operative diminishes the legitimacy and 
relevance of the co-operative structure in the contemporary agricultural industry and 
the wider agricultural supply chain. It is discriminatory as it covertly privileges the 
corporate business model over alternative business structures and permits 
stakeholders to overlook or devalue the potential benefits of the co-operative 
structure. It undermines stakeholder knowledge of the role of the agricultural co-
operative in the broader community, and limits the transfer of information and 
awareness about the ability of the co-operative structure to subsequent generations of 
farmers and rural communities.  
The contemporary Australian public policy position for agricultural co-
operatives can be contrasted with that in the United States (Torgerson et al., 1997; 
United States Department of Agriculture, 2002) and to a lesser extent in Canada 
(Fulton, 2001). The United States, rhetorically at least, also makes use of neoliberal 
theory to organise its economy, yet its public policy position for agricultural co-
operatives is explicit. In addition to legislative frameworks which confer taxation and 
anti-trust benefits to agricultural co-operatives, the United States provides significant 
institutional support for the agricultural co-operative structure (Fulton, 2001). United 
States government agencies at the Federal and State level, in agriculture and rural 
community economic development, along with other co-operative development 
organisations, often funded by the Federal United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), implement a range of strategies to develop and support agricultural co-
operatives. This support is diverse, such as a network of co-operative development 
organisations that employ development officers to advise farmer groups about 
forming co-operatives, and the provision of seed funding for feasibility studies and 
business plans. Agricultural faculties within several universities provide extension to 
and undertake academic research about agricultural co-operatives to complement the 
activities of government agencies. This research is closely linked with the 
agricultural industry to maximise reciprocal skills and knowledge transfer between 
actors from both the agricultural industry and the tertiary sector. There is also a 
strong linkage between regional and rural development policy and the role of 
agricultural co-operatives in rural community economic development (Fulton, 2001).  
The United States experience, mirrored to some extent by the Canadian 
approach, has an integrated and complementary set of public policies and strategies 
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to develop the co-operative structure. The synergy created by these intertwined 
elements of a cohesive agricultural co-operative public policy facilitates a virtuous 
cycle. To illustrate, other institutions orient themselves to supplement this public 
policy. Banking institutions are prepared to lend capital to co-operatives and the 
professional advisory services understand the co-operative structure and advise 
farmer groups from a strong knowledge base. Fulton (2001) argues that the 
institutional support offered via government agencies and other sectors is possibly 
the most significant factor in the United States agricultural co-operative 
development.121
In contrast, Australia and Western Australia do not have a similarly broad and 
integrated public policy framework supplemented by strong institutional supports 
and strategies to champion the agricultural co-operative structure. Unlike the United 
States, Canada and parts of Europe, Australia has invested very little in agricultural 
co-operative research (Cronan, 2003).122 Agricultural industry associations 
(Interviewee 655, 2003; Interviewee 656, 2003), other industry and business 
associations (Interviewee 688, 2001; Interviewee 689, 2002), the tertiary education 
sector and the professional bodies and banking sector (Interviewee 692, 2002; 
Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 2003; Interviewee 696, 2002) lack a basic 
knowledge of the co-operative structure or unintentionally perpetuate misconceptions 
about the model. The provision of publicly funded curriculum for co-operatives at 
secondary, technical or tertiary level is virtually non existent (Cronan, 2003), and 
promotion of co-operatives as part of a comprehensive economic development 
framework is marginal if not absent. Public funding for the co-operative peak body, 
which essentially undertakes some functions on behalf of government, particularly in 
                                                 
121 Fulton’s (2001) paper explores the New Generation Co-operative (NGC) phenomenon in the 
United States to explain why Canada has not experienced a similar explosion in NGC development. 
However, the conclusions he draws concerning the United States institutional support for NGCs 
applies to agricultural co-operatives generally and highlight the different public policy environment 
between the United States and Australia.  
122 According to Cronan (2003) Australia in 2003 had two PhDs specialising in the co-operative 
movement, and two PhD students researching agricultural co-operatives, including the researcher of 
this thesis. The Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development (ACCORD) affiliated 
with Charles Sturt University and the University of Technology Sydney, conducted research into co-
operatives. Cronan (2003) stated that government and the universities funded ACCORD, and that the 
centre did not receive any financial contribution from the co-operative movement. Funding constraints 
necessitated that ACCORD adopt a broader research focus into the ‘social economy’, which, it can be 
argued, diverted its attention away from dedicated co-operative research. ACCORD ceased operation 
in 2005. 
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advice on governance and regulatory responsibilities of co-operatives, is also 
marginal.  
Despite this neglect of institutional support for the agricultural co-operative 
sector emanating in part from a lack of public policy, there are fine examples of ad 
hoc initiatives. The Western Australian Department of Agriculture has undertaken 
several initiatives over a decade or so that demonstrate a strong and sustained 
commitment to stimulating the agricultural co-operative sector.123 Additionally, from 
time to time, the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection has provided 
small grants to the co-operative sector peak body to undertake specific tasks (Booth, 
2004).124 However, these informal approaches are highly dependent on the goodwill 
of individual government Ministers or influential public servants within these 
Departments. Hence, these initiatives are particularly vulnerable as the lack of an 
overall public policy for agricultural co-operatives prohibits these initiatives 
becoming more formally embedded within the organisation.  
Consequently, the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector has an 
under-developed and under-resourced institutional environment in both the public 
and private sectors to support the co-operative movement. An overall government 
policy statement on the value and contribution of co-operatives to the State’s social 
and economic development does not exist and is one of the factors contributing to the 
generally weak co-operative movement in present day Western Australia. 
Decline in the Former Public Policy Position for Agricultural Co-operatives  
Despite the theoretical and empirical benefits of the agricultural co-operative 
structure identified in the earlier chapters, this knowledge and understanding is not 
robust among present day actors. Consequently, the agricultural co-operative 
structure has slipped into a very neutral and passive public policy twilight zone. A 
number of interrelated and multi-levelled factors partly explain this decline in 
agricultural co-operative public policy.  
                                                 
123 Some of these activities are discussed in a following section. 
124 The Western Australian Department of Employment and Consumer Affairs has in the past given 
the peak body $15,000 in some financial years to fund specific activities, such as consultation with co-
operatives about the proposed legislation. 
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Chapter Three explored neoliberalism as the dominant paradigm driving 
Australian macro-level industry policy, including agricultural industry policy, over 
the last two to three decades (Pusey, 1991; Stilwell, 2000). The objective of these 
market-oriented reforms was to introduce greater competition into different industry 
sectors, including agriculture, and dismantle unnecessary regulation (Hilmer, 1993). 
The 1995 National Competition Policy Agreement involved a review of all 
State and Commonwealth legislation to determine if any piece of legislation had an 
anti-competitive impact on Australian industry. This review included legislation for 
co-operatives and Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs), which share some 
features in common with co-operatives. From the perspective of National 
Competition Policy, co-operatives are interpreted under the Trade Practices Act 
1974, the Commonwealth government’s anti-competitive legislation, as agreements 
between competitors, that is between farmers, which may be potentially anti-
competitive (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, 2002).  
The International Labour Office (ILO) (2001) commented on the implications 
for the co-operative business model of this international trend by nation States 
towards market driven economies and the use of competition policy to facilitate free 
markets. The significant issue identified by the ILO was the potential conflict 
between competition legislation and the agricultural co-operative business structure. 
The ILO argues that agricultural co-operatives are a collection of individual farmers 
who assemble to achieve economies of scale or other business efficiencies in the 
agricultural supply chain that they would not be able to achieve as independent farm 
business entities. However, the ILO acknowledges that, from the perspective of 
competition policy, this form of co-operation can be mistakenly interpreted as 
collusion. The ILO recommends that government policy makers acquaint themselves 
with the fundamental distinction between a co-operative business venture and the 
anti-competitive practices of IOFs to understand that the co-operative model is not 
engaging in collusive behaviour.  
This misinterpretation of the role of the agricultural co-operative confirms the 
difficulty facing advocates of the co-operative structure to develop a constructive 
public policy space within a neoliberal framework. Clearly, this misunderstanding 
about the role and function of the agricultural co-operative business structure is 
persistent. Submissions from the peak bodies of the co-operative movement in New 
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South Wales (Co-operative Federation of New South Wales, 2002) and Victoria (Co-
operative Federation of Victoria, 2002) to the 2002 review of the Commonwealth 
Trade Practices Act 1974, expressed concern that the Act does not comprehend the 
intrinsic differences between the co-operative business structure and other forms of 
commercial structures. Furthermore, the submissions argued that, contrary to 
contemporary understanding, the co-operative business structure is a pro-competitive 
market mechanism that corrects market failure and therefore stimulates a competitive 
environment. Consequently, the submissions conclude that the Trade Practices Act 
1974 has an intrinsic and entrenched prejudice against the co-operative business 
structure that impedes the development of successful co-operative businesses.125  
However, recommendations emanating from the review offer some benefits 
for the co-operative structure. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC), which already had the ability to adjudicate on anti-competitive 
practices that would otherwise breach the Trade Practices Act 1974 through a 
mechanism known as an authorisation process (Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, 2001), may develop a simpler process to enable farmers, as 
small business operators, to bargain collectively (Oczkowski, 2003). Despite this 
tentatively constructive outcome, the essential problem of a lack of understanding 
about the fundamental differences between the co-operative business structure and 
other business models in Commonwealth anti-competitive legislation, and the 
administrative and regulatory government bodies responsible for the carriage of this 
legislation, continues to plague the development of a public policy framework for the 
co-operative business structure.  
This perpetual misconstruction by highly powerful and influential actors 
within these Commonwealth regulatory and administrative agencies about the unique 
function of the agricultural co-operative structure and its pro-competitive role in a 
market economy, is deeply entrenched. Further, the competition policy interpretation 
of the co-operative business structure filters through to other influential agencies. To 
illustrate this lack of understanding about the role of the co-operative structure, the 
Australian Stock Exchange, a public company, has sought to accommodate those 
                                                 
125 The Capper-Volstead Act 1922 recognises the dilemma that agricultural co-operatives can be 
perceived as behaving collusively in anti-trust or anti-competitive legislation and overcomes this by 
quarantining, with certain qualifications, the agricultural co-operative from this type of legislation. 
The review of the Trade Practices Act 1974 rejected submissions recommending that Australia adopt 
a similar piece of legislation for agricultural co-operatives. 
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agricultural co-operatives seeking to raise external funds by listing them in a specific 
category on the stock exchange. At one level, this appears to be a positive 
development in normalising agricultural co-operatives as simply one option among a 
suite of business structures. However, the Australian Stock Exchange interprets the 
co-operative structure as an immature structure that will inevitably transform into the 
IOF corporate structure (Australian Stock Exchange, 2001). Consequently, rather 
than being presented as a valid model in its own right, the co-operative structure is 
stereotyped by the Australian Stock Exchange as an oddity among business 
structures that will eventually evolve into the standard IOF.  
In addition to the macro-level industry policy and the agricultural industry 
policy, another significant factor to explain the lack of an agricultural co-operative 
public policy is the manner in which neoliberalism invariably redefines the role of 
the State. The theory dictates that the private sector is able to provide services and 
goods more efficiently than the public sector, leading to the ethos of minimal and 
small government (Stilwell, 2000). Government delivered services, neoliberal theory 
argues, will lessen the well-being of society, as government provision of services 
tends to be bureaucratic, inefficient and stifles innovativeness (Stilwell, 2000). 
Neoliberalism maintains that governments cannot remedy market failures.  
Furthermore, the costs associated with leaving the market to resolve market failure 
will be lower than the costs incurred from government initiatives to address market 
failure. Under this model, the legitimate role of government agencies is pared back to 
facilitating a stable, free and competitive market to enable the private sector to 
assume the dominant role in an economy.  
Marsh and Parnell (1998) catalogue the significant changes in the functions 
of State Departments of Agriculture, particularly in the context of agricultural 
extension programs,126 as these organisations reposition themselves according to the 
neoliberal paradigm. As well as out-sourcing former government delivered services 
and employees to the private sector on the basis of private benefit, other strategies 
                                                 
126 Marsh and Pannell (1997; 1998) define agricultural extension very generally to encompass both 
public and private sector activities including technology transfer, education, attitude change, human 
resource development, and dissemination and collection of information. They also incorporate off-
farm as well as on-farm players in agricultural industries in this definition. The breadth of this 
definition could include a public policy position on agricultural co-operatives and the strategies to 
endorse and stimulate the uptake of this alternative business structure as part of agricultural extension. 
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127include decentralising a trimmed department  to the regions; implementing the 
‘Funder-Purchaser-Provider’ model; developing industry partnership groups; and 
focusing on cost-recovery and cost-sharing. In addition to the influence of 
neoliberalism in the development of agricultural policy and the redefined role of 
State Departments of Agriculture, Marsh and Pannell (1998) also attribute the 
changing function of agricultural government agencies to other more pragmatic 
factors, such as increasing fiscal burdens on government and the waning significance 
of the agricultural industry in the Australian economy.  
These competitive market driven policies alter the historical relationship 
between State and Commonwealth government Departments of Agriculture and 
farmers and significantly modify the traditional range of strategies available to 
Departments of Agriculture. Seeking to develop a public policy framework for 
agricultural co-operatives in this new paradigm is challenging as it is essentially 
contrary to open market policy strategies for government. Subsequent sections in this 
chapter explore in some detail the conflict confronting a Department of Agriculture 
in seeking to develop and implement an agricultural co-operative public policy in a 
neoliberal environment. 
This overarching account of the influence of orthodox economic theory on 
the lack of an agricultural co-operative public policy framework is supplemented by 
other related explanations. Chapter Three identified several elements of 
neoliberalism that are incompatible with the philosophy underpinning the co-
operative business structure. Briefly, the archetypal business structure consistent with 
orthodox economics is the IOF or corporate structure, which focuses on the pursuit 
of profit and the distribution of this profit to shareholders. In contrast, an agricultural 
co-operative is formed to pursue benefits or services for its members rather than a 
‘profit’ from a commercial activity. Another element of the neoliberal doctrine is the 
concept of individualism, which suggests that individuals should pursue activities to 
maximise their personal welfare (Lawrence, 1987). The co-operative model is a 
collective, rather than individualistic, approach to economic activity (Fulton, 1995). 
Economic theory therefore has a difficulty in accommodating a concept such as ‘co-
                                                 
127 A trimmed or pared down Department refers to the reduced Full-time Equivalent (FTE) public 
servants within the Department of Agriculture, as staff are made redundant or relocated to undertake 
former Department functions that the Department has privatised. 
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operation’ when one of the cornerstones of the theory is the pursuit of individual 
self-interest. 
Another factor leading to the diminished public policy role for agricultural 
co-operatives is the perception of the co-operative structure as an outdated business 
model.  A range of influential stakeholders, such as some professional advisors and 
agribusiness consultants, bankers and media representatives, often hold this view. 
The features of the co-operative model, such as its collective membership base as 
opposed to individualism, and its focus on services and benefits rather than profit, 
further reinforce the perceived oddity of this structure for this stakeholder sector 
trained in classical economic principles. This view is strengthened by the dominant 
discourse by commentators and many academics about the shortcomings of the 
agricultural co-operative structure. This commentary often focuses on the difficulties 
agricultural co-operatives encounter with capital raising, which allegedly do not 
occur with a company structure. The solution to capital raising challenges is 
supposedly found in converting the co-operative to a corporate structure, which in 
turn fortifies the dominance of the neoliberal paradigm. In summary, the lack of 
positive and informed understanding of the co-operative structure in the business and 
corporate world, reinforced by some elements of the media, combined with the 
deficit in professional training for stakeholders about the co-operative business 
model, along with the overriding ascendancy of the neoliberal paradigm, lead to a 
blindness about the economic value of a collective business structure in agriculture. 
Lastly, the capacity of the present day Western Australian co-operative 
movement to develop a relationship with government to explain the benefits and 
significance of the co-operative model appears to be limited (Interviewee 682, 2003). 
According to Interviewee 682 (2003), very little information about the co-operative 
sector crosses the desks of Ministers of a number of departments, particularly when 
compared to other business sectors. Consequently, ministerial policy makers and 
government department officers have minimal understanding of the co-operative 
movement and the co-operative structure. As the co-operative movement does not or 
cannot present a cohesive agenda to the government, the result is unclear or mixed 
messages about what the sector is trying to achieve. 
Despite a conducive public policy environment in the past to nurture the 
agricultural co-operative structure, contemporary public policy based on a 
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competitive market driven framework does not encourage the use of this business 
structure. Clearly, the development of an agricultural co-operative public policy in 
Western Australia will be very challenging. An agricultural co-operative public 
policy promoting the co-operative structure presents a quandary for policy makers as 
it potentially competes with central notions of orthodox economic theory and 
National Competition Policy. Additionally, agencies that administer or regulate 
Commonwealth legislation may be inclined to misinterpret the co-operative structure 
as a form of collusion (Co-operative Federation of Victoria, 2002). State and 
Commonwealth government public policy makers are unable to counter the efficacy 
of this interpretation as they have limited direct experience with or awareness of the 
benefits of the agricultural co-operative structure. Furthermore, their professional and 
classical economic training channels them into interpreting the model via the IOF 
prism. All these institutional elements contribute to the enervated state of the overall 
co-operative movement in Western Australia and Australia, and challenge the 
relevance of the co-operative business structure. Without an overt public policy 
framework for agricultural co-operatives supporting the peak bodies and successful 
agricultural co-operatives demonstrating the merits of the co-operative structure in a 
market economy, there is very little opportunity for these misconceptions to be 
corrected.  
Public Policy Theory for Agricultural Co-operatives 
The Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and the various State 
co-operative Acts to incorporate the co-operative structure are reminders that 
Australia had a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives. The concept 
of ‘public good’ provides a rationale for the further development of a public policy 
framework for the agricultural co-operative model. Musgrave and Musgrave (2003, p 
ii) quote Adam Smith as first defining the nature and purpose of a ‘public good’.128 
According to Musgrave and Musgrave, Smith supported the free market but 
understood that it had some deficits. Smith observed the existence of certain products  
which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a 
great society are, however, of such a nature that the profits could 
never repay the expenses to any individual or small number of 
                                                 
128 This concept of ‘good’ in economic terminology refers to something that may be tradable and 
have some economic value, rather than understanding the term ‘good’ in a moral sense. 
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individuals, and which it therefore cannot be expected that any 
individual or small number of individuals should erect. (A. Smith, 
1994 [1776], cited in Musgrave and Musgrave, 2003, p ii)   
Smith’s concept of a public good can be defined as ‘a good that, even if 
consumed by one person, is still available for consumption by others’ (Begg, Fischer, 
& Dornbusch, 1997, p 48).  The notion can be further understood by differentiating it 
from a ‘private good’. A private good is can be defined as a ‘good, if consumed by 
one person, cannot be consumed by another’ (Begg et al., 1997, p 262). The 
consumption of private goods is restricted to those individuals who actually pay for 
them (Begg et al., 1997). Those individuals, in purchasing and consuming the good, 
also gain the benefit of consumption (Kaul et al., 2003).  
The concept of public good contains two necessary features. Firstly, the idea 
of ‘non-rivalry’ embodied within a public good, in which the consumption by one 
individual of a good does not reduce the amount available for other people. Access to 
sunlight or fresh air epitomises this criterion to some extent. Secondly, the concept of 
‘non-excludability’ conveys the idea that when the good is provided, no individual is 
excluded from the benefits, as the benefits are collective. Kaul, Conceicao, Le 
Goulven, & Mendoza, (2003) argue that a public good which possess these two 
qualities absolutely is ‘pure’. Of interest to agricultural co-operatives, Kaul et al. 
(2003) adopt the term ‘collective good’ to differentiate ‘pure’ public goods from 
those that are applicable to a particular sub-set of society. An agricultural co-
operative is clearly a public good that is restricted to a sector of society, that is 
farmers, and is therefore appropriately termed a ‘collective good’. However, for 
reasons of clarity and simplicity, this analysis of agricultural co-operative public 
policy will continue to apply the term ‘public good’ rather than ‘collective good’. 
Clearly, the motivation for the provision of a public good is some form of 
market failure in the private sector. According to Musgrave and Musgrave (2003), 
Smith acknowledged that as the market fails to provide public goods, it is appropriate 
that government to do this. In a contemporary context, the term ‘public’ does not 
imply that its production is undertaken by a public sector, that is, by government, but 
relates to the consumption of the public good by the public (Kaul et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, the peculiarities of a public good often result in a government 
connection to it in some way (Pannell, 2004). Further, public goods often are not 
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free. The sheer cost of providing them discourages the private sector from 
undertaking this function, resulting in government provision at some cost to the 
community.129  
Pannell (2004) further differentiates the understanding of ‘public good’, 
which has a precise economic meaning, from concepts of ‘public benefit’ and 
‘private benefit’. ‘Public benefit’ and ‘private benefit’ are terms that arose in 
interviews with public servants when discussing issues around the present and 
potential role of the Western Australian Department of Agriculture with the 
agricultural co-operative sector (Interviewee 679, 2002; Interviewee 680, 2003). 
Pannell (2004) also notes the popular use of these terms by government agencies and 
actors, but points out that there is a deficit in theoretical information on ‘private 
benefit’ and ‘public benefit’, although there is considerable literature on the theory of 
‘public good’. Pannell (2004) defines the concept of ‘private benefit’ as benefits 
which are generated for the private landholder, while ‘public benefit’ concerns 
benefits generated for a collective group of landholders. According to Pannell, the 
‘public/private benefit’ concept is applied by government agencies as a rationale for 
funding activities that are considered to generate public benefits. However, 
government will not fund activities which result in ‘private benefit’ for individual 
farmers as there are assumed to be sufficient market based incentives for farmers to 
adopt the practice without additional government encouragement (Pannell, 2004). 
Pannell (2004) argues that the concept of public and private benefit is not derived 
from public good theory and is not linked to the concept of market failure. However, 
in the context of this thesis, both concepts clearly have an underlying neoliberal 
sentiment that rationalises when government should or should not be involved with 
the provision of a public good or a public benefit (Pannell, 2004).  
                                                 
129 However, a downside to the provision of a public good is the propensity for free-riding. As all 
individuals in a community share a benefit, it becomes a ‘public good’. Free-riding occurs when an 
individual is able to gain the benefit without contributing to its availability (Kaul et al., 2003). Chapter 
Five discusses Olson’s concept of collective action to explain the motivations for free riding. As the 
co-operative can be construed as a public good, consistent with any public good, there is an incentive 
for individuals to minimise their involvement in producing the public good, as it is accessible for all 
members, resulting in free riding (Cook, 1995; Fulton, 2001).  
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Public and Private Goods and the Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture 
In the context of a neoliberal paradigm, the concept of public and private 
goods and benefits determines whether government or the private sector provides the 
good or benefit. In the process of deeming a good or benefit as public or private, the 
role and structure of government is inevitably redefined (Marsh & Pannell, 1997, p 
8). The overall effect is the reorientation of government departments from direct 
delivery of many programs previously delivered by governments by shifting 
responsibility for delivery to the private sector. This also includes extension 
activities, such as agricultural co-operative initiatives.130 Extension activities have 
shifted from being a public good provided by the Department of Agriculture to a 
private good delivered by the private sector. This is rationalised on the basis that the 
consumption of agricultural extension, such as enhanced business management skills 
or technical production skills, translates into a direct private benefit for the individual 
farmers who consume this good, through greater on-farm business efficiency or 
profitability. Therefore, it is appropriate for individual farmers to pay, on a user-pays 
or fee-for-service basis, for extension. Secondly, neoliberalism assumes that the State 
or government services tend to be inefficient and bureaucratic while the private 
sector is deemed to provide these services and goods in an innovative, efficient and 
profitable manner (Marsh & Pannell, 1998). Consequently, it is presupposed that 
private agricultural consultants are better placed than State Departments of 
Agriculture officers to deliver agricultural extension (Marsh & Pannell, 1998).  
However, in the context of extension for agricultural co-operatives, it is clear 
that the market, represented by the private sector, has failed to provide appropriate 
advice to farmer groups wishing to explore the potential of an agricultural co-
operative. The research has identified several examples of farmer groups being 
actively dissuaded by private professional advisors and agribusiness consultants from 
adopting the co-operative structure for their proposed venture (Booth, 2004; 
Interviewee 664, 2002; Interviewee 665, 2003).  
                                                 
130 Marsh and Pannell’s definition of ‘extension’ is described elsewhere in the chapter. 
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Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Co-operative Public Policy 
A neoliberal interpretation of the role of the State also reinforces a narrow 
and one-dimensional interpretation about the agricultural co-operative structure. 
Rather than evaluating agricultural co-operatives from a neoliberal perspective, an 
agricultural co-operative public policy position requires a nuanced response from 
government that acknowledges the pro-competitive nature of the co-operative 
structure. Public good theory suggests that in market failure situations, government 
and government agencies have a legitimate function to provide public goods to 
ameliorate the market failure.  
Agricultural co-operatives are able to address two forms of market failure and 
therefore justify the development of a public policy position for the agricultural co-
operative. Firstly, a form of market failure in agricultural extension is arising, as the 
market is unable or unwilling to build the institutional support to deliver informed 
professional development and advice about the agricultural co-operative. Western 
Australia does not have one private sector consultant providing dedicated training, 
professional advice, or development services for individuals or groups of farmers 
seeking guidance on agricultural co-operatives,131 despite evidence of an existing 
market demand for these services. Additionally, due to the weak institutional 
environment surrounding the agricultural co-operative sector, including the co-
operative movement peak body, other organisations such as industry or business 
associations do not feel any pressure to meet this need for advice and support for 
agricultural co-operative development. The outcome for farmer groups of this 
entrenched lack of institutional support for the agricultural co-operative model is the 
exclusion of the co-operative structure as an option in the suite of business structures 
for proposed farmer group initiatives. Given the documented theoretical and 
empirical public good features of the agricultural co-operative structure, the market 
failure in agricultural co-operative extension has potential economic disadvantages 
for the agricultural industry.  
A second level of market failure is apparent, as the neoliberal interpretation 
of the agricultural co-operative structure devalues its capacity to perform a public 
good function within the wider agricultural supply chain. As stated above, neoliberal 
                                                 
131 The former Executive Officer of the CFWA indicated that he would undertake consultancy work 
in co-operative development and advice.  
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public policy interprets the co-operative structure as a form of collusion that is 
deemed as anti-competitive. However, an informed understanding of the co-operative 
structure reveals that it facilitates a competitive market by correcting market failures. 
Paradoxically, the lack of an agricultural co-operative public policy leads to a 
propensity for market failure in the agricultural industry. The difficult position of 
farmers in the agricultural supply chain identified in Chapter Three illustrates the 
depth of market failure in the agri-food industry. The development of agricultural co-
operatives by farmers can, to some extent, address this market failure. The multi-
tiered market failures arising from a lack of support for the agricultural co-operative 
structure at the agricultural industry level and in the institutional and extension 
spheres demand a public policy intervention by the Western Australian Department 
of Agriculture.  
Arguments to Justify a Public Policy Framework for Agricultural Co-operatives 
A key theme in the agricultural co-operative literature review in Chapter Two 
was the pro-competitive ability of the agricultural co-operative structure to correct 
various forms of market failure. Orthodox economic theory confirms that the 
agricultural co-operative structure is able to use economies of scale to countervail the 
power of monopolies or monopsonies in other links of the supply chain (Cobia, 
1989). Agricultural co-operatives are also able to provide a good or service that the 
market was unable or unwilling to provide (Cobia, 1989). These elements of the 
agricultural co-operative structure were a significant factor in the early adoption of 
the model in the agricultural industry. Chapter Two argued that, in its contemporary 
role, the agricultural co-operative structure is able to rebalance market power 
disparities between different actors in the agricultural supply chain. This pro-
competitive ability of the agricultural co-operative structure to even out the 
behavioural extremes of a free market economy demonstrates that the agricultural co-
operative performs a public good for society in excess of its specific business 
activity.  
From a sociological perspective, Chapter Two also demonstrated that 
agricultural co-operatives provide economic and social benefits to the industry and 
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132rural communities, thereby performing another form of ‘public good’.  Agricultural 
co-operatives facilitate the development of social capital, enable members to 
experience democracy within the co-operative, and strengthen active participation of 
members within their local community (Craig, 1993). Further, agricultural co-
operatives are mutual self-help organisations (Craig, 1993), which is compatible with 
the neoliberal tenet that individuals help themselves solve their own problems. As a 
result of these public good characteristics of the agricultural co-operative structure, 
government itself does not have to intervene to achieve these outcomes.  
The Department of Agriculture goal to develop the economic viability of the 
agricultural industry provides further justification for a public policy position for the 
agricultural co-operative model (Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 
n.d.). Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that the objective of the Department of 
Agriculture was to provide a benefit to multiple farm entities and the broader 
industry, rather than to a single farm unit. He maintained that agricultural co-
operatives also provide benefits to multiple farm entities and by default to the 
broader industry, and as such represented a form of public benefit. While Interviewee 
680 (2003) acknowledged that a corporate entity could also benefit multiple farm 
entities, the corporate structure does not have the intrinsic qualities of distributing 
surplus among members and providing service at cost, which contributes to the 
public benefit function of the agricultural co-operative structure. 
Consequently, he argued, there is a high level of compatibility between the 
wider public benefits delivered by the Department and agricultural co-operatives. 
Due to this consistency in outcomes, he argued, it was appropriate for the 
Department to provide public policy support for the agricultural co-operative 
structure. Therefore, in supporting the co-operative structure to benefit the broader 
industry, the Department was also achieving its own objective of benefiting the 
broader industry (Interviewee 680, 2003). Additionally and importantly, Interviewee 
680 (2003) considered that, as agricultural co-operatives have a net public benefit for 
the community and the industry, it was reasonable for the government to share the 
risk of fledging agricultural co-operative start-ups by providing access to seed 
funding for activities such as feasibility studies or business plans.  
                                                 
132 While social outcomes are not part of the economic theory of public goods, the wider social 
benefits of agricultural co-operatives in rural communities exceeds the actual co-operative activities 
(Mooney & Gray, 2002).  
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Concurrently, Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that in developing the viability 
of the co-operative sector, the Department of Agriculture is also building a private 
benefit for individual farmers as agricultural co-operatives have well documented 
economic advantages in improving the efficiency and profitability of the farmer’s 
individual farm enterprise. Therefore, he reasoned, a stronger agricultural co-
operative sector leads to a stronger farm enterprise, which then becomes self-
perpetuating. Interviewee 680 (2003) concluded that this end point of economically 
viable individual family farms, complemented by a viable co-operative sector, 
legitimised a public policy position for agricultural co-operatives by the Department 
of Agriculture. Paradoxically, Interviewee 680 (2003) added, an agricultural co-
operative public policy framework can facilitate government objectives of 
economically profitable and efficient individual farm businesses and over time, the 
withdrawal of overt government involvement in this area, further rationalising a 
public policy framework to develop the agricultural co-operative sector. 
In the opinion of Interviewee 680 (2003), several constructive side effects 
also result from a public policy position for agricultural co-operatives. Drafting a 
public policy framework and exploring the range of strategies within the Department 
to implement the policy results in a deeper awareness of the structure among policy 
makers. Further, a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives stimulates 
professional advisors, the media, and industry and business associations to develop a 
more informed understanding of the model. A public policy framework for 
agricultural co-operatives ensures knowledge transfer about the benefits of the co-
operative structure among present day and future farmers. A public policy 
framework legitimises the agricultural co-operative structure as a valid business 
structure, expanding the range of business model options for farmers as they seek to 
explore potential opportunities or shield themselves from the downsides of 
globalisation and industry restructuring. Lastly, an agricultural co-operative public 
policy positively influences gatekeepers and stimulates institutions to undertake a 
catalyst role in co-operative development and support.  
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Department of Agriculture Initiatives in Agricultural Co-operative 
Development  
A neoliberal paradigm diminishes the role of a government agency while 
privileging the private market. While a strong theoretical element drives the rhetoric 
of government policy, in the context of agricultural co-operative activity within the 
Department of Agriculture, the actual behaviour of some staff within the Department 
indicates that they are more engaged with the agricultural co-operative structure than 
neoliberal theory would suggest. To some extent, these activities reflect the views of 
individual Department officers that there is a justifiable role for government in the 
agricultural co-operative sector. These individuals tend to be informed by New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), which arose in the 1920s as a separate theoretical 
response to the market failures emanating from the interpretations of liberalism and 
classical economics (Hall & Taylor, 1996). This branch of economic theory 
legitimises a position for institutions, including governments, in industry policy. 
However, the dominant economic discourse in government agencies requires 
that arguments for a possible policy position for agricultural co-operatives be framed 
in neoliberal discourse to ensure its passage through the channels of government. It is 
a difficult and conflicting task to analyse an issue on the basis of one theory due to its 
explanatory capacity yet use the language of a competing theory to rationalise it in a 
public policy sense. However, agricultural co-operatives have always been pragmatic 
business structures. To ensure that the agricultural co-operative structure can perform 
its broader public good role of stimulating competition and correcting market failure 
in the agricultural supply chain, and contributing to the well-being of rural 
communities, this pragmatism must also enter into the debate on agricultural co-
operative public policy. 
The examples of ad hoc agricultural co-operative support and initiatives 
occurred under both the Western Australian Coalition and Labor Governments. The 
Department of Agriculture, in the last decade, has directed considerable public funds 
into developing industry knowledge of agricultural co-operatives. In the late 1990s, 
the Western Australian Department of Agriculture initiated several international 
study tours comprising agricultural industry actors, dedicated to exploring the 
agricultural co-operative structure, particularly the new phenomenon of the NGC 
structure (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 652, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002; Interviewee 
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133695, 2003).  The Department also sponsored lectures and seminars delivered in 
Western Australia by internationally renowned agricultural co-operative academics 
and proponents (Interviewee 689, 2002; Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 
2003). Additionally, the Department provided seed funding for feasibility studies for 
potential co-operatives to evaluate business concepts (Interviewee 665, 2003; 
Interviewee 680, 2003). It directed significant public funds and officer support to the 
establishment of the Challenge Dairy Co-operative as part of an industry 
restructuring package negotiated for deregulating the Western Australian dairy 
industry (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 652, 2003; Interviewee 679, 2002; Interviewee 
680, 2003). Further, the Western Australian Department of Agriculture has played a 
significant role in promoting the co-operative alternative to agricultural and allied 
industry sectors undergoing deregulation. Particularly in relation to the actual or 
potential dismantling of SMAs for the dairy, egg, potato and meat industries, the 
Department has been active in presenting the co-operative model as an alternative 
business model post deregulation. Department officers have also been involved in 
water deregulation, leading to the formation of farmer owned co-operatives 
managing the distribution of water rights.  
The Department has also supported and funded research into agricultural co-
operatives, such as assisting a staff member to undertake PhD research in the United 
States and contributing funds to Western Australian PhD research on agricultural co-
operatives (Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 681, 2001).134 Departmental officers 
driving agricultural co-operative initiatives have also sought to integrate the 
agricultural co-operative structure into other programs and strategies within the 
Department (Interviewee 680, 2003; Plunkett & Kingwell, 2001; Western Australian 
Department of Agriculture, 2002b). 
Perhaps the most significant example of Department of Agriculture activity 
has been the introduction in late 2004, after several years of persistent activity, of a 
new piece of specific Western Australian legislation for agricultural co-operatives, 
entitled Co-operative Loans Act 2004. This legislation enables Western Australian 
agricultural co-operatives to gain the benefits of S120 (1)(c) of the Income Tax 
                                                 
133 Appendix Three provides an overview of these study tours and seminars about the NGC model. 
134 This thesis is the Western Australian research partially funded by the Department of Agriculture. 
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135Assessment Act 1936.  Following Department information seminars about the new 
legislation, Interviewee 680 (2003) believed that there was a high level of latent 
interest from farmers about the co-operative business model.  
The introduction of the new loans facility coincided with the evolution of 
some niche industry sectors, such as the olive industry, which were investigating the 
processing stage for the commodity. Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that the loans 
facility provided the agricultural industry with a concrete feature that positively 
differentiated the co-operative business structure from the corporate structure and 
therefore cemented the co-operative structure as a viable option for these niche 
industries (Interviewee 680, 2003). Lastly, Interviewee 680 (2003) suggested that the 
loans facility was also a benefit for agricultural co-operatives as co-operatives were 
renowned for poor governance systems, particularly management and financial 
control. The loans facility requires co-operatives to be ‘profitable’ to benefit from it 
and therefore imposes financial discipline on co-operatives, overcoming the 
reputation of poor financial control in co-operatives.136
These ad hoc initiatives have arisen when individual public servants 
recognised the potential of the agricultural co-operative model to meet Departmental 
objectives of a viable agricultural industry, and therefore sought to stimulate the 
uptake of the structure. Apart from the Co-operative Loans Act 2004, which is 
institutionalised into Western Australian government policy, these agricultural co-
operative initiatives are dependent on the goodwill of three or four individual actors 
spread throughout the Department of Agriculture. While this is highly admirable at 
one level, this ad hoc approach is too dependent on these few individuals. If these 
individuals left the Department, then the momentum they created within the 
Department to support the agricultural co-operative would no doubt dissipate. 
According to Interviewee 680 (2003), State Departments of Agriculture throughout 
Australia have a similar informal approach in which individual public servants drive 
the co-operative agenda, as agricultural co-operative strategies are not entrenched in 
                                                 
135 Previously, the Western Australian government, unlike most other Australian State governments, 
had not introduced a mechanism to loan government funds with its associated taxation benefits to 
agricultural co-operatives under S120(1)(c) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.  
136 Interviewee 680 (2003) indicated that in promoting the new legislation to the industry that farmer 
groups interested in pursuing the co-operative model had little understanding of the steps required to 
establish a co-operative, suggesting that a gap in provision of co-operative development services to 
the agricultural co-operative sector. The issue is which organisation should fill this gap in co-operative 
development  - the peak body, the Department of Agriculture, or the private sector. 
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a policy position within the departments. He also thought that the Commonwealth 
Department of Agriculture had even less involvement in or connection with the co-
operative model, with minimal evidence of efforts to facilitate its development 
(Interviewee 680, 2003). 
Further, these individuals believe that the Department is best placed to 
undertake these developmental activities within the industry, given the fragile 
institutional support for agricultural co-operatives. This, they argue, is particularly so 
when other organisations that could or should undertake this public policy leadership 
role, such as the CFWA, are in a weak position (Interviewee 680, 2003). 
Consequently, these Department of Agriculture officers are mounting agricultural co-
operative development strategies in a broader institutional and public policy vacuum 
that may drive the agricultural co-operative movement in inappropriate directions. A 
public policy position on agricultural co-operatives within the wider government and 
appropriate government departments, and importantly developed in conjunction with 
the peak body, is necessary to separate initiatives supporting agricultural co-
operatives from the goodwill of individual public servants. This is necessary to 
institutionalise agricultural co-operative policy into the long-term fabric of 
government policy and service delivery.  
Developing a Public Policy for Agricultural Co-operatives 
The United Nations (1998) produced guidelines for member countries to 
assist in creating a supportive environment for the development of co-operatives. The 
guidelines are a valuable contribution to drafting a public policy framework for 
agricultural co-operatives, which can be contextualised to Western Australia’s 
specific institutional environment.  
The guidelines address issues related to the public recognition of the co-
operative structure; the legal, judicial and administrative provisions for co-
operatives; research, data collection and statistics on co-operatives; information and 
education about co-operatives; the provision of public funds for co-operatives and 
institutional arrangements for collaboration and partnership between the co-operative 
movement and government. Paraphrasing some key points of the guidelines: 
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• Government recognises and understands the uniqueness of the co-operative 
business structure, based on co-operative principles and values which are 
desirable and beneficial to society. 
• Government is charged with creating a supporting and enabling environment 
for co-operatives and working in partnership with the co-operative 
movement. 
• Government publicly acknowledges and promotes the role of co-operatives in 
the economy and society.  
• Co-operative legislation incorporates and reinforces the co-operative 
principles. All other laws, judicial and administrative practices are consistent 
with co-operative legislation and principles. The co-operative movement via 
the peak body needs to monitor this and bring anomalies to attention of 
relevant government agencies. 
• Government acknowledges the co-operative structure’s self-regulatory nature 
and the autonomy of the co-operative movement. Government therefore 
should not be involved in the internal affairs of individual co-operatives or 
the co-operative movement. Government works in partnership with the co-
operative movement, via the peak body, in the development of co-operative 
movement public policy, with formal procedures set up for consultation and 
collaboration between government and co-operative movement. 
• A single government department should undertake the registration and 
regulatory functions. At the industry level, government agencies, such as the 
Department of Agriculture, should undertake development activities in 
consultation with the co-operative movement peak body. Government 
departments must avoid ‘taking over’ the development of the co-operative 
movement. 
• Government funding to the co-operative movement or co-operative business 
should be the same as other funding arrangements between government and 
business sector.  
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• Government can have active role in undertaking and funding co-operative 
research, the results of which need to be disseminated to the co-operative 
movement. 
• The co-operative business structure is mainstreamed and normalised by 
receiving the same level of public government support as any other form of 
business enterprise. 
• Government has a role in facilitating knowledge and understanding of the co-
operative movement and the co-operative business structure, especially in 
dismantling prejudices and misconceptions. (United Nations, 1998) 
In Western Australia and Australia generally, agricultural co-operative public 
policy is strong in relation to legislative matters, evidenced by dedicated co-operative 
legislation in each Australian State that incorporates the co-operative principles and 
the taxation concessions within the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. However, in 
other areas, public policy for agricultural co-operatives is clearly deficient. It is 
apparent that governments do not provide a supportive framework equal to that 
provided for other forms of business structures (International Co-operative Alliance, 
1999). Western Australian support mechanisms for small business and companies far 
outweigh those available for the co-operative business structure, such as the Small 
Business Development Centre and the Business Enterprise Centres located in 
regional centres. Additionally the business sector is well supported by a range of 
industry associations, such as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which is 
able to exert considerable political influence over State and Commonwealth 
governments. However, the most debilitating factor for an agricultural co-operative 
public policy is the apparent ambivalence of government towards the co-operative 
sector, which in turn permits other actors of influence to dismiss its contribution and 
relevance to contemporary Australian agriculture. 
Several interviewees commented positively on the agricultural co-operative 
public policy model illustrated by the Rural Business-Co-operative Service in the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which in turn was supported by a 
strong institutional framework (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 680, 2003; Madden, 
2003b). Madden (2003b) commented enthusiastically about the USDA support for 
agricultural co-operatives and considered that it was a legitimate role for Australian 
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State and Commonwealth governments to fund a similar resource for the agricultural 
industry. However, based on his personal views of not relying on government,137 he 
believed that rather than a government agency delivering such services, that it 
contributes to the activities of organisations such as the Co-operative Federations in 
each State to provide the level of co-operative sector support. Madden believed that 
such a strategy would stimulate the agricultural co-operative sector in Western 
Australia.  
The Respective Roles of the Department of Agriculture and the CFWA 
The United Nations guidelines (1998) and interviews confirm that a 
supportive government public policy is a key element in shaping the development 
and viability of co-operatives as a valid business structure in agriculture. The 
guidelines, however, indicate that the challenge for government is not to develop the 
co-operative sector itself, but to facilitate an environment to stimulate the autonomy 
of the co-operative sector with its own aims and philosophy. This position is 
consistent with the neoliberal role of government as the manager rather than 
deliverer of goods and services. Therefore, while the role of government is to provide 
a positive public policy environment for co-operatives, the driving force in 
implementing a public policy for co-operatives rests with the co-operative 
movement.  
These guidelines indicate that the future role of government involves 
collaboration between the three levels of Australian government and with various 
significant actors in the private sector and the peak bodies representing the 
agricultural industry, the business sector, the co-operative movement and rural 
communities, which collectively influence the validity of the agricultural co-
operative structure. This facilitator role entails political and managerial issues related 
to the sensitive design and implementation of politically acceptable strategies to 
enhance the viability of the agricultural co-operative sector, and the appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation of agricultural co-operative initiatives delivered under the 
concept of public good. The UN guidelines also emphasise the need for government 
to involve participatory decision making processes with the co-operative peak body 
                                                 
137 Chapter Seven expands on Madden’s views of government involvement in agriculture. 
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and co-operative actors, which will enhance political support for public policy for 
agricultural co-operative sector strategies.  
While the United Nations guidelines provide direction on the role of 
government in co-operative sector development, the long established co-operative 
movement peak bodies are also a resource to facilitate the development of 
agricultural co-operative public policy. To illustrate, the Canadian Co-operative 
Association takes a proactive role in the development of public policy for the co-
operative sector. Its webpage, in relation to public policy, states: 
If government policies, legislation, and regulation are to enable co-
operatives to thrive, a national voice for co-operatives must be heard 
within the corridors of power. Our Government Affairs & Public 
Policy (GAPP) unit analyzes and influences federal government 
strategies, policies, legislation, and regulations to ensure that the 
needs of co-operatives are met. Communicating this information to 
CCA members is an important part of the unit’s work. Each month 
GAP Update highlights key public policy developments and 
government relations that are of interest to the co-operative sector. 
The GAPP unit also works with members to develop positions and 
representations to shape government policy and programs, and 
facilitates opportunities for CCA and its members to partner with the 
federal government. (Canadian Co-operative Association, n.d.) 
As outlined in Chapter Five, the co-operative movement peak body, CFWA, 
is under-resourced to perform a similar role of monitoring various government 
activities to determine possible impacts on the Western Australian co-operative 
sector. Additionally Chapter Five suggests that the peak body also lacks the 
necessary influence to encourage government to pursue a co-operative movement 
public policy framework. However, given the underlying compatibility of the 
objectives of the Department of Agriculture with those of the CFWA, the 
Department can help ameliorate this situation by initiating, in conjunction with the 
CFWA, a strategy to incorporate the agricultural co-operative business structure into 
Department activities in rural and regional Western Australia. 
A challenge for the co-operative movement and its peak body is to recognise 
the influence of neoliberalism on political and economic contemporary macro-level 
public policy and how over time, these influences pervade the wider society. These 
notions diminish the basic values of the co-operative movement and consequently, 
the ability of the peak body to exert political and economic influence. The peak 
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body, in seeking to lobby for a public policy position favourable toward the Western 
Australian co-operative movement, needs to acknowledge and accept that 
neoliberalism is deeply entrenched internationally and nationally, and therefore 
develop strategies to facilitate the co-operative identity in this environment. This 
partly involves understanding these wider political and economic drivers, and the 
way that they are implemented in an institutional sense. This also incorporates an 
understanding that there are influential opinion leaders who view the co-operative 
structure as an inappropriate business structure in a market economy.  
Despite this, the CFWA is perhaps at a fortunate time in history.  After 
several decades of allowing the market to organise the economy, a recognition by 
government of the role of civil society structures, such as the Western Australian co-
operative movement peak body, is emerging (Lyons, 1996). According to Lyons, 
civil society sits between the State and the market economy and is a ‘sphere of 
freedom where people can co-operate and organise to pursue their interests as 
citizens free of the state or the market’ (Lyons, 1996, p 8). Civil society organisations 
can focus on non-market aspects of society and undertake activities to ameliorate the 
excesses of a free market. Civil society organisations can also advise and influence 
governments (Lyons, 1996). These types of organisations can develop national and 
international networks, and form partnerships with government that can lead to fresh 
perspectives in developing and implement public policy (Lyons, 1996). The CFWA 
can sit in this civil society space and in partnership with government, to facilitate 
public policy development on behalf of the co-operative movement. 
Lastly, the peak body must take the lead role in this area as an attitude change 
agent and knowledge builder for the co-operative structure. The co-operative 
movement peak body, in addition to a constructive relationship with government, 
needs to ensure that it nurtures positive relationships with a range of agencies or 
groups that can influence the success of a public policy framework for agricultural 
co-operatives. These include liaising with industry associations such as the 
Pastoralists and Graziers Association (PGA), Western Australian Farmers Federation 
(WAFF) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI), a range of professional 
associations in the professions of law, accounting, banking and finance, management 
and marketing, among others. Further, other government agencies involved with 
business development, such as Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) 
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and the Business Enterprise Centres are important partners in developing a 
constructive public policy environment for agricultural co-operatives.  
Apart from these relationship strategies, it is essential that the peak body for 
the co-operative movement have a thorough understanding of the implications of 
macro-level public policy at the State and Commonwealth government sphere on the 
co-operative business structure and the development of co-operative public policy. 
Focusing on the micro-level, in isolation from these wider issues, will not lead to 
sustainable policy position for the co-operative movement and struggle to be 
effective. 
Agricultural Co-operatives and Statutory Marketing Authorities  
The previous section argued that the concept of public good legitimised the 
development of a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives.  This 
section explores a related example of public policy for collective farmer activity, the 
Statutory Marketing Authority.  An analysis of SMAs and their association with co-
operatives is included in this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, interviewee perceptions 
revealed some confusion about the differences between SMAs and agricultural co-
operatives, to the extent that sometimes it was unclear if interviewees were referring 
to SMAs or co-operatives. Secondly, in a public policy environment of agricultural 
industry restructuring, the dismantling of SMAs creates opportunities for co-
operatives to form as an alternative structure. Examples of co-operatives forming in 
the wake of dismantling of SMAs are examined to identify if this will stimulate 
interest in the model. 
Chapter Four revealed that Australian farmer approaches to collective 
organisational structures has passed through a number of phases. The first phase 
indicated that early 20th century Australian farmers followed the strategies of other 
agriculturally focused Western countries by forming co-operatives in response to 
some form of market failure. Following two world wars and the Depression, but 
particularly after the Second World War, the second phase emerged with the 
introduction of Statutory Marketing Authorities (SMAs).  Primary producers 
connected with co-operatives such as Westralian Farmers Co-operative, lobbied 
government to establish these SMAs and the two collective structures continued to 
function side by side.  In response to changes in government economic and political 
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positions over the last two decades, a third phase has arisen, resulting in the 
dismantling of most SMAs. This last phase reveals that the agricultural industry is 
entering a new period in the agricultural co-operative story.  
The Productivity Commission defines SMAs as: 
monopoly producer boards, protected by legislation and various 
import controls [to provide a] vehicle for an array of home price and 
stabilisation schemes for many commodities. (Productivity 
Commission, 2000, p ix) 
SMAs are grower controlled organisations underpinned by State or 
Commonwealth government legislation, with final responsibility for their operation 
sitting with the government that drafted the legislation. The legislation often conveys 
monopoly power to compulsorily buy and sell farmers’ commodities for both the 
Australian and overseas markets. This pooling and marketing aspect of SMAs is 
often referred to as ‘single desk’ (Productivity Commission, 2000) and the two terms 
are used interchangeably.138   
Two theoretical concepts support the formation of SMAs arrangements.  
Firstly, the concept of economies of scale enables growers to pool their 
homogeneous commodity to achieve reduced costs and highest possible prices in 
domestic and overseas markets. Secondly, SMAs provide a countervailing power to 
other actors in the supply chain by bringing small atomised producers together under 
the banner of the SMA to offset monopoly power of IOFs in the post-farm links of 
the supply chain (Productivity Commission, 2000). Chapter Two reveals that these 
arguments are consistent with those put forward in the literature concerning the 
formation of agricultural co-operatives.   
This similarity in theoretical justification and function has clearly resulted in 
confusion in the literature and by interviewees about the differences between the two 
structures. Given the imperfect knowledge of the co-operative structure identified in 
interviews with a range of actors, it is understandable that many interviewees, even 
those closely connected to the agricultural industry, struggle to differentiate between 
the co-operative structure and the organisational structure represented by the SMA. 
While many aspects of SMAs and co-operatives are similar, the compulsory 
acquisition of commodities via a piece of legislation is the key difference between 
                                                 
138 In addition to the term ‘single desk’ SMAs are also referred to as Statutory Marketing Boards. 
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marketing co-operatives and SMAs. The Productivity Commission refers to SMAs as 
‘compulsory co-operatives’ (Productivity Commission, 2000) while agricultural co-
operatives are voluntary organisations. Mauldon and Schapper (1974) argue that 
SMAs are essentially government instrumentalities with farmer representation. Like 
co-operatives, SMAs are effectively the link between producers and the wider supply 
chain and have enabled farmers to gain some control over the processing and 
marketing their commodities (Moran, Blunden, & Bradly, 1996). The interviews 
suggest that those who hold negative opinions associated with SMAs transfer these 
views across to the co-operative structure, to the detriment of the wider public 
perception of the agricultural co-operative structure.  
Legislative Basis of SMAs 
As Chapter Two illustrated, Cobia (1989) and Torgerson et al. (1997) give 
some insight to the formation of monopoly co-operative structures underpinned by a 
legal framework. They argue that Sapiro, an influential agricultural co-operative 
theorist in the first two decades of the 20th century, advocated that agricultural 
producers establish centralised monopolies on a commodity basis, supported by 
legislation. Sapiro argued that orderly marketing would balance grower market 
power with large external corporations as wall as increase returns to farmers. 
Torgerson et al. (1997) contend that Sapiro’s influence on this type of co-
operative structure lead to the drafting of the Capper-Volstead Act 1922, the Co-
operative Marketing Act 1926, and the creation of national commodity co-operatives 
under the Federal Farm Board in 1929. They also credit him with the formation of 
orderly marketing structures established under the Agricultural Marketing 
Agreements Act 1937. 
Sapiro’s influence diminished as other co-operative theorists gained favour, 
particularly Nourse, who advocated the concept of the co-operative competitive 
yardstick (Torgerson et al., 1997). Nourse viewed co-operatives as a mechanism to 
address market failure via regionally based co-operatives rather than large centrally 
controlled structures supported by specific legislation. While the United States 
drifted away from Sapiro’s approach, the timeframe of his influence in the United 
States corresponds with the period when Australian producers were investigating 
marketing options (Sandford, 1955). 
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Linkages between SMAs and Agricultural Co-operatives 
The early history of Australian SMAs further reveals the interrelatedness of 
the SMA and co-operative concepts. Governments, in response to WW1 and food 
shortages, introduced specific legislation to establish SMAs to ensure an orderly 
marketing approach for staple food commodities. Many of these early SMAs grew 
out of already established voluntary farmer co-operatives which had been formed at 
the beginning of the 20th century to gain higher prices for farmer commodities 
(Industry Commission, 1991; Sandford, 1955). When various governments sought to 
withdraw from these arrangements in the years following WWI, farmers lobbied for 
the retention of these formalised arrangements of SMAs underpinned by government 
legislation (Sandford, 1955).  
Government attention in the SMA mechanism was further reinforced in the 
1920s. Increased agricultural production, resulting from soldier settler farms and 
improving technology, caused a fall in commodity prices and threatened the 
economic viability of solder settler farmers. Additionally, it was in the government’s 
interest to continue to support the agricultural industry as it had invested substantial 
funds in infrastructure, such as roads, rail and irrigation to support these settler farms 
(Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). The combined impact of these two factors encouraged 
governments to establish SMAs in a number of commodities to ensure that domestic 
prices were maintained and farmers able to stay on their properties. 
In anticipation of a boom in agricultural production and a corresponding fall 
in prices following the Second World War, farmers called for the preservation of 
existing statutory price stabilisation and marketing arrangements. Moreover, the 
concept was extended as some form of orderly domestic and export marketing 
system was introduced in this period for most commodities. This practice continued 
through the 1950s and 1960s (Productivity Commission, 2000).   
SMAs were a policy outcome of an era in which Australian farmers and 
governments were comfortable with active government involvement in orderly 
marketing. Chapter Three argues that Keynesian policy influence on government can 
partly explain this affiliation with orderly marketing arrangements. Additionally, a 
long period of conservative government provided the agricultural lobby group with a 
mechanism to ensure government intervention in the development of favourable 
agricultural policy. There was also a long standing belief in government and the 
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community that the agricultural industry was fundamental to the well-being of the 
Australian economy (Mauldon & Schapper, 1974). 
Chapter Three demonstrates that public policy attitudes towards SMAs 
changed in the 1970s under the influence of neoliberal inspired economic theory. The 
shifting public policy position on SMAs can be attributed to the differences in 
government understanding of their role within the economy. Various reviews of 
SMAs have been undertaken since the formation of the Industry Assistance 
Commission by the Australian Labor Government in 1973 (Mauldon & Schapper, 
1974), and later the Industry Commission (1991). In recent years, following Hilmer 
(1993) and the subsequent introduction of the National Competition Policy, all 
remaining SMAs were scheduled for review (Productivity Commission, 2000). 
National Competition Policy 
In the National Competition Policy agreement of 1995 with the 
Commonwealth government, all State governments were required to review all their 
legislation to ascertain if similar outcomes can be achieved for the community 
without using legislation (National Competition Council, 1998; Productivity 
Commission, 2000). Under National Competition Policy, the direction of Australian 
public policy is undoubtedly towards abandoning these single desk arrangements. 
The peak farmers association, the National Farmers Federation (NFF), also supports 
this policy position (Halpin, 1999), although it is more contentious in some 
agricultural industry sectors than others. The long standing debate within the grains 
industry over the restructure of the Australian Wheat Board was and remains a very 
heated issue (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999; Martin, 2006; Skuthorp, 2006).   
The argument against SMAs revolves around the economic inefficiencies 
built into these single desk mechanisms (Productivity Commission, 1999). SMAs are 
recast as structures that stifle competition; remove farmer incentives to improve 
productivity and quality and average grower returns despite individual farmer efforts 
to increase productivity. SMAs are now deemed as constituting an inappropriate 
form of assistance to the agricultural industry (Productivity Commission, 1999).  The 
Productivity Commission (2000) emphasises that the compulsory element of SMAs 
and the economic inefficiencies that arise from this, rather than the collective action 
aspect, is the driver for change. As discussed in Chapter Five, the collective 
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behaviour of farmers via co-operatives is a separate issue covered by the 
Commonwealth Trade Practices Act 1974.  
Under the National Competition Policy (NCP) framework, the burden of 
proof is on the individual SMAs to argue that their monopoly marketing 
arrangements are in the public interest (Productivity Commission, 2000). This is 
clearly a difficult hurdel as many SMAs have been dismantled altogether and 
elements of other SMA functions have been progressively removed in preparation for 
industry deregulation. The use of reviews has undoubtedly been a successful strategy 
for government to bring change to the long established statutory marketing system in 
agriculture.  
In addition to the requirements of the NCP, many of the Western Australian 
SMAs had regular reviews built into their underpinning legislation. Further, the 
Western Australian Labor Government, when newly elected in 2001, directed that all 
statutory authorities be reviewed (The Machinery of Government Taskforce, 
2001).139 The Western Australian Meat Marketing Corporation was dismantled 
following a review in the late 1990s (Clarke, 1999).  The Western Australian dairy 
industry was deregulated in 2001 and its SMA dismantled (Economics and Industry 
Standing Committee, 2003). The Potato Marketing Board, trading as Western Potato, 
and the Egg Marketing Board, trading as Golden Eggs, were reviewed and 
subsequently dismantled in 2005 (Agricultural Produce Commission, 2005).  Each 
Australian State conducted similar reviews of SMAs.   
Several years after the mid-1990s introduction of the NCP, Western Australia 
continued to have the largest number of remaining SMAs in Australia (Interviewee 
680, 2003). Interviewee 680 (2003) attributed this to several factors.  He argued that 
the power of sections of the agri-political lobby in Western Australia to influence 
government to retain SMAs combined with the reality that many farmers in Western 
Australia ardently believe that these structures are serving their needs are partial 
explanations.  Interviewee 680 (2003) advised that a widespread response from 
Western Australian farmers concerning the implications of the NCP and proposed 
reviews of SMA was to seek stronger Western Australian government legislation to 
insulate existing SMAs. He considered that generally, Western Australian farmers’ 
response to international developments in agriculture and the related food and fibre 
                                                 
139 The Taskforce review encompassed all statutory authorities, not just those in the agricultural 
industry (The Machinery of Government Taskforce, 2001). 
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industries was to ‘build a bigger fire wall’ via government intervention to enhance 
the power and structures of SMAs.   
Additionally, he argued that successive Western Australian governments did 
not have the appetite to deal with the political fallout from the agricultural industry 
about this matter.  Furthermore, some government actors continue to support the 
retention of these structures. Several interviewees commented that the incumbent 
Minister for Agriculture, the Hon. Mr Kim Chance is a supporter of the retention of 
SMAs.  Indeed, some interviewees characterised the Minister as an ‘agrarian 
socialist’ (Interviewee 672, 2002; Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 686, 2003; 
Interviewee 695, 2003).   
Apart from ideological arguments supporting SMAs, other pragmatic reasons 
partly explain why the Western Australian government is moving slowly in 
reviewing SMAs.  In the views of some interviewees (Interviewee 660, 2002; 
Interviewee 665, 2003) SMAs are institutions integral to maintaining an important 
industry, and hence economic activity, in Western Australia. The recent fresh 
produce campaigns reflect that urban voters want fresh local produce sold in Western 
Australia (Agricultural Produce Commission, 2005). Perhaps the government 
considers that it is electorally unpalatable to dismantle institutional arrangements that 
contribute to ensuring safe local produce is sold in Western Australia. Despite these 
possible sentiments, the implications of not complying with the requirements of the 
NCP conveys a significant financial burden on Western Australia which will no 
doubt influence the final decision in relation to the remaining SMAs in Western 
Australia. 
Interviewee Perspectives and Insights 
The interviewees frequently referred to Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH) 
as an example of an agricultural co-operative with which they were familiar. 
Additionally many were also aware of CBH’s ability to compulsorily acquire 
producer grain, thereby paradoxically referring to it as an SMA. These interrelated 
functions within CBH have led to lack of clarity among some interviewees about 
what a co-operative is and how it differs from a SMA.  This misunderstanding about 
CBH is also demonstrated at government level. Under National Competition Policy, 
the Productivity Commission identified CBH as an SMA for review (Competition 
Policy Unit Western Australian Treasury, 2001).  
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Mauldon and Schapper (1974) clarify to an extent why this misunderstanding 
about the distinction between an SMA and an agricultural co-operative arises.  
Mauldon and Schapper (1974, p 166) argue that some ‘successful farmer co-
operatives … act as agents for statutory marketing boards, such as Co-operative Bulk 
Handling in Western Australia…’.  Sandford (1955) explained that the founding 
members of CBH believed that the co-operative would only be viable if it was able to 
collect all Western Australian grain.  This, they argued, could not be guaranteed in a 
free market situation so the co-operative proponents successfully made a case to the 
Western Australian government to draft legislation granting CBH the sole right to 
compulsorily acquire all grain from Western Australian producers (Co-operative 
Bulk Handling, n.d.; Sandford, 1955).  While CBH is registered under the Western 
Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 as a farmer owned and controlled 
co-operative, it also functions under a specific piece of Western Australian 
legislation, the Bulk Handling Act 1967, which effectively removes farmer choice 
about which organisation can handle their grain.  
According to the Western Australian government, CBH is not an SMA but 
rather a privately owned co-operative and therefore it does not fall under the 
requirements of the National Competition Policy (Competition Policy Unit Western 
Australian Treasury, 2001).140 However, while the Western Australian government 
rejected the NCP requirement to review CBH on the basis of it being an SMA, the 
government planned to review the underpinning legislation, the Bulk Handling Act 
1967 as it was conducting reviews of all Western Australian legislation (Competition 
Policy Unit Western Australian Treasury, 2001; The Machinery of Government 
Taskforce, 2001).  CBH reveals some uncertainty in the industry and government 
policy makers about the differences between agricultural co-operatives and SMAs, as 
it occupies a strange space as a quasi SMA quasi co-operative.  This lack of clarity 
about CBH carries over to other SMAs and agricultural co-operatives and accounts 
for the confusion among interviewees and other actors about the differences between 
the two structures. Further, many interviewees colloquially referred to SMAs as co-
operatives, further confusing the differences between the models. 
Two divergent groups arose in interviewee perspectives of SMAs and by 
implication, agricultural co-operatives. The interviews suggested that those who 
                                                 
140 The CFWA also argues strongly that the CBH is a co-operative and not an SMA (Interviewee 
797, 2004). 
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support SMAs tend to be older farmers or industry actors, possibly reflecting 
Keynesian or agrarian socialist influences towards agricultural industry public 
policy. They retained, through inter-generational memory, knowledge that 
agricultural co-operatives and SMAs were formed to ensure farmers were able to 
survive economically difficult times by instituting collective business structures. For 
this group, it did not really matter what business structure, an SMA or a co-operative, 
was used.  The main objective was that the co-operative principles of farmer control 
and farmer benefit via profit distribution to members were central pillars in the 
business structure. The similarity in the objectives of the SMA and agricultural co-
operative structure was the key to understanding this group’s views.  Further, they 
did not express concern about their inability to correctly distinguish between a co-
operative business and an SMA.  
Conversely, interviewees who favoured a drier economic analysis highlighted 
the negative features of the SMA as argued by the Productivity Commission (2000).  
Interviewees holding this view tended to be from either the wider agribusiness sector 
or younger farmers who were tertiary educated in agri-business, economics and 
management theory. Both groups focused on the compulsory element of SMAs 
leading to inefficiencies, and their externally imposed politicised nature. Negative 
perceptions in these groups about SMAs were often then transferred to the co-
operative model, as they were both perceived as similar types of organisations.  
While some younger farmers hold a negative view of agricultural co-
operatives due to similarities in function and structure with SMAs (Interviewee 689, 
2002), Madden (2003b) presents an alternative perspective.  He argues that its 
younger members are the ‘better quality’ members because they understand business 
and can evaluate the benefits of the co-operative model using these business tools. 
Younger farmers, he contends, have not grown up in the SMA ‘era’ and arguably are 
not tainted by the negative views about them. This segment, while trained in the 
theory of the free market economy, can evaluate the economic benefits of the co-
operative model without the ‘baggage’ of the former SMA era. While co-operatives 
may not fit the traditional IOF business model of an open market, this segment, 
Madden (2003b) argues, can apply their economic training to identify the financial 
benefits of the collective business model. Lastly, he believes, young farmers perceive 
the new co-operatives, such as the UFCC and Challenge, as their own enterprises, 
while SMAs were externally imposed models with overtones of political 
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interference. Appendix Four outlines a proposed typology of farmer attitudes, based 
on Madden (2003b) and other interviewee perceptions, of the agricultural co-
operative model. 
Dismantled SMAs Adopting Co-operative Structures  
The dismantling of SMAs in Western Australia has had an interesting 
outcome.  A co-operative structure has evolved from deregulation of Western 
Australian SMAs in the agricultural water industry, the dairy industry and the meat 
processing and marketing industry. The Western Australian Meat Marketing Co-
operative (WAMMCO) was formed as a farmer owned co-operative to undertake the 
abattoir and marketing functions of the former SMA. Following the dismantling of 
its SMA, a small group of producers established a dairy processing co-operative, 
Challenge Dairy Co-operative, although the functions of the co-operative are 
different from those of the former dairy industry SMA. 
The co-operative model was raised as option in a government discussion 
paper for the egg industry in the event that the industry SMA was dismantled 
(Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 2002a). The SMA was dismantled in 
2005 and its assets transferred to a producer owned company, West Coast Eggs 
Limited, which trades as Golden Egg Farms (Agricultural Produce Commission, 
2005). The potato industry SMA was the last remaining SMA for that industry in 
Australia and the Board and industry strongly but unsuccessfully lobbied for its 
retention (Interviewee 686, 2003; Potato Marketing Corporation of Western 
Australia, 2003).  Potato industry restructuring commenced in 2005 with a producer 
owned entity assuming responsibility for marketing and promotion functions 
(Agricultural Produce Commission, 2005).   
Role of Government in Forming Co-operatives in Place of Dismantled SMAs 
The creation of a co-operative structure following industry deregulation 
provides an insight into the role of the Western Australian government and Minister 
for Agriculture. According to Booth (2004), the Western Australian government 
initiated the formation of regional farmer owned and controlled co-operatives 
following deregulation of the water industry.  Interviewee 680 (2003) indicated that 
the decision for the meat marketing SMA to adopt a co-operative structure was 
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essentially a politically driven one. The fledgling Challenge Dairy Co-operative 
received a significant grant from the Western Australian government in the wake of 
dairy industry deregulation (Bowen, 2003). The hand of government is clearly 
connected with these examples of a co-operative business structure arising from 
dismantled SMAs. 
Clarke (1999) explains the behaviour of the then Western Australian 
Coalition Government’s role in the late 1990s in dismantling the financially 
vulnerable meat industry SMA and the subsequent installation of the WAMMCO co-
operative structure as a form of the ‘third way’. Hamilton (2001, p 89) defines the 
‘Third Way’ as searching ‘for a means of grafting traditional social democratic 
concern for equality and social justice onto an economic system based on free 
markets’. Interviewee 680 (2003) argued that while a minor partner in the former 
Western Australian Coalition Government, the National Party was a controlling force 
in the agricultural industry and the Minister for Agriculture was from the National 
Party. According to Interviewee 680 (2003), the Liberal Party ideology was 
essentially neoclassical economic theory, while the National Party approach was still 
linked with concepts found in agrarian socialism. As a result, the Western Australian 
government was reluctant to upset the National Party members of the Coalition, 
which were concerned about letting the free market resolve the destiny of the meat 
industry and the possible implications for rural industries and communities. Yet it 
was also reluctant to become involved in the meat industry as an equity partner in a 
business venture.  The Western Australian government had previously been 
connected with a number of abattoirs with negative political outcomes (Clarke, 
1999). The ‘third way’ provided the Western Australian government with a 
politically acceptable pathway between these ideological differences.  
The traditional co-operative model provided the government with a strategy 
to achieve this ‘third way’.  Similar to an SMA, the co-operative structure retains 
control and ownership by the industry, with profits going back to the farmers, but, 
distinct from the SMA, government no longer has a role. Clarke (1999) argued that 
this strategy provided the government with a ‘win-win’ situation as the meat industry 
SMA was dismantled, fulfilling its NCP requirements. Secondly, producers were 
sheltered from the vagaries of the market by the co-operative structure.  
Clarke’s ‘third way’ arguments help explain the present Western Australian 
Labor Government’s involvement in dismantling SMAs in other agricultural sectors 
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141and facilitating the development of farmer controlled businesses in their wake.  
However, the role of the Western Australian government in initiating new 
agricultural co-operatives needs to be carefully considered. This chapter has argued 
that it is an appropriate role for government to support agricultural co-operatives due 
to their public good function in correcting market failure.  Therefore, it is reasonable 
for government to develop a public policy framework for the agricultural co-
operative sector.  The United Nations Guidelines identify that the role of government 
should be arm’s length rather than proactive and top down and that it is not 
appropriate for government to initiate agricultural co-operative development (United 
Nations, 1998). The WAMMCO scenario suggests that the Western Australian 
government was the driving force behind the development of the co-operative. The 
hand of government can also be seen in the dairy processing co-operative and the 
various regional water industry co-operatives.  However, given the weak institutional 
environment surrounding the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector, 
these initiatives would not have eventuated without the driving role of government, 
to the disadvantage of producers in these industry sectors. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the implications for two matters concerning 
government public policy that partly explains the contemporary environment for 
agricultural co-operatives.  The chapter firstly explored the public policy position for 
agricultural co-operatives, with a particular focus on the appropriate role of 
government agencies in shaping this. Secondly, the chapter analysed the relationship 
between agricultural co-operatives and SMAs and the public policy role of 
government in this relationship.   
The chapter identified that there are constructive elements in Western 
Australia on which to build a positive public policy framework for agricultural co-
operatives. The Western Australian Department of Agriculture has demonstrated its 
                                                 
141 Farmer controlled and owned business structures may be registered under the Commonwealth 
Corporations Act 2001 rather than the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943. Only 
entities registered under the latter legislation can be labelled ‘co-operatives’, resulting in new entities 
adopting the term ‘farmer owned company’.  According to Interviewee 822 (2002), the Corporations 
Act 2001 enables farmers to achieve all that they wish for a co-operative business by embedding co-
operative principles into the constitution, with the exception of the name ‘co-operative’.  This 
approach also provides the added advantage of the benefits and flexibility of the Commonwealth 
legislation, overcoming shortcomings in the State legislation. 
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interest in the public good potential of the co-operative model and initiated several 
projects, which along with the favourable legislative framework, can form the basis 
of a revamped public policy for agricultural co-operatives.  
The chapter also explored the appropriate role of government for agricultural 
co-operatives following the dismantling of SMAs.  The chapter identified that there 
are similarities between the agricultural co-operative structure and the SMA structure 
that often caused confusion about the critical distinctions between them.  Neoliberal 
informed economic policies leading to the dismantling of SMAs has paradoxically 
provided opportunities for developing agricultural co-operatives in their wake. In 
conclusion, this chapter argued that there is a legitimate role for government to 
stimulate a public policy environment favourable towards agricultural co-operative 
development.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
United Farmers Co-operative Company Case Study 
The UFCC will not deviate from the co-operative principles. 
(Madden, 2003b) 
The UFCC objective is to maximise return to shareholder farmers’ 
enterprise. (Madden, 2003b) 
Introduction 
Two chapters are devoted to the case study of United Farmers Co-operative 
Company (UFCC). This first chapter identifies the conditions that led to the genesis 
of the co-operative and reviews the early years of its evolution. The chapter analyses 
both the economic and less acknowledged sociologically influenced factors 
contributing to the co-operative’s birth. Chapter Eight examines the UFCC as a 
maturing co-operative, with a particular focus on its internal dynamics. 
The case study is based primarily on long interviews in late 2002 and early 
2003 with two actors associated with the co-operative, one of whom was the 
founding Chairman, Mr Rod Madden (2003b). At the time of the interviews, the 
Chair had held this position for about a decade. Additional information about the 
UFCC was gathered via the rural media, in the wider national co-operative 
movement newsletters and updates on the UFCC website. Comments from other 
interviewees who were not directly connected with the UFCC also added to the wider 
understanding of this agricultural co-operative.  
Background 
The United Farmers Co-operative Company (UFCC) is predominantly a 
supply co-operative of fertiliser and agricultural chemicals, focusing mostly on the 
broad acre grains industry of Western Australia. In the last few years, it has also 
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supplied other Western Australian agricultural industries, such as the horticulture and 
dairy industries, with chemicals and fertilisers (United Farmers Co-operative 
Company Webpage, n.d.). Recent developments at the UFCC have been the addition 
of value added services such as a grains pooling and marketing division and crop risk 
management services (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). 
The UFCC was incorporated as a co-operative in 1992 under the Companies 
(Co-operative) Act 1943. By 2002, it had grown to around 3000 farmer members142, 
representing approximately 50 per cent of broad acre farmers in Western Australia 
(Interviewee 650, 2003; Madden, 2003b). Within a decade, the co-operative had an 
annual turnover of around $100 million, assets of $20 million, and rebated over $34 
million to shareholders (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). The 
UFCC, in 2002, had approximately 60 employees in full-time and part-time positions 
(Interviewee 650, 2003; Madden, 2003b). Its head office is located at the Fremantle 
Port in Rous Head, Western Australia, with storage facilities in Perth, Kwinana, 
Geraldton, Esperance and Albany.  Membership of the UFCC is restricted to 
individuals who are involved in some form of commodity production in any sector of 
the agricultural industry (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  
Member shares are $1.00 each, and the UFCC requests that members hold 1000 
shares, representing a $1,000 investment in the UFCC (United Farmers Co-operative 
Company Webpage, n.d.).143  The Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 requires that 
the UFCC conduct 90 per cent of its business with its membership (United Farmers 
Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). 
The Creation of an Agricultural Co-operative 
Madden (2003b) maintained that the UFCC was formed to duplicate one of 
the core functions of the former agricultural co-operative, Westralian Farmers Co-
operative (now Wesfarmers), which had historically provided its farmer members 
with agricultural chemicals and fertiliser via the subsidiary CSBP Limited. Despite 
its past as an agricultural co-operative, Madden argued that, as a company, 
Wesfarmers was essentially a corporate monopoly supplier of fertiliser, extracting 
                                                 
142 The UFCC refers to its members as shareholders.  Throughout this case study, the terms are used 
interchangeably. 
143 Members are able to purchase fewer shares initially and build up their 1000 shares over time, 
funded via patronage rebates (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  
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high profits from farmers. To illustrate his point, he stated that in 1991, the 
Wesfarmers annual report indicated that of its $55 million profit for the financial 
year, $50 million had been drawn from fertiliser sales to farmers. This was 
particularly bitter for Madden, as previously when Wesfarmers was an agricultural 
co-operative, its objective was the provision of services to farmers at cost. However, 
he contended that, as a corporation, Wesfarmers was maximising profit for 
shareholders at the expense of farmers. 
The Chair’s interpretation of Westralian Farmers Co-operative conversion 
into a corporation is arguably the most significant of the multiple triggers leading to 
the genesis of the UFCC. In Madden’s words, Wesfarmers represented the ‘power of 
corporations to leach profit away from rural areas’ (Madden, 2003b). Further, 
Wesfarmers confirmed that individual family farms powerlessly butt up against large 
corporations in the agricultural supply chain, unless they collectively and 
influentially link into the chain under the aegis of their own agricultural co-operative. 
The Wesfarmers experience, the Chair believed, highlighted the dangers associated 
with farmers losing control of their own co-operatives and therefore control of their 
own destiny.  
In addition to the increasing price of fertiliser and agricultural chemicals 
charged by Wesfarmers, Madden argued that the prices of other farm inputs were 
also increasing via the influence of several other corporates or multinationals 
entering the agricultural industry. The Chair argued that farmers had an ‘almost 
pathological hatred of multinational corporations’ based on their collective historical 
experience of exploitation by corporations (Madden, 2003b). An agribusiness 
consultant in the grains industry (Interviewee 688, 2001) also supports this 
perspective about farmers’ significant dislike of corporations and it is a reoccurring 
theme in Sandford’s (1955) work. Corporations, the Chair argued, had only one 
motive to get involved in the agricultural industry and that was to ‘take what little 
profit was left in the industry away from producers and rural regions’ (Madden, 
2003b).  
Apart from the issue of Wesfarmers and the subsequent increase in the cost of 
farm inputs, Madden identified several other economic factors that were instrumental 
to the formation of UFCC. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australian 
agriculture was in a well-established and continuing period of restructuring based 
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around the concepts of neoclassical economic theory (Lawrence, 1987). The 
Commonwealth government corporatised the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) and 
dismantled the ‘guaranteed minimum price’ (GMP) scheme (Pritchard, 1998), 
changing a long established method of paying farmers for grain collected by the 
AWB. The price of wheat also collapsed in this period as the Australian dollar rose 
in value (Madden, 2003b). Madden cited the damaging impact of record interest rates 
during the early 1990s on farm businesses and that banks foreclosed on farmers ‘with 
no compunction’. He added that the lack of farmer payments for wheat shipped to 
Iraq as a result of the 1991 Gulf War also contributed to the difficult economic 
circumstances facing Western Australian farmers (Madden, 2003b).144 Madden 
commented that farmers who had borrowed money to expand their operations 
following the successful Western Australian seasons and strong commodity prices of 
the early 1980s, which at the time appeared to be a reasonable strategy, were 
particularly financially vulnerable in the late 1980s and early 1990s due to these 
multiple factors (Madden, 2003a). Madden (2003a) stated that ‘Not since the great 
Depression of the 1930s had there been a greater need for a co-operative to be 
formed.’ 
The combined impact of these events motivated the Chair and a farmer 
colleague from the same grain growing region to form a political lobbying group, the 
Rural Action Movement, to highlight and address the difficulties facing farmers. The 
Chair believed that State and Commonwealth governments were not adequately 
assisting farmers caught in this multifaceted vise.145  
However, Madden became uncomfortable in this new role of a politicised 
farmer lobbyist. Madden is reported as stating ‘We started the Rural Action 
Movement out of frustration - because farmers were getting a raw deal and nobody 
was listening’ (Lee, 2003, p 1). He asserted in interviews for this thesis that he did 
not enjoy being involved with the media or meeting with what he termed ‘dopey 
                                                 
144 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, United Nations sanctions prevented Australian wheat farmers from 
receiving a $480 million payment for wheat delivered over the previous three years.  Most of the debt 
was recouped in following years via insurance compensation payments, but the Australian 
Government forgave the remaining $98 million debt in 2004, leaving some farmers with a deficit of 
up to $20,000 (Parliament of Australia Senate, 2005).   
145 Western Australian farmers were not alone during this period in confronting these problems and 
forming activist lobby groups. Halpin (1999) refers to unfavourable economic conditions producing 
activist lobby groups and that a Rural Action Movement (RAM) also formed in NSW in a similar 
timeframe. 
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politicians’ whom he believed were not genuinely interested in doing anything 
constructive about the dire situation of farmers (Madden, 2003b). Madden became 
disenchanted with RAM’s inability to influence agricultural policy politically. 
According to Lee (2003, p 1), Madden stated ‘…it seemed we were working hard for 
so little and I decided I was wasting my time with politics’. He elected to withdraw 
from this activist role and focus on achieving an economic outcome to offset the 
escalating costs of farming. Lee (2003, p 1) quotes Madden stating ‘When someone 
suggested that we could import fertiliser cheaply, I decided it was a good way to help 
make the family farm more viable, which had always been my goal’. This, Madden 
considered, was a practical activity that could be achieved by farmers themselves to 
address one of the economic dilemmas they were confronting, that is, the cost of 
farm inputs.146 The short period of political activism by the individuals who became 
the Directors of the UFCC had ended.  
Forming the UFCC 
The UFFC commenced its commercial life in July 1992 with five farmer 
shareholders contributing $1,000 each (Madden, 2003a).147 The objective of the new 
co-operative was to, on behalf of its members, lower the price of farm inputs and 
therefore increase the financial viability of the farm business.148 The Directors 
identified four major farm business cost points as fertiliser, chemicals, finance and 
fuel. Fertiliser was selected as the initial focus of the UFCC, and subsequently it 
determined that it would investigate opportunities in reducing the costs to farmers 
associated with chemicals, and later finance and fuel (Madden, 2003a). As an 
                                                 
146 Interviewee 689 (2002), an agribusiness consultant, argues that the UFCC had been able to find a 
space in the fertiliser market because of earlier activity by AgDirect, a small for-profit business which 
had imported fertiliser into Western Australia. According to Interviewee 689 (2002), AgDirect broke 
the Wesfarmers connected CSBP Limited’s stranglehold on the fertiliser market and was able to 
capture a significant percentage of that market. As a result of this breakdown in the CSBP monopoly, 
he argued that other fertiliser importers were able to enter the market, including UFCC (Interviewee 
689, 2002). Actors connected with the UFCC did not raise this background information.  
147 The Western Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 requires a minimum of five 
members to incorporate a co-operative. 
148 This is similar to a concept in Torgerson, Reynolds, & Gray (1997) who refer to work conducted 
in the 1940s by Emelianoff. He argued that an agricultural co-operative is an ‘aggregate of economic 
units’ represented by its members and is not itself an ‘acquisitive economic unit’. Torgerson et al. 
(1997) summarised Emelianoff’s understanding of the co-operative as an agent of its members who 
collectively are the principals. Cook reinforces Madden’s concept by stating that ‘The co-operative's 
goal is to enhance the financial well-being of its owners as producers, not as investors. Thus, a co-
operative is appropriately viewed as an extension of a producer-owner's farming operation’ (Cook, 
Ratchford, & Griffith, 1995, p 1). 
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interview in 2003 confirms (Lee, 2003), Madden, in late 2002, considered that the 
UFCC had not lost sight of its original purpose to provide members with the best 
priced fertiliser to enable the farmer members’ businesses to be more profitable.  
The UFCC developed a ‘statement in lieu of prospectus’ and commenced a 
promotional campaign to encourage other farmers in rural communities throughout 
Western Australia to become members of the new co-operative (Madden, 2003a). 
This involved Madden personally undertaking a series of meetings from Esperance to 
Northampton and all country towns in between. In a few months, $66,000 was raised 
and the Directors employed a manager and set about the task of importing fertiliser 
(Madden, 2003a). The lack of a strong capital base meant that the Board of Directors 
was unable to employ additional staff.  The Board decided to directly contract 
Conbata Pty Ltd as the procurement agent, and Bakke Shipping Pty Ltd to arrange 
the shipping and logistics on a commission basis. This strategy enabled the Board to 
calculate fixed costs in advance, enabling the co-operative to provide fertiliser to 
members at an extremely low cost.  
The fledging co-operative’s low capital base and lack of organisational 
history inhibited the Board’s ability to access credit from any banks. Therefore, 
members were required to pay well in advance for their fertiliser. When funds had 
been raised and a letter of credit organised, the procurement and shipping agents 
attended to their respective tasks. This strategy leveraged the modest co-operative 
capital and skill base and enabled the Directors to focus their efforts on the 
promotional aspects associated with building the co-operative’s membership base. 
Ironically, Madden (2003b) reflected, if the Board had had the funds to employ more 
people at that early point, rather than contract in the required expertise, the co-
operative’s development may have been retarded due to the probable lack of breadth 
in in-house skills to import and distribute fertiliser.  
In the first year, the co-operative achieved a turnover of $14.7 million, with a 
profit (surplus) of $1 million. As it had been difficult to raise the start-up capital in 
the first year, the Board decided to rebate the co-operative surplus to its members as 
80 per cent bonus shares and 20 per cent cash, thereby retaining $1 million in cash as 
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149share capital in the first year.  The co-operative determined that it would not pay 
any dividends, as it firmly believed the dividend to members was in the form of the 
lower cost of fertiliser. Implementing this strategy in the first year meant that the co-
operative did not have to deal with many of the issues associated with sourcing funds 
for a fledgling co-operative. Capital raising, according to several Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector commentators, is a major impediment to co-operative 
formation and development, and the most significant issue facing Australian 
agricultural co-operatives (see Greenwood, 1999; Langdon, 1991; O'Connor & 
Thompson, 2001).  
In the first two years, the UFCC was able to competitively import fertiliser on 
behalf of its membership with very simple logistical techniques and infrastructure 
requirements. Fertiliser was discharged from the ships directly into members’ trucks 
on the wharf. Additional storage was hired if required (Madden, 2003a). This 
uncomplicated approach enabled the UFCC to build a judicious capital base from its 
modest beginnings.  
However, the presence of the UFCC in the market place did not go unnoticed 
by its competitors. Providing a service at cost based on co-operative philosophy 
impacted on the IOF price of fertiliser in Western Australia. CSPB Limited was 
substantially threatened by the presence of the UFCC in the market place, and had 
retrenched several hundred employees in this short period of competition from the 
UFCC (Madden, 2003a). However, by the third year of UFCC operation in 1995, 
CSBP Limited recognised that the UFCC had a limited capital base and that the co-
operative could not offer an up-front price for fertiliser (Madden, 2003b).150 CSBP 
Limited implemented a loss leading strategy to exploit these weaknesses (Madden, 
2003b).  It undercut the UFCC by selling fertiliser at a lower price than it or its 
competitors could source it, even though it was financially unprofitable for CSBP 
Limited to adopt this strategy (Madden, 2003b). A ‘fertiliser price war’ erupted 
between CSBP Limited and the UFCC (Madden, 2003b). Madden is adamant that the 
objective of Wesfarmers, (the parent company of CSBP Limited), was to drive the 
                                                 
149 The 80 per cent/20 per cent split in the UFCC rebate strategy is explained in Chapter Eight.  The 
UFCC therefore has two categories of shares – member shares valued at $1.00 each, and bonus shares 
created from the patronage rebate mechanism adopted by the UFCC. 
150 The UFCC pricing for fertiliser comprises two parts, the original purchase price and the effect of 
the rebates on this initial price.  The original purchase price is comparable to the market price set by 
competitors.  This price is then offset by the rebates members receive annually.  Rebates are discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter. 
 180
potentially financially vulnerable UFCC out of business (Madden, 2003a, 2003b). 
The UFCC Board of Directors, recognising that it could not compete with this 
artificially low price, rapidly developed a response based on its co-operative 
objective of supplying its members with the lowest priced fertiliser (Madden, 2003b). 
The Board swiftly recommended to its members by fax, telephone and letter that the 
prices offered by CSBP Limited were lower than what the UFCC could purchase it 
and recommended that members purchase their fertiliser from Wesfarmers (Madden, 
2003b). UFCC members followed this advice and Wesfarmers suddenly had 
overwhelming numbers of orders for fertiliser that was significantly underpriced, 
immediately affecting its own profitability. Within two weeks, the price returned to 
its original level. While the UFCC did not make a profit in that third year, it had 
achieved its foundation goal of lowering the price of fertiliser for its members 
(Madden, 2003b).  
A third player, Summit, was also caught up in this price war. Summit’s 
response to the lowering of the Wesfarmers price was to match it although it was at a 
price that impacted on Summit’s own profitability (Madden, 2003b). Madden 
(2003b) argued that Summit adopted this strategy as they could not afford to have 
their customers seduced by the low Wesfarmers price for fertiliser because they may 
switch altogether, threatening Summit’s future business (Madden, 2003b). He 
believed that Summit lost significantly from the price war (Madden, 2003b). 
The UFCC had survived its first commercial challenge to its position in the 
market by relying on the co-operative principles to guide its strategy. This episode 
demonstrates the ethics underpinning the UFCC philosophy as a low cost supplier of 
fertiliser. While the UFCC did not itself supply the fertiliser, it achieved the objective 
of lowering the cost of fertiliser to its membership. However, Madden (2003b) 
volunteered that if a similar situation in which a competitor sought to destabilise the 
UFCC via price war arose as the co-operative matured, the UFCC would not be able 
to take such a principled stand. To illustrate, the Chair said that as a result of a 
change in Australian Quarantine Inspection Services (AQIS) requirement, members 
could no longer collect their fertiliser directly into their trucks from the wharf 
(Madden, 2003b). In response to this, the UFCC instigated a program of building 
storage facilities at various ports at considerable expense. Consequently, each storage 
facility had fixed overheads and needed to operate at optimum capacity to ensure that 
 181
members were assured of the lowest price for fertiliser. The co-operative, therefore, 
was no longer financially unencumbered as in 1995 when it could make the 
principled decision not to import fertiliser and recommend its members purchase 
elsewhere (Madden, 2003b). This account suggests that the life cycle of the maturing 
agricultural co-operative has inexorably led to different internal business strategies 
and therefore different responses to external threats.151 The case study reveals that 
the co-operative principles did not provide the over-riding guidance for a maturing 
agricultural co-operative as it did in its formative years. As the case study unfolds 
further in Chapter Eight, other incidences in the evolution of the UFCC highlight the 
conflicts an agricultural co-operative tussles with in trying to apply the co-operative 
principles throughout its life cycle. 
UFCC and Agricultural Economic Co-operative Theory 
The factors cited by Madden leading to the birth of the UFCC illustrate that 
traditional economic theory for the formation and continuation of co-operatives is 
still a powerful explanation for the establishment of Australian agricultural co-
operatives.  Chapter Two demonstrated that the ability of agricultural co-operatives 
to achieve economies of scale or break the power of monopolies are key triggers 
motivating farmers to establish co-operatives.   
The episode with CSBP Limited illustrates that market failure arising from 
monopoly (or monopsony) situations prevent farmers from participating fairly in a 
market (Cobia, 1989; Cook, 1995). This can be demonstrated historically in the 
literature, as farmers formed an agricultural co-operative as a strategy to counter the 
power and influence of powerful corporations (Cobia, 1989; Cook, 1995; Craig, 
1993; Hansmann, 1996). The high prices Western Australian farmers were forced to 
pay in the early 1990s for fertiliser supplied by companies such as CSBP Limited 
exposes this type of market failure. An agricultural co-operative, with its capacity for 
economies of scale, can provide a countervailing balance to an exploitative market 
                                                 
151 The concept of life cycle is described in Chapter Eight.  It is a useful adaptation of a biological 
concept to understand the evolution of an organisation through stages of establishment, growth, 
maturation and potential decline. Cook’s (1995) five stage theory of the evolution of co-operatives 
also indirectly suggests that agricultural co-operatives travel through a number of relatively 
predictable life cycle stages. 
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152situation and introduce a fair market price [a ‘floor price’]  for a commodity 
(Cobia, 1989). The entry of the UFCC to the market illustrates this countervailing 
ability because as a co-operative it was quickly able to lower the market price 
charged by corporates for chemicals and fertiliser in Western Australia (Madden, 
2003b). The UFCC demonstrates the relevance of agricultural co-operative economic 
theory in explaining contemporary Australian agricultural co-operatives, and 
importantly, that an agricultural co-operative is a proven strategy to address present 
day market failure. 
The threat posed by CSBP Limited in the 1995 ‘fertiliser war’ also led the 
UFCC Board of Directors to acknowledge that, as with any organisation, the co-
operative needed to address its strategic planning processes and future direction. 
With the support of external management consultants, the UFCC Board of Directors 
and management developed a clearer understanding of the fertiliser industry and the 
import and logistics business. The UFCC Board of Directors were able to overcome 
an issue found in the literature (see, for example, Patrie, 1998) in which farmer 
Directors, whose expertise lies in commodity production, are guiding a commercial 
entity in another sector of the agricultural supply chain in which they have very little 
knowledge, experience or sophisticated management expertise. However, the Board 
succeeded in this backwards vertical integration, as the UFCC achieved significant 
financial returns over the next two years. This in turn enabled the UFCC to develop 
strong relationships with their bankers which resulted in favourable and flexible 
trading terms (Madden, 2003a), addressing another problem commonly attributed to 
the agricultural co-operative model of difficulties in capital raising. Over the next 
decade, the UFCC established itself as a major player in the agricultural supply 
sector of the agribusiness industry, with an annual turnover in 2002/2003 of $100 
million and more than 3000 farmer members in Western Australia (United Farmers 
Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  
Madden’s explanation for the formation of the UFCC reflects a strong 
economic focus. Indeed, many of the interviews conducted for this thesis suggest that 
agricultural industry actors adopt the concepts of economic theory and use the 
                                                 
152 Western Australian actors often use the phrase ‘floor price’ to describe the effect of an 
agricultural co-operative in a market on price. 
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language associated with the IOF business structure to explain the presence of 
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia.  
The UFCC and Sociologically Informed Enquiry 
While agricultural economic co-operative theory helps explain the formation 
of the UFCC, sociologically informed enquiry provides different perspectives on the 
establishment of the UFCC to complement economically informed explanations. 
Madden stated that the five founding UFCC Directors knew about the co-operative 
model as a result of their exposure as grain growers to agricultural co-operatives in 
Western Australia, particularly Co-operative Bulk Handling and Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative. As Chapter Four demonstrates, the Western Australian grains industry 
and the wider agricultural industry was historically steeped in the agricultural co-
operative business approach to integrate with and control other links of the 
agricultural supply chain. The early development of the Western Australian 
agricultural industry and the evolution of agricultural co-operatives were highly 
entwined, leading to a prosperous industry following WWII (Sandford, 1955). As the 
founding UFCC Directors were from long established grain farming families well 
embedded in their communities, they were very aware of the role that co-operatives 
had played over the generations in the viability their own family farms. Therefore, 
the co-operative model was fully institutionalised into the broad acre grains industry 
of Western Australia and an accepted and understood strategy.  
The five founding Directors sought the advice of an accountant, Mr Don 
Munro, who at the time was closely associated with the CFWA, in forming the co-
operative. The accountant had a library of agricultural co-operative books and lent 
some of these to the Chair. The ability of the group to identify and consult an 
accountant with a strong knowledge of the co-operative business structure 
demonstrates the historical depth of agricultural co-operative institutionalisation, 
although the UFCC was fortunate that this level of support was still available at this 
time from Munro, who was close to retirement.  Chapter Five and Six argue that this 
institutionalisation has diminished over the last 20 years or so and the ability to 
access this level of professional expertise in the first decade of the 21st century is 
highly debatable.  
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The Chair commented that emotion rather than agricultural co-operative 
economic theory or business knowledge originally drove the formation and early 
development of the UFCC. He recognised that they ‘got the UFCC right without 
really realising it and that there was a lot of luck involved’ (Madden, 2003b). 
However, he also added wryly that ‘you make your own luck’ (Madden, 2003b). 
These comments reflect the informal and unconscious knowledge that the founding 
members had developed over their lives about the agricultural co-operative business 
model. Simply as a result of being immersed within the agricultural industry and 
watching the significant agricultural co-operative institutions which had a 
considerable and influential role within the industry, they were highly but perhaps 
unconsciously socialised into the co-operative business approach. The formal 
research they commenced once they had decided to create the UFCC merely built on 
this implicit understanding they already had. The experience of the UFCC illustrates 
that individuals motivated to form an agricultural co-operative tap into a deeply 
embedded folk memory that forms a connection between people from which to 
further develop the co-operative concept. 
After the UFCC was established, the Chair sought to expand his knowledge 
of the agricultural co-operative business structure and travelled to Britain and the 
USA to observe other co-operatives. He also read widely on co-operative theory, 
attended co-operative and corporate business courses, conferences and workshops, 
such as the Monash Agribusiness Co-operatives Conference, the Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australian conferences and the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors seminars. Interviews with the UFCC Chair for this thesis 
revealed that he had developed a deep knowledge of co-operative history and values 
and was comfortable in discussing co-operative theory. Increasing knowledge of co-
operative theory reinforced his commitment to the co-operative business model and 
confirmed to him that ‘they had got it right with the UFCC’ (Madden, 2003b). His 
belief in and commitment to the co-operative structure had not wavered as the UFCC 
matured into a successful and influential agricultural organisation. 
The Chair’s view that a deep-seated distrust in the farming sector of 
corporations also suggests non-economic triggers are a factor in co-operative 
development. This intense suspicion of corporations by farmers also demonstrates a 
complementary need by farmers to ‘control their own destiny’ (Madden, 2003b). The 
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Chair believed that farmers understood that ownership of their co-operative business 
enabled them to achieve this level of control in their industry. He considered that the 
co-operative concepts of ‘member owned’ and ‘member controlled’ were not only 
easily understood concepts, but were very meaningful for farmers as they satisfied 
this deep need for control. The co-operative business structure, with its high intrinsic 
trustworthiness, combined with farmers’ ability to exert control over their own 
situation and thus avoid economic dependence on corporations they did not trust, was 
a powerfully motivating combination of features for farmers.  
The UFCC as an Expression of Agrarian Socialism 
The Chair’s focus on farmer distrust of corporates reflected a philosophical 
and ideological battle about neoliberal influenced capitalism and the way that it is 
rolling out in Australia. However, several interviewees suggested alternative 
motivations for this strong aversion of corporations and embracing the co-operative 
model.  An interviewee from the accounting industry specialising in the agricultural 
industry (Interviewee 695, 2003) believed that farmers’ inherent ‘socialist’ outlook 
was a key feature which attracted farmers to the co-operative structure. Therefore, he 
argued, the founding members of the UFCC may have had this philosophical 
commitment to this type of business structure, as it was consistent with agrarian 
socialism. An agribusiness consultant in the grains industry (Interviewee 688, 2001) 
considered that the co-operative model used by the UFCC represented a version of 
‘feel good economics’ which he believed was appealing to its members. He 
suggested that farmers who join agricultural co-operatives were drawn to the dual 
benefits of an economic return for their farm business combined with a social benefit 
for their communities and the industry (Interviewee 688, 2001). The interviewee also 
added that he thought that farmers have supported the UFCC because the UFCC is 
the underdog and helping them out by becoming members appealed to farmers’ sense 
of fairness. He also thought that UFCC members want something different from what 
Wesfarmers or other corporates could offer them, illustrating this with the view that 
farmers felt that corporates took them for granted, unlike a member based 
agricultural co-operative (Interviewee 688, 2001).   
These comments about ‘feel good economics’ and agrarian socialism reveal a 
perception by some agribusiness advisors that there is a segment of the agricultural 
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industry who are wedded to remnants of Keynesian style economics in Australian 
agriculture and this is the segment which is also attracted to the co-operative 
structure. This view implies that the UFCC membership represents an element in 
agriculture that is perhaps disillusioned by the perceived social and environmental 
costs of the form of capitalism practised in Australia today. However, the Chair 
dismissed these possible explanations of ‘feel good economics’, agrarian socialism or 
the Australian ethos of ‘supporting the underdog’ as reasons for farmers supporting 
the agricultural co-operative model. The Chair maintained that he was very 
committed to the pragmatic economic outcomes of the co-operative structure that he 
believed was the overriding motivating factor for farmer attachment to the structure. 
He wryly added, to support his position, that one of the Board members was 
definitely not a ‘socialist’ type; on the contrary, he was very committed to dry 
economic theory. 
The UFCC as an Expression of Social Capital 
The Chair was from a settler family with a reputation developed over several 
generations of being involved in district agri-political issues, the local church, and 
the community (Interviewee 824, 2003). Ergstrom (1994) and Patrie (1998), in the 
context of NGCs, contend that Northern European immigrants to the prairie states of 
the United States created an environment for farming families to work together in a 
range of activities associated with their church and local social activities within their 
communities. They argue that this collaborative approach within the communities 
translated to economic behaviour based on collective business structures. Wilkinson 
& Quarter (1996) note this phenomenon in the co-operative activity in the 
experiences of the Evangeline community in Prince Edward Island, Canada 
(Wilkinson & Quarter, 1996). Interviewee 691 (2002), a United States academic, in 
personal communication, also acknowledged a possible link between the prevalence 
of co-operatives in certain American States and the northern European ethnic 
background of the settlers.  
Booth (2004) believed that the religious and social activities of these early 
Scandinavian settlers on the co-operative nature of the North American prairie States 
was a significant antecedent to the success of the co-operative business structure in 
that region. Booth based this view on his personal observations and discussions with 
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United States co-operators while on a Western Australian Department of Agriculture 
study tour. He commented on the way in which local communities, over generations, 
were used to meeting on Sundays for church services. This coming together in one 
context, he believed, spilt over into other areas leading to an intertwining of 
religious, civic, social and economic aspects of members in the community. This, he 
argued, created a fertile ground in which to continue with the co-operative economic 
business approach that they brought with them as immigrants at the end of the 19th 
century. He believed that the passing of generations or the influence of the corporate 
business structure had not undermined this connection in these communities to the 
co-operative model. However, Fulton (2001) argues that the explanatory power of 
Northern European immigrant and religious aspects, while a factor, may have been 
over played in the literature as a causal element in the formation of agricultural co-
operatives in North America. 
Despite Fulton’s position, Booth (2004) considered that this strong 
community and religious aspect he observed in co-operators the United States was a 
factor in Madden’s connection with the agricultural co-operative sector. Booth 
argued that the UFCC Chair ’s Christian background instilled a strong community 
ethos in him. Further, the commonality of Christian values and co-operatives values 
reinforced a connection to the co-operative business structure. This, Booth attributed, 
was a direct precursor to the UFCC Chair’s commitment to the co-operative model 
and a key element in its subsequent success. Booth believed that the attitude 
displayed by the Chair was not a common outlook shared by others involved in co-
operatives in Australia or by Australians generally. In Booth’s view, the connection 
between a strong community ethos and agricultural co-operatives in the United States 
was not as observable in Western Australian rural communities and was a factor 
inhibiting the uptake of the co-operative structure in contemporary Western 
Australia. 
When these were raised with him, the Chair was not familiar with the views 
put forward by agricultural co-operative observers such as Ergstrom (1994) and 
Patrie (1998) about a strong co-operative culture emanating from communities with 
similarly robust religious and social ties. The Chair (Madden, 2003b) acknowledged 
his personal Christian values but did not consider that these were a major factor in 
the formation of the UFCC as he was the only practising Christian on the Board of 
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Directors. However, he believed that co-operative behaviour does seem to be linked 
with undertaking community deeds. The Chair noted that the similar quality of all 
Board members was their commitment to and involvement in their local community. 
He stated that they all shared a ‘community mindedness’ and were actively involved 
in local community initiatives and events. The co-operative Board knew each other 
via these community activities before working as a group to explore options for their 
farming businesses. This commitment to improving their community, Madden 
(2003b) stated, motivated and sustained them to form and nurture the co-operative.  
The community behaviour displayed by the original five members can 
understood as a form of social capital. This enabled them to trust each prior to 
commencing discussions about adverse economic issues and the formation of an 
agricultural co-operative as a strategy to address this problem. This behaviour 
illustrates Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of social capital and how it can be utilised and 
converted to another form of capital. A clear pathway from the previously existing 
social capital within the local community to the creation of economic capital can be 
demonstrated via the UFCC, leading to a form of ‘co-operative capital’. The UFCC 
case study indicates that the presence of social capital within an agricultural 
community is a precursor to the creation of an agricultural co-operative.  The depth 
of social capital in Western Australian rural communities is a factor influencing a 
community’s capacity to explore the potential of the agricultural co-operative model 
for economic opportunities.  
The non-economic factors explored in the formation of the UFCC and farmer 
connection to the model are insightful to identifying if an agricultural co-operative 
can arise as a potential solution in rural communities facing economic difficulties. 
However, Madden’s interpretation of why the model is embraced by farmers is 
grounded in the economic adversity facing the agricultural industry and particularly 
the behaviour of corporates in agriculture leading to some form of market failure. 
These factors, well established in economic agricultural co-operative theory, appear 
to carry more authority with Madden as the main stimulants for the formation for the 
UFCC and member connection to the structure. Madden’s greater comfort with 
economic rather than sociological explanations for the formation of the UFCC 
reflects the dominance of economic theory in contemporary agricultural industry 
discourse. When recommending the co-operative model as a potential solution to 
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agricultural communities, the case study reveals that economic language carries 
greater authority to encourage communities to adopt the co-operative structure. 
However, an understanding of the sociological factors underpinning the development 
of an agricultural co-operative cannot be overlooked. 
The UFCC as an Expression of a Farmer Initiated Social Movement 
Madden’s 1990s involvement in a political interest group such as the Rural 
Action Movement and an agricultural co-operative reflects an historical repetition of 
the political and economic environment in the period leading up to WWI.  As 
Chapter Four identified, this period also resulted in the concurrent formation of a 
political interest group and an agricultural co-operative. At a 1914 farmer meeting 
convened to discuss strategies to address the severe economic conditions confronting 
farmers, it was agreed that a political interest group, which evolved into the Country 
Party, would be formed to lobby government on these matters (K. Smith, 1984). At 
the same meeting, it was also agreed that a separate strategy would be implemented 
to focus on farmers helping themselves economically and the Westralian Farmers 
Co-operative was formed (K. Smith, 1984). The political activism and agricultural 
co-operative activities were to be undertaken as two separate pursuits, which 
removed the co-operative from agricultural industry political activism, consistent 
with the co-operative philosophy of political neutrality.  
This shared linkage of political and economic action by Western Australian 
farmers can be viewed as a form of farmer initiated social movement (Craig, 1993; 
Mooney & Gray, 2002). Analysing the birth of the UFCC as a social movement 
provides an alternative insight to the motivations for this type of collective action. 
Craig (1993, p 19) defines a social movement as ‘a collective attempt to bring about 
or resist change in social institutions or to create an entirely new order by non-
institutionalised means’. Craig argues that three factors need to be present in a social 
movement. Firstly, a shared frustration with the existing orders is evident. The 
farmer meetings of 1914 and the early 1990s, convened to address the economic 
disadvantage of farmers, illustrate a powerful dissatisfaction with the existing 
conditions. However, Craig argues that this frustration is insufficient to explain the 
evolution of a social movement. This leads to the second necessary factor, which is 
the ‘development of a vision or a belief in the possibility of a different state of 
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affairs, which leads to the articulation of a goal or ideology’ (Craig, 1993, p 19). The 
period leading to the formation of both Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the 
UFCC co-operative clearly demonstrate Craig’s second essential element. Madden 
and his colleagues mirrored the early agricultural co-operative champions who 
advocated and promoted an alternative strategy for farmers to help themselves via 
the co-operative business structure. The passionate language displayed by the UFCC 
Chair to explain the circumstances facing farmers in the early 1990s illustrates that it 
was possible to develop strategies to alleviate their situation. Lastly, Craig (1993, p 
19) states that the ‘emergence of organisations that are devoted to realising the vision 
or the mission of the social movement’ becomes the catalyst in the ongoing 
expression of the idea and garnering the support of others. The formation of 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC illustrate this third necessary 
element, as both new entities were the pivot on which further farmer support for the 
co-operative business structure was gathered. The decade following both the 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC reflect rapid and substantial 
organisational development that reinforced the vision of farmer control and 
economic power via this alternative approach to business behaviour. The triggers 
contributing to the formation of the UFCC in the early 1990s replicate many of the 
factors leading to the establishment of Westralian Farmers Co-operative eighty years 
earlier and suggest that both co-operatives can be viewed as the vehicle for a farmer 
initiated social movement.  
The UFCC and the Agricultural Co-operative Life Cycle 
Craig (1993) alludes to the cyclical nature of an individual agricultural co-
operative business, whereby a successful co-operative expands and matures, and in 
the process may lose its co-operative focus and subsequently convert to a corporate 
structure. Interestingly, an outcome of this evolutionary life cycle of an agricultural 
co-operative is that it recreates the negative economic conditions that stimulated the 
formation of a co-operative business in the first place. This in turn sets up the 
opportunity for the birth of a new co-operative. This co-operative life cycle can be 
illustrated by the formation of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, and its sustained 
growth over several decades, followed by its conversion to Wesfarmers. This 
conversion then created the necessary conditions for the formation of the UFCC as a 
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response to some of the negative economic factors for farmers, such as higher costs 
for farm inputs, emanating from the new corporate Wesfarmers.  
The parallels between Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the UFCC reveal 
patterns of an organisational life cycle for an agricultural co-operative, as well as a 
broader agricultural co-operative sector life cycle. One version of the life cycle 
concept would predict that, like the Westralian Farmers Co-operative, the UFCC 
itself will eventually convert into a corporation. Madden’s response to this possible 
scenario was ‘that co-operatives will never die’.  While Madden was adamant that 
the UFCC itself would remain a co-operative business, he indicated that if the UFCC 
did evolve into a corporation, it would simply create the conditions for the birth of a 
new agricultural co-operative, hence continuing the rotation of the agricultural co-
operative sector life cycle. 
Sandford (1955, p 43), writing 30 years before the Wesfarmers conversion, 
also indirectly acknowledges the concept of a co-operative life cycle when referring 
to the need for the agricultural industry to learn the lesson of a co-operative business 
response to economic and social adversity ‘over and over again’. However, his 
comment that ‘it is not in times of prosperity but during adversity that forward 
movements are made; the former is the time for consolidation, and the latter the time 
to command and exploit new support’ (Sandford, 1955, p 43).  This suggests that 
when the agricultural industry is performing well, commitment to and knowledge of 
the co-operative business model diminishes. Sandford’s insight about the need to 
relearn the co-operative business solution to economic and social adversity is 
reinforced by the relatively low levels of awareness of the co-operative business 
model by many actors interviewed for this thesis.   
The ‘Co-operative Champion’ 
This account of the UFCC story strongly features the role of the founding 
Chair as a significant actor in the genesis of the UFCC. The literature, particularly 
the empirical work, highlights the importance of an individual who assumes the role 
of ‘co-operative champion’ to facilitate the evolution of an agricultural co-operative 
from a good idea into reality. Patrie (1998) identifies a number of critical factors in 
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153the individual who successfully fills this role.  The co-operative champion must 
come to the fore in the early period of the co-operative’s development to move the 
concept along to an outcome. The individual must be credible and have the ability to 
command the respect of colleagues. He has to have a willingness to accept a ‘servant 
leadership’ role, be able to accept criticism and be uncompensated for his work. A 
co-operative champion will rarely recuperate the personal costs associated in 
undertaking this role, nor be rewarded for these efforts. If a champion seeks to 
capture personal benefits, he will risk being seen as ‘corrupt’, possibly leading to a 
decline in member motivation. The champion needs to be a developer rather than a 
promoter, with sound business sense and judgement. A champion as well needs to 
build strong communication channels with potential members and a range of external 
actors. A co-operative champion also has to demonstrate financial stability in his 
own farm business. Lastly, a co-operative champion requires a sound knowledge of 
the wider agricultural industry. Bielik (n.d.) comments that the co-operative 
champion must evolve from within the farmer group. It is not, she argues, a function 
that can be undertaken by external actors such as agribusiness management 
consultants or government officers. 
Several interviewees commented on the importance of the catalyst role of a 
key individual - the co-operative champion - in the evolution of Western Australian 
co-operatives (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 680, 2003; Interviewee 688, 2001; 
Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 2003). These interviewees recognised a 
strong and respected leader as a central ingredient to the success of co-operatives 
such as the UFCC. Conversely, the absence of a co-operative champion as a catalyst 
has resulted in many co-operative failures in the embryonic phase of development 
(Booth, 2004).  
The inaugural UFCC Chair is an archetype of the co-operative champion. He 
is one of the few co-operative actors in Western Australia who is known as an 
advocate of the agricultural co-operative structure outside of his own co-operative. 
This deep seated passion which motivated Madden to form the RAM and secure a 
‘better deal for Western Australian farmers’ (Madden, 2003b) is also an element in 
the makeup of a co-operative champion. The UFCC Chair is acknowledged by many 
                                                 
153 Every ‘co-operative champion’ discussed in the literature or interviewed for this research has 
been a male.  
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external actors as one of the critical success factor in the achievements of the UFCC. 
The intrinsic qualities in the founding Board members, particularly the inaugural 
Chair, provide some insights into the role of a ‘co-operative champion’ to translate a 
vision into reality. The Board nurtured an emergent co-operative into a substantial 
business in a few years. The Chair strongly supports the philosophical position of co-
operative values, particularly in relation to ‘one member, one vote’ and proportional 
rebates based on patronage. As a result of this demonstrated commitment to the 
UFCC, the Chair brings a great deal of credibility to the function of co-operative 
champion.  
Despite Madden’s personal role with the UFCC, there was a consensus 
among these interviewees that the overall Western Australian agricultural co-
operative sector lacked ‘co-operative champions’ to advocate on behalf of the wider 
co-operative sector. Key co-operative leaders at the beginning of the 20th century 
with a focus on using the co-operative model as a vehicle to develop the agricultural 
industry and well-being of farmers, such as Harper and Thompson, appear to be 
missing from the contemporary Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.  
Interviewee 689 (2002), principal of an agribusiness consultancy, argued that a key 
factor in the lack of co-operative champions in Western Australia is the pressures of 
modern farming businesses which absorb considerable time and energy of an 
individual farmer. He reasoned that adopting the role of co-operative champion on 
behalf of the industry would inevitably diminish a farmer’s focus on his or her 
primary business and therefore threaten its economic viability. This rationale for the 
lack of co-operative champions points to the dominance of the economic ethos 
driving modern agriculture. The language and sentiment from State and 
Commonwealth government agencies reinforces the position that farmers are now 
business managers and their farms are businesses; Farming cannot be seen primarily 
as a ‘lifestyle’. Agricultural industry associations (Halpin, 1999) and agribusiness 
advisors (Interviewee 689, 2002) tend to support and reinforce this economic 
orientation of the agricultural industry. Therefore, farmers who do not direct their 
full effort to the financial success of their farm business are characterised as ‘poor 
businessmen’ (Interviewee 689, 2002) who risk farm failure through their lack of 
commitment to farm management issues. The dominant ethos of individualism 
demonstrated by focusing on one’s own financial well-being is incompatible with the 
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notion of working on behalf of industry to undertake the role of co-operative 
champion.  
This contemporary environment in agriculture is a key difference between 
modern agriculture and the agricultural industry that enabled the first co-operatives 
to form in Western Australia around the time of the First World War. Clearly, the 
changed circumstances of modern agriculture limit the capacity of individual farmers 
who could potentially undertake the role of co-operative champion (Interviewee 689, 
2002). This in turn restricts the ability of many agricultural co-operatives to form, 
grow and succeed in Western Australia. The inability of the agricultural co-operative 
sector to cultivate a critical mass of co-operative champions is clearly one of the 
barriers to the wider adoption of the agricultural co-operative model in Western 
Australia. Despite the drawbacks facing potential co-operative champions, the 
inaugural UFCC Chair, supported by the founding Board members and their families, 
was able to undertake this vital function on behalf of other farmers. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has canvassed a range of economic and non-economic factors 
leading to the establishment of the UFCC. Economic adversity in the external 
agricultural industry environment is clearly a key trigger in the formation of the co-
operative.  A significant element was a form of market failure in which corporations 
were extracting high prices from farmers for farm inputs. This is consistent with 
agricultural economic co-operative theory. Another trigger was economic adversity 
arising from the implementation of agricultural industry public policy informed by 
neoclassical economic theory during the 1980s and 1990s. Additionally, farmers 
were disadvantaged by factors outside of their control, such as the Gulf War and 
fluctuating exchange rates. 
The economic adversity leading to the formation of the UFCC replicates the 
dominant issue that prompted the formation of Westralian Farmers Co-operative, 
demonstrating a cyclical pattern in the establishment of agricultural co-operatives. 
Another historical link between the UFCC and Westralian Farmers Co-operative is 
the political connection arising from farmer discontent. Both the creation of political 
interest groups and agricultural co-operatives can be understood in the context of 
farmer initiated social movements.  
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The commitment of the founding Board of Directors and their success in 
recruiting their members is attributed to the deeply embedded folk memory of 
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia’s broad acre rural communities. This 
folk memory of the purpose of a co-operative model legitimised the structure as a 
strategy for the supply of farm inputs. A further feature is the community focus of 
the founding Directors and their connectedness to their communities. A pre-existing 
level of trust developed within their social and community interactions enabled them 
to move onto deep discussions about business and economic issues. The Chair’s 
developing knowledge of co-operative theory reinforced the appropriateness of the 
co-operative structure for their purpose. The embryonic co-operative was fortunate 
that additional professional advice about the agricultural co-operative structure was 
accessible and available. This was partly due to happenstance as the co-operative 
movement peak body had contracted an accountant with a long history of 
involvement with agricultural co-operatives and was well connected to an extended 
‘co-operative familiar’ network of professional advisors. This thesis overall has 
identified that access to and the knowledge base of agribusiness professional advisors 
about co-operative issues is not as available in contemporary times.  
Lastly, the pivotal role of the Chair as a co-operative champion in the 
development of the UFCC was a critical factor. As identified in Chapter Four in the 
first wave of agricultural co-operative development in Western Australia, the role of 
charismatic farmers who can arise from the ‘grass roots’ and advocate the co-
operative business alternative to fellow farmers remains a critical factor in the 
formation of agricultural co-operatives. Without these co-operative champions acting 
as instigators, co-operative businesses are unable to establish themselves as 
alternative sources of co-operative advisory support and knowledge is scarce or non-
existent. In the absence of wider institutional support, the subsequent loss of a co-
operative champion from an established agricultural co-operative is a contributing 
factor in it becoming unsustainable as a co-operative in the longer term. The over-
dependence on co-operative champions to stimulate agricultural co-operatives in 
Western Australia highlights the lack of wider institutional frameworks to support 
agricultural co-operatives. 
The birth of the UFCC indicates that the rationale for commencing a co-
operative business is multifaceted. These factors are both economic and non-
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economic. However, the economic justification is more obvious and carries greater 
weight in the eyes of most UFCC commentators. While non-economic factors are 
subtle, acknowledging the role of these intangible elements to the formation of a co-
operative is essential in any strategies to present the agricultural co-operative as a 
potential solution to help confront rural difficulties. A hidden outcome of the success 
of the UFCC is a re-evaluation of the value of agricultural co-operatives as a 
business structure. The UFCC clearly demonstrated that an agricultural co-operative 
is an appropriate response to an industry undergoing restructuring.  
This chapter has revealed the astonishing achievements of this twelve year 
old agricultural co-operative. Chapter Eight analyses the internal dynamics of an 
agricultural co-operative functioning within a broader economic and political 
framework that privileges the corporate business structure over the co-operative 
structure. The chapter explores an evolving undertone in which the future of the 
UFCC as a co-operative is potentially uncertain.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
UFCC as a Mature Co-operative 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the external circumstances that triggered the 
formation of the United Farmers Co-operative Company and its significant 
achievements as an agricultural co-operative over the following decade.  This chapter 
reviews the maturing UFCC, with a particular focus on its internal dynamics.  This 
chapter outlines some recent developments in the UFCC, indicating that the 
organisation is now behaving differently from its start-up and early evolution phases.  
The chapter concludes that the co-operative logic within the UFCC, which 
influenced its initial organisational development, is in danger of being eroded 
predominantly by internal factors. This may lead to an eventual conversion of the 
UFCC to a corporation. 
The information in the chapter is heavily dependent on the accounts of events 
relayed in several interviews, particularly those with Madden, as well as information 
available in the public domain.154  While the UFCC is the basis of the chapter, the 
chapter also draws on information from other interviewees to illustrate wider 
agricultural co-operative organisational behaviour in contemporary Australia.   
Co-operative Management Issues 
The UFCC case study provides insight into matters relating to employing 
suitably skilled senior staff in an agricultural co-operative.  The following section 
discusses the implications of importing senior level staff from corporations, 
determining salary packages for senior staff, and the challenges for agricultural co-
                                                 
154 In order to avoid repeatedly attributing information to Madden and other interviewees, I have 
resolved not to cite them in every instance. 
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operative Boards in inculcating co-operative values in senior staff to develop 
appropriate business strategies based on these values.   
Selecting a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
The UFCC Board of Directors appointed the incumbent CEO in early 
2002.155  The Board had clearly experienced a problematical time recruiting and 
developing the correct mix of CEO skills for the rapidly growing co-operative.  In its 
first ten years, five individuals had occupied the position of Chief Executive 
Officer.156  The Board of Directors asked all of them to leave their position, 
reflecting that as an agricultural co-operative grows in size and is more exposed to 
the wider business environment and economy, it needs to employ higher calibre 
management.  The high turnover of CEOs suggests that while the UFCC had 
experienced significant success as an agricultural co-operative in the market place, it 
also had some challenging internal staff issues. 
The first interviews for this thesis focused on the recruitment process for the 
incumbent CEO.  The intensity of discussions with interviewees about the 
recruitment of a CEO highlights the key role this senior management position plays 
in an agricultural co-operative and the need to find the right person for the position.  
The UFCC placed the CEO position with a recruitment agency.  Members of the 
Board of Directors interviewed five short-listed applicants and a subset was asked to 
attend a second interview.  The interview panel identified their preferred applicant 
(not the person finally appointed to the position) and invited the individual to an 
evening meal with the full Board.  The Board quickly became aware that their 
selected candidate was not going to fit with the organisational culture of the 
agricultural co-operative.  The Chair contacted the second preferred applicant (the 
person subsequently appointed to the position) early the next morning to come to a 
breakfast meeting with the Board.  After the meeting, the Chair advised the applicant 
that he would be contacted within the week.  He was offered the job that afternoon.   
                                                 
155 Throughout this discussion, the Chair and CEO are referred to as the Chair and CEO. However, it 
needs to be recognised that this is a story that evolves over a decade or so and parts of the account 
refer to periods prior to, or after these individuals held their respective roles. To avoid confusion, the 
two individuals are referred to by the titles of Chair or CEO even though they may not have been in 
these positions at a particular time in the narrative. 
156 The UFCC Board of Directors did not use the title ‘Chief Executive Officer’ for all the 
incumbents managing the co-operative.  This discussion employs the term CEO to refer to all 
individuals who filled this role, despite variations in their official job title. 
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The newly recruited CEO achieved some very impressive outcomes in the 
first year of his appointment.  These substantially contributed to the UFCC 
profitability and returns to members.  In 2002 the UFCC had returned to members 
$6.72 million in rebates in one of the worst years for the agricultural industry as a 
consequence of severe drought.  The CEO had also negotiated $2.2 million 
reimbursement from the $3 million written off previously as a result of a 
contaminated shipload of chemical.157  Within the first eight months of his 
employment, the CEO had also resolved most of the outstanding litigations facing 
the UFCC.158  The Chair confirmed the CEO’s achievements on behalf of the 
members. He added that the Board of Directors recognised the CEO’s contribution to 
the financial basis of the co-operative with a substantial enhancement of the CEO 
compensation package on the first anniversary of his appointment.159
Importing Corporate Staff 
The CEO recruited two former colleagues from the corporate sector in his 
first twelve months at the UFCC, resulting in three new senior level corporate sector 
managers working in the co-operative in a relatively short period.  The Chair had 
commented on how well these new recruits had adapted to the co-operative business 
structure and believed that they now understood the values underpinning the 
organisation.  This was attributed to dedicated professional development of UFCC 
staff about the co-operative values and business model.  
The Chair explained this co-operative journey for the new senior 
management recruits by recounting a story concerning the ability of one of them to 
adapt to the co-operative business ethos.160  The new employee had a long and ‘hard 
nosed’ corporate background, and from the Chair’s comments appeared to be 
perplexed by the co-operative model approach to business when first appointed.  The 
new manager demonstrated this confusion about co-operative business objectives by 
commenting to the Chair ‘that if the UFCC continues to grow at this rate we will be 
                                                 
157 The UFCC had written off approximately $3 million when a container of fertiliser was rejected in 
by Australian quarantine in the late 1990s on the basis of contamination.  The source of contamination 
was the supplier from Israel.  Despite hiring lawyers in several countries the UFCC could not get 
reimbursement and had resigned itself to the loss, advising the membership that it had been written 
off.  The new CEO successfully negotiated a $2.2 million reimbursement comprising cash and 
replacement fertiliser to be delivered over the following two years.   
158 At the time of the selection for the CEO, the co-operative was involved in seven litigations, one of 
which involved an industrial relations unfair dismissal case with the immediate past CEO. 
159 Compensation packages for agricultural co-operative senior management are discussed below. 
160 This episode does not refer to the CEO. 
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able to list on the Australian Stock Exchange in a year’.  The comment reflected the 
manager’s eagerness to impress the Chair as well as his uninformed belief that this 
would be a highly desirable outcome for the UFCC.  The Chair stated that he made it 
very clear to the manager that the future UFCC business strategy was as a co-
operative based on co-operative principles and listing on the stock exchange would 
be the last option for the UFCC.  The Chair maintained that he had reinforced to the 
manager that it was precisely because of the co-operative business strategy that the 
UFCC had achieved such long-term financial success.  The Chair believed that the 
new manager had evolved well into the co-operative ethos and understood the 
purpose of the UFCC as a mechanism to benefit farmers’ own businesses, rather than 
as an entity in its own right.   
The Chair also stated that he was very impressed with the way in which the 
CEO adapted from the corporate world to the co-operative environment and the 
specialist management qualities he brought to the UFCC.  At the time of the 
interviews in late 2002 and early 2003, the relationship between the CEO and the 
Chair appeared to be very positive.  The CEO gave the impression of developing a 
good understanding of co-operative philosophy and business strategy by participating 
in professional development on co-operative values and encouraging his staff to also 
build their understanding. The Chair and the CEO seemed to share optimism for the 
future of the UFCC as an agricultural co-operative that adhered to the co-operative 
principles.   
These vignettes demonstrate that the UFCC, like most other agricultural co-
operatives in Australia, is forced to recruit senior staff from outside the co-operative 
movement.  This situation reflects a lack of co-operative business and management 
training at the undergraduate or graduate level in Australian universities.  This in turn 
deprives the agricultural co-operative sector of appropriately trained management.  
The experience of the UFCC suggests that corporate staff can be imported from the 
corporate sector into commercial co-operatives on the proviso that they are intensely 
professionally developed in the co-operative values.  If this can successfully occur, 
the lack of specific training for co-operative managers at tertiary level is not 
necessarily a barrier to the agricultural co-operative sector in Western Australia as 
the co-operative philosophy can be grafted onto managers via professional 
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development after technical managerial competence is gained in standard commerce 
and business degrees.   
While the UFCC Chair acknowledged that this was not optimal, in the 
absence of a co-operative management training facility in Australia to provide a pool 
of potential co-operative management staff, he was comfortable with the recruitment 
of corporate sector staff into the UFCC.  He rationalised this on the basis that he 
viewed a co-operative as essentially a business and, in the same way that a corporate 
needs to adopt business tools, a co-operative can also utilise these technical and 
managerial strategies.  He argued that in common with a corporate, a co-operative 
needed to implement strategic planning, financial and accounting management, 
human resource management, marketing, operational management strategies and 
governance policies and procedures.  The Chair considered that the corporate 
background of the executive management team brought a range of skills and 
strategies that the UFCC could utilise to its benefit (Madden, 2003b).  The Chair 
stated that a staff member with an ability to read a balance sheet was of more use to 
the co-operative than an employee with an understanding of co-operative principles 
but with limited technical business skills.  This strategy, he acknowledged, can only 
work in an environment in which the Board of Directors was strongly committed to 
the co-operative principles and understood their role as Directors of a co-operative 
business.  At the time of the interviews, the Chair believed these values were solidly 
embedded within the Board.   
The UFCC experience in early 2003 with the importation of corporate staff is 
contrary to the picture painted by Craig (1993) of corporate managers in co-operative 
positions and their influence over the future strategies of the co-operative.  Craig 
(1993) highlights co-operative leadership within both the Board of Directors and 
management as one of the factors contributing to the failure of co-operatives 
remaining as co-operative businesses.  He attributes this potential for co-operative 
failure to a conflict between co-operative logic and the logic of bureaucratic 
organisations such as IOFs.  Craig argues that a CEO needs to understand and 
balance the twin co-operative objectives of the economic and the democratic in 
managing the organisation.  Craig maintains that management trained in the 
dominant capitalist corporate paradigm struggle to understand the co-operative 
philosophy.  He contends that the CEO often becomes the instrument by which a co-
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operative starts the process towards becoming a corporation by focusing on the 
economic and losing its ‘democratic’ qualities.  As a result, the CEO applies 
management principles compatible with corporations and experiences frustration 
with the co-operative’s inability to conform to the rules and norms of an IOF.  Due to 
the imported CEO’s lack of knowledge and understanding of the unique philosophy 
underpinning co-operative structures, the CEO can feel discouraged when the Board 
chides him or her for being too corporate (Craig, 1993).  In response, the CEO then 
tries even harder to please the Board by applying other corporate logic strategies, 
inadvertently setting up a cycle of co-operative decline (Craig, 1993).   
Craig (1993) also notes that the CEO, in a position of influence and authority, 
may also subtly encourage the Board to move towards corporate strategies.  In an 
environment where the Board may not be fully conversant with and committed to co-
operative principles, a CEO can exude considerable authority (Craig, 1993).  The 
CEO can therefore eventually become an instrument of a co-operative converting to 
a corporation, arguing that this is the only way to achieve organisational growth and 
increased profits.  Additionally, Craig comments, the CEO is supported in this 
strategy by external professionals, such as solicitors, accountants, financiers and 
management advisors who also lack understanding of co-operative culture and 
operate within the rules of corporate business structures.  Collectively, these external 
advisors tend to present the co-operative business structure as substandard compared 
with the corporate structure. 
The scenario outlined by Craig, whereby a corporate manager sits 
uncomfortably in a co-operative management role and becomes an instrument of 
corporatisation, did not appear to apply, at the time of the 2003 interviews, to the 
UFCC.  The UFCC recruitment and professional development of imported corporate 
staff suggested that both the Board and the new staff operated under Craig’s co-
operative logic paradigm.  However, Craig’s insight into the influence of corporate 
trained management in a co-operative’s evolution may prove to be correct for the 
UFCC.  The ensuing events in early 2004, outlined later in the chapter, suggest that 
the Chair was not as persuasive as he thought in influencing senior management 
about the merits of co-operative values in guiding long-term business strategies for 
the UFCC. The unfolding UFCC case study supports Craig’s position that an 
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agricultural co-operative is vulnerable to the internalisation of corporate ideology 
and practices from management that destabilises co-operative logic.  
Compensation Strategies for Agricultural Co-operative CEOs 
The CEO accepted the UFCC position although it was a significant salary 
drop from his former corporate sector remuneration.161  The Australian agricultural 
industry has a reputation for paying low wages for on-farm employees and its 
industry associations (Rural Training Council of Australia, 2000).  Based on 
comments from some interviewees, this appears to also be a feature with agricultural 
co-operative manager salary levels (Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 695, 2003).  
This phenomenon in which agricultural co-operatives lag behind in compensation 
levels for managers compared with managers of comparable sized IOFs is also noted 
in the United States (United States Department of Agriculture, 2002).  Interviewee 
654 (2003) thought that farmers in Australia did not really understand the need for 
appropriate compensation for the managers of agribusinesses, including the CEOs of 
agricultural co-operatives, despite these organisations being comparable to those in 
the corporate sector and deserving similar salary packages.  He attributed this 
tendency towards lower compensation levels to the unpredictable nature of farmers’ 
income, resulting from international price fluctuations for commodities and variable 
climatic conditions.  This situation, he maintained, set up some resentment among 
farmers when the CEO continued to receive a consistent income paid from the co-
operative’s activities, regardless of the fluctuations in the farmers’ income and the 
financial viability of the agricultural co-operative (Interviewee 654, 2003).  
Therefore, offering lower salaries to staff employed in agricultural industry 
associations, peak bodies and co-operatives helped off-set this resentment by farmers 
towards employees who received stable incomes regardless of the economic well-
being of the agricultural industry. 
Interviewees identified strategies to supplement agricultural co-operative 
salary packages to overcome the compensation differential between the CEOs of 
corporations and agricultural co-operatives.  One strategy was conferring bonuses for 
achievement of certain benchmarks.  According to Interviewee 650 (2003), the 
UFCC Board of Directors offered bonuses to executive management for 
                                                 
161 After many years working overseas, the UFCC CEO was prepared to accept a lower 
compensation package in exchange for the family and lifestyle benefits of residing permanently in 
Perth. 
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‘achievement of performance in excess of expectations’.  In 2002, the UFCC Board 
conferred both a bonus and a significant salary package increase on its CEO at the 
first anniversary of his employment in recognition of his input to the co-operative’s 
profitability (Madden, 2003b).   
The use of bonuses to reward the CEO suggests that the UFCC Board had a 
mechanism to objectively measure the CEO’s performance.  The Board of a publicly 
listed corporation, with its primary focus on maximising shareholder profitability, 
can use its Australian Stock Exchange share price as an objective ‘measure’ by 
which to reward CEO competence via bonuses. However, an agricultural co-
operative is a complex organisation, often with a multiplicity of goals, some of which 
can be contradictory (Craig, 1993; Mooney & Gray, 2002).  To illustrate, this 
conflict arises in relation to the twin UFCC objectives of low cost fertiliser supply 
and high member rebates.  To achieve high rebates, the UFCC has to charge as high 
a price as possible for the product it imports in order to maximise the profit it makes 
on behalf of its members and can distribute back to them as rebates.  However, the 
UFCC also has an objective of supplying the product at the lowest price possible to 
its members in order to reduce their input costs and as a result contribute to the 
financial profitability of their individual farm businesses.  These objectives are 
contradictory and appear as of equal value or importance. A good understanding of 
co-operative principles helps prioritise these objectives and minimise the conflict.  
The UFCC Chair frequently and clearly stated that the first objective of the UFCC 
was low cost supply to facilitate the profitability of member farm businesses.  
Rebates were therefore a lesser objective. However, Johnson (2005, p 1) recognised 
that in the UFCC ‘Traditionally, the key performance indicator - often the only 
performance indicator - considered by members has been the annual rebate’.   
These contradictory co-operative objectives can make it difficult to apply 
performance measures to determine CEO compensation bonuses.  The annual rebate 
is the more observable indicator by which to measure the performance of an 
agricultural co-operative and hence evaluate the performance of the CEO.  The 
concern with applying an ‘objective’ criterion of UFCC ‘profitability’ as measured 
by rebates as a trigger for a CEO bonus is that it focuses the Board, the members and 
the CEO on the lesser of the UFCC’s co-operative objectives of rebates, rather than 
low cost supply.  It reinforces a corporate mindset about ‘profitability’ on the co-
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operative that potentially erodes the co-operative logic.  Further, it inadvertently 
trains co-operative members to assess the performance of the co-operative on the 
basis of how much rebate is received each year, diverting their focus from the true 
purpose of the co-operative on low cost supply as a strategy to maximise returns to 
the family farm. Bonuses, particularly those based on annual rebates, therefore, can 
be a distracting and damaging mechanism by which to reward agricultural co-
operative CEO performance. 
The CEO of another co-operative identified an alternative to the bonus 
strategy to supplement agricultural co-operative CEO salary levels.  He reasoned that 
reward for effort should be in the form of issuing shares in the co-operative business 
to management (Interviewee 654, 2003).  This, he argued, was an incentive to co-
operative management to ensure that ‘we [the Board of Directors and senior 
management staff] are all rowing in the same direction’ (Interviewee 654, 2003).  
However, this strategy is contrary to co-operative principles in which the benefits of 
the co-operative should only accrue to the members (Craig, 1993).  By issuing shares 
to management, a portion of co-operative ‘profit’ is diverted away from the 
membership to management.  This potentially sets up a conflict situation within the 
Board by forcing it to direct a percentage of co-operative surplus to management 
shareholders, who are essentially investors, and the balance to co-operative members.   
Interviewee 669 (2003) presented a third option for agricultural co-operative 
CEO salary packages which forgoes performance incentives such as bonuses and 
share allocations.  He was not self-conscious about acknowledging that the CEO of a 
co-operative needed to be appropriately compensated for their contribution to the 
financial viability of the co-operative, at a similar level to a comparable sized 
corporation.  He claimed to be personally satisfied with his salary package, despite 
the lack of performance incentives to enhance his base salary.  This ‘fair and 
reasonable’ compensation strategy enabled the CEO to concentrate on core business, 
as it removed the potential for a CEO’s self-focused distraction to develop 
supplementary strategies such as bonuses or share allocations to boost an inadequate 
base level compensation package.   
Interviewee comments on agricultural co-operative compensation packages 
demonstrate a need for Board of Directors to be sensitive to the messages they 
covertly convey to the wider agribusiness industry when establishing salary packages 
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for management staff.  Further, interviewee insights and the literature suggest that 
performance incentives can be counter-productive for agricultural co-operative CEOs 
as they can potentially distract CEOs from core co-operative objectives. 
The Relationship Between the Board and the CEO 
A former UFCC Director, speaking generally rather than specifically about 
the UFCC, considered that the most significant issue for a co-operative was the 
dynamics between the management and the Board (Interviewee 660, 2002).  In his 
view, he thought that management tended to dominate an agricultural co-operative 
unless there was a strong and knowledgeable Board of Directors to provide checks 
and balances on the management team.  In his opinion, management had a vested 
interest in shifting the power balance in their favour.  An alternative position is that 
the CEO accepts the authority of the Board and does not exploit a situation to assume 
greater power or authority (Interviewee 650, 2003).  Interviewee 669 (2003), 
speaking as a former co-operative business CEO, argued that a co-operative needs a 
strong relationship between the Board and the CEO, suggesting a joint or collective 
power balance between the two functions.  Three views on the power balance in the 
relationship between the CEO and the Board of Directors are evident - that the CEO 
seeks to dominate the Board (Interviewee 660, 2002); that the Board controls and 
directs the CEO (Interviewee 650, 2003);or there is a strong and balanced 
relationship between the two (Interviewee 669, 2003).   
The comments by Interviewee 660 (2002) that the management of co-
operative organisations will seek to manoeuvre themselves into a powerful and 
influential position are consistent with empirical and theoretical literature on co-
operative business structures.  Craig (1993) argues that agricultural co-operative 
CEOs tend to exert an influence over the Board of Directors.  Further, due to the 
corporate background of CEOs, this influence appears to encourage co-operatives to 
evolve in the direction of converting to a corporation (Craig, 1993).  Interviewee 660 
(2002), illustrated this trend by the activities of the CBH to restructure as a 
corporation, a topical agri-political issue at the time.  He believed that the campaign  
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by the CBH Board of Directors to convert to a corporation was in reality the result of 
management pressure and influence on the Board.162
Interviewee 660 (2002), as an agricultural co-operative Board Director, 
argued that it was unacceptable for management to influence the Board in the 
direction of a structural change to a corporation.  He unequivocally put the 
responsibility on co-operative CEOs and management to understand that the co-
operative model is the best structure for producers to collectively gain the greatest 
financial return for their commodity and that management must work to achieve this 
outcome (Interviewee 660, 2002).  Following on from this logic, he maintained that a 
conversion of a co-operative to a corporation is actually a demonstration of the 
failure of the co-operative CEO and Board to do the best by its members.  Therefore, 
he reasoned, a co-operative that started to entertain ideas of becoming a corporate 
showed a flaw in management and Board understanding of the co-operative model 
(Interviewee 660, 2002).   
The unfolding UFCC case study suggests that in the agricultural co-operative 
business, problems with the CEO or Board can be eventually connected back to their 
lack of understanding of the co-operative paradigm or logic.  At the time of the 
interviews with actors associated with the UFCC, there was scant indication of a lack 
of commitment to the co-operative principles by management or within the UFCC 
Board of Directors. However, the events leading up to the 2004 AGM suggest that 
this commitment was not as deeply embedded as required in an agricultural co-
operative to quarantine it from potential debates about its future structure. 
Farmer Board Concept of a Working Week 
The interviews with actors associated with agricultural co-operatives 
highlighted the rapid turnover in the CEOs of agricultural co-operatives.  This was 
attributed to the phenomenon of ‘burn out’, often resulting from the demanding 
nature of working with farmer Boards (Interviewee 654, 2003; Interviewee 668, 
2001; Interviewee 694, 2003; Interviewee 949, 2003).  According to Interviewee 694 
                                                 
162 The 2002 drive to convert CBH to a company business structure and possibly list on the stock 
exchange was not successful.  However the retiring CBH Chair, Watson, publicly raised the issue 
again in early 2004, arguing that the CBH needed to change its co-operative structure to increase 
CBH’s market value and face future challenges in a rapidly consolidating national storage and 
handling industry (Slater, 2004).  In late 2005, the CBH Board accepted member dissatisfaction with 
this proposed direction and publicly acknowledged that it would not pursue corporatisation and public 
listing, unless overwhelmingly initiated by members at some point in the future (Bolt, 2005b). 
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(2003), several Western Australian agricultural co-operatives had lost CEOs as a 
result of a real or perceived expectation that they were available 24 hours a day to 
Board members.  The culture of agricultural co-operatives appears to manoeuvre 
CEOs into a position in which it is difficult for them to put a boundary around their 
personal accessibility to their Chair and individual Directors on the Board.   
The interview process described earlier to recruit the UFCC CEO hints at 
this.  When the Board of Directors realised at a Saturday night dinner that the 
preferred applicant for the CEO position was not suitable, Madden (2003b) contacted 
the second preferred applicant very early the following morning requesting that he 
come to a breakfast meeting.  This incident reveals a Board of Directors that finds it 
difficult to differentiate between an individual’s private and work time.  Interviewee 
694 (2003) also illustrated this expectation of high level CEO accessibility by 
describing an episode in which a Chair contacted his CEO at 3.00am to discuss an 
issue concerning the co-operative.  Interviewee 694 (2003), based on personal 
experience, portrayed working with farmers and farmer Boards as a very intense 
activity.  Helou (2002), an agricultural co-operative CEO recruited from the 
corporate sector, commented on an ‘intimacy’ in the relationship between the Chair, 
the Board, the CEO and co-operative members that he had not experienced when he 
was in the corporate sector.  He sought to illustrate this intimacy by drawing a 
parallel with a shareholder of a large company listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange who would never know if there was an administrative problem at its head 
office.  However, if there was a problem in an agricultural co-operative head office, a 
member would be sure to know about it and get onto the CEO immediately, 
regardless of the time of the day or night.   
Interviewee 669 (2003) presented a different perspective on this issue of 
accessibility.  He argued that the agricultural co-operative CEO has to accept greater 
interaction with members and recognise that it is the members’ right to be involved 
with their co-operative.  It appears that accessibility to a farmer Board outside 
standard working hours depends on the personal views and disposition of the CEO.  
However, Interviewee 694 (2003) believed that these situations would not be 
tolerated in a corporation.  He also commented that it illustrates the way that those in 
the agricultural industry conduct business, which, in his opinion, is not very 
professionally.  He added that agricultural co-operative Boards need to learn about 
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the norms of modern management, including the appropriateness of contact with 
management outside working hours. 
The tendency for a mismatch between the approach of an agricultural co-
operative Board of Directors to ‘standard working hours’ and that of a co-operative 
employee can be explained by the traditional working patterns found in farming.  
Farming businesses and family residences are frequently co-located creating an 
opportunity to work on the farm business outside traditional work hours.  
Agricultural work often requires intense spurts of activity that does not respect the 
clock.  Additionally, an agricultural co-operative is a creature of passion, which 
requires from its proponents the level of commitment, and attention that is similar to 
the demands of a young child.  This enthusiasm and dedication to the co-operative in 
the Board of Directors is a key ingredient to the development of the co-operative 
business.  However, a paid employee, no matter how committed they are to the 
values underpinning the co-operative organisation, cannot be expected to share this 
interest to the same depth, particularly if they have to balance personal commitments 
as well. 
This level of interaction by members with their agricultural co-operative can 
also be viewed as a positive strength of the co-operative.  Agricultural co-operative 
members are demonstrating that they identify strongly with their co-operative.  The 
issue is how to manage this level of commitment and perhaps channelling it 
constructively.  It becomes counterproductive if this connectedness to the local 
community overwhelms co-operative management and staff, leading to burn out and 
high staff turnover.  The literature does not expose the negative aspects of being 
employed in an agricultural co-operative in such a personal manner as identified in 
these interviews.   
Perceptions of Agricultural Co-operatives by External Actors 
The previous section discussed issues related to the management of the 
UFCC, particularly the central role that the Chair, the Board of Directors and the 
CEO play in the organisation.  This section explores the attitudes of external actors 
from the corporate and agribusiness sector about the agricultural co-operative model.  
Key themes are perceptions by individuals from the corporate sector of the 
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agricultural co-operative as a business structure and work environment, and the lack 
of professionalism of agricultural co-operative management and Board of Directors. 
Stereotyping of the Agricultural Co-operative Business Model 
As discussed above, the UFCC imported new management staff from the 
corporate sector.  Interviewee 650 (2003) commented that the new recruits expressed 
a concern that they would not have enough work to do in a co-operative and 
therefore be insufficiently stimulated.  The comment reflects the lack of knowledge 
by corporate actors about the co-operative structure as a commercial entity.  
Interviewee 650 (2003) acknowledged that working in a co-operative was not a 
‘normal’ business, as management in agricultural co-operative has to balance a 
broader range of interests than just the financial success of the organisation, 
however, he reassured the potential recruits that the UFCC was a highly 
commercially oriented work environment well suited to their skills.  Further, 
Interviewee 650 (2003) argued that while an agricultural co-operative deviates from 
the corporate norm, it remains a ‘hard edged’ commercially focused organisation 
operating according to the realities of the market economy.  According to 
Interviewee 650 (2003), the new recruits had subsequently found the co-operative 
work environment very challenging and stimulating and as a result of their 
experiences at the UFCC, had re-evaluated their initial perceptions of a co-operative 
as a ‘soft’ business. 
A representative from a bank with an agribusiness focus (Interviewee 694, 
2003) observed that agricultural co-operatives tend to attract two types of CEOs.  
Firstly, he maintained, young CEOs work in an agricultural co-operative for a few 
years with the objective of developing their management expertise and when an 
opportunity arises, move into senior positions in the corporate world.  For this group, 
he believed that the agricultural co-operative CEO role is perceived as a stepping 
stone in their corporate career, rather than a goal in itself.  The other group, in his 
opinion, consisted of older CEOs who view the agricultural co-operative position as 
an ‘end of career’ role prior to retirement, as it is perceived as a less demanding role 
than its comparable counterpart in the corporate sector.   
This view suggests that the position of CEO of an agricultural co-operative is 
not a highly sought after career move.  By implication, mid-career agricultural co-
operative CEOs have not been able to secure more prestigious and career enhancing 
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positions in the corporate sector.  There is also an implication in his comment that 
indicates that agricultural co-operatives can only attract ‘second best’ applicants to 
the role of CEO.  A former CEO (Interviewee 654, 2003) of another Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative confirmed this sentiment when he remarked that 
corporate sector colleagues and social contacts sympathised with him for being the 
CEO of an agricultural co-operative and working with farmers.  He believed that his 
colleagues viewed the position of CEO of a co-operative as a ‘come down’ and that it 
lacked the prestige of a similar position in a company.   
The Agricultural Co-operative as an Outdated Business Model 
The views and experiences of Interviewee 694 (2003) and Interviewee 654 
(2003) suggest that many in the corporate sector perceive agricultural co-operatives 
as staid and out-of-date business structures which are protected from the harsh 
demands of business and cannot function in the market economy.  By implication, 
agricultural co-operative CEOs therefore have limited management skills and would 
not succeed in the corporate environment.  Indeed, one interviewee stated that some 
agricultural co-operatives were run like ‘sheltered workshops’ (Interviewee 694, 
2003). Discussions with Booth (2004) indicate that some co-operatives do indeed 
function in this way and therefore the reputation was not undeserved.  According to 
Booth, it is anticipated that these co-operatives will close or be sold as for-profit 
businesses when the current management retires (Booth, 2004).   
The UFCC experience, however, demonstrates that agricultural co-operatives 
in Western Australia can only remain economically viable if they adopt the 
techniques of modern management and understand that they are functioning within a 
market economy.  Therefore, highly commercial agricultural co-operatives are 
required to recruit senior management staff of very high calibre.  These staff are 
clearly not ‘second best’ employees.  However, as indicated previously, the 
recruitment of senior level staff from the corporate sector requires a complementary 
professional development strategy to establish the appropriate philosophical 
orientation of the organisation and its strategic direction. 
Interviewee 654 (2003) indicated that another commonly held perception of 
agricultural co-operatives by corporate and agribusiness actors is that co-operatives 
do not appeal to ‘successful’ farmers.  According to this view, ‘successful’ farmers 
are those who operate commercially profitable farm businesses and have linked into 
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the wider agricultural supply chain as independent agents.  As successful farmers, 
they do not need the collective approach of agricultural co-operatives.  Consequently, 
agricultural co-operatives appeal to the less successful or ‘problem’ farmers in the 
industry and are effectively only a ‘safety net’.  Associated with this view is the 
perception of some corporate actors that agricultural co-operatives are an old-
fashioned ‘welfare’ strategy that does not sit well in a modern market economy 
(Interviewee 689, 2002).   
However, the UFCC experience does not fit these stereotypes of a co-
operative as a safety net or welfare mechanism for unsuccessful farmers.  The UFCC 
has over 3,000 grains industry members, representing approximately 50 per cent of 
Western Australia’s grain growers.  Collectively Western Australian farmers produce 
about one third of Australia’s grain crop (Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture, 2001b).  It would be difficult to sustain an argument that these 3,000 
grain farmers constitute the agricultural industry’s ‘welfare’ farmers.  On the 
contrary, Madden (2003b) argues that these farmers are in fact deliberately choosing 
the UFCC to manage a segment of their farm business as part of an overall farm 
management strategy, reflecting an opposing view that these members are very 
business oriented and successful farmers.  According to Madden (2003b), the farmers 
with business management and economics training are the ones who make informed 
decisions about the economic benefits of the agricultural co-operative model for the 
financial development of their farm businesses and are deliberately choosing to 
become members of the UFCC as a strategy to achieve this. 
An interviewee raised a contradiction in perceptions about the agricultural co-
operative model often held by external actors (Interviewee 654, 2003).  On the one 
hand, he argued that the agricultural co-operative model received a lot of criticism 
from those not closely associated with them, because ‘everyone knows about 
agricultural co-operatives, particularly the problems of co-operatives’ (Interviewee 
654, 2003).  However, in exploring his comments further, it became clear that this 
‘knowing’ was actually a myth about agricultural co-operatives based on 
misinformation rather than the reality of what the co-operative model actually 
provides for its members.  Ironically, in other situations, this interviewee found that 
being associated with an agricultural co-operative in commercial situations was an 
advantage as external actors regarded co-operatives as reputable and trustworthy 
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organisations.  This reveals an interesting paradox about the perceptions of the 
agricultural co-operative model.  On the other hand, these sentiments by third parties 
reveal the perception of co-operatives having a range of problems, yet concurrently 
co-operatives are also perceived by third parties as reliable and honourable 
organisations with which to do business. 
Agricultural Co-operative Business Strategy 
This section discusses a range of issues related to the UFCC business 
strategy, such as capital raising, share allocations and marketing.  It was apparent at 
the time of the research interviews that the UFCC was firmly committed to co-
operative principles and that its focus was to ensure the best return for its members 
rather than to be the biggest player in the market.  However, some indications have 
appeared that suggest that there is a difference in interpretation among actors 
associated with the UFCC about the meaning of the co-operative principles and the 
most appropriate strategies for the co-operative to adopt.  Unlike a company which 
focuses on profit maximisation, the UFCC business strategy is based around co-
operative principles.  Tensions between business strategy for a co-operative and 
corporate business strategy have become evident as the co-operative matures. 
Co-operative Principles at UFCC 
The 2003 version of the United Farmers Co-operative website conveyed a 
strong sense that farmers needed to collaborate via co-operative businesses to ensure 
that corporate organisations did not ‘take what little profit there is left in the 
industry’ (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).163  The ‘strict 
adherence to the co-operative principles’, particularly farmer ownership and control 
via the co-operative structure, was an important message communicated by the 
webpage (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  The website 
emphasised the benefit of the agricultural co-operative model for rural Western 
Australia communities as a strategy to retard rural decline, emphasising that the 
significant shareholder rebates represented funds that have been retained within rural 
communities due to the presence of an agricultural co-operative (United Farmers Co-
                                                 
163 The UFCC webpage was upgraded in 2003 and some of the earlier pages referred to in this 
chapter were subsequently removed from the website. 
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operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  The UFCC has publicly retained these 
sentiments in subsequent upgrades of its webpage. 
The messages on the UFCC website strongly indicated that the organisation 
understood the co-operative principles and the point of difference resulting from 
adopting a co-operative rather than company structure within an agricultural industry 
context.  The webpage also hinted that it was important that current and potential 
members understood the benefits of the co-operative model for the agricultural 
industry and their local communities.  These sentiments are consistent with the 
literature on the benefits of co-operatives in rural communities and their ability to 
reduce exposure to the profit driven behaviours of companies (see, for example, 
Mooney & Gray, 2002; Torgerson et al., 1997).   
The Chair attributed the success of the UFCC during its first decade to the 
relevance and strength of the co-operative structure in the Western Australian 
agricultural industry.  The Chair conveyed in the interviews that he was adamant that 
the rationale of the UFCC was to increase the financial profitability of its 
shareholders as farmers, not as investors.  He continued to maintain this view in late 
2003 when he stated that ‘the [UFCC] philosophy is still to maximise returns to the 
family farm - not [for the UFCC itself] to …. make a profit’ (Lee, 2003).  The Chair 
quite rightly argued that the UFCC was not an investment vehicle for its shareholders 
and therefore it should not view shareholder members as investors (Madden cited in 
Lee, 2003).  However, as discussed above, the management and the Board of 
Director can be conflicted by their perception of the twin objectives of low cost 
supply and high rebates.164  A shift to privileging rebates over low cost supply 
inappropriately represents the UFCC shareholders as investors, akin to the purpose of 
a company.  Consequently, the objective of being a low cost supplier aligned to the 
co-operative principles becomes jeopardised.    
A second conflict in objectives for the Board and management team is in 
balancing the twin objectives of the economic and the democratic (Craig, 1993), 
particularly with respect to co-operative equity principles.  This conflict was 
illustrated by an episode in which some members who bought substantially large 
                                                 
164 This conflict in objectives is reflected in the following statement ‘the focus on rebate levels 
creates a “Catch 22” situation for our management team …. This directly conflicts with the traditional 
goal of our Co-operative - to achieve the lowest possible prices for our members’ (Johnson, 2005). 
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amounts of product from the UFCC requested a bulk discount (Interviewee 650 
2003).  These members argued that if they bought in bulk from a corporation they 
would be able to receive a discount, and could not appreciate why the UFCC did not 
offer the same benefit (Interviewee 650 2003).  Management trained in the corporate 
sector can understand the rationale behind this argument of discounts for bulk 
purchases.  A corporate organisation is able to develop different incentive packages 
to engender loyalty from customers, leading to greater organisational profitability.  
Management becomes the vehicle for promoting these types of corporate strategies 
and encouraging the Board to implement them (Craig, 1993).  However, the co-
operative principles dictate that the UFCC cannot discriminate amongst its 
membership in its pricing strategy.  Further, all product is sold at cost, regardless of 
how much is purchased by an individual member.  By adhering to its co-operative 
principles and not offering bulk discounts, the UFCC received some dissension from 
a few members (Interviewee 650 2003).165   
Agricultural economists, such as Staatz (1987), have used these conflicts in 
co-operative goals to illustrate the shortcomings of the co-operative model when 
compared to an IOF.  Craig (1993) and Mooney and Gray (2002) also acknowledge 
the conflicting nature of co-operative objectives, but address it from a different 
perspective.  Mooney and Gray (2002) argue that the conflicting objectives in a co-
operative business in fact stimulate innovation in the co-operative.  They contend 
that the co-operative objectives force the Board and management to think laterally.  
This they argue actually inspires rigour and vitality in the co-operative, leading to 
innovative solutions and approaches. 
UFCC Business Strategy and Philosophy 
The UFCC webpage stated that the UFCC philosophy was: 
To promote and advance the family farm as a viable long-term 
business unit by engaging in commercial activities which balances the 
financial objectives of the organisation with the needs and 
expectations of its shareholders. (United Farmers Co-operative 
Company Webpage, n.d.) 
                                                 
165 In addition to this story reflecting a lack of awareness of co-operative principles by some 
elements of the management team, it also demonstrates that some UFCC members also did not 
understand the basic difference between an agricultural co-operative and an IOF.  This reinforces a 
perception that agricultural co-operative members tend to adopt an agricultural co-operative structure 
for pragmatic rather than values based reasons. 
 216
Following from this the UFCC webpage maintained that its objectives were: 
• To increase farm operating margins of farmer 
shareholders. 
• To maintain financial strength and independence. 
166• To remain farmer owned and controlled.  
Lastly, the UFCC webpage identified that its core business was supplying 
fertiliser to its membership (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  
Interviewee 650 (2003) considered that the UFCC co-operative business strategy 
comprised three components.  Firstly, he maintained that the UFCC’s core 
philosophy was based on the co-operative principles.  The UFCC webpage contained 
significant information on the co-operative principles but does not actually state this.  
Secondly, the core mission, he stated, was to reduce costs of farm inputs to increase 
profitability of farm outputs.  This is consistent with the sentiment of the UFCC 
philosophy as outlined on the webpage.  Lastly, he argued that the UFCC core 
business, as a supply co-operative, was the logistics business.  This interpretation 
differed from that stated on the UFCC webpage of low cost supply of agricultural 
chemicals and fertiliser.   
As Interviewee 650 (2003) considered that the UFCC was in the logistics 
business, he argued that it was a natural extension for the co-operative to enter the 
grain marketing business, in which the UFCC would identify the best priced markets 
for members’ grain. In his view, it was still a logistics activity and therefore 
consistent with the UFCC core business strategy (Interviewee 650, 2003).  He 
believed that the addition of grain marketing to the UFCC’s supply business was 
essentially just a reversal of the input process.  He argued that it called upon many of 
the same logistics, networks and relationships and skills that the UFCC had already 
developed.   
Consistent with this view that the UFCC was in the logistics business, the 
UFCC Board of Directors subsequently developed a proposal for a marketing arm to 
compete with the former single desk marketer, AWB Ltd, which had been privatised 
in 1999.  In 2003, the UFCC presented a ‘road show’ in rural areas to its members to 
                                                 
166 These statements are from the 2003 version of the UFCC webpage.  The UFCC statements on its 
philosophy and objectives did not include the terms ‘co-operative’ or ‘co-operative principles’.  The 
webpage, in other sections, contained detailed information on the co-operative business structure, 
principles and history (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.). 
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ascertain the level of interest in the concept.  According to Interviewee 650 (2003), 
the country tour demonstrated considerable farmer disenchantment with AWB Ltd 
and that farmers were interested in the proposed UFCC strategy because it offered an 
alternative marketing option for them.  The UFCC website confirmed that it pursued 
this strategy with the introduction of a grains division.  This division presents ‘a 
range of grain, pulse and oilseed marketing options to its shareholders’ by offering a 
mix of Wheat Pooling and Cash trading options (United Farmers Co-operative 
Company Webpage, n.d.). 
This backwards and forwards logistics strategy represents a significant 
diversion from the original UFCC objective to lower the price of farm inputs to its 
members by sourcing agricultural supplies and providing them to members at near 
cost (Madden, 2003a).  However, Interviewee 650, (2003) argued that the grains 
marketing function of the UFCC could meet the second part of the UFCC objective 
of increasing the members’ return for farm-gate produce prices by selling members’ 
commodities at higher prices than achieved by the current market processes.  
Madden (2003b) argued that these functions are two different business activities that 
could cause the successful supply co-operative to loose its momentum in its area of 
expertise.  Co-operative theory suggests that an agricultural co-operative is formed to 
address a specific need such as economic adversity (Cobia, 1989).  The UFCC 
corrected a form of market failure via the ‘competitive yardstick’ mechanism by 
importing and selling fertiliser at a lower price than the main supplier.  Deviating 
from this objective into another activity, which does not necessarily require a co-
operative structure to perform the function, may threaten the organisation’s primary 
function of low cost supply and hence its future as a co-operative (Craig, 1993).   
After entering the grain marketing area, the UFCC continued to expand its 
range of goods and services to members by offering crop nutrition and protection 
(insurance), as well as wool marketing services (United Farmers Co-operative 
Company Webpage, n.d).  The evolving direction of the UFCC business strategy is 
discussed further in the context of the 2004 AGM. 
Capital Raising Strategies 
The International Labour Office (2001) notes that one of the commonly 
identified disadvantages with the co-operative structure is the problem of raising 
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sufficient capital or funds.  Capital raising is a perennial issue in agricultural co-
operative literature and is often quoted by commentators as one of the most 
significant shortcomings for the model (see, for example, Greenwood, 1999; 
Langdon, 1991).  They argue that the lack of available equity, combined with the 
relatively small ‘return on investment’ compared with for-profit agribusiness firms, 
limits the agricultural co-operative’s ability to be competitive.  This identified 
weakness in the co-operative structure is attributed to the co-operative principle of 
‘one member, one vote’ in which a member’s financial contribution to the co-
operative is not rewarded via proportionally weighted voting power.  In contrast, the 
larger a shareholder’s financial input to a corporation, the greater voting rights the 
shareholder enjoys.  Further, a co-operative member’s individual contribution will 
not result in meaningful dividends on this capital, as the purpose of the co-operative 
is not an investment vehicle for individual members, but rather to provide a 
collective benefit or service to its membership.  The considered outcome by many 
commentators of these intrinsic co-operative features is that a co-operative member 
has little incentive to contribute more than the minimum funds to the co-operative.  
This in turn, they maintain, restricts the ability of the co-operative to raise sufficient 
capital for its commercial activities.  The argument concludes that, compared to other 
commercial business structures, the co-operative structure has an inherent 
disadvantage in raising capital.   
Hansmann (1996) does not share this view.  He comments that equity capital 
required by agricultural co-operatives must generally be raised from the members 
and that it is not apparent that difficulty in raising capital has substantially inhibited 
the formation and growth of co-operatives.  He further suggests that agricultural co-
operative managers have not reflected any general sense that their organisations 
suffered from serious capital constraints, or that it was harder to raise capital as a co-
operative than an IOF (Hansmann, 1996).   
Madden (2003b) indicated that the UFCC was well capitalised and the issues 
outlined above did not arise in the UFCC, although he acknowledged that the ability 
of an agricultural co-operative to raise capital is an essential element to its viability.  
The Chair divided UFCC capital raising strategies into two categories; infrastructure 
funds for building long-lived capital assets and working capital for ongoing co-
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operative business activities.  Both classes of funds mutually reinforced and 
leveraged each other.   
Rebate Strategies, Retained Earnings and Infrastructure Capital 
Consistent with co-operative theory of rebates based on member patronage 
(Craig, 1993), all UFCC trading profit is distributed back to members as rebates in 
proportion to the amount of business they have conducted with the co-operative 
(United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  The UFCC rebate policy 
was developed to maximise member benefits under sections of the Commonwealth 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, in conjunction with strategies that were 
permissible under the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943.  The 
Chair acknowledged that the legislated taxation concessions, in conjunction with the 
Western Australian legislation, were very important for the capital raising and 
financial management of the UFCC and that it would be difficult for an agricultural 
co-operative to build capital reserves without these concessions (Madden, 2003b).   
Under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, profits retained by a co-
operative are taxed at the standard company rate.  However, Sections 117, 118 and 
119 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 allow agricultural co-operatives to 
deduct patronage rebates to members out of pre-tax income.  Therefore, an 
agricultural co-operative does not pay tax on profits that it distributes to members as 
rebates, transferring the taxation burden to the individual member level (Greenwood, 
1999; Hildebrand, 2002; Madden, 2003b).  The UFCC is able to comply with the 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 concessions as all trading profits 
are rebated to members as unfranked assessable income.   
Greenwood (1999), in analysing capital raising strategies for dairy co-
operatives located in Australia’s eastern States, argues that these sections of the 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 are counter-productive, since they 
encourage agricultural co-operatives to return all surplus to members as rebates and 
therefore restrict the ability of agricultural co-operatives to build up cash reserves.  
Consequently, agricultural co-operatives are not able to preserve capital for 
infrastructure (Greenwood, 1999). 
However, the UFCC is able to avoid the problem identified by Greenwood of 
diminishing cash reserves within the co-operative.  Of significance to the UFCC 
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rebate strategy, the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 allows 
members’ rebates to be distributed as a mix of bonus shares and cash.  UFCC trading 
profits (surplus) are rebated back to members, not as cash, but by allocating 20 per 
cent as cash and 80 per cent as bonus shares in the UFCC.  The members’ rebate 
associated with the 80 per cent bonus shares is retained within the co-operative as 
cash for infrastructure capital.  In effect, the UFCC has retained the actual cash 
component equivalent to the 80 per cent of member rebates in return for bonus 
shares, thereby building a significant interest free cash reserve within the co-
operative.  The Chair believed that UFCC farmer members understood that the co-
operative could not be starved of funds in order to maximise member cash returns 
and supported the strategy of converting 80 per cent of member rebates into bonus 
shares (Madden, 2003b).   
As the UFCC has rebated all trading profits to members as unfranked 
assessable income, the members pay the appropriate tax on the combined 80 per cent 
bonus share rebate and the 20 per cent cash rebate according to their own businesses 
tax regime, as it is all assessable income for the member.  The member generally 
uses the 20 per cent cash component to pay the overall tax bill (Madden, 2003b).  
According to the Chair, the UFCC members understand the taxation arrangements 
and how they have been designed to enable the UFCC to build up its capital reserves 
(Madden, 2003b).   
The outcome of this strategy is that the same tax concession under the 
Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 is achieved, but 80 per cent is 
retained as capital in the co-operative.  This ensures that the UFCC has sufficient 
capital to continue expansion of the co-operative business as only 20 per cent of 
UFCC profits are rebated as cash.  In addition, they do not have to pay interest on the 
retained rebates because it is not borrowed funds.  Madden (2003b) credited this 
strategy as one of the main reasons that the UFCC had been able to minimise the 
potential dilemma of capital raising within an agricultural co-operative structure.   
For the UFCC rebate policy to work effectively it has to meet several 
requirements.  Firstly, the 80 per cent of bonus share rebates has to be capped at an 
achievable ceiling, in this case, $22,000, so that it was a genuine incentive for 
members to support the strategy (Booth, 2004).  When a member has accumulated 
$22,000 of bonus shares, the total value of the rebate is paid out to the member in 
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cash (United Farmers Co-operative Company Webpage, n.d.).  The incentive element 
of the bonus shares worked well as the Chair said that members looked forward to 
receiving their $22,000 cash (Madden, 2003b).  Madden (2003b) believed that the 
$22,000 rebate also encouraged members to purchase more product from the UFCC, 
for example, by buying two years supply of fertiliser in one year and storing it on 
their farm, in order to achieve the rebate as soon as possible.  This suited UFCC as 
well because they were selling more fertiliser.   
After a member has received their $22,000, subsequent rebates are paid fully 
in cash, rather than in the combination of cash and bonus shares.  Members are then 
effectively getting their fertiliser at cost from UFCC, which also means that the 
member is getting the best possible deal.  Madden (2003b) argued that this ‘at cost’ 
benefit for members could only occur with a co-operative business model and a 
corporate could not compete with this strategy.   
Secondly, the rebate strategy of 20 per cent cash, 80 per cent bonus shares, 
combined with the $22,000 ceiling, avoids the problem faced by co-operatives with 
high levels of retained member rebates (Booth, 2004; Craig, 1993; Madden, 2003b).  
When an agricultural co-operative holds high levels of retained member rebates, it 
may face a significant cash flow problem if many members seek to realise the value 
of their bonus shares in the same time period (Cook, 1995).  With a $22,000 ceiling, 
the UFCC is able to monitor how much it needs in reserves to meet projected 
member rebate payments each year and budget for it, thus managing its cash flow.  
By limiting the value of bonus share allocations to $22,000 per member and then 
paying members out in cash once they achieve this level, the UFCC is ensuring that 
it will never have a huge ‘payout’ bill at some future date.  Further, the rebate 
strategy alleviates the ‘horizon problem’ (Cook, 1995) as members are collectively 
prepared to leave their rebates in the co-operative to ensure it can pursue future 
investment strategies, despite their own projected membership timeframe. 
Lastly, the ‘retained earnings’ converted into bonus shares are clearly 
allocated to members rather than becoming the joint property of all members.  This 
strategy minimises the conflict identified by Cook (1995) about residual claims on 
the unallocated assets of co-operatives.  The UFCC rebate strategy has created a 
virtuous cycle as it has alleviated many of the identified shortcomings in capital 
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raising for agricultural co-operatives and generated sufficient funds for infrastructure 
capital. 
Madden (2003b) stated that the five founding UFCC Board of Directors were 
able to design the rebate policy and associated capital raising solutions due to their 
prior exposure to capital issues confronting other agricultural co-operatives such as 
CBH and Westralian Farmers Co-operative.  According to Madden (2003b), one of 
the motives for Westralian Farmers Co-operative to restructure as Wesfarmers was 
the substantial unallocated equity within the co-operative.  In the Wesfarmers 
situation, Madden (2003b) believed that this resulted in the co-operative shares being 
undervalued on paper as they were not reflected in co-operative assets.  As indicated 
by Madden (2003b), the Wesfarmers management and Board believed the true value 
of the co-operative would only be best realised via a corporate structure listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.167  The UFCC, he argued, avoided this problem of 
unallocated equity and the value of the co-operative increasing asset wise out of 
proportion to the paper value of the shares by introducing the cash and bonus share 
rebate allocation strategy.  At all times the amount of member rebates within the 
UFCC are clearly identified back to the individual members (Madden, 2003b).  
Consequently, there is no collective ownership of retained earnings within the UFCC 
(Madden, 2003b). 
The Chair (2003b) explained how the UFCC used infrastructure capital.  He 
stated firmly that the UFCC was very clear that its core function is importing and 
distribution rather than storage and handling.  This clarity of vision meant that the 
UFCC leased storage facilities where possible and capital for infrastructure was 
minimised.  The UFCC only built or purchased infrastructure if no other alternative 
was available.  Additionally the UFCC did not make an investment strategy in 
infrastructure unless it could ensure a 22.5 per cent return on investment (Madden, 
2003b).  This strategy also reduces member equity tied to collectively owned 
infrastructure. 
Madden (2003b) illustrated this leasing strategy with the negotiations in 2002 
with the Fremantle Port Authority.  He remarked that due to the volume of business 
it conducts, the UFCC found that commercial stakeholders who profit from this 
                                                 
167 Chapter Four notes that a trigger for the conversion to Wesfarmers was a concern about 
‘corporate raiders’ mounting a take-over bid for Westralian Farmers Co-operative. 
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volume were keen to work with the UFCC to facilitate business strategies for their 
mutual benefit.  The Port Authority negotiated with UFCC to build dedicated storage 
facilities that the UFCC leased for 21 years, as both parties benefit from the ongoing 
success of the co-operative.  The UFCC was not using its own capital but rather that 
of investor agencies (in this case the port authorities) to obtain the infrastructure they 
required.  However, Madden (2003b) acknowledged that, as a facility leased for a 
significant period of time, the agricultural co-operative now confronted issues 
associated with depreciation and needed to ensure that the facility was utilised at 
optimum capacity to maximise returns for its members.   
The competing objectives of retaining members’ equity within the co-
operative for business goals and the desire to return cash refunds to members is a 
complex issue for agricultural co-operative Board of Directors to manage.  The 
UFCC has dealt with this issue in a manner that supports both objectives.  The UFCC 
Chair is aware that the rebate policy they have instigated is a unique response to 
rebates and attributes this to the flexibility within the Western Australian co-
operative legislation.  He said that agricultural co-operative representatives from 
other Australian States visited the UFCC to gain a better understanding its solution to 
the tension between capital raising and member rebates.   
Working Capital 
Madden (2003b) explained that UFCC working capital was gained via a 
combination of farmer funds and bank borrowings.  Initially the UFCC was required 
to use ‘letters of credit’, in which it was necessary for the UFCC to have a specified 
amount of working capital in the bank to pay for the goods before delivery.  The 
early success of the UFCC as a supply co-operative enabled it to build an adequate 
capital base.  Consequently, rather than borrowing money from its own bankers, it 
was able to leverage the collective capital raising capacity of all its members.  The 
Chair explained the process via a hypothetical example.  Each member, he stated, 
was able to raise, through their own farm business banking arrangements, say 
$100,000, with which to buy fertiliser.  With about 3000 members placing orders and 
using their own money to pay for it, the UFCC then had the capacity to import 
fertiliser very competitively without using its own funds.  As a result of this strategy, 
the UFCC, by 2003 had an annual turnover of $100 million.  Madden (2003b) stated 
that this system had evolved further whereby the UFCC now operates on the basis of 
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‘cash against documents’ where the individual farmer pays directly for their order via 
a direct debit system at a time when the supplier needs to be paid.  The UFCC was 
therefore effectively left out of the capital transfer loop as the farmer was paying the 
supplier directly.  The outcome was that the UFCC adopted a brokerage role and did 
not itself have to use its own funds to arrange for purchase of product.   
Madden (2003b) argued that both categories of fundraising, infrastructure 
capital and working capital, are mutually beneficial.  Further, these internal capital 
raising strategies enabled the UFCC to raise additional funds in its own right 
(Madden, 2003b).  The Chair stated that their banker had authorised the UFCC to 
borrow up to 350 per cent of its asset base.  He illustrated the significance of this by 
contrasting the borrowing capacity of an individual farmer, tied to a standard loan to 
valuation ratio of 50 per cent to 90 per cent of their asset base.  Madden (2003b) 
further stated that the UFCC was the largest Western Australian customer for that 
bank and the tenth largest customer nationally.  Consequently, he pointed out, the 
UFCC was also able to obtain a better interest rate on the funds it did borrow.   
Capital raising is the one consistent point in the literature about the weakness 
of the co-operative model over the corporate structure.  To an extent, the UFCC is 
not as exposed to the issue of capital raising because as a supply co-operative it has a 
relatively small need for capital to build infrastructure.  However, the UFCC 
strategies for capital raising are innovative and have proven to be successful.  
Further, the co-operative business structure has not restricted its ability to raise 
capital.  On the contrary, the UFCC has been able to exploit unique features 
associated with the co-operative structure to pursue innovative and successful capital 
raising strategies. 
The UFCC approach to capital raising demonstrates that co-operatives have a 
remarkable ability to accumulate capital when members have a strong collective 
interest.  Madden (2003b) strongly believed that agricultural co-operatives should not 
have a capital raising problem.  Paraphrasing Parnell (1999b), Madden (2003b) 
argued that if members supported the proposed activities they will make the 
necessary effort to raise the funds for the well-being of the co-operative, in the 
knowledge that the co-operative was in effect an extension of their own farm 
businesses.  If the funds could not be raised via the membership, Madden (2003b) 
argued that the purpose of the funds needed to be questioned.  His attitude towards 
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the issue of capital raising for an agricultural co-operative reiterated his intrinsic 
connection to the co-operative logic.   
Dry Shareholders 
In Australia, members of an agricultural co-operative who no longer trade 
with the co-operative are referred to as ‘dry shareholders’ or ‘non-trading 
shareholders’.168  The theoretical problem with dry shareholders in a co-operative is 
that they separate the ownership of a co-operative from its users (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2002).  Dry shareholders can therefore adopt the outlook 
of an investor rather than a member and consequently may behave in a manner that 
ensures they will gain the most for their shares rather than focusing on getting the 
best price or service from the co-operative (Cook, 1995).  An increasing proportion 
of dry shareholders in a co-operative’s membership may result in sub-optimal 
influence decision making in the co-operative, and this may not be in the best long-
term interests of the co-operative (Cook, 1995).169  Furthermore, an agricultural co-
operative may become particularly vulnerable to corporate take-over when raiders 
offer dry shareholders a greater amount for their shares than the face or par value of 
their co-operative shares (Greenwood, 1999).170 171
The UFCC Board of Directors developed a strategy of buying back 
membership shares from non-trading members at par value, that is, the UFCC pays 
back the same face value of the share that the member paid for them in the first 
place.  The Board introduced this strategy to avoid a situation relating to dry 
shareholders which arose with the former agricultural co-operative, Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative.  According to Madden (2003b), non-active Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative members were approached to sell their membership shares at a 
premium to a ‘corporate raider’ who wished to control the co-operative.  While the 
                                                 
168 An agricultural co-operative member may become non-trading if, for example, they retire or leave 
the industry, but still retain their share in the co-operative. 
169 This phenomenon is known as the horizon problem (Cook, 1995). 
170 Agricultural co-operatives can develop substantial assets but the par value of a member’s share 
does not reflect this as it remains fixed.  In addition to the issue of dry shareholders and corporate 
takeovers, the growing asset backing of a co-operative can stimulate debate in a co-operative to 
consider a corporate structure to unlock this value held in assets.  This argument was employed in the 
CBH debate about corporatising (Bolt, 2005b). 
171 An agricultural co-operative, Pivot, was the target of a takeover bid by Shears in 1987 
(Greenwood, 1999). 
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strategy was unsuccessful, it highlighted the potential problem for a co-operative of a 
large pool of non-trading members within a co-operative. 
The present Western Australian legislation is silent on the issue of dry 
shareholders. The problems associated with dry shareholders within a co-operative 
have been recognised in the drafting of the proposed Western Australian co-operative 
legislation, which expressly excludes dry shareholders from co-operative 
membership.   
Open or Closed Membership 
Madden (2003b) commented that in late 2002 the UFCC Board of Directors 
had recognised that it must contend with being too successful in the business of 
importing fertiliser and chemicals as it was attracting more members than it had the 
capacity to service, particularly during periods of peak demand.  The UFCC had 
implemented a strategy to smooth out demand over the year, by offering a discount 
to encourage farmers to collect their fertiliser in non-peak periods, representing a 
saving to the UFCC in storage and benefiting both parties.  Additionally, UFCC 
Board considered whether to close off membership in certain geographic regions, as 
they did not have the capacity to expand storage facilities in those areas.  The UFCC 
Board also contemplated the option of closed membership, by putting a ceiling on 
the number of members in the co-operative.172  
This last strategy is contrary to co-operative principles of open membership.  
The Chair was able to rationalise the incompatibility of this strategy with the co-
operative principle of open membership.  He stated that the UFCC’s primary 
objective was to the economic well-being of its farmer members.  In his view, the 
UFCC did not have a responsibility to the entire agricultural industry (Madden, 
2003b).  Therefore, if the Directors determined that closed membership was the most 
appropriate strategy to address that issue, he was able to support it in good 
                                                 
172 The concept of ‘open’ or ‘closed’ membership in co-operative theory is different from the way 
that the terms are applied to legal discourse.  In co-operative theory, ‘open’ membership means that 
any farmer can become a member, while ‘closed’ membership restricts membership of the co-
operative to farmers who also meet some other requirement. ‘Open’ shareholdings in law apply to 
publicly listed companies which do not put a qualifier on who may purchase shares.  ‘Closed’ 
shareholdings refer to a situation in which a shareholder must comply with some requirement in order 
to purchase shares.  Farmer controlled businesses registered under the Corporations Act 2001 are 
deemed ‘closed’ as only practising farmers can purchase shares in the company, even though every 
farmer in the industry may choose to join and this is, in a sense, a form of open membership. 
 227
conscience (Madden, 2003b).  Subsequently, Madden advised that the problem did 
not evolve to the point where the UFCC had to close membership.   
In contrast to the Chair’s concern about the possible need to close 
membership as a result of too great a demand, Interviewee 650 (2003) was concerned 
that the UFCC was about to reach a natural ceiling on membership and could only 
capture another 15 per cent of potential Western Australian members.  He considered 
that this ceiling on members would restrict future growth opportunities for the co-
operative.  He thought that there may be potential for the UFCC to expand into other 
Australian States via NETCO 173(Interviewee 650, 2003).   The UFCC subsequently 
expanded its membership into Queensland and New South Wales by signing up 
distributors in these States as members, who then sold UFCC product to non-member 
farmers (Ladyman, 2004a).   
The UFCC Chair’s comments in relation to member size reinforce the UFCC 
objective of being a low cost supply co-operative and demonstrate that the co-
operative did not seek to be the largest player in the marketplace (Madden, 2003b).  
The comments of Interviewee 650 (2003) reflect a need for the UFCC to identify 
strategies for future business growth.  The differing orientations in business strategy 
revealed by these two perspectives are explored later in the chapter. 
External Advisors on Co-operative Board of Directors 
UFCC members democratically elect the Board of Directors from within the 
membership.174  The Chair strongly believed that it was appropriate for the UFCC to 
only allow farmer members to sit on the UFCC Board.  However, he also 
acknowledged that a drawback was that it also curtailed the pool of potential Board 
members and therefore the skills mix of the Board.  The Western Australian 
Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 allows co-operatives to appoint non-members as 
Board directors.  The UFCC Board is able to balance the skills mix of its farmer 
Board Directors by inviting external advisors onto the Board of Directors.  In 2003, 
the UFCC had one external Board member who was from an accounting firm. 
                                                 
173 NETCO was an Australian wide grains industry second tier alliance of agricultural co-operatives 
(Australian Centre for Co-operative Research and Development, 2003).  The UFCC was a foundation 
member of NETCO.  NETCO collapsed in late 2003, a month after being awarded a Rabobank 
Agribusiness of the Year award (Booth, 2004). 
174 The UFCC Board in 2005 consisted of seven farmer members (United Farmers Co-operative 
Company Webpage, n.d.). 
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Madden (2003b) maintained that external Directors with expertise in the 
corporate sector were a beneficial addition to the UFCC Board, as many issues 
facing corporates and co-operatives were similar, such as governance and finance 
matters.  Madden (2003b) argued that the external Director appointed to the UFCC 
Board of Directors made excellent contributions in the accounting and business 
strategy areas.  He also considered that the individual was personally committed to 
the future well-being of the UFCC as a co-operative and made an effort not miss a 
Board meeting despite personal or work commitments (Madden, 2003b).  While 
Madden (2003b) acknowledged that external Directors may not understand the co-
operative philosophy, he believed the potential corporate influence of external 
Directors was countered by the Board as it was steeped in the co-operative 
principles.  Therefore the Board was able to filter the technical advice of external 
Directors to ensure that what the Board adopted was consistent with co-operative 
philosophy (Madden, 2003b).  The UFCC case study suggests that external Directors 
on an agricultural co-operative Board are appropriate and valuable, as long as the 
Board can interpret and implement such advice via co-operative principles. 
Co-operative Principles and Member Education  
The demand by some UFCC members for bulk purchase discounts discussed 
earlier actually reflects a lack of understanding by them about the differences 
between an agricultural co-operative and a corporation.  The underlying problem of 
member confusion about these differences can be tackled via member education on 
the distinct purpose and operational functions of a co-operative enterprise.   
However, interviews conducted for this research indicated that implementing 
member education within an agricultural co-operative remains a persistent difficulty 
for the Western Australian co-operative movement.  Madden (2003b) acknowledged 
that it was a challenge for the UFCC Board of Directors and management to provide 
conceptual understanding of agricultural co-operative theory to more than 3000 
members scattered throughout a large geographical region of the State.  The Chair 
had written articles in the UFCC newsletter about the history of the co-operative 
movement to build knowledge of the uniqueness of the co-operative model and 
principles.  However, he was certain that the articles ‘went over members’ heads’ 
and was sure that it was not meaningful for them.  Members, he argued, were already 
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overloaded with information as farm business managers functioning in a rapidly 
changing agricultural industry.  He attributed this information overload to 
contemporary farmers’ need to be competent in a range of areas which was not 
required of farmers a generation earlier.  Non-essential information about the 
benefits of the co-operative business model in this environment failed to attract 
farmers’ attention.   
The Chair thought that the UFCC did not need to be overly concerned about 
ensuring that members understood the unique purpose and structure of the co-
operative model.  He considered that as long as members were getting their fertiliser 
from the UFCC at a cost plus price, the UFCC was achieving its role as a co-
operative.  He believed that the members’ litmus test for the UFCC was the price of 
chemicals and fertiliser and if the UFCC delivered on this front, the UFCC was 
servicing its membership.  Consequently, Madden’s (2003b) preferred strategy in 
relation to member eduction was to ensure that the Directors and staff were schooled 
in the co-operative principles, and as a result, they could make informed decisions on 
behalf of the wider membership about the strategic and operational direction of the 
co-operative.  
Notwithstanding the Chair’s views on member education, the UFCC, 
however, operates in an environment in which the agricultural industry is confronting 
significant restructuring based on notions found in neoclassical economic theory.  
This theory exhibits a partiality towards the corporate structure and diminishes the 
validity of the co-operative business model.  The UFCC membership, without the 
opportunity to access and participate in co-operative education and develop a strong 
understanding of the point of difference about the co-operative as a business model 
from the company structure, is not going to be in a position to make informed 
judgements on behalf of the UFCC at critical times.  As later events suggest, 
particularly at the 2004 AGM in which members were asked to vote on issues 
concerning the strategic direction for the UFCC as a co-operative, the scant attention 
by the UFCC Board of Directors to the education of the broader membership about 
co-operative principles and strategies proved to be a high risk omission.  Further, the 
Chair’s later efforts to communicate the uniqueness and value of the co-operative 
business model to the UFCC membership was too late to influence them about the 
future direction of the UFCC.  The UFCC experience suggests that, unless members 
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have an appreciation of co-operative logic, they will not be able to make informed 
decisions on the future directions of their co-operative. 
Generational Change and Succession Planning 
In response to the disruptions that occurred when some Board members or 
staff left their positions, the UFCC Board of Directors subsequently implemented 
succession planning to ensure the smooth transition from one incumbent in a position 
to the next (Madden, 2003b).  Part of the succession planning strategy involved a 
training development program for potential Board members, combining professional 
development in the technical and legal duties of Board members with an 
understanding of co-operative principles.  The UFCC Board invited members to 
nominate for the program and successful applicants were required to sign a 
confidentiality clause when they participated in the program.  At the completion of 
the program, those who were interested in pursuing a Board position put themselves 
forward as potential nominees for future elections.  Board members also participated 
in on-going professional development programs, such as those offered by the 
Australian Institute of Management (AIM) and the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors (AICD). 
The UFCC also introduced a succession plan for senior management.  The 
sudden removal of one of the previous CEOs demonstrated that the organisation had 
not mentored other staff to fill this role, leaving the UFCC in a difficult situation 
(Interviewee 650, 2003).  The succession plan for senior staff involved developing a 
skills matrix for each staff member and then aligning these to the positions within the 
organisation.  The matrix identified strengths and gaps in staff skills sets.  Senior 
staff coached individuals with potential for senior positions about the broader UFCC 
business management functions.   
Clearly the UFCC efforts in succession planning and professional 
development are seen as an investment, rather then as a cost, in the future of the 
organisation as an agricultural co-operative.  The UFCC case study reveals that the 
organisation is proactively minimising difficulties with staff and Board changes, 
which will also contribute to addressing issues associated with generational change.  
While the ‘co-operative champions’ who initially formed an agricultural co-operative 
remain actively involved, the original purpose of the co-operative remains 
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paramount.  However, as the ‘co-operative champions’ retire from the industry, a 
new generation of farmers will become involved in the organisation and without the 
inculcation of co-operative values, the co-operative may be at some risk (Craig, 
1993).   
Cote (2000) observes that the generational shift in a maturing agricultural co-
operative can become a pressure point for a co-operative.  Subsequent farmer 
generations may not appreciate or understand the nature of the co-operative business 
structure and therefore not be able to make informed decisions about future business 
strategies (Cote, 2000).  They may be impatient to convert the co-operative to an IOF 
to enable it to be free of perceived constraints of the co-operative structure (Cote, 
2000). The UFCC case study indicates that dedicated training for prospective Board 
members in co-operative theory and practice is a potential strategy to avoid this 
pressure from successive generations to convert an agricultural co-operative to a 
corporate structure.   
The 2004 AGM 
The previous discussion has described and analysed several features of the 
UFCC to understand how an agricultural co-operative, as an organisation, is 
adjusting to a deregulated agricultural industry.  This section is primarily based on an 
analysis of events in the UFCC in late 2003 and early 2004, culminating with the 
AGM in January 2004, to gain insight to an agricultural co-operative undergoing a 
‘changing of the guard’. 
The UFCC was created expressly as a co-operative to maximise returns to the 
family farm in the form of low cost farm inputs, specifically fertiliser and chemicals 
(Madden, 2003b).  The UFCC has evolved into an organisation of substance and 
influence within the grains industry and wider agribusiness sector.  This growth, 
however, has exposed an evolving divergence in philosophical beliefs within the 
Board and senior management about the most appropriate business strategies for the 
co-operative to implement.   
The growing difference of views resulted in Madden resigning as Chair of the 
UFCC Board in September 2003, although he retained his position as a Director 
(Ladyman, 2004a).  The timing of Madden’s resignation is an indication of the depth 
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of the crisis, as it occurred outside the usual AGM cycle.  Johnson, the deputy Chair 
and a co-founding Director of the UFCC, was appointed as the interim Chair until the 
next AGM election scheduled for January 2004 (Farmers Weekly, 2003).  Johnson 
was subsequently elected as the UFCC Chairman and Madden resigned as a Director, 
ending his role as a driving force in the UFCC.  These events were well documented 
in the rural media (see, for example, Australian Broadcasting Commission Rural 
News, 2004; Bowen, 2004; Crane, 2004a, 2004b; Farmers Weekly, 2003; Ladyman, 
2004a). 
Broadly, two groups represented the conflict in philosophical and ideological 
understanding about the objective of this agricultural co-operative and the most 
appropriate strategic decision making to achieve that objective.  One group is 
symbolised by Madden, the former and inaugural Chair.  This group espouses the co-
operative objective of low cost farm input supply to shareholders to maximise the 
profitability of family farms, supplemented by annual rebates.  The other Director 
group, represented by Johnson, and seemingly aligned with senior management, also 
claims to adhere to these co-operative goals (Ladyman, 2004b).  In behaviour and 
strategy, however, this faction appears to support profit and growth strategies that are 
more consistent with the goals of a corporation.175   
Exploring the events leading up to this conflict illustrates the philosophical 
base underpinning agricultural co-operative strategy and decision making processes 
as the co-operative matures organisationally.  According to rural media reports, 
Madden’s resignation as Chair resulted from his concern over the 2003-04 budget 
and his perception that the budget indicated a change to the co-operative’s strategic 
direction (Ladyman, 2004a).  Taylor, a retired founding Director who, unlike 
Madden, was freed from confidentiality constraints imposed on Directors, made 
several strong comments in a letter to the editor of a rural newspaper that give 
additional insight into the reasons surrounding Madden’s sudden and unexpected 
resignation.  According to Taylor (2004), Madden’s departure was triggered by a 
‘lack of opportunity to fully research the annual budget prior to its adoption on the 
slender margin of 4 to 3 and the potential liability of adopting that budget without 
                                                 
175 To support this growth strategy, the Board argued that the UFCC was losing its competitive 
advantage as a low cost supplier, as rivals had cut their prices for fertiliser.  This had forced the UFCC 
to diversify into other areas, such as grain buying and insurance to ensure ongoing profitability (Bolt, 
2005a). 
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full appreciation’ of its implications for the UFCC.  Taylor adds that Madden’s 
concern over the budget subsequently ‘degenerated into a legal stand off [by some 
UFCC Directors and senior management against Madden personally] which has 
precluded the relevant issues being aired before shareholders’ (Taylor, 2004).   
The situation deteriorated as three UFCC Board members, including the 
founding Chair, subsequently resigned from their Director positions in late December 
2003 (Ladyman, 2004a).  This action suggests a deeply felt disquiet among the three 
Directors about the strategic direction of the UFCC (Ladyman, 2004a), the 
accompanying budget to implement this new focus and the ensuing legal ‘stand off’.  
The solicitor representing the three resigning Directors was quoted as stating that 
they were concerned that the UFCC Board was no longer pursuing the primary 
purpose for which it was established, and that it was not acting in the best interests of 
members (Ladyman, 2004a).  Further, the solicitor is reported as stating that the three 
Directors were concerned that this strategy would potentially lead the UFCC in the 
direction of corporatisation, counter to their belief about members’ long-term 
expectations that the UFCC remain as a co-operative (Ladyman, 2004a). 
Prior to the AGM scheduled in late January 2004, the three Directors, 
represented by Madden, communicated their concerns via a letter to shareholders.  
They believed that in advising the shareholders of their concerns, shareholders could 
make an informed decision when voting at the AGM (Ladyman, 2004a).  A specific 
objective outlined in the letter was to encourage shareholders to vote against the re-
election of the Chair, Johnson, who, they believed, represented a growth based 
strategic direction.  The letter stated that the UFCC objective of a ‘low cost operating 
structure to maximise returns to grower members is now being eroded’ (Ladyman, 
2004a, directly quoting from the letter).  The letter continued by asserting that ‘We 
have, in a remarkably short period of time, become similar to the organisations that 
we were originally formed to compete against’ (Ladyman, 2004a, directly quoting 
from the letter).  They argued that this was evidenced by the decision of the Board 
‘by the slender majority, to accept a major change to the strategic direction of the co-
operative’ (Ladyman, 2004a, directly quoting from the letter).  The letter further 
alleged that the cost of UFCC administration, storage and overheads had increased 
from 10 per cent of gross turnover of $88.5 million in 2001 to more than 15 per cent 
of $94.6 million in the 2003 trading year.  The letter’s authors also expressed 
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concern that non-member farmers in Queensland and NSW had purchased UFCC 
product at lower prices than Western Australian members, contrary to co-operative 
principles (Ladyman, 2004a).  Taylor (2004) provides further information that 
supports the resigning Directors’ claim of increasing costs.  He stated that in the 
previous 12 month period, ‘staff remuneration has increased … by $879,000 or 
approximately 45 per cent’ while ‘productivity increased by 4 per cent’.  Taylor 
(2004) added that he believed that a similar increase in staff costs was proposed for 
the following year.   
It appears, however, that the three left their communication attempt with 
shareholders too late.  At the closed AGM, Johnson was re-elected.  Media reports 
quoted Johnson as asserting that only two other shareholders supported the position 
taken by the three resigning Directors (Ladyman, 2004b).  Johnson interpreted this as 
an ‘outstanding success and an endorsement of the current Board strategic direction 
and the current management team’ (Ladyman, 2004b).  He rejected the claims of the 
resigning Directors, arguing that if the UFCC was no longer a low cost supplier, 
members would be switching to the competition to source their chemicals (Ladyman, 
2004a).   
The UFCC CEO did not deny the allegation that the UFCC was behaving in a 
similar way to corporates (Ladyman, 2004b).  Rather, he rationalised this mirroring 
of corporate conduct on the basis of the extra regulatory or legislative frameworks, 
such as occupational health and safety legislation, now imposed on all businesses, 
including agricultural co-operatives, which were not deemed as important in the 
early 1990s when the UFCC first formed (Ladyman, 2004b).  The CEO also 
acknowledged that the UFCC costs had increased, but that this occurred within the 
context of increased profits.  While he conceded that the UFCC cost structure was 
similar to that of a corporate cost structure, he argued that this did not mean that the 
UFCC was therefore going to become a corporation (Ladyman, 2004b). 
The three resigning Directors did not speak at the AGM.  Johnson claimed 
that anyone who wished to speak at the AGM could do so and that if the three did not 
choose to speak it was their own choice (Ladyman, 2004b).  Taylor (2004) gave a 
different insight into the conduct of the UFCC 2004 AGM process.  He claimed that 
the resigning Directors and their supporters were constrained from speaking freely at 
the AGM due to the presence of UFCC solicitors at the AGM (Taylor, 2004).  
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According to Taylor (2004) the three Directors were also refused permission to have 
their own legal advisors at the meeting.  Taylor’s interpretation of the AGM casts a 
different light on Johnson’s statement that any shareholder was free to speak. 
Despite Taylor’s implied suggestion of Johnson’s autocratic behaviour at the 
closed AGM, Madden was reported as saying that he was satisfied with the AGM 
outcome and that it was a demonstration of democracy at its best (Ladyman, 2004b).  
Another resigning Board member also echoed this sentiment.  This acceptance by the 
resigning Directors of the outcome of the shareholders’ vote illustrates a 
philosophical position in which the process of democratic decision making contained 
in the co-operative principles is more important than the actual decision itself (Craig, 
1993). 
Approximately 130 members attended the AGM out of a membership in 
excess of 3000, representing less than 5 per cent of the membership.  The number of 
proxy votes held by the Chair was not indicated in media reports.  Johnson claimed 
the attendance of 130 members doubled the usual attendance rate (Ladyman, 2004b).  
He attributed the high attendance to the media reports of the UFCC Board dispute 
and member interest in gaining a first hand understanding of the reasons behind the 
resignation of the Board Directors.  Implied in Johnson’s statement is that members 
were able to gain impartial information and make informed decisions about the 
future direction of the UFCC.  However, the above discussion suggests that the AGM 
was a highly orchestrated process in which the ‘demonstration of democracy’ was 
debatable, particularly given the presence of solicitors representing the Johnson 
faction effectively silencing the Madden faction.   
Understanding the UFCC as a Mature Co-operative 
The 2004 AGM exposed a divergence in views among Board members about 
the most appropriate strategies to implement.  These debates reflect a deeper 
discussion about the on-going relevance of co-operative values and business 
structure for the UFCC as it matures.  Interviews with actors connected with the 
UFCC provide insights into the decision making processes employed to rationalise 
this evolving shift in philosophical orientation and therefore business strategy.  Craig 
(1993), from a sociological perspective, discusses the motivations of decision 
making processes in co-operatives.  Craig identifies the three criteria for decision 
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making in a co-operative as profit, service and meaning.  The profit rationale for 
decision making is consistent with the neoliberal philosophy underpinning capitalism 
and IOFs.  This form of organisational decision making tends to be based on the 
objectives of growth and profit maximisation and is comparable with the style of 
decision making found in companies.   
This can be contrasted with the decision making processes that are 
compatible with co-operative logic, particularly the service rationale of a co-
operative.  According to Craig, the service rationale establishes that the purpose of 
the organisation is:  
to provide services to meet individual needs.  Democratic 
participatory structures are present to enable individuals to define 
their needs and to translate those needs into tangible services provided 
by the organisations that they control. (Craig, 1993, p 66) 
In this framework, good co-operative decisions are ‘those that meet the 
service needs of the largest number of individual members over the longest time’ 
(Craig, 1993, p 67).  Further, profit arising from the provision of this service belongs 
to the members and is subsequently returned to members.  Growth associated with 
the profit rationale is therefore a secondary value for a co-operative.  Craig 
summarises by stating: 
…the central tenet for decision making is the provision of the services 
to the people who use the organisation.  Co-operative organisations 
are not ends in themselves, but a means to an end.  They exist to serve 
the members. (Craig, 1993, p 67) 
Craig explains that the ‘meaning’ rationale in decision making can be 
understood as the sense of purpose individuals’ gain from participating in the co-
operative. Ensuring that members are actively involved in decision making processes 
leads to the best decision making outcomes for the co-operative.  Craig states that the 
‘actual decisions are less important than the manner by which they are reached’ 
(Craig, 1993, p 67).   
The profit rationale emanating from orthodox economic theory can explain 
the philosophical basis and the accompanying organisational goals embraced by the 
Johnson camp.  However, this rationale can hardly sustain the co-operative logic of 
the UFCC and will lay the foundations for increasing imitation of corporate 
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behaviour.  In contrast, the service rationale displayed by the inaugural Chair is 
clearly demonstrated by his view that the strategic direction of the UFCC needs to be 
based on the provision of a low cost supply to reduce input costs to members and 
contribute to the profitability of members’ farm businesses.  This is consistent with 
the view that the UFCC is a means to an end for shareholders, rather than an end in 
itself.  This understanding appears to have been lost by the Johnson camp, which 
seem to focus on the UFCC as a stand-alone entity in its own right.   
Lastly, Madden’s comment that the UFCC AGM was ‘a demonstration of 
democracy at its best’ (Ladyman, 2004b) and a comment by another resigning 
Director that the decision of the shareholders was ‘fine by him’ and he wished the 
UFCC Board well (Ladyman, 2004b) reflect Craig’s concept of the ‘meaning’ 
rationale.  Madden’s statement embodies the concept that the mechanism of the 
democratic decision making process was more important than the decision itself, 
even though his personal view was the casualty of the shareholders’ vote. 
Craig’s analysis helps explain the difference in interpretation of the term 
‘growth’, a term frequently and readily used during the interviews to describe UFCC 
strategies.  From one perspective, UFCC growth is evidenced by the substantial 
increase in membership numbers and the consequent expansion in scale in the 
importation of chemicals and fertiliser and the associated logistical matters.  In this 
context, growth is consistent with the UFCC objective as a co-operative of low cost 
supply.  This form of growth has a positive impact on the co-operative as it facilitates 
economies of scale that in turn enhances low cost supply.  The ‘profit’ or surplus that 
accumulates as a result of this type of growth, after servicing business expenses, is 
returned to members in the form of rebates proportionally linked to volume of 
business conducted with the UFCC.  After a decade of adopting this form of growth, 
Madden still remained committed to maximising returns to the family farm (Lee, 
2003).  Clearly, the rapid expansion of the UFCC had not altered Madden’s belief in 
the co-operative principles or the relevance of the co-operative business structure for 
farmers and the agricultural industry.  
However, the term ‘growth’ reveals how commonly used and understood 
corporate terminology can lead to confusion about precisely what is meant to be 
conveyed by this language terms in the context of a co-operative business.  In 
business and strategic management theory, growth can also be understood as a 
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business strategy in which the pursuit of profitability becomes an end in itself.  There 
is clearly a clash of ideologies with these different understandings of growth (Craig, 
1993, p 66).  Hind notes this discord by stating that: 
The [literatures] relating to conventional businesses exhibit a 
tendency of accepting growth as an inevitable consequence of 
corporate existence, i.e., to grow or die. Certainly many economic and 
management theories of firms lean toward profit, growth, or sales 
maximization/optimization as the firm’s obvious goals. For 
conventional, non-co-operative structures, this may well be 
appropriate. Co-operative definitions and theory, however, would 
suggest that these traditional corporate goals are either superfluous or 
act as constraints within which other member benefit goals may be 
aimed, i.e., in theory at least, they are a means rather than an end. 
(Hind, 1997, p 1079) 
This corporate interpretation of the term ‘growth’ is illustrated by a statement 
from the Chair which demonstrates that he believes that the UFCC was adopting a 
pro-business growth strategy counter to co-operative values.  Madden publicly stated 
that: 
I don't mind growth, providing that growth is sustainable and in the 
best interests of the shareholders; but the growth that the Co-operative 
has endeavoured to achieve over the last couple of years, and I believe 
in the future, has come at a cost to shareholders; and the cost has been 
reflected back in higher prices and a lower rebate. (Australian 
Broadcasting Commission Rural News, 2004) 
Madden’s assertions about inappropriate forms of growth in an agricultural 
co-operative reflect a tension about what is the most suitable strategy for a maturing 
agricultural co-operative.  The life cycle concept, paradoxically derived from 
business management and economics disciplines rather than co-operative theory, is a 
useful diagnostic device to gain an insight into the UFCC’s evolution, its present 
circumstances and possible directions for future strategies to work through this clash 
in ideologies.  Hanks, Watson, Jansen, and Chandler (1993, p 7), cited in McMahon 
(1998), define the life cycle as ‘a unique configuration of variables related to 
organisation context or structure’.  Based on a biological metaphor, the life cycle 
concept reasons that all organisations will pass through several identifiable stages of 
evolution (McMahon, 1998).  Consistent with most economic and management 
theories of the firm, the concept is underpinned by a pro-growth orientation.  This 
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assumption of growth drives organisational decision making, although empirical 
research acknowledges that some business behaviour is not solely motivated by 
growth (McMahon, 1998).  The life cycle concept further assumes that businesses 
generally progress sequentially from one stage to the next in a deterministic manner.  
A cluster of features is usually associated with each life cycle phase.  Various models 
of organisational life cycle suggest that there are three to ten phases of development 
(McMahon, 1998).  McMahon (1998) favours the Hanks et al. (1993) model which 
consists of four development stages and two ‘disengagement’ stages.  Summarising 
Hanks et al. (1993), these stages are: 
• The start up phase in which the organisation is a young and small enterprise 
with a simple organisational structure. 
• The expansion phase in which the organisation is a slightly older and larger 
entity with a more complex organisational structure.  As the organisation is 
more formalised, functional specialisation is implemented and the goal of the 
organisation is product commercialisation. 
• The maturity phase in which the organisation is double the size of the 
expansion phase although it may not be older.  The internal structure is more 
complex with increasingly specialised functions. 
• The diversification phase in which the organisation is medium sized with 
divisional structures.  Organisational formality is at the highest level of any 
stage of the life cycle. (Hanks et al., 1993, cited in McMahon, 1998). 
Of interest to a maturing agricultural co-operative, Hanks et al. (1993) 
include two ‘disengagement’ life cycle stages in which the business is sustainable but 
not oriented around the concept of growth.  Paraphrasing, these stages are: 
• The life style phase in which the organisation is a little larger than the start up 
phase but usually older.  Organisationally it is similar to the start-up phase 
but it has attained viability as a small scale organisation and then disengaged 
from the growth process. 
176• The ‘capped growth’ phase  in which the organisation is slightly bigger 
than the expansion stage, although usually much older.  It is often less 
                                                 
176 This is McMahon’s term for this phase. 
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complex organisationally than other businesses in the expansion phase.  The 
organisation is economically viable and profitable, as it has achieved an 
appropriate size and depth of market penetration.  The organisation can linger 
at this stage indefinitely, as long as the external environment does not erode 
its market niche or management undermine its competitive advantage. (Hanks 
et al., 1993, cited in McMahon, 1998)177 
Based on the phases of the life cycle model, the UFCC appears to be 
straddling the maturity phase and the diversification phase.  The UFCC has evolved 
into a highly departmentalised and hierarchical structure, with senior executives 
managing their respective departments and reporting to an overarching CEO.  
Policies and procedures are documented and formalised, with a strong focus on 
corporate governance.  Further, reported media comments from Johnson, the UFCC 
Chairman who succeeded Madden, suggests that the UFCC has linked its future 
strategy to the business growth focus of the diversification phase.   
In contrast, Madden’s reported statements suggest that he believes that the 
future strategy for the UFCC, as a co-operative, would be more compatible with the 
‘capped growth’ phase (Ladyman, 2004a, 2004b; Madden, 2003a, 2003b).  The 
capped growth strategy honours the foundation co-operative objective of maximising 
returns to farm business via the supply of low cost fertilisers.  This suggests focusing 
on the maintenance and servicing of present members.  This strategy is a form of 
‘satisficing’ in which the UFCC Board are content to adopt a long term strategy in 
which the UFCC sustains itself by continuing with its original purpose of being a low 
cost farm input co-operative.  The life cycle concept theorises that this strategy is 
sustainable in the long term and can only be undermined by a changing external 
environment diminishing its market niche or by inappropriate management styles.   
For an organisation wedded to a co-operative logic, this strategy explains the 
UFCC’s co-operative objective on behalf of its shareholders.  However, for a co-
operative employing senior management imported from the corporate sector and 
experiencing a period of rapid development as it matures organisationally, this 
                                                 
177 In addition to the phases outlined above, McMahon (1998) notes that some life cycle models also 
include an organisational development phase, (which occurs prior to the start-up phase), a decline 
phase and a renewal phase.   
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strategy is at odds with corporate trained management’s understanding of 
organisational behaviour.   
The concept of organisational life cycle reveals that in the early phases of 
start-up and expansion, the organisation attracts individuals whose management style 
is entrepreneurial and energetic to ensure that the organisation survives and grows in 
a dynamic and possibly threatening external environment (Hanks et al., 1993, cited in 
McMahon, 1998).  The UFCC case study confirms this very engaged style of 
Directors of co-operatives, as the founding UFCC Directors were highly visionary, 
committed and motivated.  These characteristics are also consistent with the 
phenomenon of the ‘co-operative champion’, as discussed in Chapter Seven.  
However, when an organisation evolves and matures, the life cycle concept 
demonstrates that a more conservative management approach is required (Hanks et 
al., 1993, cited in McMahon, 1998).  A ‘capped growth’ strategy, essentially 
implying a failure to grow, is contrary to strategies adopted by managers socialised 
in the corporate logic (Craig, 1993).  Encouraged by management mostly trained 
within a corporate environment who are keen to demonstrate their capabilities in 
continuing with the UFCC success story, it is almost inevitable that some Board 
Directors would scan for alternative business strategies based around the economic 
concept of growth, as understood in an IOF sense (Craig, 1993).  The fact that the 
business is a co-operative with clear principles for strategic behaviour is lost in this 
excitement.  Hence, corporate trained managers resist strategies for a maturing co-
operative that are consistent with co-operative principles (Craig. 1993).   
Madden’s comments indicate that strategies based around pursuing growth as 
a goal in its own right were being considered by the UFCC Board of Directors.  
Without clear guidance of business strategy founded on co-operative logic, combined 
with a lack of insight by Directors and management about what is occurring (Craig, 
1993), a co-operative organisation can drift under its own powerful momentum 
(Perrow, 1986) into the default IOF position of pursuing growth in volume, 
customers and turnover.  Strategies such as supplying interstate ‘members’ with 
fertiliser at a lower cost than Western Australian members and offering grain  
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178marketing and crop improvement services certainly increases turnover.   In the 
process, increasing turnover and ‘profitability’ become the indicators by which 
management and the Board of Directors start to gauge the organisation’s success 
rather than the co-operative objectives of member benefit and services.  
Consequently, the goal of low cost supply becomes a secondary concern to the 
pursuit of growth strategies.   
The twin tensions in the goals of low cost supply and increasing turnover and 
profitability are difficult to juggle.  The organisational maturing of the UFCC, the 
importation of senior management socialised in classical economic theory and IOF 
business structures, and the centralisation of power and decision making away from 
the regionally based members to a head office, have all combined and contributed to 
eroding the co-operative logic of the UFCC.  The original purpose of maximising 
farmer business returns for the benefit of shareholder members becomes lost in this 
evolution.  Madden’s untidy exit from the UFCC Board symbolises just how far the 
UFCC has strayed from its co-operative roots. 
Notwithstanding the above analysis, an alternative explanation can be 
mounted.  Madden’s views can be interpreted as a form of ‘arrested development’, in 
which he is resisting the natural life cycle evolution of the UFCC into its most 
appropriate long-term business structure.  Maug (2001, p 167) presents an argument 
that the ‘optimal ownership structure of a company changes over the life cycle of the 
firm’.  He argues that as an organisation progresses through the life cycle stages, the 
most appropriate company structure may also change.  Therefore, Maug argues, in 
some phases of the organisation’s evolution, it is advantageous to retain the original 
structure; however, this comparative advantage can change over time and another 
structure may better serve the organisation’s needs.   
The extension of the evolution of an organisation’s life cycle to also include a 
change in business structure is pertinent to the UFCC.  This argument provides an 
                                                 
178 The UFCC Board response to a perceived conflict in co-operative principles of low cost supply 
and high rebates illustrates this drift towards corporate strategies.  The Board, under the guidance of 
its Chair, Johnson, argued that members judge the success of the co-operative via high rebates rather 
than low cost supply and as a result it was important for the Board to focus on strategies to ensure 
high member rebates (Johnson, 2005).  The Board elected to ‘progressively pav[e] the way to create 
revenue streams from investment in value-adding processes to deliver increased returns in the future’ 
(Johnson, 2005, p 1).  This strategy is similar to a corporation as it is an investment designed to create 
a profit for distribution back to shareholders.  It is not related to the co-operative purpose of provision 
of goods and services to members. 
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insight into the conversion of Westralian Farmers Co-operative from a farmer owned 
and controlled co-operative to a publicly listed company structure of Wesfarmers 
with non-farmer shareholders.  Munro (2003) argued that Westralian Farmers Co-
operative had simply outgrown its co-operative business structure and had to become 
a publicly listed company.  The conversion of the co-operative to Wesfarmers and its 
subsequent growth illustrates Maug’s (2001) point that the most appropriate business 
structure evolves over the life cycle of an organisation.  The Wesfarmers conversion 
also provides some insight into UFCC’s possible future direction as a co-operative.   
The Subtle Influence of Wesfarmers 
In March 2004, national and local media reports about a 94 year old retired 
farmer from the small wheatbelt town of Narrogin captured the imagination of 
Western Australians (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2004; Australian 
Broadcasting Commission PM Radio National, 2004; Bolt, 2004; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2004; The Age, 2004). Bachelor Alf Jenkins, who had passed away in 2003, 
willed his neighbours a parcel of 400,000 Wesfarmers shares worth about $11 
million.  Most of the media stories focused on the quiet unassuming habits of 
Jenkins, his love of country sport, the kindly nature of his long standing and aging 
neighbours who cared for him as a family member, and the way that country people 
look after each other. 
Aside from the warm-hearted human interest element of this story, another 
narrative is evident.  This relates to the potential capital gain agricultural co-
operative shareholders can hope to achieve if the co-operative changes its structure to 
a company.  According to Bolt (2004), thousands of older Western Australian 
farmers have accumulated share funds worth several hundred thousand dollars each 
as a result of owning shares in the former Westralian Farmers Co-operative.  Bolt, 
however, also covertly delivers another message, that is, it is the duty of agricultural 
co-operative Directors to explore the benefits of the corporate model on behalf of 
their member shareholders.  Bolt’s analysis of Wesfarmers ‘spectacular growth’ and 
that it was once a ‘sleepy West Australian farmer co-op’, implicitly reinforces a view 
that agricultural co-operatives are old fashioned structures and successful co-
operatives must convert to a corporate structure to capture higher shareholder 
profitability.  The media presentation of the Wesfarmers story is that the most 
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appropriate and even ‘ethical’ goal for a co-operative Board of Directors is to steer a 
successful co-operative onto the path of corporatisation.  Bolt’s newspaper report 
connects Wesfarmers growth in share values as a corporate to that of the Australian 
Wheat Board (AWB), another former farmer owned entity that is now publicly listed, 
as Bolt reports, to the advantage of Western Australian wheat farmers.179  Bolt 
(2004) also suggests that each Western Australian grain grower could also benefit by 
$100,000 if Co-operative Bulk Handling (CBH) restructured from     a co-operative 
to a listed company.  Media reports reinforcing the subsequent profitability of 
agricultural co-operatives that convert to corporations further emphasise the 
perception of the inappropriateness of the co-operative structure in contemporary 
Western Australian agriculture.  For UFCC Directors, and no doubt some members, 
the Wesfarmers story presents as an alluring model for the UFCC to emulate.  
This thinking can be theoretically reinforced within contemporary economic 
public policy, as a market economy endorses profit driven and growth oriented 
corporate business structures as the most appropriate organisational structure.  In this 
context, the agricultural co-operative model is seen as an anachronism of a time long 
past.  Some agribusiness interviewees have explained the paradoxical success of the 
UFCC in a contemporary agricultural industry by suggesting that the co-operative 
model is acceptable in a start-up situation when the market does not enable a 
company structure to evolve (Interviewee 688, 2001; Interviewee 689, 2002; 
Interviewee 695, 2003).  However, once the co-operative has reached a critical mass, 
the message is that modern business actors do not sentimentally attach themselves to 
the co-operative structure; rather, they move in the direction that market forces take 
them.180  If this means restructuring a co-operative to a corporate structure, so be it.   
Would this strategy represent a betrayal of the co-operative members and the 
co-operative ethos?  Or would it indicate that the UFCC Board of Directors have 
behaved truly responsibly by steering the UFCC toward a corporate structure and 
giving members the opportunity to potentially benefit from rising share values in the 
                                                 
179 Bolt is incorrect to suggest that Westralian Farmers Co-operative and the AWB are similar 
organisational structures.  The AWB was not a co-operative, but rather a SMA underpinned by 
legislation, which gave it monopoly powers in the marketing of wheat.  Therefore, the linking of 
Wesfarmers as a former co-operative that corporatised to AWB which is now ‘privatised’ is 
inappropriate.  Further, it is debatable if CBH is a co-operative as it also has a legislative base which 
historically gave it monopoly status.  The confusion between SMAs, quasi SMAs and voluntary 
agricultural co-operatives was frequently encountered in the course of this research.   
180 This view is consistent with Nourse’s theory of competitive yardstick. 
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way that Wesfarmers shareholders have?  This research has revealed very few 
criticisms from interviewees of the Wesfarmers decision to convert to a corporate 
structure.  Madden (2003b) is one of a few individuals who is prepared to state that 
Wesfarmers actually betrayed not only its present shareholders, but its founding 
members, past and future generations of farmers and the agricultural industry, when 
it corporatised.   
The paradox for those who wish to see the UFCC continue into the long term 
as an agricultural co-operative is that farmer members of the former Westralian 
Farmers Co-operative who retained their Wesfarmers shares have now become 
wealthy.  This further reinforces the perception held by some UFCC shareholders 
and other actors connected with the agricultural and agribusiness industries (possibly 
a majority) that the true benefits of a co-operative come to its shareholder members 
when it converts to a corporation and is subsequently able to compete profitably in 
the market place.   
UFCC Postscript 
Recent developments within the UFCC provide further insight into the 
evolving position of agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. At the 2006 
UFCC Annual General Meeting, Mr Max Johnson, the Chair elected after Madden’s 
resignation in 2004, unexpectedly lost in a vote for re-election as Chair (Bolt, 
2006a).  Prior to the election, a dissident group of about 20 members sought to 
negotiate with the Chair to remove the Chief Executive Officer.  The group 
expressed disquiet about the incremental shift in the UFCC from its original focus on 
the low cost supply of fertiliser and chemicals by diversifying into wool broking, 
grain buying, insurance and finance.  The group was also concerned that the UFCC 
did not pay a rebate in 2005, for only the second time in its history (Bolt, 2005a, 
2006a).181  The group’s concerns suggest that some members believed that the CEO 
was the instigator of the changing direction within the UFCC. Johnson refused to 
abide by the group’s demands, and as it held the numbers to defeat him, he lost the 
                                                 
181 The first time the UFCC did not pay rebates is discussed in Chapter Seven. According to the 
UFCC, several factors accounted for low profitability and the subsequent decision not to pay a rebate 
in 2005. Although the cost of fertiliser rose substantially, revenue was sacrificed to enable the UFCC 
to maintain its pre-rise price.  The UFCC was left with carry-over stock as many farmers did not 
collect pre-ordered fertiliser due to liquidity problems or the wet start to the season. Delays also 
occurred with commissioning a compaction plant (Bolt, 2005a). 
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election.  Just over a month later, in March 2006, the UFCC CEO suddenly resigned, 
refusing to comment on the reasons for his decision (Henderson, 2006a).   
Madden continues to be a significant actor within the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector. In late 2004, he was appointed as a Director on the 
Board of WAMMCO, the meat processing and marketing co-operative established 
following the dismantling of the meat industry SMA (Western Australian Meat 
Marketing Co-operative, 2004).  In 2006, Madden successfully campaigned for 
election as a Director on the CBH Board, on the platform of regaining grower 
ownership and control of CBH.  He won the position formerly held by long-standing 
and pro-corporate director, Mr John Carstairs.182  Madden’s election was interpreted 
as a win for the pro-co-operative lobby (Henderson, 2006b).  The continuing 
influence of Madden in the agricultural co-operative sector, while the UFCC has had 
yet another change in Chair and CEO, indicates a growing power balance in favour 
of those advocating the co-operative business model over those who are advocating 
other business structures.  
Concluding Comments 
This chapter analysed internal factors at the UFCC in order to understand 
how, as a maturing agricultural co-operative, it has negotiated its position within a 
changing macro-economic environment. The UFCC case study indicated that part of 
this maturation process for an agricultural co-operative is evaluating the relevance of 
the co-operative principles and structure.  The chapter argued that there are 
strengthening signals suggesting that the UFCC Board is considering alternative 
business structures, possibly corporatisation.  The diverging views concerning the 
UFCC’s strategic direction, exposed by the 2004 AGM, demonstrated that the 
commitment to the ethos and values of the agricultural co-operative philosophy for 
larger and maturing agricultural co-operatives is challenged by the weight of 
neoliberal ideology.   
The 2006 developments at the UFCC, however, indicated that some farmer 
members are not prepared to accept this shift within the UFCC to corporate business 
                                                 
182 Mr Carstairs is also the Chair of the CFWA, the peak body for the Western Australian co-
operative sector. 
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strategies and a potential conversion to a company.  This mirrors the long but 
eventually unsuccessful debate within CHB to corporatise and possibly list on the 
Australian Stock Exchange.  A shared theme connected these developments.  They 
suggested that farmers’ minds have become focused on the importance of actively 
defending farmer owned and controlled structures, such as agricultural co-operatives, 
as a strategy to protect their position in a changing agricultural supply chain.  The 
exit of Johnson and the CEO from the UFCC is an indicator that farmers are not 
prepared to lose control of collective business structures that assist them in 
competing fairly in an evolving domestic and market environment. This hinted that 
contemporary farmers are developing a sophisticated understanding of the role of 
agricultural co-operatives in helping them adjust to neoliberal influenced reform.   
However, the case study also demonstrated that members need to be vigilant 
against pressures to corporatise agricultural co-operatives.  The possible conversion 
of the UFCC to a corporate needs to be placed against a background in which many 
external commentators schooled within a liberalised market economy perceive 
agricultural co-operatives as immature business structures.  Moreover, this 
perception is reinforced by the subtext of the Wesfarmers story as an idealised 
archetype for a large successful co-operative to imitate.  Therefore, despite the 
coalescing of some farmers into a faction to defend the co-operative structure for the 
UFCC, other members perceive a conversion to a corporate business structure as an 
appropriate and reasonable long-term strategy for the co-operative.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
Concluding Remarks: The Contemporary Position of Agricultural Co-
operatives in Western Australia 
Introduction 
This thesis has provided an exploratory study of the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector during a period of significant industry restructuring.  
It has approached the analysis at two levels.  Firstly, the thesis has examined the 
broader political economy shaping the agricultural co-operative sector. Secondly, via 
a detailed case study of one agricultural co-operative, the thesis has considered how 
this external world influenced the internal behaviour of the agricultural co-operative. 
This chapter revisits these two themes in the context of the information outlined in 
the preceding chapters. The chapter concludes with recommendations for public 
policy for the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector and possible areas 
for future research into agricultural co-operatives. 
Thesis Findings 
The thesis has broached a myriad of challenging issues for the Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative sector. Chapter One noted that Western Australia 
experienced an upsurge in co-operative formation in the recent past. Several issues 
contributed to this renewed interest in the co-operative model.  These included the 
rapid growth of a relatively new agricultural co-operative, the UFCC (Lee, 2003), the 
on-going debate within CBH about the most appropriate business structure it should 
adopt (Bolt, 2005c) and industry deregulation in which several co-operatives formed 
in the wake of dismantled SMAs (Interviewee 689).  Additionally, the Western 
Australian Department of Agriculture was emerging as an actor in the agricultural 
co-operative sector (Interviewee 680), and the CFWA, in converting the Executive 
Officer role to a full-time position, was beginning to exert some influence in the 
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wider co-operative movement in Western Australia (Booth, 2004). However, the 
chapter also hinted at possible barriers to the uptake of the co-operative model 
associated with neo-liberal influenced industry reform that potentially limited the 
momentum of the mini-revival. This paradox was essentially the research problem. 
The research question arising from this tension was: 
How do contemporary agricultural co-operatives contend with a neoliberal 
influenced political and economic environment? 
Chapter Two reviewed selected literature to analyse the major approaches to 
co-operative theory and agricultural co-operative theory.  The chapter discussed 
definitional variations of an agricultural co-operative and stated the definition 
adopted within this thesis. The chapter highlighted the influence of economic 
analysis to explain the formation and behaviour of agricultural co-operatives.  This 
analysis has tended to fall into two areas.  Firstly, at a macro-economic level, theory 
evolution has sought to explain the existence of the agricultural co-operative as an 
organisational structure by its capacity to contribute to the public good by correcting 
market failure (Torgerson et al., 1997). This area of theoretical development pre-
dated the second theme of agricultural co-operative theoretical evolution.  Starting 
around the late 1940s, the focus of theoretical evolution shifted to micro-economic 
analysis of the internal organisational behaviour of agricultural co-operatives 
(Torgerson et al., 1997).  This later theoretical development often focused on 
perceived structural deficits in the agricultural co-operative model, particularly in 
comparison with the IOF structure, and frequently prescribed the incorporation of 
elements of the IOF model as a solution.  A contemporary and evolving area in the 
theoretical and empirical literature was an exploration of agricultural co-operatives 
that have incorporated features of the IOF, with the NGC model presented as an 
example of a hybrid agricultural co-operative structure. 
Chapter Two also reviewed literature for alternative theoretical insights into 
agricultural co-operative behaviour.  Craig’s (1993) concept of ‘co-operative logic’ 
was used throughout this thesis to examine the behaviour of actors associated with 
agricultural co-operatives.  The concept of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Putman, 
1993) provided an alternative lens to examine farmer member motivation and the 
potential impact of the agricultural co-operative on rural communities. Mooney and 
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Gray (2002) examined the organisational tension that may arise within agricultural 
co-operatives from embedding the co-operative values in business strategy.  
The chapter concluded that a dominance of orthodox economic theory about 
the behaviour of agricultural co-operatives was unable to explain some features of 
contemporary agricultural co-operatives.  Neglected areas in the economic analysis 
of agricultural co-operatives included, for example, non-economic motivations for 
member involvement with an agricultural co-operative and the role of co-operative 
values within the organisation. Research into the capacity of the agricultural co-
operative to contribute to the public good by correcting market failure is currently 
lacking in the contemporary analysis of agricultural co-operatives. Additionally, 
further research into the ability of the agricultural co-operative to integrate farmer 
members’ businesses with the supply chain is required. An emerging theme in the 
recent literature has been a call for an interdisciplinary approach to broaden 
theoretical and empirical understanding of agricultural co-operative behaviour.  This 
thesis has adopted an interdisciplinary approach to examine the agricultural co-
operative model in the Western Australian context. 
Chapter Three explored key concepts embedded in neoclassical economic 
theory and neoliberalism (Pusey, 2003). The chapter discussed changes in 
agricultural industry policy over the last two to three decades in Australia, brought 
about by the international and domestic economic and political policies influenced by 
neoliberalism (Keogh, 2004).  The chapter argued that agricultural industry policies, 
based on neoliberal notions, have had an uneven impact on the industry and rural 
communities.  Given the theoretical capacity of agricultural co-operatives to 
contribute to the efficiency of the market, as identified in Chapter Two, this chapter 
argued that the model contributes to the economic well-being of farmers as they 
confront significant structural changes arising from market-based policies.  
Chapter Three concluded that, paradoxically, neoliberalism has a double 
effect on agricultural co-operatives. While agricultural industry deregulation, 
including the dismantling of SMAs, can stimulate renewed interest in the co-
operative business model by present day farmers, the chapter noted that 
neoliberalism also sets limits on the evolution of commercially successful 
agricultural co-operatives. The foundations of neoclassical economic theory, based 
on notions of individualism and the singular pursuit of profit maximisation by IOFs 
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(Pusey, 2003), downplays the collective and democratic nature of co-operative 
principles that are fundamental to the co-operative business structure (Craig, 1993). 
Furthermore, the chapter established that the co-operative business model is 
frequently misconstrued or misunderstood by powerful gate keepers who, influenced 
by orthodox economic theory, privilege the corporate IOF model over the co-
operative model and incorrectly deem the co-operative business model as a 
substandard or outdated structure.  Additionally, under the influence of the open 
market, agricultural co-operatives in present day Western Australia also function in a 
wider political, business and economic environment. This environment, the chapter 
argued, reinforced this misinformed perception of the co-operative business model 
and therefore marginalised it as a legitimate alternative business structure.  
To place the contemporary period in perspective, Chapter Four explored the 
development of the early Western Australian agricultural co-operatives in the first 
decades of the 20th century.  The harsh economic and social conditions in rural and 
regional Western Australia during this period were particularly associated with the 
development of these co-operatives (K. Smith, 1984). Westralian Farmers Co-
operative was a co-operative of significance that emerged from this period.  
Consistent with agricultural co-operative theory, Westralian Farmers Co-operative 
evolved to correct some form of market power, specifically to provide a missing or 
costly service or good in the market (Cobia, 1989).  The chapter demonstrated that 
Westralian Farmers Co-operative symbolised the capacity of the co-operative model 
to adapt to and create an economically strong and politically influential Western 
Australian agricultural co-operative sector over the following half century.   
Parallels can be drawn between the harsh economic conditions described in 
Chapter Four and the conditions confronting farmers during the contemporary period 
of agricultural industry restructuring, as discussed in Chapter Three.  Chapter Four 
argued that these conditions in the first decades of the 20th century triggered the early 
period of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector evolution by 
correcting some form of market failure.  These difficult contemporary conditions 
partly explain why, as discussed in Chapter One, Western Australia has witnessed a 
minor resurgence in agricultural co-operative activity in the last few years. 
Chapter Five examined the CFWA, the peak body for the co-operative 
movement in Western Australia. By exploring the functions of a peak body, the 
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chapter argued that the CFWA has a particularly difficult task undertaking the role of 
a peak body.  Firstly, the CFWA has to position the co-operative business model as a 
valid alternative to the IOF business model that is favoured by the dominant 
neoliberal framework discussed in Chapter Three. In this setting, considerable skill is 
required by the CFWA to access influential gate keepers and public policy makers 
and present strong arguments in favour of the co-operative model. Additionally, the 
peak body is required to support and develop its membership base and become the 
custodian and inter-generational transmitter of co-operative values.  The chapter 
argued that the CFWA currently does not have sufficient capacity or authority to 
achieve either of these functions and is limited in its ability to facilitate the long term 
sustainability of the co-operative movement.  
Chapter Six examined the State level public policy and institutional 
frameworks for the agricultural co-operative sector. Chapter Six argued that as 
agricultural co-operatives have the capacity to correct market failure, they are in turn 
performing a ‘public good’ (Fulton, 2001).  By addressing market failure, 
agricultural co-operatives are facilitating greater competition in the market.  
Therefore, agricultural co-operatives have the capacity to enhance the productivity of 
the agricultural industry, providing a rationale for government investment in the 
agricultural co-operative sector (Fulton, 2001). 
The chapter argued that the State has a valid role in ensuring that the co-
operative model is presented to actors involved in agricultural business and rural 
economic development as a beneficial business model for the agricultural industry. 
Furthermore, the chapter maintained that the State has an implied obligation to help 
sustain a viable institutional framework to support the wider Australian co-operative 
movement. Notwithstanding some legislative frameworks supporting agricultural co-
operatives, the State, under the influence of orthodox economic policies that dictate 
minimal and small government, has generally not taken on this broader public policy 
and institutional responsibility. The chapter concluded that the lack of a public policy 
position for agricultural co-operatives by the State disadvantages Australian farmers 
and rural communities as there are consequently fewer options available for farmers 
to adjust to the negative outcomes of an open market in rural Australia. This public 
policy deficit has in part contributed to the highly vulnerable situation of the current 
Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.  
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Chapter Seven was the first of two chapters devoted to the UFCC.  In 
examining the UFCC, the chapter ascertained that the role of charismatic farmers 
who arose from the ‘grass roots’ and promoted the co-operative business alternative 
to fellow farmers was a critical factor in the formation of agricultural co-operatives. 
This was significant, as Chapter Six has demonstrated a deficit in public policy and 
institutional support for the agricultural co-operative sector at the State level, while 
Chapter Five concluded that the CFWA was limited in its capacity to undertake its 
peak body role.  Consequently, existing and embryonic agricultural co-operatives 
were highly dependent on other mechanisms, such as the role of charismatic farmers, 
for their development. Patrie (1998) and Ergstrom (1994) also identified the central 
role of the co-operative champion in the formation and growth of agricultural co-
operatives and contended that without these co-operative champions acting as 
instigators, co-operative businesses struggled to become established. 
Chapter Seven argued that the dependence on co-operative champions to 
stimulate agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia further highlighted the lack 
of wider institutional frameworks to support agricultural co-operatives.  This 
situation also revealed an ad hoc approach to agricultural co-operative development 
and the potential vulnerability of the Western Australian agricultural co-operative 
sector. Additionally, the chapter noted that alternative sources of well-informed co-
operative advisory support and knowledge in Western Australia were scarce. In the 
absence of wider institutional support, the subsequent loss of a co-operative 
champion from an established agricultural co-operative may result in it becoming 
unsustainable as a co-operative in the longer term (Craig, 1993).  
Consistent with agricultural co-operative economic theory, Chapter Seven 
also established that the UFCC was formed to address a market failure.  Farmers 
were unable to buy agricultural chemical and fertiliser at fair prices due to the 
dominance of an IOF in the market place (Cobia, 1989).  Madden (2003b) 
highlighted the paradox of this situation, as the IOF itself was a former agricultural 
co-operative.   
Chapter Eight continued with the UFCC case study by investigating the 
influence of the neo-classical influenced market place on the internal behaviour of 
the co-operative.  Chapter Eight argued that as the UFCC matured as a business, it 
has become highly susceptible to the influence of management imported from the 
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corporate sector.  These managers, trained in IOF business and financial management 
theory, were unfamiliar with or indifferent to the business ethos of organisations 
based on co-operative values. The case study also highlighted that the UFCC Board 
of Directors was similarly drawn in conflicting directions by co-operative principles 
and corporate business practices.  This scenario is consistent with that outlined by 
Craig (1993) who argued that within the present neoliberal paradigm, co-operative 
principles are challenged by management trained in IOF business strategies, leading 
to the pressure to corporatise. Building on this concept, a maturing agricultural co-
operative can be subject to a life cycle that moves from a co-operative structure, via 
incremental pragmatic adjustments to perceived deficits in the co-operative business 
model, to an eventual corporate business structure. Craig (1993) argued that when 
co-operative Boards of Directors and management base business strategy on co-
operative logic, they are able to resolve tension between IOF and co-operative 
philosophy.  The UFCC case study, supported by the outcome of the unsuccessful 
attempt by some actors seeking to corporatise CBH, suggested that members can 
exert a restraining influence on Boards of agricultural co-operatives that are tempted 
to corporatise.  It remains to be seen how the UFCC will resolve its internal tensions 
between co-operative principles and IOF business strategies and if it will remain a 
co-operative in the longer term. 
The thesis concluded that, despite some incongruity in the theoretical basis of 
agricultural co-operatives and neoliberal influenced reform, the agricultural co-
operative model has a role in the contemporary market driven economic environment 
of Australian agriculture.  The UFCC case study illustrated the theoretical and 
applied strengths of the model within an industry responding to agricultural 
restructuring. Rather than positing a diminishing role for agricultural co-operatives in 
present day Western Australian agriculture, the thesis concluded that the agricultural 
co-operative structure has a valid contribution to make to contemporary agriculture.   
Thesis Recommendations 
The thesis recommends a sustained response by key agencies to develop a 
public policy and institutional framework for the agricultural co-operative sector. A 
significant strategy is to build a solid CFWA to undertake its core functions as a peak 
body. This approach requires a supportive Department of Agriculture, Department of 
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Local Government and Regional Development and Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection to assist the CFWA develop and implement strategies that 
present the co-operative structure to farmers and rural communities as a legitimate 
and economically viable means of engaging with a changing global agricultural 
market. Additionally, professional advisors and their associations, business 
associations, industry associations, the media and tertiary institutions require ongoing 
professional development initiated by the peak body, supported by government 
agencies and delivered by appropriately trained facilitators, to dispel misinformation 
and develop informed knowledge about the co-operative model. By building the 
institutional strength of the peak body, combined with the public policy support of 
government agencies and informing the professional ‘gate keepers’ about the 
strengths of the co-operative model, the agricultural co-operative sector can be 
legitimised and rejuvenated.  This can lead to a virtuous circle of social and 
economic advantages for rural and regional communities in Western Australia. 
Without such a public policy framework for agricultural co-operatives, Western 
Australian farmers will be denied choice in the range of business structures available 
to suit their particular needs. 
Limitations of the Thesis 
This thesis was an exploratory study of various issues affecting the 
contemporary Western Australian agricultural co-operative sector.  The research 
adopted a qualitative research methodology that enabled the researcher to explore, 
examine, and describe an agricultural co-operative and the wider agricultural co-
operative sector in depth.  The case study methodology provided the thesis with rich 
and meaningful data that would not have been obtained by other research 
methodologies (Patton, 1990).  Nevertheless, the thesis revealed that the qualitative 
case study methodology had several disadvantages. 
While the case study methodology enabled a holistic approach to reflect the 
complex reality of the agricultural co-operative sector, the breadth of the 
investigation and diversity of information at times became overwhelming.  From 
time to time, the vast quantity of material made it difficult to focus on the main 
purpose of the thesis.  As the case study methodology acknowledged multiple 
realities of different interviewees (Patton, 1990), at times it became difficult to 
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reconcile the diverse perspectives of interviewees and determine how representative 
they were of views held by actors in the wider agricultural co-operative sector.  
While the in-depth interviews extracted confidential and sensitive information, the 
interpretation of this information by the researcher was to some extent subjective, 
another accepted limitation of the case study methodology (Patton, 1990).  Further, it 
is acknowledged by the researcher that the research may have been influenced and 
possibly manipulated by interviewees (Patton, 1990), particularly as the thesis was 
highly dependent on only a few interviewees for significant parts.  This dependence 
often did not allow independent verification of data, another potential disadvantage 
of the case study methodology.  Additionally, interviewee confidentiality demanded 
by academic research, when undertaking a case study with relatively few co-
operatives and actors, required careful attention and management by the researcher.  
The four years dedicated to this research exposed another limitation of the 
case study method.  Many changes occurred within organisations that were central to 
the research, particularly with some key interviewees leaving their positions.  The 
researcher was required to work with the organisational and actor changes as they 
presented themselves.  Further, these changes had to be accommodated during the 
writing phases as they often had significant implications for the conclusions of the 
thesis. 
Lastly, while the case study methodology allowed the researcher to learn a 
great deal about a particular case (Patton, 1990), this thesis demonstrated that it may 
be inappropriate to generalise beyond that case. The UFCC experiences documented 
in this thesis were unique to that co-operative and do not necessarily provide insights 
to the evolution of other agricultural co-operatives. 
Future Research 
As an exploratory study, this thesis points to several areas of further research 
about Australian agricultural co-operatives.  The research focused on actors who had 
close associations with an agricultural co-operative or the co-operative movement.  It 
did not widely canvass the views of agricultural co-operative members about the co-
operative business model.  The proposed typology of farmers’ attitudes to 
agricultural co-operatives outlined in Appendix Four deserves further research to 
determine if it does capture different farmer views about the co-operative model.  
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Ascertaining farmer views about the validity of the co-operative model would assist 
policy makers and the peak body develop strategies to build the Western Australian 
co-operative movement.   
Secondly, the thesis noted a lack of agricultural industry public policy 
development for the co-operative model.  Further research is required about 
Australian agricultural co-operatives to provide directions for government agencies 
to develop public policy encompassing the agricultural co-operative sector.   
Thirdly, the research suggested that agricultural co-operatives can have a 
positive impact on the social and economic well-being of rural communities 
adjusting to the effects of significant agricultural industry restructuring.  This 
potential role deserves further attention as a research focus.   
Fourthly, this thesis did not examine the opinions of women in agriculture 
about the co-operative model.  Women may perceive agricultural co-operatives quite 
differently from the views expressed by the male interviewees in this thesis and their 
views may provide valuable insights for public policy development.   
Lastly, this research revealed a deficit in basic data in Australia about the 
agricultural co-operative sector.  There is a dearth in aggregate information about 
Western Australia’s agricultural co-operatives such as, for example, business 
turnover, rebate strategies, membership size, Board of Director composition and size, 
CEO remuneration strategies, the influence of co-operative values on the 
development of business strategies, agricultural co-operative involvement in the 
community and the economic impact of the co-operative on the community.  
Collection of this information is an important research task to establish benchmarks 
by which to chart the future progress of the agricultural co-operative sector in 
Western Australia. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Background to the Thesis 
In 2000, Edith Cowan University and the Western Australian Department of 
Agriculture submitted a proposal to fund a PhD to the Australian Research Council.  
The proposal stated that:  
‘This project will examine the potential of New Generation 
Co-operatives (NGCs) to contribute to the revival of Australian rural 
communities.  NGCs offer farmers the prospect of increased incomes 
by adding value to their agricultural outputs through downstream 
processing.  NGCs may also provide significant flow-on benefits for 
rural communities by enhancing levels of local economic activity. The 
project will assist agencies such as the Industry Partner to assess the 
opportunities and obstacles facing NGCs in Australia.  The project 
should also contribute to the development of policies and strategies 
that could, where appropriate, facilitate the establishment of NGCs in 
rural communities. 
The proposal was the outcome of considerable attention by the Western 
Australian Department of Agriculture in the mid to late 1990s about the potential of 
the NGC model for the Australian agricultural industry.  At the time, two emerging 
agricultural co-operatives were exploring the NGC model and it was envisaged that 
these organisations would serve as case studies for the empirical component of the 
research.   
The Australian Research Council endorsed and funded the proposal and 
formal PhD research commenced in March 2001. On the basis that the research was 
to be oriented towards the NGC model, a research proposal was prepared and 
submitted in October 2001 to the university and subsequently endorsed by external 
examiners.  However, by the beginning of the second year of study it became clear 
that the NGC case studies were not progressing as anticipated.  One potential case 
study did not choose the NGC model, and the second one was aspiring to achieve the 
status of an NGC by incrementally working towards this structure over a long term 
period. 
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This presented difficulties for the planned empirical component of the 
research as it was evident that the agriculture industry in Western Australia was not 
adopting the NGC model.  In addition, an unexpected change in the Western 
Australian government occurred in early 2001.  The implications of this change of 
government for agricultural co-operatives emerged slowly.  Over time, the initial 
enthusiasm in sections of the Department of Agriculture for the NGC model 
increasingly drifted onto other priorities and initiatives.  These events resulted in a 
loss of direction in the research that took some time to assess and work through.  It 
was a significant conceptual leap to understand after 15 months or so that the project 
was not about NGCs.   
Part way through the second year of the research, the decision was made to 
broaden the research from the specific NGC model to explore agricultural co-
operatives in Western Australia in a broader manner.  This thesis is the outcome of 
this decision to undertake a wider exploratory analysis of the Western Australian 
agricultural co-operative sector. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Evolution of Legislation for Co-operative Business Structures 
Introduction 
The legislative backdrop to co-operatives in Australia occurs at two levels of 
government.  At the Commonwealth government level, a range of broader pieces of 
legislation, such as the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936, the Corporations Act 2001, 
and the Trade Practices Act 1974 impact upon co-operatives.  Specific legislation to 
facilitate co-operative incorporation and registration also exists within each 
Australian State.  The purpose of this discussion is to draw together a narrative of 
developments, over the last decade or so, in enacting updated State co-operative 
legislation for the incorporation and governance of co-operatives.  
Australian experiences with co-operative legislation 
The first co-operatives legislation in Australia was the Western Australian 
Co-operative and Provident Societies Act 1903.  Most Australian States had co-
operative legislation prior to WWII, with the exception of Victoria, which did not 
enact specific co-operative legislation until 1953.183  These original examples of co-
operative legislation at the State level and a specific section of the Commonwealth 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 relating to agricultural co-operatives reflect a 
favourable legal environment for co-operatives in the first half of the 20th century. 
During the late 1980s, discussion on co-operative legislation began to 
percolate amongst the State Co-operative Federations, particularly in relation to 
                                                 
183 This explains why several large Victorian based agricultural co-operatives, such as Murray 
Goulburn, a dairy co-operative, incorporated under their then State based Corporations Law rather 
than under co-operative legislation. Although registered as corporations, these early Victorian co-
operatives were structured internally as co-operatives.  Akin to co-operatives registered via co-
operative legislation, these organisations were able to qualify as co-operatives for taxation purposes as 
the Commonwealth Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 contained several sections specifically related to 
agricultural co-operatives. 
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agricultural co-operatives, about updating the existing Acts (Victoria, 1996).  These 
talks arose from frustration with inconsistencies in extant State-based legislation, 
particularly related to the inability of co-operatives to operate across State borders, 
register new members from outside the home State, overcome inconsistencies 
between the co-operative principles and modern business behaviour and capital 
raising issues (New South Wales, 1992).   
The process for reviewing co-operative legislation formally commenced in 
1990.  State Ministers for Agriculture agreed to seek the support of their respective 
Attorneys-General to examine existing co-operative legislation and with a view to 
introduce nationally consistent legislation to enable co-operatives to operate across 
State borders (Victoria, 1996).184  New South Wales had already commenced a 
review of its 1923 legislation in 1989 (New South Wales, 1992).  The legislation 
enacted by the NSW government in 1992 sought to address concerns identified in the 
former legislation by introducing an innovative capital raising mechanism known as 
a ‘co-operative capital unit’ (New South Wales Department of Fair Trading, 
1997a).185
In the period 1990 to 1996, a State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General 
working party explored options for nationally consistent legislation via either 
template legislation, similar common legislation or identical legislation in each State.  
The working party recommended the adoption of common core provisions (CCPs) by 
each State.  In 1996, the Attorneys-General Standing Committee agreed that each 
State and Territory sign the Consistent Co-operatives Laws Agreement to enable 
them to enact co-operatives legislation containing the agreed core consistent 
provisions (Victoria, 1996).   
Key elements of the CCP legislation concerned a definition of active 
membership and removal of non-active members; enshrining the ICA co-operative 
principles; introducing the status of ‘natural person’ and removing the concept of 
                                                 
184 At that time in most states the co-operatives legislation fell under the portfolio of the Attorneys-
General, in the Department of Justice. The Co-operative and Provident Societies Act 1903 was 
transferred from the Western Australian Justice Department to the Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection. The Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 has been under the Consumer 
Affairs portfolio for some time. In most Australian States, co-operative legislation has been reassigned 
from the Attorneys-General to similar Departments of Fair Trading or Consumer Affairs. 
185 Co-operative Capital Units are discussed in a following section. 
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‘ultra vires’; introducing different classes of shares; voting based on membership, 
and stronger regulatory mechanisms for addressing inappropriate organisational 
behaviour.  The CCP legislation also introduced two categories of co-operative - 
trading and non-trading.  Non-trading co-operatives were not-for-profit organisations 
formed for a wider community benefit, while trading co-operatives were the 
commercially oriented co-operatives, such as agricultural co-operatives.  Trading co-
operatives gave distributions on share capital while non-trading co-operatives did not 
(Victoria, 1996).186
The Working Party also endorsed a mechanism to clarify the relationship 
between the new co-operatives CCP legislation and predecessors of the Corporations 
Act 2001. This was to be achieved via a ‘roll back’ of a section of the Corporations 
Act 2001 so that it did not apply to capital raising activities of co-operatives.  It was 
proposed that this would be enacted once each State had CCP co-operative 
legislation in place (Victoria, 1996).187  
Victoria was the first State to introduce the new co-operatives legislation 
based on the CCP concept.  The Victorian legislation was to form the basis of new 
CCP co-operatives legislation in other States (Victoria, 1996).  The CCP legislation 
did not include the CCU instrument contained in the New South Wales legislation.  
New South Wales amended its 1992 legislation in 1997 to mirror the CCP legislation 
and ensure subsequent compatibility with the proposed Corporations Act 2001 
changes (New South Wales, 1995; New South Wales Department of Fair Trading, 
1997b). Over the next few years, most Australian States introduced co-operatives 
CCP legislation or amendments to ensure compatibility with CCP legislation.  
Western Australia remained the only Australian State without new CCP based co-
operatives legislation.   
                                                 
186 In the event the co-operative is wound up, members receive the nominal value of their shares. 
187 This matter becomes more important in the later discussion on activities related to Western 
Australian co-operative legislation. 
 264
The round of legislative changes in this period resulted in the following: 
• New South Wales Co-operatives Legislation Amendment Act 1999 
• Queensland Co-operatives Act 1997 
• South Australia Co-operatives Act 1997 
• Victoria Co-operatives Act 1996 
• Tasmania Co-operatives Act 1999 
The discourse in Parliamentary Debates in various Australian State 
jurisdictions about introducing the new CCP legislation demonstrated the potential 
appeal of the co-operative model to both sides of Australian politics.  For the left, the 
Labor Party, co-operatives offered a mechanism for local control and a structure to 
promote democracy and a blend of social and economic goals in regional 
communities.  On the right, co-operatives were consistent with neoclassical 
economic theory in that they promoted enterprise and confidence in the merits of the 
private sector. In both scenarios, co-operatives enabled the local community to 
engage with the globalised capitalist economy.  Unfortunately, this rhetoric has not 
overly impacted on the development of public policy for co-operatives in these 
jurisdictions. 
While each State was engaged with drafting and implementing their version 
of CCP legislation, another development was brewing.  The objective of the decade 
of CCP legislation, now enacted in most States, was to achieve some form of 
consistency in co-operatives legislation.  However, ongoing irregularities persisted. 
The inability to enable co-operatives to trade and raise funds across State borders, to 
register new members from interstate and ongoing fund raising problems, despite the 
enactment of CCP legislation, continued as a major inhibitor to trading co-operative 
development. (National Co-op Update, 2000).  It became apparent that the original 
triggers for the development of CCP legislation had not been resolved.   
These legislative difficulties came to the notice of the Ministerial Council on 
Consumer Affairs that established a new working party in 2001 to recommend 
changes to achieve nationally consistent co-operative legislation.188 Following 
consultation with the Co-operative Federations in each State, the working party 
                                                 
188 Responsibility for co-operative legislation had moved during the decade of legislation reform 
from the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General to the Ministerial Council of Consumer Affairs. 
 265
reconfirmed the CCP approach as the appropriate strategy for achieving national 
consistency.  However, the working party agreed to amend the CCP in two areas.  
Firstly, it included the New South Wales concept of CCUs (Given, 2001).  To 
minimise some awkward cross-State administrative mechanisms, the CCP also 
incorporated principles of mutual recognition.  In the longer term, the review hinted 
that the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs may develop template legislation to 
replace the similar style CCPs co-operative legislation (National Co-op Update, 
2001).   
189Co-operative Capital Units (CCUs)
In 2001, the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs agreed to introduce a 
mechanism known as Co-operative Capital Units into the CCP legislation.  The 
purpose of the inclusion of the CCUs into the CCP legislation was to widen the 
capital raising ability of co-operatives (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs, 
2003).  CCUs were first considered in the 1989 New South Wales government 
review of the Co-operation Act 1923 and were subsequently incorporated into the 
1992 co-operative legislation (New South Wales Department of Fair Trading, 
1997a).  
CCUs are a ‘hybrid’ capital raising instrument, comprising components of 
both a debt and an equity instrument, falling anywhere between these two extremes.  
A CCU can be defined as neither equity finance nor debt.190  In creating a new 
instrument for capital raising, the proponents recognised the risks associated with 
allowing external investors to invest in a co-operative, particularly in relation to 
marginalising member control and undermining co-operative principles.  While the 
New South Wales Department of Fair Trading believed that they had addressed this 
concern, the proposed introduction of CCUs into the CCP legislation was a point of 
contention for some State representatives (Given, 2004, 2001).  Concern about 
corroding co-operative principles by inviting outsider investors into the co-operative 
remained.  This argument was countered by the New South Wales experience which 
                                                 
189 For further information on Co-operative Capital Units, refer to the NSW Consumer Affairs 
website www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au. 
190 The difference between equity finance and debt is apparent when a corporate body is wound up.  
Individuals who lent funds (ie own a debt instrument) are entitled to be paid in full before the 
shareholders who own the equity investment (Ford et al., 1997). 
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claimed that the integrity of the co-operative principles were maintained with 
appropriate legislative mechanisms (New South Wales Department of Fair Trading, 
1997a).  
New South Wales has over a decade of experience with CCUs.  However, 
CCUs have not been adopted with great enthusiasm by NSW trading co-operatives.  
Less than ten NSW registered co-operatives have adopted the mechanism (Given, 
2004, 2001).  The focus on co-operative capital raising highlights the dominance of 
this issue in the literature and public policy in Australia.191  Yet, the minimal uptake 
of CCUs demonstrates that co-operatives have resolved their capital raising issues in 
alternative ways.  This indicates that capital raising is not as significant a problem as 
is sometimes suggested in the literature. 
Nevertheless, the incorporation of the CCU mechanism in the proposed 
Western Australian co-operative legislation will provide co-operatives with another 
option for capital raising.  The research has identified one area in which it may be a 
useful tool (Booth, 2004).  A proposed value adding agricultural co-operative with a 
significant rural community focus has two co-operative proponents who are not 
farmers.  The existing co-operative legislative prohibits investors from becoming 
members of the co-operative.  The CCU mechanism may provide the vehicle for 
non-farm community people to contribute by investing in the proposed co-operative 
and potentially sharing in its benefits (Booth, 2004).   
It is apparent that after more than a decade of reform in co-operative 
legislation to achieve some level of uniformity, co-operatives were still confronting 
problems associated with inconsistent legislation that has not delivered a co-
operative friendly legislation framework.  While the drive to develop CCP legislation 
in each State was admirable, the outcome was that it was an inappropriate 
mechanism to attain nationally consistent co-operative legislation.  As each State 
‘leap frogged’ to introduce CCP amendments, massaged to suit their particular State 
based matters, it was unavoidable that there would be ongoing inconsistencies in the 
CCP legislation. 
                                                 
191 See Chapter Two for a theoretical discussion on capital raising issues for agricultural co-
operatives.  See Chapter Eight on the UFCC approach to capital raising, which suggests that this issue 
may be overstated.   
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Template Legislation 
The solution lay in adopting template legislation.  The September 2005 
Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs meeting acknowledged that the CCP 
approach was unable to ensure consistency in co-operative legislation in each State, 
and replaced it with a strategy of template legislation (Ministerial Council on 
Consumer Affairs, 2005). The Queensland legislation became the template model for 
legislation in other Australian States. 
While all this activity was occurring elsewhere, progress to enact new 
legislative in Western Australia was erratic.  Without CCP or template co-operative 
legislation enacted in Western Australia, the proposed ‘roll back’ of the 
Corporations Act 2001 to address capital raising difficulties for co-operatives, 
endorsed by the Attorneys-General Standing Committee in 1996, could not be 
implemented (Booth, 2004).  While the delay in the Corporations Act 2001 roll back 
would appear to be a major issue for each State Co-operative Federation, and that 
other States would be pressuring the Western Australian government and the CFWA 
to implement new legislation, it has not been a significant item in co-operative 
newsletters or discussions with interviewees conducted for this research.  This 
silence further suggests that the inability of co-operatives to raise capital has been 
over-played by some co-operative commentators and academics.   
Developments in Western Australia 
Booth (2004) advised in mid 2001 that the Western Australian co-operative 
bill had been drafted, using the Victorian legislation as a model.192  He added that 
while the Victorian Act had the right sentiments by incorporating the co-operative 
principles, at the ‘nuts and bolts’ level it had been poorly drafted and was not 
acceptable for the Western Australian co-operative movement, particularly for 
commercial co-operatives.  He supported his views with experiences in Victoria, 
stating that newly forming commercial co-operatives in Victoria still tended to use 
the Commonwealth Corporations Act 2001 to incorporate and built the co-operative 
                                                 
192 At the time, the Victorian Act was the model for other states to emulate. The Queensland Act 
subsequently replaced the Victorian Act as the model for other Australian State legislation. 
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principles into their Articles, rather than use the new State-based co-operatives 
legislation.   
In the early period of research on this project, intermittent advice from 
Interviewee 678 (2003), an officer within the Department of Consumer and 
Employment Protection responsible for registering co-operatives, did not progress 
beyond commenting that the proposed legislation was going to be implemented at the 
next sitting of Parliament.  He qualified this by acknowledging that it still had to 
make it onto the list of impending legislation.  He expressed a view that the delay in 
progressing the new Act reflected the low priority of co-operatives for the Western 
Australian government.   
In this phase, Interviewee 680 (2003), from the Department of Agriculture, 
also advised that the draft legislation had been written and sent to the parliamentary 
drafters.  Interviewee 681 (2001), from the same Department, later stated that the 
legislation was in the second drafting stage indicating that it had progressed 
reasonably well.  However, Interviewee 680 (2003) subsequently advised that it had 
been ‘bumped off’ twice despite it being ready to progress further to the ‘approval to 
draft’ stage.  He further advised that it had been delayed so long that it now required 
a Cabinet submission to get it back to the ‘approval to draft’ stage, then to present it 
as a bill and then to become legislation.  The see-sawing of the draft legislation over 
a two year period resulted in it becoming an orphan in which no particular 
Department felt it had to take responsibility for ensuring the passage of the 
legislation. 
In May 2003, the CFWA’s lead article in its newsletter contained an 
encouraging update on the progress of updated co-operative legislation (Co-operative 
Federation of Western Australia, 2003a).  The item advised that the proposed co-
operative bill had been placed on a priority listing ready for drafting and possible 
implementation in 2004.  The development was attributed to the CFWA’s gentle and 
‘behind the scenes’ lobbying for the new legislation. Concurrently, as discussed 
above, the Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs also had the issue of co-
operatives template legislation high on its agenda, which certainly was a powerful 
influence in advancing Western Australia’s rather noncompliant position on updated 
co-operatives legislation.  
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The lack of outcry by Western Australian co-operatives about on-going 
delays in enacting new legislation can partly be attributed to the efficacy of the 
existing Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 legislation (Booth, 2004).  Booth 
(2004) commented that this legislation, despite being 60 years old, was very flexible 
and able to accommodate the unique and specific needs of each co-operative.  While 
the Western Australian Corporations (Co-operative) Act 1943 was very extensive, 
Booth argued that it did not ‘prescribe’ what a co-operative had to do.  As Western 
Australia has less than sixty functioning co-operatives, almost every new one was a 
distinctive organisation confronting a range of specific issues.  The flexibility in the 
existing legislation provided the scope for each new co-operative to develop its 
internal systems, for example, classes of shares, share allocations and capital raising 
strategies, to suit its unique circumstances.  He further argued that it also contained 
several of the features that the proposed CCP legislation was seeking to introduce.  
These included the status of ‘natural persons’, the ability to have different classes of 
shares, to form partnerships or joint ventures with non-co-operative organisations 
and have a limited number of non-farm members as Board Directors, and, borrowed 
from the Corporations Act, the ability to assign ‘individual property rights’ to 
retained equity through a share allocation mechanism. He attributed this flexibility to 
the historical development of the Act, as it was based on the former Western 
Australian Corporations Law, and therefore, was essentially a piece of corporations’ 
law.  According to Booth, the accommodating nature of the existing legislation was a 
great asset to for Western Australian co-operatives.  
Perhaps these features of the existing legislation meant the Western 
Australian co-operative movement did not have a problem that needed fixing. 
However, although the existing Western Australian legislation did not hold up the 
incorporation of new co-operatives, the Western Australian government’s delay in 
introducing new legislation placed an administrative burden on new co-operatives 
developing their internal structures and mechanisms to comply with the existing 
legislation as well as ensuring that they were not disadvantaging themselves under 
the proposed legislation. 
As of early 2006, Western Australia still does not have new legislation to 
replace the Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943, although the issue has become more 
prominent in both government, the CFWA and the co-operative movement. The 
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Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment Protection 
established an Industry Reference Group in 2004 with representatives from the 
CFWA and co-operative businesses to work through matters that had contributed to 
the slow evolution of the proposed legislation.   
Although Western Australia has signed a Ministerial Council of Consumer 
Affairs agreement on template legislation, it was not going to fully adopt the 
Queensland template.  According to Newcombe (2005), and not directly related to 
the proposed co-operatives legislation, it was not politically acceptable to the Liberal 
and National Parties to adopt template legislation as it gave away their right to 
scrutinise proposed legislation (Newcombe, 2005).  Additionally, the Industry 
Reference Group had identified several concerns with some provisions in the 
template legislation.  As a result, the Group determined that it was going to develop 
Western Australian specific legislation.  Some of the proposed changes were 
significant shifts from the template legislation, while others focused more on 
operational issues for co-operatives transitioning from the existing legislation to the 
proposed legislation.   
When enacted, the CFWA advises that the new legislation will result in: 
 
• changes to current Western Australian co-operative accounting 
practices. 
• new capital raising procedures by the substitution of 
‘information statements’ for ‘prospectuses’. 
• the emergence of ‘national co-operatives’ by the removal of 
legal complications on cross border membership recruitment; 
• increased flexibility for capital raising by the issue of 
subordinated debt instruments, ‘Co-operative Capital Units’ 
(CCU’s), which under certain circumstances can be listed on a 
stock exchange. 
• continuing the practice of issuing non voting classes of shares. 
• the introduction of a ‘non-distributing’ or ‘non-trading’ class 
of co-operatives which are relevant to social and community 
activities. (Co-operative Federation of Western Australia, 
2005a, p 3) 
The formation of the Industry Working Group reflects a growing ability of 
the CFWA and the co-operative movement to lobby the Western Australian 
government about issues of significance to co-operatives. Assuming that its priority 
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listing is maintained, Western Australia can expect new legislation within the 
foreseeable future.   
The principles underpinning co-operative legislation 
There is no requirement to have specific co-operative legislation, as a co-
operative can be incorporated under any legal form that can accommodate the 
definition and features of a co-operative in its internal statutes, such as under the 
Corporations Act 2001.  According to Interviewee 696, a legal academic, there are a 
number of advantages in using the Corporations Act 2001 over State-based co-
operative legislation.  It is, he contends, easier to use this law, as more people are 
familiar with it; there is a large body of literature associated with it; it is relatively 
easy to form a company; and it is nationally based and underpinned by regulatory 
control of Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC).  In contrast, he 
argues, State-based co-operative legislation is not very efficient as it is not well 
resourced and there are few professional advisors with the necessary knowledge of 
its legal requirements. The legal academic queried the need to have State-based co-
operative legislation when all the benefits of the Corporations Act were available to 
co-operatives.  While he acknowledged the history of the co-operative movement, he 
was curious why Australian States still retained co-operative legislation.  He 
recognised that there is some symbolic importance in having separate co-operative 
legislation for co-operative members; however, from a legal or contracting position, 
he argued that there is no real reason to have it. 
Interviewee 822 (2002) agrees that the Corporations Act 2001 can 
accommodate all the elements required for an agricultural co-operative, together with 
the attendant advantages identified by Interviewee 696 (2002).  The only 
disadvantage Interviewee 822 (2002) identified was that incorporating under this Act 
removed the ability to name the resultant entity a ‘co-operative’ as only entities 
incorporated under the Western Australian Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943 
could legally use this name.  Differing from Booth’s views, Interviewee 822 believed 
that Companies (Co-operative) Act 1943, due to it being legislation enacted in the 
1940s, lacked the flexibility and the benefits of updated amendments for corporations 
available under the Commonwealth Act.  Based on his experience of working with 
agricultural co-operatives wishing to explore organisational structural options to 
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overcome these deficits in the Western Australian Act, but not necessarily to 
corporatise, he identified a deep-seated fear by some co-operative actors towards the 
Corporations Act 2001 and found it difficult to convey the advantages of using it.  
He commented that solicitors working with co-operatives need to develop an 
understanding of and sensitivity towards the ideological basis of agricultural co-
operatives when working with actors from these organisations. 
The supranational bodies developing policy guiding principles for co-
operative legislation do not support this view that there is really no need for 
dedicated co-operative legislation.  The International Labor Organisation (1998) 
developed a framework for co-operative legislation in 1998.  In the following years, 
the United Nations drafted and subsequently endorsed Guidelines Aimed at Creating 
a Supportive Environment for the Development of Co-operatives drawn up by 
Committee for the Promotion and Advancement of Co-operatives (COPAC) (United 
Nations, 2001).  Essentially the guidelines highlight that co-operatives should be 
recognised as distinct legal entities under their own dedicated co-operatives 
legislation (United Nations, 2001).  The Statement on the Co-operative Identity 
adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1995 also proposed co-
operative legislation as a key element in the co-operative identity.  The United 
Nations (2001) guidelines also recommend that the co-operative sector and peak 
bodies participate in the drafting of co-operative legislation.   
The CCP and template legislation in Australia meets most of the United 
Nations guidelines for co-operative legislation.  Co-operative principles were first 
enshrined in the Victorian co-operatives CCP legislation in 1997.  Separate legal 
entity status was incorporated into the 1992 New South Wales legislation and 
duplicated in the Victorian legislation.  The involvement of the peak bodies in the co-
operative sector has been part of the process in reviewing co-operatives legislation 
from the late 1980s; indeed the review process commenced from the co-operative 
sector.  Co-operatives have dedicated legislation, as for-profit enterprises have 
dedicated legislation.  However, the ICA identified that governments do not provide 
a supportive framework for co-operatives equivalent to that provided for corporate 
structures (International Co-operative Alliance, 1999).  To illustrate, the level of 
government support for small business development (such as the Business Enterprise 
Centres and Small Business Development Centre) demonstrates the divide between 
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the government support for private for-profit business structures and the level of 
support for co-operative structures. 
Conclusion 
Chapter Six concluded that Western Australia generally lacks a public policy 
framework that is favourable towards the agricultural co-operative sector.  One area, 
however, where the co-operative movement has been fortunate is in the continuation 
of some form of legislation for co-operative businesses from the beginning of the 
20th century.  Across Australia, with the exception of Western Australia, legislation 
for co-operatives has been updated in the last decade to reflect contemporary 
conditions for co-operative businesses and to reinforce the centrality of the co-
operative principles.  The long process to enact revised co-operatives legislation in 
Western Australia can be partly attributed to the co-operative movement’s 
satisfaction with the existing legislation.  However, its lack of progress also reflects 
the low priority of the co-operative movement for the Western Australian 
government, along with the inability of the CFWA to exert influence on behalf of the 
co-operative movement in this arena.  
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APPENDIX 3 
Agricultural Co-operatives Study Tours and Seminars  
Introduction 
The purpose of this appendix is two fold.  Firstly, it explores the role of study 
tours and seminars in building knowledge and stimulating the adoption of the 
agricultural co-operative model among actors in, or associated with, the agricultural 
industry.  Secondly, the discussion examines the role of government in initiating 
study tours.193   
During the latter period of the Western Australian Coalition Government, 
from about 1996 to 2001, the Department of Agriculture funded several study tours 
to the United States and Canada to observe the New Generation Co-operative (NGC) 
model.  Additionally, the Department hosted a number of seminar presentations by 
United States NGC proponents and academics in Western Australia.  Based on 
interviewees’ recollections, the following table summarises anecdotal information 
about the sequence of various study tours and seminar presentations tours and 
seminars.   
                                                 
193 Information for this section is based almost solely on field notes taken during interviewee 
discussions, as very little written information about these tours or seminars has been located.  Where 
possible, statements of ‘fact’ have been verified by other interviews.  However, the narrative may 
inadvertently contain errors.   
 275
Illustrative Outline of Study Tours and Seminars 1996-2002 
Date Event 
August 
1996 
As part of the ‘Doing More with Agriculture’ program, 
the Department of Agriculture conducted a study tour of 
Western Australian agricultural industry actors to North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota to observe rural 
community economic development initiatives.  NGCs 
were observed as a potential tool for community 
development. 
23 April 
1998 
Professor Michael Cook delivered a seminar in Perth 
hosted by the Department of Agriculture on the NGC 
model.  A representative of a United States NGC 
accompanied Professor Cook.194
30 March 
1999 
Professor Michael Cook delivered a lecture at the Hyatt 
Hotel in Perth on the NGC model, organised by Glen 
Thompson of Global Linkages.  A representative of 
another United States NGC accompanied Professor Cook. 
21 August-6 
September 
1999 
The Department of Agriculture conducted a study tour of 
Western Australian agricultural industry and co-operative 
movement actors to North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Minnesota to specifically investigate the NGC model. 
March 2001 Glen Thompson, Global Linkages, organised Professor 
Michael Cook to deliver a seminar at a Sydney 
conference on the NGC model. 
September 
2001 
The Department of Agriculture hosted a lecture in Perth 
by Dr Alan Frampton of a New Zealand dairy co-
operative about the NGC model. 
2001 The Department of Agriculture coordinated and funded a 
conference in Perth for Rural Company Directors, 
including agricultural co-operative Directors.  
2002 The Dairy Research and Development Corporation 
funded a study tour for Australian dairy industry actors of 
the international dairy industry and the role of co-
operatives, including NGCs.  The CEO of the Challenge 
Dairy Co-operative was a delegate in this tour.  
 
Apart from a brief report to the ‘Doing More with Agriculture’ program 
(Western Australian Department of Agriculture, 1998) and by a participant to his 
professional association (Interviewee 689, 2002), additional written information 
about these NGC focused study tours and seminars was not located.195   
                                                 
194 Based on interviewee recollections, the CEOs of the South Dakota Soybean Co-operative and 
North Dakota Pasta Co-operative also participated in these Perth seminars with Professor Cook. 
195 The Department of Agriculture was unable to meet a request for additional information on the 
sequencing of these study tours and seminars.  This was attributed to the change of government in 
February 2001, when much historical information was lost in the period of government hand over. 
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In addition to these study tours and seminars, some interviewees also 
participated in other study tours. Tours were organised and partially funded by 
agricultural industry research and development corporations, such as the Dairy 
Research and Development Corporation (DRDC), large co-operatives and Statutory 
Marketing Authorities (SMAs), such as CBH and the Grain Pool, agribusiness 
companies such as National Foods and academic institutions such as Monash 
University Agribusiness Department.  Unlike the Department of Agriculture study 
tours; these tours had a broader focus than NGCs. 
The first encounter by Western Australians with the NGC model was via the 
1996 study tour to Canada and the United States (Booth, 2004; Interviewee 695, 
2003).  The purpose of that study tour was to consider rural community economic 
development models under the ‘Doing More with Agriculture’ program, which was 
part of an initiative known as Progress Rural.  United States representatives exhibited 
the NGC model as a very successful demonstration of rural community economic 
development. 
The impact of the NGC model on the delegates was clearly quite significant 
as a further Department of Agriculture trip to North America was conducted in 1999 
titled ‘Progress Rural Value Adding Study Tour’.  The purpose of the study tours 
was to observe the NGC model as an organisational structure for the commercial 
development of farmers, rather than as a community economic development strategy 
(Interviewee 653, 2003; Interviewee 689, 2002; Interviewee 695, 2003).  
The study tours stimulated ongoing interest as the Department of Agriculture 
hosted two lecture tours by the United States agricultural co-operative academic, 
Professor Michael Cook and an NGC Chairman, Mr Michael Warner in the same 
time frame.  A number of interviewees also attended these seminars on the NGC 
model. These study tours and seminars were partially funded from a pool of funds 
that were accumulated via the former Rural Adjustment and Finance Corporation 
(RAFCOR) scheme in which funds repaid by farmers had accumulated in a trust 
account to about $75 million (Interviewee 682, 2003).    
The agricultural co-operative model, including the NGC model, was also 
evaluated by a small group of dairy farmers from the south west of Western Australia 
(Interviewee 654, 2003). These dairy farmers were seeking alternative approaches 
for their industry before the anticipated deregulation of the dairy SMA.  The Dairy 
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Structural Adjustment Program, established to facilitate dairy industry deregulation 
and administered via the Western Australian Department of Agriculture, partially 
funded these tours.   
Participant Observations of the Study Tours and Seminars 
Participants in the study tours generally indicated that the tours were more 
worthwhile than anticipated.  Interviewees commented that the study tours exposed 
them to new concepts that would not have occurred without direct observation of 
organisational innovation in the agricultural industry of other industrialised 
countries.  New relationships were developed with key people associated with 
agricultural co-operatives.  Awareness was created in the United States and Canada 
that actors in the Western Australian agricultural industry were interested in 
developing knowledge of the co-operative model, which triggered the reciprocal trips 
to deliver seminars in Perth and regional Western Australia. 
The interview discussions with actors from agribusiness, such as farm 
management advisors, accountants and bankers, highlighted that knowledge of the 
co-operative model is marginal in this advisor group.  They received very limited, if 
any, undergraduate training in the agricultural co-operative model and minimal 
subsequent professional development on its economic contribution to the agricultural 
industry.  Therefore, the study tours provided this group with positive experiences of 
overseas co-operative businesses.  The NGC model, with its modifications to the 
traditional agricultural co-operative model based on incorporating elements of the 
IOF structure to address alleged deficits, appealed to this segment.   
The impact of the study tours on this segment is significant.  Western 
Australian farmers are highly accustomed to seeking the advice of agribusiness 
advisors and as a result, the advisors can have a significant influence over business 
strategies implemented by producers.  By participating in the study tours or seminars, 
this professional advisor segment enhanced their knowledge base and therefore 
potentially, their ability to advise farmer groups on the co-operative model as a 
commercial alterative.   
An actor associated with an agricultural co-operative considered that the 
study tours developed a strong knowledge of the NGC model and co-operative 
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principles (Interviewee 652, 2003).  He subsequently encouraged all the co-operative 
Board members to undertake study tours of NGCs and the agricultural industry 
internationally.  While the cost of this may be high, Interviewee 652 (2003) believed 
that it would return dividends to the co-operative, as the Board would be very clear 
about the philosophy and purpose of a co-operative and the NGC variation.  He 
thought that developing this knowledge would ensure that the Board was not tempted 
in the future to convert the co-operative to a corporate structure (Interviewee 652, 
2003). 
The interviewee also thought senior executive staff benefited from study 
tours.  The CEO of this co-operative subsequently participated in a trip to the United 
States to observe the NGC model.  According to Interviewee 652 (2003), the CEO 
returned with a solid understanding the co-operative philosophy and what an NGC 
could achieve.  The interviewee reflected that the development of the CEO 
knowledge of the philosophical underpinning of co-operatives and the NGC model 
was a form of insurance against potential pressure from within the organisation to 
convert the co-operative into a corporation.  The CEO also confirmed the advantage 
of the study tours (Interviewee 654, 2003).  He wrote a report to the Board of his 
experiences of the NGC model in the United States and how elements could be 
incorporated into the Western Australian agricultural co-operative (Interviewee 654, 
2003).  According to Interviewee 654 (2003), developing the intellectual capital 
Board members and the CEO by participating in study tours resulted in the co-
operative gaining a direct and observable benefit that was able to be translated into 
an economic benefit for the broader industry. 
Discussions with participants who attended the lectures presented by 
Professor Michael Cook and the CEOs of NGCs indicated that these presenters were 
powerfully motivating, almost evangelical, speakers who transferred considerable 
enthusiasm about the NGC model to the audience (Interviewee 695, 2003).  Even 
after three or four years or so, participants quite readily recalled Professor Cook’s 
five problems with the traditional agricultural model and how the NGC model 
alleviated these difficulties (Interviewee 689, 2002). 
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Knowledge Transfer 
There is little doubt that the flurry of study tours and seminars concerning co-
operatives, particularly the NGC model, stimulated a high level of interest in the 
agricultural industry about the co-operative model.  However, over the years it 
appears to not have translated into any sustained interest or action by primary 
producers to duplicate the NGC model in Western Australia, possibly with the 
exception of one agricultural co-operative.   
To illustrate, the participants of one tour agreed that each participant would 
write up issues of interest to be collated into a report (Interviewee 689, 2002).  
Despite good intentions, one or two participants wrote the final report and distributed 
it to tour members.196  According to Interviewee 689 (2002), the report summarised 
the tour, the features of the NGC model, factors which contributed to its success in 
the United States and why it may or may not work in Western Australia.  
Additionally, each participant agreed to speak at three industry forums to share 
information about NGCs.  However, according to the interviewee, this also did not 
occur with most participants (Interviewee 689, 2002). 
This research notes that the proponents of the study tours, that is, the 
Department of Agriculture, did not build in a strategy for subsequent knowledge 
transfer at the completion of the tours.  The inability of most delegates to share their 
new co-operative knowledge with the broader industry is worthy of note.  From a co-
operative theory perspective, it can be understood as the result of lack of a bottom up 
stimulus driving the initiative of study tours to investigate the agricultural co-
operative model.  Theory suggests that co-operatives are best developed when 
proponents (co-operative champions) form them, as a direct response to a perceived 
need and for their own benefit (Craig, 1993). A Western Australian government 
agency took a leading role in initiating the study tours to observe the NGC model.  
No doubt, this was well intentioned, particularly in the absence of the industry itself 
evaluating co-operative strategies on response to the advancing influence of 
globalisation.  However, the limited action in the period following the study tours 
suggests that a ‘top down’ approach does not build long-term sustainability into a 
good intention.  Co-operative theory argues that it is more appropriate for 
                                                 
196 Unfortunately, the author was unable to locate a copy of this report. 
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government agencies to respond to the request of co-operative champions to assist in 
funding elements of feasibility studies, such as gathering information of overseas 
experiences.  Empirical evidence of the Challenge Dairy Co-operative supports this.  
The Challenge Dairy Co-operative, in its formative stage, sought and received 
government support to explore dairy industry best practice internationally.  This 
included the NGC model.  The Challenge Dairy Co-operative is the only co-
operative in Western Australia that has a direct link to the short period of co-
operative study tours in the late 1990s.   
Fate of Study Tours 
The study tours did not continue following the election of the new Western 
Australian Labor Government in February 2001.  According to Interviewee 682 
(2003), this was attributed to a number of factors.  Firstly, he stated that the trust 
fund which had funded the study tours had been depleted and even if the Coalition 
Government had retained office, the funding for the study tours would have ended. 
Secondly, the study tours, he considered, had a political ‘taint’ in that they were 
perceived by a range of actors in the new Labor Government to be a mechanism to 
recruit members to the National Party.  Further, there was a perception of favouritism 
about who participated on these trips.  Interviewee 682 (2003) commented that the 
former Coalition Minister for Agriculture, a member of the National Party, had 
acknowledged this ‘perception’ of favouritism in the rural media, when publicly 
defending the value of the study tours and who participated in them. According to 
Interviewee 682 (2003), this ‘taint’ was confirmed when the tours were cancelled as 
the only people who canvassed the incoming Minister for their reintroduction were 
also members of the National Party. 
Thirdly, Interviewee 682 (2003) argued that a Labor Party election 
commitment allocated $1 million for an initiative to stimulate rural leadership, which 
was considered to duplicate the purpose of the former study tours.  Lastly, the rural 
leadership funds were transferred from the Department of Agriculture to the 
Department of Local Government and Regional Development.  Collectively, these 
factors resulted in the end of Government activity in initiating study tours to North 
America about the NGC model. 
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Impact on Industry Understanding of the Agricultural Co-operative Model 
The study tours of NGCs and the ensuing seminars developed farmer and 
government officer knowledge of a particular type of agricultural co-operative - the 
NGC model.  Interview discussions with some actors indicated that their knowledge 
of the traditional agricultural co-operative model was imperfect.  Therefore, the new 
knowledge about NGCs was developed in a vacuum of any independent knowledge 
of the traditional agricultural co-operative model in the first place.  Even several 
years after the study tours and seminars, many participants were able to identify the 
shortcomings of traditional agricultural co-operatives, particularly by quoting the 
five problems that Cook raised.  Unintentionally the integrity of the traditional 
agricultural co-operative model was undermined by the study tours and seminars and 
many participants were left with a view that the traditional agricultural co-operative 
model was flawed.   
Conclusion 
The role of study tours in the Western Australian agricultural co-operative 
story offers a number of insights.  Study tours can be analysed from the perspective 
of institutional capital, in that they constitute a concrete example of a government 
agency committing resources to the development of agricultural co-operatives in this 
State.  However, as discussed at length in Chapter Six, this cannot be interpreted as 
an overt public policy stance by the Department of Agriculture on agricultural co-
operatives.  Rather it reflects a well intentioned but ad hoc initiative promoted by 
certain individuals within the Minister’s office or the Department of Agriculture.  
Additionally, the Department’s initiative in planning study tours demonstrates a ‘top 
down’ approach to co-operative development, contrary to co-operative theory. 
The comments from interviewees demonstrate that participation in the study 
tours or attending the seminars developed individuals’ knowledge of the NGC model 
and its potential contribution to the economic viability of farm enterprises.  
Theoretically, this new knowledge could be transferred to the Western Australian 
agricultural industry and adapted to suit local conditions.  However, specific NGC 
knowledge, in the absence of a strong understanding of the traditional agricultural 
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co-operative model, paradoxically diminished interviewee recognition of the intrinsic 
value of the traditional model to Western Australian agriculture.   
Lastly, the study tours facilitated the development of networks among local 
farmers, agribusiness consultants, bankers, accountants, government officers and 
ministerial staff and their respective counterparts in the US and Canada.  These 
networks represent potential opportunities to facilitate the establishment of 
agricultural co-operatives in Western Australia. 
In conclusion, conversations with individuals who participated in the tours 
demonstrate that the study tours relating to the NGC model had a concrete value for 
the industry.  A number of industry players and advisors were exposed to new 
situations and knowledge which could be potentially transferred back to the Western 
Australian agricultural industry.  However, future study tours need to evolve from a 
farmer need for new knowledge, rather than as a result of a government department 
initiative.  A strategy for exposing industry players to international agricultural co-
operative initiatives needs to be developed via the agricultural industry itself, with 
the support of the agricultural co-operative sector and government agencies.   
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APPENDIX 4 
Typology of Farmer and Agricultural Industry Actors towards the 
Agricultural Co-operative Model 
Interviews conducted for this thesis revealed a diversity of views concerning 
the role and relevance of the agricultural co-operative model in the contemporary 
agricultural industry.  The following table is an interpretation of interviewee attitudes 
about the agricultural co-operative model that classifies farmers into four identifiable 
segments.  The segments are the Free Marketeers, the Agrarians, the Pragmatists and 
the Maximisers.  The four segments represent a tension in world views within and 
between individual producers and the institutional actors linked to agriculture about 
the agricultural co-operative model.  On balance, producers are more inclined to 
favour the co-operative structure than their external agricultural ‘advisors’.   
This framework also applies to agricultural actors who support farmers in a 
professional capacity, such as agribusiness and farm management advisors, 
accountants, lawyers, financiers and academics.  Classifying these actors into to 
these segments on the basis of their perception of the agricultural co-operative 
structure may provide an insight to determining appropriate professional 
development about the economic and social impacts of the agricultural co-operative 
model in the present day agricultural industry. 
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Typology of Agricultural Industry Actors towards the Agricultural Co-operative Model 
 
Segment Position Strategies 
The Free 
Marketeers 
This group tends to discount the co-operative model as out dated and old 
fashioned, with no place in a market driven industry.  They view the collective 
approach of the co-operative structure as being at odds with individualism and as a 
protective structure to shield underperforming producers. They have rejected the 
model, as it is perceived as an instrument for ‘failed’ farmers who require support 
of the co-operative in order to stay in the industry. Co-operatives are viewed as a 
‘leg up’ for non-competitive farmers. 
 
The sentiments expressed by this group are strongest among agribusiness 
management advisors and accountants, solicitors and bankers and one peak body 
agricultural industry association.  Elements of this attitude are also evident among 
some farmers.  Farmers with this attitude are heavily influenced by economic 
theory in their approach to farm business management.  All actors in this group 
favour orthodox economics as the basis to the development of agricultural industry 
public policy.  
This group is likely to be philosophically 
disinclined to listen to messages about the co-
operative model.  Therefore, agricultural co-
operative messages will need to emphasise the 
economic benefits of the model and use 
economic language. 
 
Agricultural industry business management, 
legal and financial advisors need professional 
development on the merits of the agricultural 
co-operative model in the agricultural supply 
chain. 
The Agrarians This group comprises those who embrace the sentiments of agrarian socialism and 
therefore philosophically reject the tenets of neoliberalism.  This group argues that 
the biophysical nature of agricultural production together with the contribution of 
the industry to urban Australia demands a dedicated agricultural industry public 
policy approach.  The agricultural co-operative business structure is perceived by 
this group as consistent with their world view, as it embraces notions of collective 
behaviour to economic disadvantage. This group also favours the retention of 
SMAs.  Consistent with this view is a sympathy and empathy with the non-
economic and social values found within the co-operative structure.   
 
The interviewees who expressed this view tend to be older farmers.  It was not a 
perspective expressed by non-farmers regardless of their connection to the 
agricultural industry or the co-operative structure 
This group is likely to respond to messages 
about the ability of the co-operative model to 
help individual farmers, via collective 
behaviour, to counter exploitative behaviour of 
multinational companies.  A key secondary 
message is the social benefits of the co-
operative model to sustain rural communities. 
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The Pragmatists This group comprises those who have embraced the rigours of a deregulated and 
internationally trade driven industry yet pragmatically recognise the benefits of a 
mutual self-help collective approach to exploit opportunities in a market driven 
economy.  However, the pragmatic approach of this group does not extend to deep 
commitment to the underlying philosophy captured by the co-operative principles.  
The mechanics but not necessarily the philosophy of the co-operative structure 
tends to define this view.   
 
The sentiments expressed by this group are not necessarily new.  It is likely that 
the agricultural co-operative model in Western Australia was always adopted by 
farmers as a pragmatic response to an economic problem without the 
embellishment of the co-operative philosophy.  Therefore, the guidance to 
business strategy found in the co-operative values may be overlooked.  Once the 
model no longer serves its purpose, members readily shift to another strategy to 
meet that need.  There is no sentimental attachment to the model itself. 
This group is likely to respond to messages 
about the economic benefits, at the farm input 
and the transport and marketing of 
commodities, of the co-operative business 
model.  The co-operative values may not be 
meaningful to this group.   
 
The Board and management of agricultural co-
operatives will benefit from professional 
development on the ability of the co-operative 
values to guide business strategy and build a 
competitive edge. 
The Maximisers This group is a subset of the Pragmatists group who incorporate the co-operative 
values into the collective structure to create an economically powerful business 
entity in a market economy.  This group is also able to use the co-operative 
principles to carve a competitive advantage in the market place. 
 
The inaugural chair of UFCC, Mr Rod Madden, encapsulates this approach. 
This group represent those who can maximise 
the benefits of the co-operative model to their 
situation.  The co-operative principles are 
intrinsically valuable to this group as a basis to 
guide business strategy. This group provides 
role models to those investigating the co-
operative model for their situation.   
 
To build awareness of these co-operatives, case 
studies are required as a promotional tool. 
APPENDIX 5 
New Generation Co-operatives 
The hybrid co-operative model, the New Generation Co-operative (NGC), 
evolved during the 1990s in the Mid West of the United States.  The traditional 
agricultural co-operative business model was modified to incorporate elements of the 
investor-owned firm (IOF) structure into the co-operative structure.  NGCs also 
sought to address problems attributed to the traditional co-operative model, such as 
‘free rider’; ‘horizon’; ‘portfolio’; ‘control’ and ‘influence costs’ Cook (1995).197  
In contrast to most traditional agricultural co-operatives, an NGC increases 
vertical integration by focusing its activities further along the supply chain. By 
adding value to their own product, the NGC enables farmers to gain larger earnings 
through selling processed products instead of an undifferentiated raw commodity.  
As a result, farmers can collectively achieve a level of market control that they could 
not harness as individuals (Stefanson et al., 1995).  
The NGC model has a number of unique characteristics, although the model 
can be varied to suit the specific situation to which it is applied.  Stefanson et al., 
(1995) identified two key features that distinguish the model from traditional co-
operatives – delivery rights and restricted membership.  To allocate the delivery 
rights and raise capital, shares are sold in the co-operative.  Generally, the NGC 
share structure has three tiers of shares: membership, equity and preferred shares 
(Stefanson and Fulton, 1997).  The NGC producers can only hold membership 
shares, and this category of share gives the producer the right to vote.  Members also 
purchase equity shares.  Equity shares are the mechanism for raising the significant 
capitalisation needed to construct the production or processing plants.  The number 
of equity shares available in each NGC is calculated by dividing the cost to establish 
the plant with the amount of product required to enable it to operate at optimum 
capacity.  When members have purchased all the equity shares, the membership is 
                                                 
197 See Chapter Two for discussion of the five factors itemised by Cook (1995). 
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closed.  Equity shares are also allocated delivery rights (a form of two-way contract) 
to the NGC: the producer commits to deliver product to the NGC as determined by 
the delivery right and the NGC is committed to taking delivery of the product.  The 
delivery contract usually contains precise quality standards.  Where a member is 
unable to deliver according to the delivery contract, the NGC may alternatively 
source the product and charge the cost to the member, thereby ensuring consistency 
in quality and quantity of product (Stefanson and Fulton, 1997).  A unique feature of 
the equity shares is that they are tradeable and can appreciate (or depreciate) in value, 
resulting in strong member involvement and control and the opportunity for capital 
gain in shares.  NGCs distribute profits to members in proportion to their patronage. 
Typically, the profit generated from added-value activity is returned annually to 
members as cash.  
The third category of shares is preferred shares, although not all NGCs have 
this feature.  These shares enable investment in the NGC from non-producers, such 
as local community members, thereby creating a vehicle for the community to 
support and benefit from the NGC.  Preferred shares do not include voting rights, 
ensuring that producer-members retain control of the NGCs.  To comply with the 
Capper-Volstead Act, dividends on preferred shares are capped at 8% (Volkin, 
1995).  
NGCs have also contributed other benefits at the local community level.  
Examples are economic diversification within the community by shifting into new 
value added products (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000; Ergstrom, 1994), facilitating rural 
development by providing income and employment opportunities and stabilizing of 
the rural communities that foster them (Holmes et al., 2001; Stefanson et al., 1995).  
However, to enable the NGC to effectively provide these multiplier benefits at the 
community level, the economic success of the NGC must be its primary focus. 
More than 200 NGCs were established during the 1990s in various parts of 
the United States of America and Canada (Fulton, 2001) although there is now some 
evidence of NGCs not succeeding in the longer term (Torgerson, 2001).  While the 
success of the NGC model has created much excitement, leading to the term ‘Co-op 
Fever’ (Patrie, 1998), it is essential that a balanced assessment of the potential 
viability of the NGC model in Australia is made.  The considerable body of literature 
about NGCs tends to be from an economic perspective; focusing on the model’s 
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ability to overcome the economic shortcomings of traditional co-operatives (Cook, 
1995), their organisational structure (Stefanson et al., 1995), their historical 
development and capacity to replicate the model in other locations (Bielik, 1999) and 
to a lesser extent, their contribution to rural economic development (Fulton and 
Hammond Ketilson, 1992; Holmes, Walzer, & Merrett, 2001; United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2002).   
The predominantly economic approach to the analysis of NGCs is no doubt 
an evolution of the literature on the more traditional forms of agricultural co-
operatives.  Australian work on NGCs is limited, and again the work has a 
predominantly economic orientation (O’Connor and Thompson, 2001; Plunkett and 
Kingwell, 2001).  
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